Full Judgment Text
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1467
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3682 of 2025)
SRINIBAS GORADIA ….Appellant(s)
Versus
ARVIND KUMAR SAHU & ORS. ….Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Leave granted.
1.1 Interlocutory Application No.266331 of 2025 is
allowed granting permission to produce the additional
documents.
2. Whether or not the appellant herein is a
‘workman’ within the meaning and concept of definition
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is the
Signature Not Verified
singular question that arises in this appeal, which would in
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2025.12.18
18:56:35 IST
Reason:
its answer, guide the outcome of the appeal.
Page 1 of 21
2.1 The aggrieved appellant has addressed
challenge to judgment and order dated 30.01.2024 passed
by the High Court of Orissa in Writ Petition (Civil) No.24351
of 2022, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment and
award dated 16.04.2022 of the Labour Court, Jeypore,
District Koraput, Orissa in Industrial Case No.02 of 2019. The
Labour Court had allowed the reference of the appellant
setting aside the termination order dated 22.04.2018 as
illegal, further directing the respondent-management to
reappoint the appellant with full back wages.
2.2 Upturning the view of the Labour Court, the
High Court held that the appellant did not fall within the
meaning of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
3. Before adverting to the moot question, basic
facts may be outlined. The appellant was appointed as
cashier in M/s Sai International Hotels Private Limited,
Rayagada, on 09.03.2025. The appellant stated that obeying
the master-servant relationship, he use to carry out the
directions of the respondent employer, that he received a
letter of appreciation from the management, and was also
receiving employee’s provident fund and State insurance
benefits as a workman. It was stated that after long service
of 12 to 13 years, his salary was suddenly stopped by the
employer.
Page 2 of 21
3.1 When inquired through right to information
process, the appellant received a letter dated 09.11.2018 in
which it was stated by the respondent-employer that his
services were already terminated from 22.04.2018 and was
offered one month’s notice pay. Since nothing yielded even
after request- letters and correspondences with the
management, the appellant invoked jurisdiction of the
Labour Court by filing Reference on 20.07.2019. The terms
of reference before the Labour Court was whether the
termination letter dated 09.11.2018 issued to the appellant
by the respondent was legal.
3.2 The first party-employer filed its written
statement before the Labour Court which is on record along
with production of additional documents. In the written
statement, the first party-employer sought to raise the
defence that the Reference was not maintainable inasmuch
as the dispute raised was not within the compass of
‘industrial dispute’ and that the appellant was not a
‘workman’ within the meaning of definition under the Act. It
was contended that the management took over hotel
business in the name of M/s Sai International Hotels Private
Limited from the previous management as the erstwhile
management was not in good financial condition.
3.2.1 As per the say of the first party-employer, the
appellant used to work as Front Office Executive and was
entrusted the work of Receptionist and supervising the room
Page 3 of 21
boys and since his duty was supervisory in nature, he was
not ‘workman’ to be entitled to seek the industrial reference.
3.2.2 In the rejoinder before the Labour Court, the
appellant asserted that he was not a supervisor nor had been
assigned any supervisory or administrative duties as such.
The appellant stated that he was under control of the
Managing Director of M/s Sai International Hotels Private
Limited and that the Managing Director used to instruct
about the work to General Manager and that the appellant
was working by carrying out the directions of his superior.
It was denied that along with the termination order, one
months’ salary, as claimed, was paid by the management.
3.3 The Labour Court concluded that the dispute
between the parties before it was in the nature of ‘industrial
dispute’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act, that the
hotel business run by the respondent-management was
‘industry’ and also that the appellant was covered within the
definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Act. The
Labour Court recorded the finding that the appellant
worked for more than 240 days in a year rendering in
continuous service. It was concluded that termination of the
appellant was in breach of provisions of Section 25(F) of the
Act, entitling the appellant-workman to be reinstated with
back wages.
Page 4 of 21
3.3.1 While holding the appellant to be a
‘workman’, the Labour Cour recorded that though it was the
case of the first party-employer that the second party was
not a ‘workman’ and had been doing supervisory work,
however the first party failed to established the same. It was
held that it is not the designation of the employee, but the
nature of duties that would determine whether the employee
concerned is a ‘workman’.
3.4 The judgment and award of the Labour Court
came to be challenged by the respondent-employer by
filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The High Court
was of the view that the contention raised by the
management-employer in its paragraph 10 of its written
statement was not properly examined by the Labour Court
that the employee was in a supervisory capacity. The High
Court relied on the decision of this Court in Syed Yakoob v.
1
K.S. Radhakrishnan , for observations in paragraphs 7 and
8 therein, and further on the observations in paragraph 7 of
the decision of this Court in National Engineering
2
Industries Ltd. v. Shri Krishan Bhageria to hold that since
the appellant could be said to be engaged in supervisory or
managerial work, he could not be treated as ‘workman’. The
High Court further relied on the contents of letter dated
21.05.2019 written by the management mentioning that the
1
AIR 1964 SC 477
2
AIR 1988 SC 329
Page 5 of 21
appellant was an employee of the old management and that
he was appointed as Manager or Front Office Supervisor.
4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant Mr.
Rajdipa Behura and learned counsels for the respondents
Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathi and Mr. Aditya Narayan Tripathi, at
length.
5. As the controversy is centripetal to the issue as
to whether the appellant is ‘workman’, the definition of
‘workman’ contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act may be looked at, at the outset. It is reproduced
hereunder,
‘2 [(s) “workman” means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward,
whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not
include any such person—
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act,
1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,
1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957
(62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service
or as an officer or other employee of a
prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly
in a managerial or administrative
capacity; or (iv) who, being employed
in a supervisory capacity, draws
Page 6 of 21
wages exceeding 3 [ten thousand
rupees] per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties
attached to the office or by reason of
the powers vested in him, functions
mainly of a managerial nature.]’
5.1 Analysing the above quoted definition of
“workman”, it states that a workman means any person
employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,
skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work
for higher reward. The terms of employment of such a person
may be express or implied. Workman includes any person
who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in
connection with or as a consequence of any dispute. Sub-
clause (iii), however, does not treat a person to be a workman
who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity. Sub-clause (iv) does not include any person who is
employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages
exceeding a particular monetary limit or that such person, by
virtue of his duties attached to his job or by reason of powers
vested in him, discharges functions which are mainly of a
managerial nature.
5.2 It would be useful to survey the decisions on
the aspect as to when an employee would fall within
aforesaid definition to become ‘workman’. In Lloyds Bank
3
Limited, New Delhi v. Panna Lal Gupta and Others this
Court observed that while dealing with the issue, the courts
3
AIR 1967 SC 428
Page 7 of 21
would generally consider the essence of the matter without
attaching undue importance to the designation of the
employee or the name assigned to the class to which the
employee belonged. The kind of primary duties performed
by the employee would be the right test to be applied, it was
held. If the employee is engaged in the clerical or manual
work, he would be a ‘workman’, whereas if he is a
supervisor, in that eventuality would not fall within the
concept of ‘workman’.
5.3 The decisions of this Court may firstly be
considered, which would throw light as to what constitutes
duties of supervisory nature as against the clerical or manual
work. In order that an employee acquires supervisory
capacity, he should be invested with right to supervise the
work of the subordinate employees to the logical end.
Supervisory function would denote independent right to
exercise control on any group of workers. This principle was
highlighted in A.R. Nataraja Ayyar and Trichy-Srirangam
4
Transport Co. Ltd wherein the employee who was
assigned the work of supervising the conductors and drivers
so as to verify whether they were discharging the duties
properly. The Checking Inspector was required to send his
daily check-record to the office. This Court held that in the
nature of work performed by the employee there was a
definite element of supervisory finality.
4
1955 I LLJ 608
Page 8 of 21
5.3.1 In United Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. L.S.
5
Seth this Court held that the cashier of the banking
company who was responsible for all the acts of commission
and omission of the employees of the cash department and
he who was controlling the work of the cash department
done by the other employees, was doing a purely
supervisory work, not to be treated as ‘workman’. It was
further observed that in order that a person is treated as
supervisor or officer, such person should occupy a position
of command with decision making power so as to exercise
his authority without the sanction of the management or
other supervisor. In All India Reserve Bank Employees’
Association and Others v. Reserve Bank of India and
6
Others this Court observed referring to the types of
employee involved in the case, ‘these employees distribute
work, detect faults, report for penalty, make arrangements
for filling vacancies, to mention only a few of the duties
which supervisory and not merely clerical’.
5.4 A Calcutta High Court decision in Mcloed &
7
Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Others
reserves a reference for its exposition to explain distinction
between supervisor and clerical duties in the context of
deciding whether an employee is workman within the
meaning of the statutory definition under the Act. It was
stated that in order to determine the category of service,
5
1954 II LLJ 457
6
AIR 1966 SC 305
7
1958 Calcutta 273
Page 9 of 21
different words like ‘supervisory, managerial,
administrative’, the common notions cannot be imported to
interpret those terms. These expressions, it was stated has
not rigid frontiers and too much subtlety should not be used
in trying to precisely defined where supervision ends,
management begins or administration commences.
5.4.1 It was emphasised that the approach should
be practical, and not theoretical. It was clearly stated that
the supervisor need not be a manager. A supervisor can be
considered to be a workman so long as he discharges
clerical work without any disciplinary power. The decision
of the Calcutta High Court was referred to with approval of
2
this Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd.
5.5 In National Engineering Industries Ltd.
(supra) , this Court referred to the Black’s Law Dictionary,
Special Deluxe, Fifth Edition (Page 1290) to explain the term
‘Supervisor’, thus,
‘In a broad sense, one having authority over
others, to superintend and direct.
The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
Page 10 of 21
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.’
5.6 Power of effective supervision, independent
exercise of authority, power to issue command, to have
subordinate staff, etc. are the basic traits which could make an
employee a supervisor or manager. At the same time,
incidental trappings of supervision while performing
essentially clerical or manual work, would not make an
employee a ‘supervisor’. The employee could still fell within
the compass of Section 2(s) of the Act to remain a ‘workman’.
5.6.1 In Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v.
8
Their Workmen the Court found that nature of duties
performed by the appellant before it showed that the
substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of
looking after the security of the factory and its property by
deputing the watchmen working under him to work at the
factory gate and that the appellant had also the powers to send
them to watch towers, to direct them to go to a accompany the
visitors of the factory. However, there was no power to appoint
which would which would bring the nature of duties outside
the purview of supervisory or commanding character. In The
Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd v. R.S. Bhatia (Dead) Through
9
Lrs. it was held that the accounted was supposed to sign the
8
AIR 1965 SC 917
9
AIR 1975 SC 1898: (1975) 4 SCC 696
Page 11 of 21
salary bills of the staff even while performing the duties of a
clerk, which by itself did not make him employee in a
managerial or administrative capacity.
5.6.2 The principal was reiterated in D.P.
10
Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Others , stating
that a supervisor was one who could bind the company to
take some kind of decision on behalf of the company. One
who was reporting merely as to the affairs of the company
and making assessment for the purpose of reporting was not
a supervisor. Again in D.P. Maheshwari vs. Delhi
11
Administration and Ors. . this Court applied the same
criteria mainly that an employee is designated as Accounts
Officer was workman since he was mainly discharging the
duties of clerical nature.
3
5.6.3 In Lloyds Bank Limited , it was further
observed that in order that a person is treated as supervisor
or officer, such person should occupy a position of
command with decision making power to exercise his
authority without the sanction of the management or other
3
supervisor. In Lloyds Bank Limited , the question was
whether employees were entitled to claim the supervisory
allowance on the footing that they were the supervisors and
not the ‘workmen’. Brining out a reverse situation than
obtained in the present case, the stand of the employer was
10
AIR 1984 SC 153
11
(1983) 4 SCC 293
Page 12 of 21
that the three workmen concerned were not supervisors,
therefore supervisory allowance would not be payable to
them.
5.6.4 While dealing with the issue, this Court delved
into kind and nature of the duties performed by those
employees to conclude that the duties assigned to them such
as checking the ledgers and entries in the subsidiary books,
overseeing the vouchers, checking cash balance, preparing
monthly reconciliation statements, etc. did not suggest the
supervisory character. Disapproving the view taken by the
Tribunal, this Court observed that the use of the word
“checking” cannot introduce an element of supervisory
nature which was purely mechanical without bearing
supervisor function.
5.6.5 The High Court in impugned order has relied
2
on National Engineering Industries Ltd. to take a view that
the appellant was not a ‘workman’. In that case after noticing
the evidence, this Court observed that the employee
concerned was working under the company as an ordinary
auditor on a monthly salary and his duties were mainly of
reporting and checking up on behalf of the management,
however, he had no independent right or authority to take
decision as the decision did not bind the company. He was
held to be a ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(S) of
the Act and not the supervisor.
Page 13 of 21
5.7 In the modern-day nature of management, in
every industrial organisation the employees of a particular
class may be required and also expected to do the work
which may have blend of supervision with clerical or manual
duties. An incidental performance of supervisory work and
vice versa may not become decisive to bring an employee
within the meaning of ‘workmen’ or to get him out of the
purview. Nature of duties to be performed by an employee,
more often than not would overlap therefore real criteria to
judge whether a ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section
2(S) of the Act is the test what is called ‘dominant nature test’.
It is the main nature of work assigned to the employee would
become decisive.
5.7.1 This Court in Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd.
12
vs. The Workmen addressed the issue whether a person
was clerk or was working in a supervisory capacity.
Applying the criteria that the principal work of clerical
nature, fall within Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act. Endorsing to the
decision of the labour court, this Court observed that few
minor duties of supervisory character cannot convert his
office of senior clerical in-charge that of supervisor.
5.7.2 It was observed,
“…..His principal work was in
maintaining and writing the cash book and
of preparing various returns. Being the
senior-most clerk he was put in charge of the
12
(1970) 3 SCC 248
Page 14 of 21
Provident Fund Section and was given a
small amount of control over the other clerks
working in the section. He was to allocate
work between them, to permit them leave
during the office hours and to recommend
their leave applications.” (Para 6)
13
5.7.3 This Court in Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd.
relied on its decision in Burma-Shell Oil Storage and
Distributing Company of India, Ltd., Madras and T heir
2
Employees pinpointed the relevance of the substantial
work consideration,
‘If a person is mainly doing supervisory
work and incidentally or for a fraction of the
time also does some clerical work, it would
have to be held that he is employed in a
supervisory capacity, and conversely; if the
main work done is of clerical nature, the mere
fact that some supervisory duties are also
carried out incidentally or as a small fraction
of the work done by him will not convert his
employment as a clerk into one in
supervisory capacity.’ (Para 3)
5.7.4 The substantial duty factor again guided this
Court in Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s Delton Cable India (P)
14
Ltd. The appellant was recruited initially as a clerk latter he
become a Chargeman Security in the factory of the respondent
holding him to be a workman, the Court noted thus,
‘The substantial duty of the appellant
was only that of a Security Inspector at the
gate of the factory premises. It was neither
managerial nor supervisory in nature in the
13
(1970) 3 SCC 248
14
(1984) 2 SCC 569
Page 15 of 21
sense in which those terms are understood
in industrial law. Therefore, the appellant
clearly falls within the definition of a
workman in Section 2(s) and the reference of
the dispute under Section 10(1)(c) was valid
in law.’ (Para 12)
5.7.5 The dominant nature test was propounded and
discussed in a slightly different context of considering the
definition of “industry”, under the Act, in Corporation of the
15
City of Nagpur vs. Employees , a body like corporation or
municipality discharges functions in different areas through
working of different departments. This Court observed that a
particular activity of municipality may be covered by the
definition of “industry’ with the financial and administrative
departments are solely in charge of that activity,
‘But there may be cases where the said
two departments may not only be in charge
of a particular activity or service covered by
the definition of "industry" but also in charge
of other activity or activities falling outside
the definition of "industry".In such cases a
working rule may be evolved to advance
social justice consistent with the principles
of equity. In such cases the solution to the
problem depends upon the answer to the
question whether such a department is
primarily and predominantly concerned
with industrial activity or incidentally
connected therewith.’
(Para 17)
(emphasis supplied)
15
AIR 1960 SC 675
Page 16 of 21
5.7.6 In all such cases, the decisive aspect considered
is whether an employee is a “workman” or not, is the
substantial, essential and principal nature of work for which
the employee is engaged. In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distribution Company of India Limited , this Court, after
referring to Ananda Bazar Patrika , referred to, with
approval, certain English decisions which also advocated and
emphasized the criteria of substantial nature of employment.
16
In Re Dairymen’s Foremen and Re Tailor’s Cutters , it was
observed that although the employees might perform manual
labour, the question was whether that was the real substantial
employment for which they were engaged or whether it was
incidental or accessory to it. It was observed, “the actual
labour of cutting out cloth might be manual labour, but the
position he really occupied was a manager of a business
department. His duties therefore substantially were not those
involving manual labour and he was not workman within the
Act”.
5.7.7 Similar test was laid down in Reid versus
17,
British and Irish Steam Packet Company Limited that
what is required to be judged is whether the manual work was
real substantial work for which the employee is engaged, and
vice-a-versa. If a substantial part of the employment cannot be
described as “manual” labour, the fact that manual work has
to be performed does not bring the employee within the
16
(1911-12) 28 Times Law Reports 587
17
(1921) 2 KBD 319
Page 17 of 21
definition of workman. The reverse is equally true. This was
highlighted in Jaques versus Owner of Steam Tug
18
Alexandra . The same test of substantial nature of
employment was applied in interpreting the word “employed
in manual labor” in the Factories Act, in J & F Stone Lighting
19
and Radio Ltd. versus Haygarth .
6. Therefore, the acid test is, what may be called
the dominant nature test to determine whether the
employee is a “workman” or not. It is the dominant nature of
work or the main employment to which the employee is
engaged, that would make or unmake the status as a
“workman” for such employee. This test is based on the
realistic consideration of the principal nature of work
performed by the employee. On the other hand, incidental
trapping of supervisory work does not make an employee
the supervisor. Even in manual duties, certain supervisory
work would be in-built, but it cannot be a ground to exclude
the employee from the definition of workman. What is to be
applied is the acid test of dominant nature. Supervisor may
have to perform clerical work attendant to his principal job.
6.1 Furthermore, the designation or nomenclature
is also not the guiding consideration. One has to look and
assess only the prominent and dominant nature of work in
which the employee is engaged by the employer. The
18
(1921) 2 AC 339
19
(1968) AC Pt. 3
Page 18 of 21
designations and nomenclatures are often designed by the
management to suit itself and to embellish the post with high-
sounding names such as manager or supervisor or executive,
as in the present case. When an employee so designated
substantially and essentially works manually without any
supervisory domain, he cannot be termed as supervisor, to
put him out of the purview of the definition in Section 2(s) of
the Act. Such an employee, notwithstanding the designation
given to him, would be a “workman” for the reason that the
substantial and essential nature of duties assigned to him and
performed by him, are manual and non-supervisory, who
possesses no command over other.
7. Applying the above principles and the tests
indicated, to the facts of the present case, the appellant was
appointed as a cashier. The employer nomenclatured the
appellant to be the manager in the Front Office. In the identity
card, he was shown to be an executive. However, when the
veil is pierced to seek the real nature of duties, the appellant
was not found to be discharging any supervisory or
authoritative work. The nomenclature or the designation
given to the appellant was an eyewash.
7.1 The evidence on behalf of the appellant clearly
showed that he was doing the work of receptionist and used
to handle the hotel boys. He denied that he was a manager or
had any supervisory powers. He stated that no employee was
under him and he was not able to exercise his own authority
Page 19 of 21
over the staff. He could establish his case that although the
respondent employer - the hotel management named his post
in a particular fashion in the identity card etc., his duties were
never supervisory or managerial, and not used to attend any
managerial meetings, nor had power to sanction leave for
anybody, nor he was supervising any person or thing in the
hotel by virtue of his singular authority.
8. Merely because the management named the
post of the appellant as manager in the front office, it would
not ipso facto take him out of the purview of workman, for, he
was not entrusted with any independent supervisory
authority or work, except incidental to manual work. The bald
assertion on behalf of the respondent employer that the
appellant was manager and that he possessed supervisory
powers, remained without support of any cogent material,
therefore, without any substantiation. In any view, applying
the dominant nature test, the principal duties entrusted to the
appellant and discharged by him invested him with the status
of a “workman”. It has to be held that the appellant fell within
the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
9. In light of the above, the High Court committed
a manifest error in taking the view that the appellant was not
a workman. The Labour Court rightly held that the appellant
was a “workman”, further recording a finding of fact that the
workman rendered had service completing 240 days in a
Page 20 of 21
year and that his termination was in breach of Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The judgment and award of
the Labour Court deserves to be upheld.
10. As a result, the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court dated 30.01.2024 in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.24351 is set aside. The judgment and award of the Labour
Court stands restored. It shall be complied with by the
respondent within two weeks from today.
11. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
In view of the disposal of the Appeal,
interlocutory applications, if any, will not survive and stand
disposed of.
…………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
…………………………………J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 17, 2025.
Page 21 of 21
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
2025 INSC 1467
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3682 of 2025)
SRINIBAS GORADIA ….Appellant(s)
Versus
ARVIND KUMAR SAHU & ORS. ….Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Leave granted.
1.1 Interlocutory Application No.266331 of 2025 is
allowed granting permission to produce the additional
documents.
2. Whether or not the appellant herein is a
‘workman’ within the meaning and concept of definition
under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is the
Signature Not Verified
singular question that arises in this appeal, which would in
Digitally signed by
babita pandey
Date: 2025.12.18
18:56:35 IST
Reason:
its answer, guide the outcome of the appeal.
Page 1 of 21
2.1 The aggrieved appellant has addressed
challenge to judgment and order dated 30.01.2024 passed
by the High Court of Orissa in Writ Petition (Civil) No.24351
of 2022, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment and
award dated 16.04.2022 of the Labour Court, Jeypore,
District Koraput, Orissa in Industrial Case No.02 of 2019. The
Labour Court had allowed the reference of the appellant
setting aside the termination order dated 22.04.2018 as
illegal, further directing the respondent-management to
reappoint the appellant with full back wages.
2.2 Upturning the view of the Labour Court, the
High Court held that the appellant did not fall within the
meaning of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
3. Before adverting to the moot question, basic
facts may be outlined. The appellant was appointed as
cashier in M/s Sai International Hotels Private Limited,
Rayagada, on 09.03.2025. The appellant stated that obeying
the master-servant relationship, he use to carry out the
directions of the respondent employer, that he received a
letter of appreciation from the management, and was also
receiving employee’s provident fund and State insurance
benefits as a workman. It was stated that after long service
of 12 to 13 years, his salary was suddenly stopped by the
employer.
Page 2 of 21
3.1 When inquired through right to information
process, the appellant received a letter dated 09.11.2018 in
which it was stated by the respondent-employer that his
services were already terminated from 22.04.2018 and was
offered one month’s notice pay. Since nothing yielded even
after request- letters and correspondences with the
management, the appellant invoked jurisdiction of the
Labour Court by filing Reference on 20.07.2019. The terms
of reference before the Labour Court was whether the
termination letter dated 09.11.2018 issued to the appellant
by the respondent was legal.
3.2 The first party-employer filed its written
statement before the Labour Court which is on record along
with production of additional documents. In the written
statement, the first party-employer sought to raise the
defence that the Reference was not maintainable inasmuch
as the dispute raised was not within the compass of
‘industrial dispute’ and that the appellant was not a
‘workman’ within the meaning of definition under the Act. It
was contended that the management took over hotel
business in the name of M/s Sai International Hotels Private
Limited from the previous management as the erstwhile
management was not in good financial condition.
3.2.1 As per the say of the first party-employer, the
appellant used to work as Front Office Executive and was
entrusted the work of Receptionist and supervising the room
Page 3 of 21
boys and since his duty was supervisory in nature, he was
not ‘workman’ to be entitled to seek the industrial reference.
3.2.2 In the rejoinder before the Labour Court, the
appellant asserted that he was not a supervisor nor had been
assigned any supervisory or administrative duties as such.
The appellant stated that he was under control of the
Managing Director of M/s Sai International Hotels Private
Limited and that the Managing Director used to instruct
about the work to General Manager and that the appellant
was working by carrying out the directions of his superior.
It was denied that along with the termination order, one
months’ salary, as claimed, was paid by the management.
3.3 The Labour Court concluded that the dispute
between the parties before it was in the nature of ‘industrial
dispute’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Act, that the
hotel business run by the respondent-management was
‘industry’ and also that the appellant was covered within the
definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Act. The
Labour Court recorded the finding that the appellant
worked for more than 240 days in a year rendering in
continuous service. It was concluded that termination of the
appellant was in breach of provisions of Section 25(F) of the
Act, entitling the appellant-workman to be reinstated with
back wages.
Page 4 of 21
3.3.1 While holding the appellant to be a
‘workman’, the Labour Cour recorded that though it was the
case of the first party-employer that the second party was
not a ‘workman’ and had been doing supervisory work,
however the first party failed to established the same. It was
held that it is not the designation of the employee, but the
nature of duties that would determine whether the employee
concerned is a ‘workman’.
3.4 The judgment and award of the Labour Court
came to be challenged by the respondent-employer by
filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The High Court
was of the view that the contention raised by the
management-employer in its paragraph 10 of its written
statement was not properly examined by the Labour Court
that the employee was in a supervisory capacity. The High
Court relied on the decision of this Court in Syed Yakoob v.
1
K.S. Radhakrishnan , for observations in paragraphs 7 and
8 therein, and further on the observations in paragraph 7 of
the decision of this Court in National Engineering
2
Industries Ltd. v. Shri Krishan Bhageria to hold that since
the appellant could be said to be engaged in supervisory or
managerial work, he could not be treated as ‘workman’. The
High Court further relied on the contents of letter dated
21.05.2019 written by the management mentioning that the
1
AIR 1964 SC 477
2
AIR 1988 SC 329
Page 5 of 21
appellant was an employee of the old management and that
he was appointed as Manager or Front Office Supervisor.
4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant Mr.
Rajdipa Behura and learned counsels for the respondents
Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathi and Mr. Aditya Narayan Tripathi, at
length.
5. As the controversy is centripetal to the issue as
to whether the appellant is ‘workman’, the definition of
‘workman’ contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act may be looked at, at the outset. It is reproduced
hereunder,
‘2 [(s) “workman” means any person (including an
apprentice) employed in any industry to do any
manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward,
whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding
under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute,
includes any such person who has been
dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that
dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or
retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not
include any such person—
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act,
1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act,
1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957
(62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service
or as an officer or other employee of a
prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly
in a managerial or administrative
capacity; or (iv) who, being employed
in a supervisory capacity, draws
Page 6 of 21
wages exceeding 3 [ten thousand
rupees] per mensem or exercises,
either by the nature of the duties
attached to the office or by reason of
the powers vested in him, functions
mainly of a managerial nature.]’
5.1 Analysing the above quoted definition of
“workman”, it states that a workman means any person
employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled,
skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work
for higher reward. The terms of employment of such a person
may be express or implied. Workman includes any person
who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in
connection with or as a consequence of any dispute. Sub-
clause (iii), however, does not treat a person to be a workman
who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative
capacity. Sub-clause (iv) does not include any person who is
employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages
exceeding a particular monetary limit or that such person, by
virtue of his duties attached to his job or by reason of powers
vested in him, discharges functions which are mainly of a
managerial nature.
5.2 It would be useful to survey the decisions on
the aspect as to when an employee would fall within
aforesaid definition to become ‘workman’. In Lloyds Bank
3
Limited, New Delhi v. Panna Lal Gupta and Others this
Court observed that while dealing with the issue, the courts
3
AIR 1967 SC 428
Page 7 of 21
would generally consider the essence of the matter without
attaching undue importance to the designation of the
employee or the name assigned to the class to which the
employee belonged. The kind of primary duties performed
by the employee would be the right test to be applied, it was
held. If the employee is engaged in the clerical or manual
work, he would be a ‘workman’, whereas if he is a
supervisor, in that eventuality would not fall within the
concept of ‘workman’.
5.3 The decisions of this Court may firstly be
considered, which would throw light as to what constitutes
duties of supervisory nature as against the clerical or manual
work. In order that an employee acquires supervisory
capacity, he should be invested with right to supervise the
work of the subordinate employees to the logical end.
Supervisory function would denote independent right to
exercise control on any group of workers. This principle was
highlighted in A.R. Nataraja Ayyar and Trichy-Srirangam
4
Transport Co. Ltd wherein the employee who was
assigned the work of supervising the conductors and drivers
so as to verify whether they were discharging the duties
properly. The Checking Inspector was required to send his
daily check-record to the office. This Court held that in the
nature of work performed by the employee there was a
definite element of supervisory finality.
4
1955 I LLJ 608
Page 8 of 21
5.3.1 In United Commercial Bank, Ltd. v. L.S.
5
Seth this Court held that the cashier of the banking
company who was responsible for all the acts of commission
and omission of the employees of the cash department and
he who was controlling the work of the cash department
done by the other employees, was doing a purely
supervisory work, not to be treated as ‘workman’. It was
further observed that in order that a person is treated as
supervisor or officer, such person should occupy a position
of command with decision making power so as to exercise
his authority without the sanction of the management or
other supervisor. In All India Reserve Bank Employees’
Association and Others v. Reserve Bank of India and
6
Others this Court observed referring to the types of
employee involved in the case, ‘these employees distribute
work, detect faults, report for penalty, make arrangements
for filling vacancies, to mention only a few of the duties
which supervisory and not merely clerical’.
5.4 A Calcutta High Court decision in Mcloed &
7
Co. v. Sixth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Others
reserves a reference for its exposition to explain distinction
between supervisor and clerical duties in the context of
deciding whether an employee is workman within the
meaning of the statutory definition under the Act. It was
stated that in order to determine the category of service,
5
1954 II LLJ 457
6
AIR 1966 SC 305
7
1958 Calcutta 273
Page 9 of 21
different words like ‘supervisory, managerial,
administrative’, the common notions cannot be imported to
interpret those terms. These expressions, it was stated has
not rigid frontiers and too much subtlety should not be used
in trying to precisely defined where supervision ends,
management begins or administration commences.
5.4.1 It was emphasised that the approach should
be practical, and not theoretical. It was clearly stated that
the supervisor need not be a manager. A supervisor can be
considered to be a workman so long as he discharges
clerical work without any disciplinary power. The decision
of the Calcutta High Court was referred to with approval of
2
this Court in National Engineering Industries Ltd.
5.5 In National Engineering Industries Ltd.
(supra) , this Court referred to the Black’s Law Dictionary,
Special Deluxe, Fifth Edition (Page 1290) to explain the term
‘Supervisor’, thus,
‘In a broad sense, one having authority over
others, to superintend and direct.
The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
Page 10 of 21
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.’
5.6 Power of effective supervision, independent
exercise of authority, power to issue command, to have
subordinate staff, etc. are the basic traits which could make an
employee a supervisor or manager. At the same time,
incidental trappings of supervision while performing
essentially clerical or manual work, would not make an
employee a ‘supervisor’. The employee could still fell within
the compass of Section 2(s) of the Act to remain a ‘workman’.
5.6.1 In Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. v.
8
Their Workmen the Court found that nature of duties
performed by the appellant before it showed that the
substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of
looking after the security of the factory and its property by
deputing the watchmen working under him to work at the
factory gate and that the appellant had also the powers to send
them to watch towers, to direct them to go to a accompany the
visitors of the factory. However, there was no power to appoint
which would which would bring the nature of duties outside
the purview of supervisory or commanding character. In The
Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd v. R.S. Bhatia (Dead) Through
9
Lrs. it was held that the accounted was supposed to sign the
8
AIR 1965 SC 917
9
AIR 1975 SC 1898: (1975) 4 SCC 696
Page 11 of 21
salary bills of the staff even while performing the duties of a
clerk, which by itself did not make him employee in a
managerial or administrative capacity.
5.6.2 The principal was reiterated in D.P.
10
Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Others , stating
that a supervisor was one who could bind the company to
take some kind of decision on behalf of the company. One
who was reporting merely as to the affairs of the company
and making assessment for the purpose of reporting was not
a supervisor. Again in D.P. Maheshwari vs. Delhi
11
Administration and Ors. . this Court applied the same
criteria mainly that an employee is designated as Accounts
Officer was workman since he was mainly discharging the
duties of clerical nature.
3
5.6.3 In Lloyds Bank Limited , it was further
observed that in order that a person is treated as supervisor
or officer, such person should occupy a position of
command with decision making power to exercise his
authority without the sanction of the management or other
3
supervisor. In Lloyds Bank Limited , the question was
whether employees were entitled to claim the supervisory
allowance on the footing that they were the supervisors and
not the ‘workmen’. Brining out a reverse situation than
obtained in the present case, the stand of the employer was
10
AIR 1984 SC 153
11
(1983) 4 SCC 293
Page 12 of 21
that the three workmen concerned were not supervisors,
therefore supervisory allowance would not be payable to
them.
5.6.4 While dealing with the issue, this Court delved
into kind and nature of the duties performed by those
employees to conclude that the duties assigned to them such
as checking the ledgers and entries in the subsidiary books,
overseeing the vouchers, checking cash balance, preparing
monthly reconciliation statements, etc. did not suggest the
supervisory character. Disapproving the view taken by the
Tribunal, this Court observed that the use of the word
“checking” cannot introduce an element of supervisory
nature which was purely mechanical without bearing
supervisor function.
5.6.5 The High Court in impugned order has relied
2
on National Engineering Industries Ltd. to take a view that
the appellant was not a ‘workman’. In that case after noticing
the evidence, this Court observed that the employee
concerned was working under the company as an ordinary
auditor on a monthly salary and his duties were mainly of
reporting and checking up on behalf of the management,
however, he had no independent right or authority to take
decision as the decision did not bind the company. He was
held to be a ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(S) of
the Act and not the supervisor.
Page 13 of 21
5.7 In the modern-day nature of management, in
every industrial organisation the employees of a particular
class may be required and also expected to do the work
which may have blend of supervision with clerical or manual
duties. An incidental performance of supervisory work and
vice versa may not become decisive to bring an employee
within the meaning of ‘workmen’ or to get him out of the
purview. Nature of duties to be performed by an employee,
more often than not would overlap therefore real criteria to
judge whether a ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section
2(S) of the Act is the test what is called ‘dominant nature test’.
It is the main nature of work assigned to the employee would
become decisive.
5.7.1 This Court in Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd.
12
vs. The Workmen addressed the issue whether a person
was clerk or was working in a supervisory capacity.
Applying the criteria that the principal work of clerical
nature, fall within Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act. Endorsing to the
decision of the labour court, this Court observed that few
minor duties of supervisory character cannot convert his
office of senior clerical in-charge that of supervisor.
5.7.2 It was observed,
“…..His principal work was in
maintaining and writing the cash book and
of preparing various returns. Being the
senior-most clerk he was put in charge of the
12
(1970) 3 SCC 248
Page 14 of 21
Provident Fund Section and was given a
small amount of control over the other clerks
working in the section. He was to allocate
work between them, to permit them leave
during the office hours and to recommend
their leave applications.” (Para 6)
13
5.7.3 This Court in Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd.
relied on its decision in Burma-Shell Oil Storage and
Distributing Company of India, Ltd., Madras and T heir
2
Employees pinpointed the relevance of the substantial
work consideration,
‘If a person is mainly doing supervisory
work and incidentally or for a fraction of the
time also does some clerical work, it would
have to be held that he is employed in a
supervisory capacity, and conversely; if the
main work done is of clerical nature, the mere
fact that some supervisory duties are also
carried out incidentally or as a small fraction
of the work done by him will not convert his
employment as a clerk into one in
supervisory capacity.’ (Para 3)
5.7.4 The substantial duty factor again guided this
Court in Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s Delton Cable India (P)
14
Ltd. The appellant was recruited initially as a clerk latter he
become a Chargeman Security in the factory of the respondent
holding him to be a workman, the Court noted thus,
‘The substantial duty of the appellant
was only that of a Security Inspector at the
gate of the factory premises. It was neither
managerial nor supervisory in nature in the
13
(1970) 3 SCC 248
14
(1984) 2 SCC 569
Page 15 of 21
sense in which those terms are understood
in industrial law. Therefore, the appellant
clearly falls within the definition of a
workman in Section 2(s) and the reference of
the dispute under Section 10(1)(c) was valid
in law.’ (Para 12)
5.7.5 The dominant nature test was propounded and
discussed in a slightly different context of considering the
definition of “industry”, under the Act, in Corporation of the
15
City of Nagpur vs. Employees , a body like corporation or
municipality discharges functions in different areas through
working of different departments. This Court observed that a
particular activity of municipality may be covered by the
definition of “industry’ with the financial and administrative
departments are solely in charge of that activity,
‘But there may be cases where the said
two departments may not only be in charge
of a particular activity or service covered by
the definition of "industry" but also in charge
of other activity or activities falling outside
the definition of "industry".In such cases a
working rule may be evolved to advance
social justice consistent with the principles
of equity. In such cases the solution to the
problem depends upon the answer to the
question whether such a department is
primarily and predominantly concerned
with industrial activity or incidentally
connected therewith.’
(Para 17)
(emphasis supplied)
15
AIR 1960 SC 675
Page 16 of 21
5.7.6 In all such cases, the decisive aspect considered
is whether an employee is a “workman” or not, is the
substantial, essential and principal nature of work for which
the employee is engaged. In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distribution Company of India Limited , this Court, after
referring to Ananda Bazar Patrika , referred to, with
approval, certain English decisions which also advocated and
emphasized the criteria of substantial nature of employment.
16
In Re Dairymen’s Foremen and Re Tailor’s Cutters , it was
observed that although the employees might perform manual
labour, the question was whether that was the real substantial
employment for which they were engaged or whether it was
incidental or accessory to it. It was observed, “the actual
labour of cutting out cloth might be manual labour, but the
position he really occupied was a manager of a business
department. His duties therefore substantially were not those
involving manual labour and he was not workman within the
Act”.
5.7.7 Similar test was laid down in Reid versus
17,
British and Irish Steam Packet Company Limited that
what is required to be judged is whether the manual work was
real substantial work for which the employee is engaged, and
vice-a-versa. If a substantial part of the employment cannot be
described as “manual” labour, the fact that manual work has
to be performed does not bring the employee within the
16
(1911-12) 28 Times Law Reports 587
17
(1921) 2 KBD 319
Page 17 of 21
definition of workman. The reverse is equally true. This was
highlighted in Jaques versus Owner of Steam Tug
18
Alexandra . The same test of substantial nature of
employment was applied in interpreting the word “employed
in manual labor” in the Factories Act, in J & F Stone Lighting
19
and Radio Ltd. versus Haygarth .
6. Therefore, the acid test is, what may be called
the dominant nature test to determine whether the
employee is a “workman” or not. It is the dominant nature of
work or the main employment to which the employee is
engaged, that would make or unmake the status as a
“workman” for such employee. This test is based on the
realistic consideration of the principal nature of work
performed by the employee. On the other hand, incidental
trapping of supervisory work does not make an employee
the supervisor. Even in manual duties, certain supervisory
work would be in-built, but it cannot be a ground to exclude
the employee from the definition of workman. What is to be
applied is the acid test of dominant nature. Supervisor may
have to perform clerical work attendant to his principal job.
6.1 Furthermore, the designation or nomenclature
is also not the guiding consideration. One has to look and
assess only the prominent and dominant nature of work in
which the employee is engaged by the employer. The
18
(1921) 2 AC 339
19
(1968) AC Pt. 3
Page 18 of 21
designations and nomenclatures are often designed by the
management to suit itself and to embellish the post with high-
sounding names such as manager or supervisor or executive,
as in the present case. When an employee so designated
substantially and essentially works manually without any
supervisory domain, he cannot be termed as supervisor, to
put him out of the purview of the definition in Section 2(s) of
the Act. Such an employee, notwithstanding the designation
given to him, would be a “workman” for the reason that the
substantial and essential nature of duties assigned to him and
performed by him, are manual and non-supervisory, who
possesses no command over other.
7. Applying the above principles and the tests
indicated, to the facts of the present case, the appellant was
appointed as a cashier. The employer nomenclatured the
appellant to be the manager in the Front Office. In the identity
card, he was shown to be an executive. However, when the
veil is pierced to seek the real nature of duties, the appellant
was not found to be discharging any supervisory or
authoritative work. The nomenclature or the designation
given to the appellant was an eyewash.
7.1 The evidence on behalf of the appellant clearly
showed that he was doing the work of receptionist and used
to handle the hotel boys. He denied that he was a manager or
had any supervisory powers. He stated that no employee was
under him and he was not able to exercise his own authority
Page 19 of 21
over the staff. He could establish his case that although the
respondent employer - the hotel management named his post
in a particular fashion in the identity card etc., his duties were
never supervisory or managerial, and not used to attend any
managerial meetings, nor had power to sanction leave for
anybody, nor he was supervising any person or thing in the
hotel by virtue of his singular authority.
8. Merely because the management named the
post of the appellant as manager in the front office, it would
not ipso facto take him out of the purview of workman, for, he
was not entrusted with any independent supervisory
authority or work, except incidental to manual work. The bald
assertion on behalf of the respondent employer that the
appellant was manager and that he possessed supervisory
powers, remained without support of any cogent material,
therefore, without any substantiation. In any view, applying
the dominant nature test, the principal duties entrusted to the
appellant and discharged by him invested him with the status
of a “workman”. It has to be held that the appellant fell within
the definition of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
9. In light of the above, the High Court committed
a manifest error in taking the view that the appellant was not
a workman. The Labour Court rightly held that the appellant
was a “workman”, further recording a finding of fact that the
workman rendered had service completing 240 days in a
Page 20 of 21
year and that his termination was in breach of Section 25-F of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The judgment and award of
the Labour Court deserves to be upheld.
10. As a result, the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court dated 30.01.2024 in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.24351 is set aside. The judgment and award of the Labour
Court stands restored. It shall be complied with by the
respondent within two weeks from today.
11. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
In view of the disposal of the Appeal,
interlocutory applications, if any, will not survive and stand
disposed of.
…………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
…………………………………J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 17, 2025.
Page 21 of 21