Full Judgment Text
2024 INSC 181
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3431 OF 2023
XXXX … Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& ANOTHER … Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Rajesh Bindal, J.
1
1. The appellant in the present case is aggrieved of the order
2 3
passed by the High Court whereby a petition filed by him under Section
4
482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR was dismissed.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the FIR in the
case in hand, which was got registered by respondent No.2/complainant
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by Dr.
Naveen Rawal
Date: 2024.03.06
16:01:04 IST
Reason:
1
Order dated 01.08.2022
2
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur
3
M.CR.C. No. 15992 of 2021
4
FIR No. 52 dated 11.12.2020 registered at P.S. Mahila Thana, Dist. Satna, (M.P.)
under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC
Page 1 of 11
is nothing else but an abuse of process of law. The complainant was a
married lady having a grown up daughter of 15 years of age living with
her parents. Claiming that in the same house, the appellant was having
physical relations with her with the consent of her parents and daughter
will be hard to believe that too when she was already married. There
could not be any question of promise to marry given by the appellant to
her at that stage. There are large discrepancies in the complaint made to
the police on the basis of which the FIR was registered if considered in
the light of the statement which the complainant got recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. The relations between the parties are shown to be
consensual, if any. The mis-statement by the complainant is evident from
the fact that she claimed to have got divorce from the earlier marriage on
10.12. 2018 and married with the appellant in a temple in January 2019 but
it is belied from the fact that decree of divorce from the earlier marriage
of the complainant was passed only on 13.01.2021. There was no question
of any marriage prior thereto. The initiation of proceedings against the
appellant being an abuse of process of law deserve to be quashed. In
support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon the decisions of this
Page 2 of 11
5
Court in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Prashant Bharti v.
6
State (NCT of Delhi) .
3. Learned counsel for the State submitted that after
investigation, charge-sheet has already been filed. The Courts are
normally slow to quash the FIR at that stage. In the case in hand, allegation
of rape on false promise to marry is clearly made out. At the stage of
quashing, only the contents in the FIR could be seen. On a perusal thereof,
a clear case is made out against the appellant.
4. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that on
account of dispute with her husband from the earlier marriage, the
complainant was living with her parents. She, at that time, was having a
grown up daughter aged 15 years. The appellant was living in their house
as a tenant. Finding that the complainant in disturbed matrimonial life,
from the advances made by the appellant, the complainant fell in the trap.
On a false promise to marry, both had started having physical relations.
They had even solemnized marriage in a temple in January 2019. Even
her family also knew about their relations and marriage. It was all in good
faith on the promise made by the appellant as the appellant had even
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 89
6
(2013) 9 SCC 293
Page 3 of 11
shown the complainant as a nominee in an insurance policy purchased by
him. With these facts on record, a clear case of rape on false promise to
marry is made out against the appellant. The FIR does not deserve to be
quashed at the initial stage.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper
book.
6. Firstly, we refer to the stand taken by the complainant in the
FIR and the statement she got recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. There
are discrepancies therein.
6.1 In the FIR, she stated that she was managing her own cloth
shop. As there was a dispute with her husband, she was living separately.
On 10.12.2018, she got divorce from her husband. She has a daughter
aged 15 years. In 2017, Sadbhav Company had taken first floor of their
house on rent in which the appellant, who was working with the company,
stayed. During spare time, he would come and sit on her shop. Gradually,
the relations developed. As she was living separate from her husband,
the appellant proposed that in case she takes divorce, he will marry her.
After the divorce of the complainant, on 10.01.2019, at about 11.00 PM, the
appellant came to her room and had physical relations. He did not stop
Page 4 of 11
even when she said that they were yet to be married. Further, on a
promise to marry, he had relations with her on 06.06.2020. When she
insisted for marriage, the appellant said that his family was not agreeing.
Finally, he refused on 11.12.2020. Thereafter, the FIR was got recorded on
11.12.2020.
6.2 While getting her statement recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C., she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017. On account
of dispute with her husband, she was living with her parents. As she got
acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In 2018, the appellant went
to Maharashtra for job. However, he used to visit her home and take care
of the complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured
the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes divorce from her
husband who used to harass and beat her. For this reason, she divorced
her husband and solemnized marriage with the appellant in a temple in
January 2019. Thereafter, they started living together with her daughter
born from the previous marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did
not solemnize court marriage. After marriage was solemnized in temple,
treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading a married
life having physical relations from January 2019 till June 2020. The
Page 5 of 11
appellant treated the complainant as his wife. Thereafter, the appellant
refused to respond to her calls and even marry her.
6.3 There was complete change in the stand of the complainant in
her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The fact remains that
the parties admittedly were in relations from 2017 onwards. Some alleged
promise to marry came in January 2019, from where they started having
physical relations. It has also come on record that it is not only the consent
of the complainant which is clearly evident but also of the parents and
daughter of the complainant as they were living in the same house, where
allegedly the appellant and the complainant were having physical
relations.
7. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she got divorce
from her earlier husband on 10.12.2018. In the statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C., she stated that marriage between the appellant and the
complainant was solemnized in a temple in January 2019. However, the
date of divorce as claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of
the decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where divorce by
mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her husband vide
judgment dated 13.01.2021. The aforesaid fact could not be disputed.
Page 6 of 11
Meaning thereby, the complainant besides the facts in the FIR and also in
the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. regarding her divorce from the
earlier marriage, sought to claim that she had re-married with the
appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage.
8. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR
was got registered and the statement got recorded by the complainant, it
is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations
between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on the
dates when the complainant alleges that the parties had physical
relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed that divorce from
her earlier marriage took place on 10.12.2018. However, the fact remains
that decree of divorce was passed only on 13.01.2021. It is not a case
where the complainant was of an immature age who could not foresee her
welfare and take right decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years
elder to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to
understand the consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she
consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case
of betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that
even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used to
Page 7 of 11
come and stay with the family and they were living as husband and wife.
It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan of
₹ 1,00,000/- to the prosecutrix through banking channel which was not
returned back.
9. Similar issue was considered by this Court in Naim
Ahamed’s case (supra) on almost identical facts where the prosecutrix
herself was already a married woman having three children. The
complaint of alleged rape on false promise of marriage was made five
years after they had started having relations. She even got pregnant from
the loins of the accused. Therein she got divorce from her existing
marriage much after the relations between the parties started. This Court
found that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix
had given her consent for sexual relationship under misconception. The
accused was not held to be guilty. Relevant paragraph 21 thereof is
extracted below:
“21. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who
herself was a married woman having three children,
could not be said to have acted under the alleged false
promise given by the appellant or under the
Page 8 of 11
misconception of fact while giving the consent to have
sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly,
she continued to have such relationship with him at least
for about five years till she gave complaint in the year
2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her
deposition before the court, are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as ‘rape’
by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far.
The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother
of three children was matured and intelligent enough to
understand the significance and the consequences of
the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting
to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the
course of such relationship with the accused, is closely
seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and
three children by having relationship with the accused,
for whom she had developed liking for him. She had
gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her
marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the
accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the
Page 9 of 11
accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male
child through the loin of the accused, she did not have
any complaint against the accused of he having given
false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She
also visited the native place of the accused in the year
2012 and came to know that he was a married man
having children also, still she continued to live with the
accused at another premises without any grievance.
She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual
consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her
husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some
disputes must have taken place between them, that she
filed the present complaint. The accused in his further
statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. had
stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to
fulfill her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it
could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the
prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual
relationship with the appellant under the misconception
Page 10 of 11
of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having
committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 of
IPC.”
9.1 The aforesaid arguments squarely cover the legal issue raised
by the appellant.
10. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order passed
by the High Court is set aside. FIR No.52 dated 11.12.2020, registered
under Section 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC at Police Station, Mahila Thana,
District Satna (M.P.) and all subsequent proceedings thereto are quashed.
11. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
……………….……………..J.
(C.T. RAVIKUMAR)
……………….……………..J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
New Delhi
March 6, 2024.
Page 11 of 11