Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
UTTAM DAS CHELA SUNDER DAS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHIROMANI GURDWARA PARBANDHAKCOMMITTEE, AMRITSAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/05/1996
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)
CITATION:
1996 SCC (5) 71 JT 1996 (5) 285
1996 SCALE (4)608
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Punchhi J.
Rival applicant for substitution, Gurdev Dass, claiming
to be Chela of Uttam Dass deceased appellant, is also
permitted to be brought on record, supportive of the appeal,
without deciding the rival claims of Gurdev Dass vis-a-vis
Kesar Dass, who is already brought on record claiming
himself to be Chela of Uttam Dass, deceased appellant, vide
order dated 25.1.1993.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, dated January 11, 1984
passed in First Appeal from Order hearing No.189 of 1973.
An institution, as held to be charitable, is located
within the revenue estate of village Kanganpur, Tahsil
Malerkotla, District Sangrur, Punjab, which was within the
erstwhile Malerkotla State, ruled by muslim Nawabs. The
State got merged in the State of Patiala and East Punjab
States Union (PEPSU) on the latter’s formation as a part B
State under the Constitution. Later the State of PEPSU was
merged with effect from 1.11.1956 in the State of Punjab
whereat beforehand the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 thereinafter
referred to as the Act, stood enforced. Later, by Punjab Act
No. 1 of 1959, the said Act was extended to the territories,
which immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were
comprised in the State of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab
States Union. The institution in question stands located in
the extended territories. Dispute arose whether the said
institution is a Sikh Gurdwara or not.
The scheme of the Act is to give to the Sikhs their
religious shrines or places of worship in accordance with
the procedure devised in the Act. Those have been divided
into two categories. Regarding those about which no
substantial doubt existed they found their way out-right in
Schedule I and their management vesting to be carried out as
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provided in Part III. Regarding the second category of the
doubtful ones, their nature as to whether they were Sikh
Gurdwaras or not, was determinable substantively in
accordance with the tests provided in Section 16, but by
adoption of procedure under Sections 7 to 11 of the Act.
Under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, any
fifty or more Sikh worshippers of a Gurdwara, each of whom
is more than twenty-one years of age and was on the
commencement of this Act, or in the case of the extended
territories from the commencement of the Amending Act, a
resident in the police station area in which the Gurdwara is
situated, may forward to the State Government, through the
appropriate Secretary to Govt., a petition praying to have
the Gurdwara declared a Sikh Gurdwara within a period of 180
days from the commencement of the Amending Act. Under sub-
section (3) of Section 7 of the Act, on receiving a petition
duly signed and forwarded under the Provisions of sub-
section (1), the State Government shall, as soon as may be
publish it along with the accompanying list, by
notification, and shall cause it and the list to be
published, in such manner as may be prescribed, at the
headquarters of the district and of the tehsil and in the
revenue estate in which the Gurdwara is situated, and at the
headquarters of every district and of every tehsil and in
every revenue estate in which any of the immovable
properties mentioned in the list is situated and shall also
give such other notice thereof as may be prescribed.
Under sub-section (4) of this section, the State
Government shall also, as soon as may be, send by registered
post a notice of the claim to any right, title or interest
included in the list to each of the persons named therein as
being in possession of such right, title or interest either
on his own behalf or on behalf of an insane person or minor
or on behalf of the Gurdwara.
Sections 8 and 9 of the Act are reproduced hereafter:
S. 8. When a notification has been published under the
provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 7 in respect
of any Gurdwara, any hereditary office-holder or any
twenty or more worshippers of the Gurdwara each of whom
is more than twenty-one years of age and was on the
commencement of this Act or, in The case of the
extended territories, on the commencement of the
Amending Act, as the case may be, a resident of a
police station area in which the Gurdwara is situated,
may forward to the State Government through the
appropriate Secretary to Government, so as to reach the
Secretary within ninety days from the date of the
publication of the notification, a petition signed and
verified by the petitioner, or petitioners, as the case
may be claiming that the Gurdwara is not a Sikh
Gurdwara, and may in such petition make a further claim
that any hereditary office-holder or any person who
would have succeeded to such office-holder under the
system of management prevailing before the first day of
January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended
territories, before the first day of November, 1956,
as the case may be, may be restored to office on the
grounds that such Gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara and
that such office-holder ceased to be an office-holder
after that day.
Provided that the State Government may in respect
of any such Gurdwara declare by notification that a
petition of twenty or more worshippers of such Gurdwara
shall be deemed to be duly forwarded whether the
petitioners were or were not on the commencement of
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this Act or, in the case of the extended territories,
on the commencement of the Amending Act, as the case
may be, residents in the police station area in which
such Gurdwara is situated, and shall thereafter deal
with any petition that may be otherwise duly forwarded
in respect of any such Gurdwara as if the petition had
been duly forwarded by petitioners who were such
residents.
S. 9(1) If no petition has been presented in accordance
with the provisions of Section 8 in respect of a
Gurdwara to which a notification published under the
provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 7 relates, the
State Government shall, after the expiration of ninety
days from the date of such notification, publish a
notification declaring the Gurdwara to be a Sikh
Gurdwara. (2) The publication of a notification under
the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be conclusive
proof that the Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara, and the
provisions of Part III shall apply to the Gurdwara with
effect from the date of the publication of the
notification.
Section 10 deals with the petitions, of claims to
property included in a list published under sub-section (3)
of Section 7.
Section 11 deals with the claim for compensation by a
hereditary office-holder of a Gurdwara notified under
Section 7 or his presumptive successor.
Chapter III of the Act deals with the appointment and
proceedings before a Tribunal, which Tribunal is constituted
under Section 12. The Tribunal, known as the Sikh Gurdwara
Tribunal 7 is to dispose of all petitions made under
Sections 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Act. The other relevant
section of the Act for our purposes is Section 16, which is
as follows :
ISSUE AS TO WHETHER A GURDWARA IS A SIKH GURDWARA TO BE
DECIDED FIRST AND HOW ISSUE IS TO BE DECIDED --
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
in force if in any proceeding before a tribunal it is
disputed that a gurdwara should or should not be declared to
be a Sikh Gurdwara, the tribunal shall, before enquiring
into any other matter in dispute relating to the said
gurdwara, decide whether it should or should not be declared
a Sikh Gurudwara in accordance with the Provisions of sub-
section
(2) If the tribunal finds that the gurdwara
(i) was established by, or in memory of any
of the Ten Sikh Gurus, or in commemoration of any
incident in the life of any of the Ten Sikh Gurus
and was used for public worship by Sikh, before
and at the time of the presentation of the
petition under sub-section (1) of Section 7 ; or
(ii) owing to some tradition connected with
one of the Ten Sikh Gurus, was used for public
worship predominantly by Sikhs, before and at the
time of the presentation of the petition under
sub-section (1) of section 7]; or
(iii) was established for use by Sikhs for
the purpose of public worship and was used for
such worship by Sikhs, before and at the time of
the presentation of the petition under sub-section
(1) of section 7 ; or
(iv) was established in memory of a Sikh
martyr, saint or historical person and was used
for public worship by Sikhs, before and at the
time of the presentation of the petition under
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sub-section (1) of section 7; or
(v) owing to some incident connected with the
Sikh religion was used for public worship
predominantly by Sikhs, before and at the time of
the presentation of the petition under sub-section
(1) of section 7,
the tribunal shall decide that it should be declared to be a
Sikh Gurdwara, and record an order accordingly.
(3) Where the tribunal finds that a gurdwara should not
be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara it shall record its
finding in an order, send subject before the first day of
November, 1956, the tribunal shall, notwithstanding such
finding continue to have jurisdiction in all matters
relating to such claim; and if the tribunal finds it proved
that such office-holder ceased to be an office-holder on or
after the first day of January, 1920 ors in the case of the
extended territories, after the first day of November, 1956,
it may by order direct that such office-holder or person who
would have so succeeded be restored to office.
Having noticed the legal provisions on the subject, let
us proceed further on the factual aspect. It transpires that
fifty four worshippers of the institution in question moved
a petition under Section 7 (1) of the Act to the State
Government of Punjab praying that the institution described
as "Gurdwara Sahib Dera Kanganpur" be declared as a Sikh
Gurdwara. A list of property claimed to be belonging to the
institution, as part thereof, was publicized as required
under Section 7 (3) of the Act. Notice of this petition was
given to Mahant Uttam Das (now dead). His interest as well
as the interest of the institution is now being represented
by two rival claimant parties herein, as substituted.
Mahant Uttam Das filed a petition under Section 8 to
the State Government, which was forwarded to the Sikh
Gurdwaras Tribunal for decision. Uttam Das stated in his
petition that the institution in question was not a Sikh
Gurdwara, but a Dera of Udasis. He claimed that the Dera was
originally founded by Baba Bakhat Mal, who was succeeded by
his Chela Mahant Tehal Dass, Mahant Tehal Dass was succeeded
by his Chela Mahant Seva Dass, who in turn was succeeded by
his Chela Mahant Gurmukh Dass, who in turn was succeeded by
his Chela Mahant Mathura Dass, who in turn was succeeded by
his Chela Mahant Kahan Dass, who in turn was succeeded by
his chela Mahant Sunder Dass and to whom had the petitioner
succeeded being Chela of Sunder Dass. Mahant Uttam Das in
this manner claimed that he was the hereditary office holder
of the Dera and was competent to file the petition. His
further claim in the petition was that the institution was
never used for the Sikh mode of worship and hence not a
Gurdwara. Besides, it was claimed that the Dera was of the
Udasis sect where the idol of Baba Sri Chand was the
principal object of worship. In addition thereto, he claimed
that there were Smadhs (sign-spots) of the previous mahants
and where the Geeta and Ramayan were recited.
Now, who are Udasis? It has been judicially settled and
understood at all times that the Udasis are a sect distinct
from the Sikhs. They have a monastic order of origin. They
are the followers of Baba Sir Chand. Unlike the Sikhs, they
sometime worship idols and Smadhs of their monastic
ancestors. They worship other objects too, such as the ball
of ashes etc. They are considered to be Hindus and at times
called Sikhs in the wider sense of the term. They bear
reverence to the Guru Granth Sahib and read it without
renouncing Hinduism. An institution of this kind where a
Udasi recites Guru Granth Sahib in the presence of a Sikh
congregation by itself is not enough to declare the
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institution to be a Sikh Gurdwara, unless it stands proved
that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for
the purpose of public worship and was used for such worship
by Since as per requirement of Section 16 (2) (III) of the
Act.
Notice was issued to the Sikh Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee, the respondent herein by the Tribunal. The
Committee in its written statement challenged the status of
Mahant Uttam Das as the hereditary office holder, The locus
standi of Uttam Das to file the petition was also challenged
on the ground that no mode of succession to the office of
the hereditary office holder was disclosed in the petition,
It was countered that the Rule of Succession was not from
Guru to Chela and that the institution was a Sikh Gurdwara.
The Tribunal framed the following two issues :
1. Whether the petitioner is a hereditary office
holder?
2. Whether the institution notified as Gurdwara Sahib
Dera Kanganpur is a Sikh Gurdwara?
The priority of deciding which issue first is given in
the marginal note to Section 16 itself quoted and emphasized
above, making it clear that the issue as to whether the
Institution is a Sikh Gurdwara is to be decided first. The
tribunal rather treated issue No.1 as preliminary,
presumably on the basis that judicial dicta of that court
required such issue as to the locus standi of the hereditary
office holder approaching under Section 8, to be determined
first.
In Hari Kishan Chela Daya Singh v. The Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar a Ors. [AIR 1976 P&H
130], the High Court of Punjab & Haryana has ruled that the
Tribunal is not to decide whether the Institution in
question is a Sikh Gurdwara or not, before adjudicating upon
the locus standi of the person who claims himself to be the
"hereditary office-holder". For coming to that view, certain
decisions of the Lahore High Court have been taken taken
into consideration. In particular, backing has been taken
from the decision of the Lahore High Court in Sunder Singh
v. Narain Das [AIR 1934 Lah. 920], suggesting that when the
locus standi of a petition under Section 8 is challenged,
that question would have to be decided before the trial
could proceed, which position is not affected by Section
16(1) of the Act, as the said provision could only apply to
a petition properly brought before the Tribunal. The same
was accepted to be the legal position in Mahant Budh Das
etc. v. The S.G.P.C. [AIR 1978 P&H 130], as well as in
Balbir Dass v. The S.G.P.C. [AIR 1980 43 (FB)]. The view of
the High Court seems to have crystalized that the locus
standi of the applicant under Section 8 of the Act is a
preliminary issue and if the applicant fails on that score,
the question whether the Institution claimed to be a Sikh
Gurdwara or not, need not be decided by the Tribunal. In
that event, the legal consequence, as envisaged in Section
9, must follow, mandating the State Government to declare
the Institution in question as a Sikh Gurdwara, without its
actually being one, on the assumption that the petition
preferred under Section 8 when failing on the basis of the
locus standi, would tantamount to filing no petition at all.
We have strong reservations to such unpurposive view of
the High Court for more than one reason. The marginal
note/caption to Section 16 is the foremost pointer that the
issue whether the Institution in question is a Sikh Gurdwara
or not, has to be decided first and other questions later.
The marginal notes or captions are, undoubtedly, part and
parcel of legislative exercise and the language employed
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therein provides the key to the legislative intent. The
words so employed are not mere surplusage. Secondly, for the
purposes of Section 8, the averments made therein by the
hereditary office-holder need be taken as sufficient on
their face value, bestowing jurisdiction on the Tribunal
relating to the Institution in question. The fact that a
petition under Section 8 was received, per se ousts
applicability of Section 9 because that can operate only
when no claim under Section 8 is preferred at all. Thirdly,
when the issue of locus standi, at the very threshold, is a
triable issue, that per se obligates the tribunal to priorly
decide the question of the Institution being a Sikh Gurdwara
or not as the first issue, for occasion may arise for not
deciding the issue of locus standi at all in the given
eventuality. Since the tribunal has proceeded to decide
issue No.1 as a preliminary one, we would not like to
stretch this matter any further except to express our doubt,
to be resolved later in an appropriate case, because of the
consequences which have been made to follow. In none of the
cases in which priority of locus standi has been established
or followed has the High Court taken into account the
marginal note/caption of Section 16 and its importance.
It is noteworthy that when the tribunal finds that the
Institution/Gurdwara can not be declared as a Sikh Gurdwara,
it ceases to have jurisdiction in all matters concerning
such Gurdwara. Only a limited jurisdiction is kept conferred
on the tribunal under sub-section (3) to be deciding
restoration to office of a hereditary office holder or of a
person, Who would have succeeded such office holder, under
the system of management prevailing, before a certain date.
The tribunal shall in that event notwithstanding such
finding of the institution being not a Sikh Gurdwara,
continue to have jurisdiction in all matters relating to
such claim on grounds tenable under Section 8.
Instantly wide Orders dated February 8, 1973, The
tribunal had all the same held that Uttam Das was a
hereditary office holder of the institution in question. No
appeal was filed by the respondent Committee against the
aforementioned orders of the tribunal. In a sense the order
dated February 8, 1973 was a final order deciding the
contentions of the parties as to whether Uttam Das was a
hereditary office holder or not. leading to consequences. An
appeal against the final order of the tribunal undoubtedly
lay under Section 34 of the Act before a Division Bench of
the High Court. As said earlier, no such step was taken. The
second battle began.
On the basis of the evidence led by the parties, the
tribunal then got engaged to decide issue no.2. Vide Order
dated May 5, 1972 it concluded against the Committee-
respondent by holding as follows :
"The fact that emerges from
all this evidence is, that the Dera
is meant for the looking after and
maintenance of blind persons who
are entrusted to its charges and
for running the Langar to provide
food for them and also to the
Faqirs and other needy persons.
There is an admission of Kahan
Dass, one of the petitioner’s
ancestor that he recited and
displayed Guru Granth Sahib. The
question that arises is, whether
these facts are enough to prove
that this institution was
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established for use by Sikhs for
the purpose of public worship,
which is an essential ingredient of
Section 16(2)(iii) of the Act,
under which the respondent-
committee claims it to be a Sikh
Gurudwara. Though, we are clear in
our mind that Guru Granth Sahib had
been the only object of worship in
this institution during the time of
Mahant Kahan Dass and no other mode
of worship was carried on in it at
any time, we are constrained to
hold that this fact by itself does
not suffice to prove that it is a
Sikh Gurdwara. It is, however,
established beyond doubt that the
petitioner’s claim that it is an
Udasi institution has no basis. All
that we can say is that it is a
charitable institution meant for
the upkeep and maintenance of the
blind and for running the Langar to
provide food to the travellers and
other needy persons who visit this
Dera.
As a result of the above
discussion, we allow the petition
and find that the institution in
dispute mentioned in Notification
No.1415-GP., dated 25th September,
1964, is not a Sikh Gurdwara.
The First Appeal filed by the respondent-Committee
before the High Court, was specifically against order dated
5.5.1973 of the tribunal, as is evident from the opening
sheet of the appeal. A lone ground no.13 was inserted in the
body thereof posing that the tribunal had gone wrong in
holding that the incumbent of the institution i.e. Mahant
Uttam Das was a hereditary office holder. Other grounds
pertained to the question whether or not the institution
answered the description given in Section 16(2)(iii) of the
Sikh Gurdwara Act.
The Division Bench of the High Court surprisingly gave
its total attention to the first issue decided under the
earlier order of the tribunal dated February 8, 1973. The
High Court held that since the petition of Mahant Uttam Das
under Section 8 did not contain any abstract averment about
any usage or custom Of succession or nomination, he had
failed to bring himself within the definition of the
expression ’hereditary office holder’, as defined in Section
2 (4)(iv) of the Act, as interpreted by various Full Benches
and Division Benches that Court and hence lacked locus
standi. On that basis the judgment of the tribunal on issue
no.1 was set aside. It ordered dismissal of Section 8
petition of Uttam Dass as incompetent, lacking in pleadings.
On the second issue, the High Court treated itself disabled
to proceed further in order to determine the nature of the
institution because of judicial authority on the subject
barring such exercise. It held that it would not interfere
with the observations of the tribunal regarding the nature
of institution. Thus reversing finding on issue no.1 alone,
it held that petition under Section 8 of the Act was
incompetent. The said order is the subject-matter of appeal
before us.
Clause (iv) of sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Act
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defines "hereditary office" :
"to mean an office to which
before the first day of January
1920, or in the case of the
extended territories, before the
first day of November, 1956, as the
case may be, devolved, according to
hereditary right or by nomination
by the office holder for the time
being, and hereditary office-holder
means the holder of a hereditary
office.’
Thus, the hereditary office holder, who is competent to
move a petition under Section 8 must plead and prove that he
acquired the said status by devolution according to
hereditary right or by nomination as per custom of the
institution. Here, the controversy between the parties is as
to the accuracy and sufficiency of pleadings in this regard,
on which learned counsel for the parties were at variance
loaded as they were with case law on that aspect as
developed in the High Court.
The High Court primarily based its decision on a Full
Bench decision of that Court in Hari Kishan Chela Daya Singh
Vs. The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar &
Ors. AIR 1976 Punjab & Haryana 130. The view taken therein
was that the person claiming himself to be a hereditary
office holder must allege and prove the complete and
consistent Rule of Descent covering all eventualities by
which he or his predecessor had and could have come to hold
the office on the prescribed date. Any omission therein of
whatever magnitude, big or small, was viewed as fatal to his
locus standi. Strictness was ordered to rule the roost.
The rule of strictness in pleadings was not adhered to
in a subsequent Full Bench decision in Mahant Budh Dass’s
case [supra] and gave way to the principle of ’substantial
compliance’. The view taken was that if the appellant had
made his claim in the petition in such a manner from which
inference could be clearly and substantially drawn that the
appellant had claimed to be a hereditary office-holder,
there would be substantial compliance With the provision of
Section 8. It was not necessary to use the expression in the
petition that he is a hereditary office holder. Noticeably,
the Hon. Judge who authored Hari Kishan’s case was a party
to Mahant Budh Dass’s case [supra].
In Balbir Dass Vs. The Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee, Amritsar - AIR 1980 Punjab & Haryana 43, another
Full Bench of the High Court took a moderate view on the
requirement of pleadings and the theory of strictness and
technicality of pleadings were termed to be medieval. The
Full Bench sacked up its views from the following
observations of this Court in Kedar Lal Syal Vs. Hari Lal
Syal - AIR 1952 SC Page 47 :
"The Court would be slow to
throw out a claim on a mere
technicality of pleading when the
substance of the thing is there and
no prejudice is caused to the other
side, however clumsily or
inartistically the plaint may be
worded."
On the same lines, another Full Bench of that court [to
which one of us i.e. M.M. Punchhi,J. was a party when in
that court], adopted the same moderate view in Mahant Dharam
Das Chela Karam Parkash v. S.G.P.C. [AIR 1987 P&H 64]. The
view expressed in Balbir Dass’s case [supra} was accorded
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agreement. The Bench viewed that the argument of the
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee based on Hari
Kishan’s case was not correct that in all cases, custom
regarding the succession, peculiar to a given Institution,
dealing with all eventualities pertaining to the mode of
succession, must be pleaded. The Bench observed that it
would be misreading of the judgment. The factum that the
same learned Judge who had authored Hari Kishan’s case was a
member of the Bench in Mahant Budh Dass’s case, where the
theory of ’strict compliance’ was adopted, was employed as a
part of reading down Hari Kishan’s case.
Reverting to the judgment under appeals it is
noticeable that the Bench fell into the trap of misreading
of Hari Kishan’s case by viewing that the custom or
practice, whatever prevailing in the Institution, had to be
pleaded and the petition must bear the specific custom of
the Institution by which the appellant and his predecessors
came to hold the office either by way of hereditary right or
by nomination. The Bench heavily leaned on Hari Kishan’s
case, bypassed Mahant Budh Dass’s case even though noticed,
by trailing to a number of Division Bench cases based on
Hari Kishan’s case. On that basis, it went on to record
satisfaction that the averments, as required by Hari
Kishan’s case, did not meet its standards. It observed as
follows :
Since the petition does not
contain any averment about any
usage or custom of inheritance or
nomination for succession the
petitioner has failed to bring
himself within the definition of
hereditary office-holder as defined
in Section 2(4)(iv) of the Act as
interpreted by various Full Benches
and Division Benches of this Court.
The nature of the Institution, it being of a charitable
nature, as determined by the Tribunal, was therefore left
uninterfered with. There was no cross-appeal at the instance
of the Present appellant before the High Court as to the
competency of the Tribunal to give such finding after
finding that the Institution was not a Sikh Gurdwara. The
appellant, prima facie, submitted to the finding as to the
nature of the Institution.
As is evident, the High Court fell into an error in
construing the pleadings under Section 8 on the strict
standards set out in Hari Kishan’s case. When the appellant
had placed the line of succession from Guru to Chela, he
automatically meant that he was basing his claim on custom
and usage, reflective from such long course of conduct and
traditions. The Tribunal in its order dated 19.10.1972 on
the basis of the pleadings in the petition under Section 8
and on the evidence recorded and tendered, inclusive of
revenue records of the State, had come to the firm
conclusion that the succession to the office of the
Mahantship in the Institution in question had been by
devolution from Guru to Chela according to hereditary right,
even though the Bhekh had assembled and given Turban to the
last Mahant Uttam Das but not as an appointing authority and
rather in the affirmance, according to the wishes of the
predecessor-in-office. The line of descent had been laid
with sufficient clarity giving rise to the conclusion that
substantially the custom and usage relating
to succession had been observed to carry on the rule of
descent by conduct. We, thus, are of the view that the High
Court fell into a grave- error in upsetting the well-
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considered and well-reasoned orders of the Tribunal.
We, thus, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned
order of the High Court dated 11.1.1984, restoring back the
orders of the Tribunal dated 19.10.1973 and the orders of
the Tribunal dated 5.5.1973 in affirmance, which has
otherwise been left uninterfered with even by the High
Court.
The appellant shall get his costs.