Full Judgment Text
$~31 to 33
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 03.05.2024
+ CRL.M.C. 5024/2022 & CRL.M.A. 20098/2022
+ CRL.M.C. 7148/2022 & CRL.M.A. 27587/2022
+ CRL.M.C. 7149/2022 & CRL.M.A. 27589/2022, CRL.M.A.
27590/2022
RAGHAVENDRA KRISHNAMURTHY YA LA KODU
..... Petitioner
Through: Ms.Krishna Parkhani, Adv.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI THROUGH ITS CHIEF
SECRETARY & ANR.
..... Respondents
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms.Meenakshi Dahiya, APP
with SI Naveen Tejan
Mr.S.K. Sharma, Adv. for R-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (ORAL)
1. These petitions have been filed under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, „Cr.P.C.‟), challenging the
Order dated 08.01.2021 in Criminal Complaint being CC NI Act
No.61/2020 (in CRL.M.C. 5024/2022); Order dated 31.01.2022 and
04.06.2022 in Criminal Complaint, being CC NI Act No.944/2021 (in
CRL.M.C. 7148/2022); and Order dated 23.07.2022 in Criminal
Complaint, being CC NI Act No.3088/2021 (in CRL.M.C.
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7149/2022), all titled KRW Leasing LLP v. Garage Cowork Pvt. Ltd.
& Ors. (hereinafter collectively referred to as the „Complaint Cases‟
and as „Impugned Orders‟) passed by the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate (NI Act) Digital Court, East District, Karkardooma Courts,
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the „Trial Court‟), summoning, inter
alia , the petitioner herein in the Complaint Cases filed by the
respondent no. 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 (in short, „NI Act‟).
Factual Matrix:
2. The above Complaint Cases have been filed by the respondent
no.2 herein alleging that:
2.1 It is in the business of equipment leasing, leasing of
immovable and movable properties of all kinds and
description, and right, title and interest therein etc.;
2.2 Accused no.1, that is, Garage Cowork Pvt. Ltd. is a
Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as „Companies Act‟). The other
accused persons, including the petitioner herein, are its
Directors and are in charge of day-to-day affairs of the
accused no.1 Company;
2.3 Respondent no.2 herein is the owner of the property
bearing no.270, Phase-2, Udyog Nagar, Gurugram,
Haryana (hereinafter referred to as the „Subject Property‟);
2.4 Respondent no.2 herein leased out the entire subject
property to the Accused no. 1 for a period of 14 years and
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4 months in consideration of monthly rent. The lease
commenced on 01.04.2020 and was to end on 31.07.2034
and the lease deed was duly registered;
2.5 Accused no.1, through one of its directors, asked for some
more time to pay monthly rent, which was considered by
the respondent no.2 keeping in view the outbreak of the
Covid-19 pandemic;
2.6 The respondent no.2 herein made numerous requests to the
accused to pay the arrears of rent, however, to no avail;
2.7 Accused no.1, through its directors, issued cheques in the
months of September, October, and December 2020 for the
due and payable monthly rent. The said cheques got
dishonoured on their presentation with the remarks “Funds
Insufficient” or “Stop Payment”. Whereafter, the
respondent no.2 herein, through its counsel, sent demand
notices dated 26.10.2020, 25.11.2020, and 07.04.2021. The
said notices were duly served upon the accused, however,
the dues were not paid.
3. By the Impugned Orders, the learned Trial Court has been
pleased to issue summons inter alia to the petitioner in the above
Complaint Cases.
4. Aggrieved of the said Orders, the petitioner has filed the present
petitions.
Submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner:
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
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was involved in the affairs of the accused no.1 Company in the
complaint cases, that is, Garage Cowork Pvt. Ltd., only as a resident
Indian Director and that too, for a short period and only for the
purposes of incorporation of the said Company in India. She submits
that the petitioner had resigned from the Company on 31.12.2020. She
submits that the petitioner was not aware of the day-to-day
functioning/affairs of the said Company, as its operations were
conducted from Gurugram, Haryana, while the petitioner is a resident
of Bengaluru, Karnataka. She submits that, in fact, he did not receive
any remuneration from the accused no.1 Company during his stint as a
Director from the said Company.
6. She further submits that the above complaint is arising out of
the relationship of a lessor and a lessee between the accused no.1
Company and the respondent no.2 created by a Lease Deed dated
12.06.2020. She submits that the said Lease Deed was not executed by
the petitioner herein, but by the authorized representative of the
accused no.1 Company, on directions of Mr.Prashant Garg, who is
also arrayed as an accused in the Complaint Cases. She submits that
the cheque has not been signed by the petitioner, but by Mr.Prashant
Garg.
7. She further submits that the demand notice(s) was not delivered
upon the petitioner.
8. She further submits that the respondent no.2 has initiated other
litigations as well against the accused no.1 Company, including
complaints to the Registrar of Companies, wherein it has not made
any allegation against the petitioner herein.
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9. Placing reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
Ashok Shewakramani & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. ,
(2023) 8 SCC 473; A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. ,
(2014) 11 SCC 790; Siby Thomas v. M/s. Somany Ceramics Ltd. ,
(2024) 1 SCC 348; National Small Industries Corporation Limited v.
Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr. , (2010) 3 SCC 330; Gunmala Sales
(P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta & Ors. , (2015) 1 SCC 103; and, Susela
Padmavathy Amma v. M/s Bharti Airtel Limited 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 311, she submits that merely because the petitioner at one point of
time was the Director of the main accused Company, he cannot be
made an accused and be summoned in a complaint filed under Section
138 of the NI Act.
10. She further submits that in one of the complaints filed by the
respondent no.2, being CT Case No.3085/2020, the learned Trial
Court did not issue summons to the petitioner.
11. She submits that, therefore, the Impugned Order is contrary to
law and liable to be set aside.
Submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent no.2:
12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent no.2
submits that the petitioner was an Executive Director of the accused
no.1 Company. He was also the Promoter of the said Company.
Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.P. Mani
& Mohan Dairy v. Dr.Snehalatha Elangovan , (2023) 10 SCC 685;
and of this Court in Sashi Kumar Nagaraji & Ors. v. M/s Magnifico
Minerals Pvt Ltd & Ors., Neutral Citation No.2023:DHC:4318, he
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submits that the position of an Executive Director is different, as he is
a „ Key Managerial Person ‟ of the Company as defined in Section
2(51) of the Companies Act. He further submits that for an Executive
Director, the law presumes that he is in-charge of and responsible for
the day-to-day affairs of the Company. He submits that, in fact, even
in Susela Padmavathy Amma (Supra), the Supreme Court has
highlighted the above distinction.
Analysis & Findings:
13. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels
for the parties.
14. At the outset, it is to be kept in mind that at the time of issuing
process, the learned Trial Court is only concerned with the allegations
made in the complaint and the evidence led in support of the same.
The learned Trial Court is only to be prima facie satisfied whether
there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The
learned Trial Court is not even required to record the reasons in detail
while issuing the process. At this stage, it is not the province of the
learned Trial Court to enter into a detailed discussion/analysis on the
merits or demerits of the case. Reference in this regard is made to the
judgments of the Supreme Court in UP Pollution Control Board v.
Mohan Meakins Ltd. & Ors. (2000) 3 SCC 745 and Bhushan Kumar
& Another v. State (NCT of Delhi ) & Another (2012) 5 SCC 424.
15. The „ Simplified Proforma for Incorporating Company
Electronically ‟ (SPICE) form for the accused no.1 Company, filed by
the respondent no.2 with its reply to the present petition, clearly shows
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the position of the petitioner to be an Executive Director and Promoter
of the accused no.1 Company.
16. Rule 2(k) of the Companies (Specification of definitions details)
Rules, 2014 defines an „ Executive Director ‟ to mean a whole-time
director as defined in clause (94) of Section 2 of the Companies Act.
17. Section 2(94) of the Companies Act defines the „ Whole-time
Director ‟ to include a director in the whole-time employment of the
company.
18. Section 2(51) defines the „ Key Managerial Personnel ‟, in
relation to a company, to inter alia mean the whole-time director.
19. Reading of the above provisions would show that an Executive
Director is a „ Key Managerial Personnel ‟, who, even in terms of
Section 2(60) of the Companies Act, shall be an „ officer who is in
default ‟.
20. Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, defines „ Promoter ‟ to
mean a person who, inter alia , has control over the affairs of the
company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, director or
otherwise or in accordance with whose advice, directions or
instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to
act, provided such person is not acting merely in a professional
capacity.
21. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner is/was the Executive
Director and Promoter of the accused no. 1 company. In law,
therefore, there is a presumption that he is not only a „ Key Managerial
Personnel ‟, but also has control over the affairs of the company.
22. Section 141 of the NI Act reads as under:
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“ 141. Offences by companies. —(1) If the
person committing an offence under section
138 is a company, every person who, at the
time the offence was committed, was in charge
of, and was responsible to, the company for
the conduct of the business of the company, as
well as the company, shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this
sub-section shall render any person liable to
punishment if he proves that the offence was
committed without his knowledge, or that he
had exercised all due diligence to prevent the
commission of such offence:
Provided further that where a person is
nominated as a Director of a company by
virtue of his holding any office or employment
in the Central Government or State
Government or a financial corporation owned
or controlled by the Central Government or
the State Government, as the case may be, he
shall not be liable for prosecution under this
Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained
in sub-section (1), where any offence under
this Act has been committed by a company and
it is proved that the offence has been
committed with the consent or connivance of,
or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of,
any director, manager, secretary or other
officer of the company, such director,
manager, secretary or other officer shall also
be deemed to be guilty of that offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this
section, —
(a) “company” means any body
corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals; and
(b) “director”, in relation to a firm,
means a partner in the firm.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
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23. In K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora & Anr. , (2009) 10 SCC 48, the
Supreme Court highlighted the difference between the position of a
Managing Director of the Company vis-à-vis an ordinary Director, as
far as Section 141 of the NI Act is concerned, and held that if the
accused is the Managing Director of a Joint Managing Director, it is
not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in
charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the
business of the company; Law presumes that the Managing Director is
in charge of and is responsible to the company for the conduct of its
business. It was held as under:
| “ | 20. Section 291 of the Companies Act, | |
|---|---|---|
| 1956 provides that subject to the provisions of | ||
| that Act, the Board of Directors of a company | ||
| shall be entitled to exercise all such powers, | ||
| and to do all such acts and things, as the | ||
| company is authorised to exercise and do. A | ||
| company though a legal entity can act only | ||
| through its Board of Directors. The settled | ||
| position is that a Managing Director is prima | ||
| facie in charge of and responsible for the | ||
| company's business and affairs and can be | ||
| prosecuted for offences by the company. But | ||
| insofar as other Directors are concerned, they | ||
| can be prosecuted only if they were in charge | ||
| of and responsible for the conduct of the | ||
| company's business. |
(a) the Managing Director(s);
(b) the whole-time Director(s);
(c) the manager;
(d) the secretary;
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(e) any person in accordance with whose
directions or instructions the Board of
Directors of the company is accustomed to
act;
(f) any person charged by the Board with
the responsibility of complying with that
provision (and who has given his consent in
that behalf to the Board); and
(g) where any company does not have any
of the officers specified in clauses (a) to (c),
any Director or Directors who may be
specified by the Board in this behalf or where
no Director is so specified, all the Directors.
It follows that other employees of the
company, cannot be said to be persons who
are responsible to the company, for the
conduct of the business of the company.
22. Section 141 uses the words “was in
charge of, and was responsible to the company
for the conduct of the business of the
company”. (emphasis supplied) It is evident
that a person who can be made vicariously
liable under sub-section (1) of Section 141 is a
person who is responsible to the company for
the conduct of the business of the company
and in addition is also in charge of the
business of the company. There may be many
Directors and secretaries who are not in
charge of the business of the company at all.
The meaning of the words “person in charge
of the business of the company” was
considered by this Court in Girdhari Lal
Gupta v. D.H. Mehta (1971) 3 SCC 189
followed in State of Karnataka v. Pratap
Chand (1981) 2 SCC 335 and Katta
Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore
Ltd. (2002) 7 SCC 655 This Court held that the
words refer to a person who is in overall
control of the day-to-day business of the
company. This Court pointed out that a person
may be a Director and thus belongs to the
group of persons making the policy followed
by the company, but yet may not be in charge
of the business of the company; that a person
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| may be a manager who is in charge of the | |
|---|---|
| business but may not be in overall charge of | |
| the business; and that a person may be an | |
| officer who may be in charge of only some | |
| part of the business. | |
| 27. The position under Section 141 of the | |
| Act can be summarised thus: | |
| (i) If the accused is the Managing Director | |
| or a Joint Managing Director, it is not | |
| necessary to make an averment in the | |
| complaint that he is in charge of, and is | |
| responsible to the company, for the conduct of | |
| the business of the company. It is sufficient if | |
| an averment is made that the accused was the | |
| Managing Director or Joint Managing | |
| Director at the relevant time. This is because | |
| the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” | |
| makes it clear that they were in charge of and | |
| are responsible to the company, for the | |
| conduct of the business of the company. | |
| (ii) In the case of a Director or an officer | |
| of the company who signed the cheque on | |
| behalf of the company, there is no need to | |
| make a specific averment that he was in | |
| charge of and was responsible to the company, | |
| for the conduct of the business of the company | |
| or make any specific allegation about consent, | |
| connivance or negligence. The very fact that | |
| the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on | |
| behalf of the company, would give rise to | |
| responsibility under sub-section (2) of Section | |
| 141. | |
| (iii) In the case of a Director, secretary or | |
| manager [as defined in Section 2(24) of the | |
| Companies Act] or a person referred to in | |
| clauses (e) and (f) of Section 5 of the | |
| Companies Act, an averment in the complaint | |
| that he was in charge of, and was responsible | |
| to the company, for the conduct of the business | |
| of the company is necessary to bring the case | |
| under Section 141(1) of the Act. No further | |
| averment would be necessary in the complaint, | |
| though some particulars will be desirable. | |
| They can also be made liable under Section |
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141(2) by making necessary averments
relating to consent and connivance or
negligence, in the complaint, to bring the
matter under that sub-section.
(iv) Other officers of a company cannot be
made liable under sub-section (1) of Section
141. Other officers of a company can be made
liable only under sub-section (2) of Section
141, by averring in the complaint their
position and duties in the company and their
role in regard to the issue and dishonour of
the cheque, disclosing consent, connivance or
negligence.”
24. In National Small Industries Corporation Limited (Supra), the
Supreme Court reiterated that if the accused is a Managing Director or
Joint Managing Director, then it is not necessary to make specific
averments in the complaint and by virtue of their position, they are
liable to be proceeded with.
25. The above position in law has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry , (2022) 10 SCC
152; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy (Supra); and, in Susela Padmavathy
Amma (Supra).
26. It is for the above reason that in Ashok Shewakramani (Supra)
and in Susela Padmavathy Amma (Supra), the Supreme Court
emphasized that in those cases, it was not dealing with the cases of a
Managing Director or a Whole-Time Director. The role of a Joint
Managing Director of a Company may be different from an ordinary
Director.
27. In Sai Girdhar Raj Kumar v. Arun Kapoor & Ors.,
2020:DHC:1859, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, held that where
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the petitioner/accused is an Executive Director in the category of
Promoter, and the complaint carries an averment that the petitioner
along with others was looking after the day-to-day affairs of the
company, being in-charge thereof was jointly and severally liable for
the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.
28. In Siby Thomas (supra), the Supreme Court was not dealing
with a case where the accused was the Managing Director or the
Whole-Time Director. The said judgment, therefore, cannot come to
the aid of the petitioner.
29. As far as the submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the petitioner, being in Bengaluru, Karnataka, while the
property and the company being in Delhi, he was not in control of the
affairs of the company, the same will be a matter of trial and cannot be
adjudicated upon in these proceedings by this Court.
30. Similarly, the submission of the petitioner that the petitioner has
since resigned, also cannot make the petitioner escape his liability
under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act, at this Stage.
In S.P. Mani & Mohan Diary (supra), the Supreme Court has held
that different persons can be in-charge of the company when each of
the series of acts of commission and omission essential to complete
the commission of offence by the company were being committed.
Therefore, “ every person who was in charge of and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of its business at the time any of the
components necessary for the commission of the offence occurred may
be “proceeded against”, but may not be “punished” if he succeeds in
proving that the offence was committed without his knowledge and
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despite his due diligence; the burden of proving that remaining on
him. ”. I may quote from the judgment as under:-
| “34. The seminal issue raised and required to | |
|---|---|
| be settled in the present case is one relating to | |
| a person liable to be proceeded against under | |
| the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 141 | |
| for being in-charge of and responsible to the | |
| company “at the time the offence was | |
| committed.” It would, therefore, be important | |
| to find out the “time” when the offence under | |
| Section 138 can be said to have been | |
| committed by the company. It is commonplace | |
| that an offence means an aggregate of facts or | |
| omissions which are punishable by law and, | |
| therefore, can consist of several parts, each | |
| part being committed at different time and | |
| place involving different persons. The | |
| provisions of Section 138 would require a | |
| series of acts of commission and omission to | |
| happen before the offence of, what may be | |
| loosely called “dishonour of cheque” can be | |
| constituted for the purpose of prosecution and | |
| punishment. It is held by the Supreme Court | |
| in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, | |
| that : | |
| “14. The offence under Section 138 | |
| of the Act can be completed only with | |
| the concatenation of a number of acts. | |
| The following are the acts which are | |
| components of the said offence : (1) | |
| drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation | |
| of the cheque to the bank, (3) returning | |
| the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, | |
| (4) giving notice in writing to the | |
| drawer of the cheque demanding | |
| payment of the cheque amount, (5) | |
| failure of the drawer to make payment | |
| within 15 days of the receipt of the | |
| notice.” | |
| 35. Different persons can be in-charge of the | |
| company when each of the series of acts of | |
| commission and omission essential to | |
| complete the commission of offence by the |
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company were being committed. To take an
example, in the case of a company, “A” might
be in charge of the company at the time of
drawing the cheque, “B” might be in charge
of the company at the time of dishonour of
cheque and “C” might be in charge of the
company at the time of failure to pay within 15
days of the receipt of the demand notice. In
such a case, the permissibility of prosecution
of A, B and C, respectively, or any of them
would advance the purpose of the provision
and, if none can be prosecuted or punished, it
would frustrate the purpose of the provisions
of Section 138 as well as Section 141.
36. The key to this interpretation lies in the use
of the phrase:“every person shall be deemed
to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to
be proceeded against and punished
accordingly” as it occurs in sub-section (1) of
Section 141 and the use of the phrase
“provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall render any person liable to
punishment if he proves…” that occurs in the
first proviso. Every person who was in charge
of and was responsible to the company for the
conduct of its business at the time any of the
components necessary for the commission of
the offence occurred may be “proceeded
against”, but may not be “punished” if he
succeeds in proving that the offence was
committed without his knowledge and despite
his due diligence; the burden of proving that
remaining on him.
37. Therefore, it also has to be held that the
time of commission of the offence of dishonour
of cheque cannot be on the stroke of a clock or
during 15 days after the demand notice has to
be construed as the time when each of the acts
of commission and omission essential to
constitute the offence was committed. The
word “every” points to the possibility of
plurality of responsible persons at the same
point of time as also to the possibility of a
series of persons being in charge when the
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sequence of events culminating into the
commission of offence by the company were
taking place.”
31. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Mr.
Prashant Garg was the director in-charge for the dealings with the
respondent no. 2. He submits that Mr. Garg is the signatory of the
cheque and the lease deed was signed by the person under his
authority. This submission cannot lead to the quashing of the
complaint cases at this stage. Only because Mr. Prashant Garg can be
made liable for the offence committed by the accused no. 1 company,
need not lead to the inference that the petitioner is not so liable. What
was his role in the transaction, would require appreciation of evidence
and the complaint cannot be quashed by this Court at this stage.
32. In S.M.S Pharmaceuticals (Supra), the Supreme Court, while
taking note of the earlier judgment in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi &
Ors. , (1983) 1 SCC 1, has observed that order of the Magistrate
issuing process can only be set aside/quashed in a case where the
allegation made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses
recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out
absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not
disclose the essential ingredients. It was further reiterated the
managing directors or the joint managing directors, by virtue of the
office they hold are in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company and can be made vicariously liable under
Section 141 of the NI Act.
33. In Gunmala Sales (Supra), the Supreme Court has cautioned
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that the High Court must use the power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. for quashing of the complaint cases under Section 138 of the
NI Act sparingly and with great circumspection and shall not conduct
a mini-trial or roving inquiry at this stage. It was held as under:
| “ | 34. We may summarise our conclusions as | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| follows: | ||||
| 34.1. Once in a complaint filed under Section | ||||
| 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act the | ||||
| basic averment is made that the Director was | ||||
| in charge of and responsible for the conduct of | ||||
| the business of the company at the relevant | ||||
| time when the offence was committed, the | ||||
| Magistrate can issue process against such | ||||
| Director. | ||||
| 34.2. If a petition is filed under Section 482 of | ||||
| the Code for quashing of such a complaint by | ||||
| the Director, the High Court may, in the facts | ||||
| of a particular case, on an overall reading of | ||||
| the complaint, refuse to quash the complaint | ||||
| because the complaint contains the basic | ||||
| averment which is sufficient to make out a case | ||||
| against the Director. | ||||
| 34.3. In the facts of a given case, on an overall | ||||
| reading of the complaint, the High Court may, | ||||
| despite the presence of the basic averment, | ||||
| quash the complaint because of the absence of | ||||
| more particulars about the role of the Director | ||||
| in the complaint. It may do so having come | ||||
| across some unimpeachable, incontrovertible | ||||
| evidence which is beyond suspicion or doubt | ||||
| or totally acceptable circumstances which may | ||||
| clearly indicate that the Director could not | ||||
| have been concerned with the issuance of | ||||
| cheques and asking him to stand the trial | ||||
| would be abuse of process of court. Despite | ||||
| the presence of basic averment, it may come to | ||||
| a conclusion that no case is made out against | ||||
| the Director. Take for instance a case of a | ||||
| Director suffering from a terminal illness who | ||||
| was bedridden at the relevant time or a | ||||
| Director who had resigned long before | ||||
| issuance of cheques. In such cases, if the High |
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| Court is convinced that prosecuting such a | ||
|---|---|---|
| Director is merely an arm-twisting tactics, the | ||
| High Court may quash the proceedings. It | ||
| bears repetition to state that to establish such | ||
| case unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence | ||
| which is beyond suspicion or doubt or some | ||
| totally acceptable circumstances will have to | ||
| be brought to the notice of the High Court. | ||
| Such cases may be few and far between but the | ||
| possibility of such a case being there cannot | ||
| be ruled out. In the absence of such evidence | ||
| or circumstances, complaint cannot be | ||
| quashed. | ||
| 34.4. No restriction can be placed on the High | ||
| Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code. | ||
| The High Court always uses and must use this | ||
| power sparingly and with great | ||
| circumspection to prevent inter alia the abuse | ||
| of the process of the court. There are no fixed | ||
| formulae to be followed by the High Court in | ||
| this regard and the exercise of this power | ||
| depends upon the facts and circumstances of | ||
| each case. The High Court at that stage does | ||
| not conduct a mini trial or roving inquiry, but | ||
| nothing prevents it from taking unimpeachable | ||
| evidence or totally acceptable circumstances | ||
| into account which may lead it to conclude | ||
| that no trial is necessary qua a particular | ||
| Director.” |
| “ | 50. The principles discernible from the |
|---|---|
| aforesaid decision of this Court in Ashutosh | |
| Ashok Parasrampuriya are that the High | |
| Court should not interfere under Section 482 | |
| of the Code at the instance of an accused | |
| unless it comes across some unimpeachable | |
| and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that | |
| the Director/partner of a firm could not have | |
| been concerned with the issuance of cheques. | |
| This Court clarified that in a given case | |
| despite the presence of basic averments, the | |
| High Court may conclude that no case is made | |
| out against the particular Director/partner |
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| provided the Director/partner is able to | |
|---|---|
| adduce some unimpeachable and | |
| incontrovertible evidence beyond suspicion | |
| and doubt.” |
35. In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petitions.
The same are dismissed, leaving all submissions of either of the
parties open to be determined by the learned Trial Court remaining
uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court.
36. The pending applications also stand disposed of being rendered
infructuous.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
MAY 3, 2024 /ns/AS
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