Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4394 of 1997
PETITIONER:
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
RESPONDENT:
State of Maharashtra & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/2003
BENCH:
Doraiswamy Raju & P.Venkatarama Reddi
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
P.Venkatarama Reddi, J.
This appeal by Special leave arises out of the judgment of
the High Court of judicature at Bombay in a first appeal and
cross- objection preferred under the Land Acquisition Act. The
High Court affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the
Joint District Judge, Nashik. The acquisition which is the
subject matter of this appeal was in respect of 5,800 sq. meters
land situated near Satana town. The market value as on
7.5.1987 was fixed at Rs.300/- per Sq. metre and the statutory
benefits under the amended Sections 23 and 28 of L.A. Act were
extended.
The acquisition proceedings were initiated under the
provisions of Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as ’MRTP Act’) read with the Land
Acquisition Act in the year 1987 for the purpose of extension of
bus-stand. Primarily, in this appeal, this Court is called upon to
decide the question whether amendments made to the Land
Acquisition Act by Central Act No. 68 of 1984 to Sections 23
and Section 28 which confer certain additional monetary
benefits to the land holders are to be made applicable to the
instant acquisition.
It may be noted that by Central Act 68 of 1984, sub-
section (1-A) was added to Section 23 which entitled the
claimants to receive the amount calculated at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum on the market value for the period commencing
on and from the date of the publication of the notification under
Section 4 (1) upto the date of the award or the date of taking
possession of the land, whichever is earlier. It is ruled by the
Constitution bench in Sunder Vs. Union Of India (2001 (7)
SCC 211) that this additional amount is part of compensation
awarded. Another benefit made available under Act 68 of 1984
is the enhancement of solatium payable as per sub-section (2) of
Section 23 from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Under Section 28,
as amended, the claimant is entitled to receive interest on the
excess compensation awarded at the increased rates.
The contention on behalf of the appellant is that the said
amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be
made applicable to the acquisition of land resorted to under the
MRTP Act, the reason being that those amendments to the
Land Acquisition Act subsequent to the date of the
commencement of MRTP Act 1966 cannot be read into the
MRTP Act. In other words, the contention is that in matters
relating to compensation and the allied benefits admissible to
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the claimants/land holders, the relevant provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as L.A. Act) as they
stood on the date of enactment of the MRTP Act alone are
relevant and the subsequent amendments thereto are liable to be
ignored in relation to an acquisition under MRTP Act. The
contention of the respondent-claimant is that any amendment
made to the Land Acquisition Act more particularly with regard
to determination and payment of compensation in respect of
which there is no independent provision in the MRTP Act shall
be made applicable for the acquisition under the MRTP Act.
No contrary intention is expressed in the MRTP Act to exclude
the future amendments to L.A. Act on the subject of
compensation. It is further contended that Section 126 is an
instance of referential legislation.
The answer to the question depends on the examination of
provisions contained in Chapter VII ("Land Acquisition") of
MRTP Act and more particularly the interpretation to be placed
on Section 126(3) of the said Act which reads as follows :
S. 126 :
(3) "On publication of a declaration under the
said section 6, the Collector shall proceed to
take order for the acquisition of the land under
the said Act; and provisions of that Act shall
apply to the acquisition of the said land with the
modification that the market value of the land
shall be, -
(i) where the land is to be acquired for the
purpose of a new town, the market value
prevailing on the date of publication of
the notification constituting or declaring
the Development Authority for such
town;
(ii) where the land is acquired for the
purposes of a Special Planning Authority,
the market value prevailing on the date of
publication of the notification of the area
as an undeveloped area; and
(iii) in any other case the market value on the
date of publication of the interim
development plan, the draft development
plan or the plan for the area or areas for
comprehensive development, which ever
is earlier, or as the case may be, the date
or publication of the draft town planning
scheme :
Provisos omitted.
The other provisions contained in Sections 125, 126,
128 and 129 may also be noted. Section 125 lays down that any
land required, reserved or designated in a regional plan,
development plan or town planning scheme for a public purpose
including plans for any area of comprehensive development or
for any new town shall be deemed to be land needed for a public
purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Section 126 (1) deals with modes of acquisition. It provides that
after the publication of a draft regional plan or a development
or other plan or town planning scheme, if any land is required
or reserved for any of the public purposes specified in the plans
or scheme, the Planning Authority, Development Authority or
any Appropriate Authority may acquire the land (a) by mutual
agreement; (b) by granting the land owner or the lessee subject
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to his paying or depositing the value of the lessor’s interest, floor
space index or transferable development rights against the area
of the land surrendered free of cost and free from all
encumbrances etc., (c) by making an application to the State
Government for acquiring such land under the Land
Acquisition Act 1894. Once an application is made under clause
(c) sub-section (1) of Section 126, sub-section (2) provides that if
the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the
application is needed for the public purpose specified therein or
if the State Government itself is of the opinion that any land
included in any such plan is needed for any public purpose, it
may make a declaration to that effect in the Official Gazette, in
the manner provided in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act
1894. The declaration so published shall be deemed to be a
declaration duly made under the said section (i.e. section 6).
Pausing here for a moment, it is seen that the State Government
itself (except in cases falling under Section 49 and 113 A) can
suo moto make a declaration in the manner provided under
Section 6 of L.A. Act, if it forms the opinion that any land
included in the plan afore-mentioned is needed for a public
purpose. The proviso to sub-section (2) enjoins that subject to
the provision contained in sub-section (4), no such declaration
shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the
publication of the draft regional plan, development plan or any
other plan or scheme, as the case may be. Sub-section (3) of
Section 126 which is crucial for our purpose assimilates and
absorbs the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the
purpose of acquisition of land after the stage of publication of
deemed declaration under Section 6. However, sub-section (3)
makes a modification in order to fix up a date corresponding to
S. 4(1) of L.A. Act. The modification is in respect of relevant
date for the computation of market value. This is provided for
by clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (3) which are extracted
above. These dates have to be substituted for the date of
publication of notification under S. 4(1) of L.A. Act. The last
sub-section in Section 126 is sub-section (4). This provision too
has the effect of modifying the Land Acquisition Act in a limited
manner. Sub-section (4) which starts with a non-obstante
clause provides for two things : (1) If the declaration is not made
within the period referred to in sub-section (2), the State
Government may make a fresh declaration and (2) in such a
case, the market value of the land shall be the market value at
the date of declaration in the Official Gazette made for
acquiring the land afresh. Then, we come to Section 128 (1)
which enables the State Government, notwithstanding anything
contained in the Act, to acquire lands for a purpose other than
the one specified in any plan or scheme, by invoking the
provisions of L.A. Act. Sub-section (2) provides that the
Planning Authority or the Development Authority or
appropriate Authority shall be deemed to be a ’person
interested’ in the land acquired. It also says that in determining
the amount of compensation the market value shall be assessed
as if the land has been released from the reservation, or
designation made in any plan or scheme. Sub-section (3) enjoins
that on the land vesting in the State Government under Section
16 or 17 of the earlier Act, the relevant plan or scheme shall be
deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of the
land. Section 129 corresponds to Section 17 or the L.A. Act and
provides for taking possession of the land in case of urgency
after giving notice of 15 days and thereupon the land shall vest
in the State Government free from encumbrances. For setting
this provision in motion an application should be made by the
planning and other authorities at any time after the publication
of notification under Section 126 (2). The proviso to Section 129
(1) corresponds to sub-section (3) of Section 17 which obligates
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the Collector to offer to the persons interested compensation for
the standing crops and trees if any on the land and for any
damage sustained by the land holder on account of sudden
dispossession unless it is excepted by Section 24 of L.A. Act.
Sub-section (2) of Section 129 provides for payment of interest at
the rate of 4 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation
from the date of taking possession of the land upto the date of
payment. This provision is attracted where possession of land is
taken by invoking urgency clause. The rate of interest is
specifically limited to 4 per cent which was the rate prevailing
under the L.A. Act when MRTP Act was enacted. Sub-section
(3) of Section 129 provides for payment of advance not
exceeding 2/3rd of the amount estimated to be payable to the
person interested in case the possession of land is taken under
sub-section (1) of Section 129. To some extent, it corresponds to
sub-section (3A) of Section 17 instead by Act 68 of 1984 and it
marks a departure from the then existing provision of L.A. Act,
i.e. Section 17. Thus, as far as acquisition on urgent basis is
concerned, specific and detailed provisions are made under
Section 129. Incidentally, we may mention that there is no
pleading nor material before us that the acquisition in question
was under Section 129(1). We need not therefore consider
whether the rate of interest could be limited to 4%.
These are broadly the salient provisions with which we are
concerned and in the midst of which the crucial provision,
namely, sub-section (3) of Section 126 stands.
It is a well established legislative practice to borrow the
provisions of an earlier Act on a particular subject by making a
broad reference to the earlier Act or some or most of its
provisions therein so as to make them applicable to the relevant
subject matter dealt with by the later statute. This is done
primarily as a matter of convenience in order to avoid verbatim
repetition of the provisions of the earlier Act. Very often such
reference is followed by certain modifications subject to which
the earlier Act should apply. Those modifications may be few
or numerous. When such legislative device is adopted, the
relevant provisions of the earlier Act will apply mutatis mutandis
to the matters governed by the later Act. But, the difficulty in
construction would arise when the earlier Act is repealed or
amended/modified. The intricate question then would be
whether the repeal or amendments should be ignored and the
borrowed provisions should be read as they were at the time of
enactment of later Act OR the provisions of earlier Act should
be applied subject to subsequent amendments/modifications. If
there is a definite indication in the later Act as to the
applicability or otherwise of subsequent amendments in the Act
referred to, no difficulty arises; but, the problem arises when
there is no such indication. It is here that we come across two
allied but qualitatively different concepts of statutory
interpretation known as incorporation by reference and mere
reference or citation of earlier statute in the later Act. In the
former case, any change in the incorporated statute by way of
amendment or repeal has no effect on the incorporating statute.
In other words, the provisions of the incorporated statute as they
stood at the relevant time when incorporating statute was
enacted will ever continue to be read into that later statute
unless the legislature takes a positive step to amend the later
statute in tune with the amendments. However, the legal effect is
otherwise in the case of a statute which merely makes a
reference to the provisions of an earlier statute. In that case, the
modification of the statute from time to time, will have its
impact on the statute in which it is referred to. The provisions
in the earlier statute with their amendments will have to be read
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into the later enactment in which they are referred to unless any
such subsequent amendment is inconsistent with a specific
provision already in existence.
The expression ’incorporation by reference’ has been
aptly and succinctly expounded by the Privy Council in
Secretary of State Vs. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society
Limited [A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 149]. We shall quote the relevant
passage occurring at Page 152.
"In this country it is accepted that where a
statute is incorporated by reference into a
second statute, the repeal of the first statute
does not affect the second:"
x x x
"The independent existence of the two Acts is
therefore recognized; despite the death of the
parent Act, its offspring survives in the
incorporating Act. Though no such saving
clause appears in the General Clauses Act, their
Lordships think that the principle involved is as
much applicable in India as it is in this
country."
As regards additions in the first statute by way of
subsequent amendments, the position has been clarified in the
following words:
"It seems to be no less logical to hold that where
certain provisions from an existing Act have
been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no
addition to the former Act, which is not
expressly made applicable to the subsequent
Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at
all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act
to function effectually without the addition."
The distinction between incorporation by reference and
adoption of provisions by mere reference or citation is not too
easy to highlight. The distinction is one of difference in degree
and is often blurred. The fact that no clear-cut guidelines or
distinguishing features have been spelt out to ascertain whether
it belongs to one or the other category makes the task of
identification difficult. The semantics associated with
interpretation play their role to a limited extent. Ultimately, it is
a matter of probe into legislative intention and/or taking an
insight into the working of the enactment if one or the other
view is adopted. The doctrinaire approach to ascertain whether
the legislation is by incorporation or reference is, on ultimate
analysis, directed towards that end. The distinction often pales
into insignificance with the exceptions enveloping the main rule.
Did the Legislature intend to bind itself to any future
changes that may be made to the earlier enactment from which
the provisions are borrowed? OR whether the Legislature had
frozen the provisions of earlier Act prevailing on the date of
enactment of later statute so as to insulate it from the impact of
subsequent modifications? These are the questions which loom
large in judging the question whether the provisions borrowed
from an earlier Act should be read subject to the subsequent
amendments made therein. The language, the scheme and
purpose of the Act no doubt assume significance while finding
answer to this question.
One indicia to spell out whether it is a case of
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incorporation or reference has been furnished by the decision of
the Privy Council in Secretary of State Vs. Hindustan Coop.
Insurance Society Ltd, (Supra), that is, whether the modifications
that are made to the provisions of the earlier Act while broadly
adopting the same are "numerous and substantial". What that
observation means is if they are "numerous and substantial",
prima facie it manifests an intention on the part of the
Legislature not to go beyond the provisions of the borrowed Act
as they existed at the time of enactment of the later Act except
reading them subject to the modifications made.
This very issuewhether the M.R.T.P. Act had
incorporated in itself the original provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act or adopted the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act by reference came up for consideration in a
different context in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sant
Joginder Singh, (1995 Suppl. 2 SCC 475). There, the question
arose whether Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act
introduced by Central Act 68 of 84 which prescribed the outer
limit for passing the award under Section 11 and also providing
for the consequence of non-compliance thereof should be read
into the M.R.T.P. Act by virtue of Section 126(3). A two Judge
Bench of this Court answered that question in the negative. The
learned Judges have mainly relied on sub-Sections (2) & (4) of
Section 126 for reaching the conclusion that a provision like
Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act stands excluded by
necessary implication. Their Lordships also discussed the
question whether the provisions of M.R.T.P. Act dealing with
acquisition of land have incorporated the provisions of L.A. Act
or only adopted them by a process of reference. Relying on the
earlier decision in Gauri Shankar Gaur Vs. State of U.P. [1994 (1)
SCC Page 92] in which the provisions of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad Adhiniyam fell for consideration, this Court expressed
the view that "similar is the position under the Act", meaning
thereby that the subsequent amendments to the L.A. Act cannot
be transposed into the M.R.T.P. Act. At the same time, a
distinction was made between procedural and substantive
provisions and it was observed that Section 11A which is a
procedural provision, does not stand on the same footing as
Section 23 of the L.A. Act. A further observation was made that
the legislature did not intend to apply the unspecified provisions
of the earlier Act to the exercise of power of acquisition under
M.R.T.P. Act. The learned Judges proceeded on the basis that
the scheme and provisions of U.P. Adhiniyam and M.R.T.P. Act
are the same. Though we find that there are certain differences
between the two provisions, it is however not necessary to dilate
on this aspect further. The ultimate conclusion in Sant Joginder
Singh’s case seems to rest on the ratio that there is sufficient
indicia in M.R.T.P. Act itself to exclude the applicability of
Section 11 A of the L.A. Act in view of sub-Sections (2) and (4) of
Section 126. As we are approaching the question of correct
interpretation of Section 126 (3) from a different perspective,
there is no need to enter into a further discussion as to whether
and to what extent support can be drawn from this decision.
We are of the view that the issue arising in the present case
can be decided on a different principle in the light of two recent
decisions of this Court without undertaking an exercise of placing
Section 126 (3) into one or the other category of legislation.
First, we have the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
V. Jainul Islam (1998 (2) SCC 467) decided by a three-Judge
Bench. The Court having reached a conclusion that the U.P. Avas
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 must be deemed to have
incorporated the provisions of L.A Act as then existing subject to
modifications specified in the Adhiniyam, did not go further to
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reach a logical conclusion that the amendments to L.A Act by Act
68 of 1984 cannot be read into the Adhiniyam. The issue was,
however, approached from a different angle, by applying the well
known principle of statutory interpretation that "if certain
provisions of law, construed in one way, would make them
consistent with the Constitution and another interpretation would
render them unconstitutional, the court would lean in favour of
the former construction". Proceeding on this line of enquiry, it
was observed thus :
"We would, therefore, examine whether the
provisions of the Adhiniyam if they are so
construed as to incorporate the provisions of
the LA Act as it stood on the date of
enactment of the Adhiniyam without the
amendments introduced in the LA Act by the
1984 Act relating to determination and
payment of compensation would be violative
of the provisions of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In this context, it may be stated
that if the provisions are construed as
indicated above an owner whose land is
acquired for the purpose of the Adhiniyam
would be entitled to payment of solatium
under Section 23(2) of the LA Act @ 15% and
interest under Section 28 of the LA Act @ 6%
but an owner whose lands are acquired under
the provisions of the LA Act as amended by
the 1984 Act would be entitled to payment of
solatium @ 30% and interest @ 9% and 15%
and would also be entitled to payment of
additional amount as per the provisions
of Section 23(1-A) of the LA Act, as amended.
In other words, the compensation payable to
the owner whose land is acquired for the
purposes of the Adhiniyam would be less than
the compensation payable to the owner whose
land is acquired under the LA Act as amended
by the 1984 Act. Is there any rational basis for
treating the two landowners differently in the
matter of payment of compensation for the
acquisition of their lands?"
Relying on the special Bench decision of this Court in
Nagpur Improvement Trust case (1973 (1) SCC 500), the
learned Judges held :
"The reasons which weighed with this Court
striking down the provisions of the Nagpur
Improvement Trust Act whereby Section 23 of
the earlier Act had been modified in its
application for the purpose of acquisition
under the said Act would, therefore, equally
apply while considering the constitutional
validity of the provisions of the Adhiniyam
whereunder the provisions of Section 23 of the
LA Act have been modified under the
Schedule to the Adhiniyam."
The opinion was further reinforced in Para 31 and a final
view was expressed in the following terms :
"Since the present case involves acquisition of
land under the provisions of the LA Act as
applicable under the Adhiniyam, it is fully
covered by the law laid down by this Court in
Nagpur Improvement Trust. Keeping in view
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the principles laid down in the said decision of
this Court, it has to be held that if the
provisions of the Adhiniyam are so construed
as to mean that the provisions of the LA Act,
as they stood on the date of enactment of the
Adhiniyam, would be applicable to acquisition
of land for the purpose of the Adhiniyam and
that the amendments introduced in the LA
Act, by the 1984 Act relating to determination
and payment of compensation are not
applicable, the consequence would be that the
provisions of the LA Act, as applicable under
the Adhiniyam would suffer from the vice of
arbitrary and hostile discrimination. Such a
consequence would be avoided if the
provisions of the Adhiniyam are construed to
mean that the provisions of the LA Act, as
amended by the 1984 Act, relating to
determination and payment of compensation
would apply to acquisition of land for the
purposes of the Adhiniyam. There is nothing
in the Adhiniyam which precludes adopting
the latter construction (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, the provisions of the
Adhiniyam show that the intention of the
legislature, While enacting the Adhiniyam,
was to confer the benefit of solatium @ 15%
by modifying Section 23(2) in the Schedule,
which benefit was not available under the
provisions of the LA Act as it was applicable
in the State of Uttar Pradesh at the time of
enactment of the Adhiniyam: It cannot,
therefore, be said that the intention of the
legislature, in enacting the Adhiniyam, was to
deny to the landowners the benefits relating to
determination and payment of compensation
which would be available to them under any
amendment made in the LA Act after the
enactment of the Adhiniyam. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that on a proper
construction of Section 55 of the Adhiniyam it
must be held that while incorporating the
provisions of the LA Act in the Adhiniyam the
intention of the legislature was that
amendments in the LA Act relating to
determination and payment of compensation
would be applicable to acquisition of lands for
the purposes of the Adhiniyam. This means
that the amendments introduced in the LA
Act by the 1984 Act relating to determination
and payment of compensation, viz., Section
23(1-A) and Section 23(2) and 28 as amended
by the 1984 Act would be applicable to
acquisitions for the purposes of the
Adhiniyam under Section 55 of the
Adhiniyam."
It may be noted that in Nagpur Improvement Trust case,
the special Bench ruled that in the matter of evolving
principles for assessment of compensation, there can be no
valid classification on the basis of the authority acquiring the
land. As far as the owner is concerned, it does not matter to
him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other.
We have a similar situation here. The ratio and reasoning
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in U.P. A.E.V. Parishad case applies with equal, if not greater
force, to the acquisition under Chapter VII of MRTP Act of
which Section 126(3) is a part. In fact the modifications made
by MRTP Act to the provisions of L.A. Act are minimal and at
any rate, less substantial than those effected by U.P.
Adhiniyam except in regard to the urgent acquisition dealt
with by Section 129. The matters covered by the earlier Act
have not been specifically referred to or restated because it is
already ordained by Section 126(3) that the provisions of L.A
Act should be applied to the acquisition of land notified under
the MRTP Act. As regards the determination of
compensation, there are no modifications of substantial or
drastic nature. The modification in Section 126(3) relating to
the date of ascertainment of market value is only warranted in
the context of the scheme of the Act. Section 126(4) read with
the proviso to sub-section (2) is aimed at giving a fair deal to
the land holder while at the same time reserving the power to
issue a fresh declaration notwithstanding the expiry of one
year. If such fresh declaration is issued, the market value shall
be assessed with reference to the date of publication of fresh
declaration. In our view, the provisions contained in Section
126 or any other provisions occurring in Chapter VII
(discussed supra), far from manifesting an intention not to
apply the provisions of L.A. Act as amended from time to time
vis--vis compensation seem to suggest that the legislature did
not intend to make a marked departure from the L.A. Act on
the subject of compensation and other allied monetary
benefits. Reiterating the observation made in U.P. Awas
Parishad case in para 31, we hold that there is nothing in the
MRTP Act which precludes adopting the construction that the
provision of L.A. Act, as amended by 1984 Act relating to
award of compensation, would apply with full vigour to the
acquisition of land under that Act. Unless such interpretation
is placed on Section 126(3) the acquisition under MRTP Act
will be afflicted with the vice of invidious discrimination and
palpable arbitrariness hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. If
the interpretation which is sought to be placed by the appellant
is accepted Section 126(3) itself is liable to be struck down as
violative of Article 14 in which case the entire process of
acquisition contemplated by Chapter VII will become
unworkable and ineffectual. The land-holders whose lands are
acquired under Chapter VII of MRTP Act cannot, in our view,
be subjected to a disability or disadvantage in the matter of
obtaining monetary recompense for the deprivation of land
depending upon the nature of public purpose or the authority
for whose benefit the land is acquired.
The view taken in U.P. A.E.V. Parishad case was
reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in a very
recent decision of Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vasant Rao
(2002 (7) SCC 657). The ratio of the decision in U.P.A.E.V.
Parishad case and the conclusion reached therein were
endorsed and applied to the cases of acquisition under Punjab
Town Improvement Act 1922 and Nagpur Improvement Trust
Act 1936. After referring in extenso to the U.P.A.E.V.
Parishad case, B.P. Singh, J. speaking for the Court observed
at paragraph 50 :
"So far as the Punjab Act and the Nagpur Act
are concerned, the Schedules do not modify
the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act which provides for payment
of solatium. However, a proviso was added to
the effect that sub-section (2) shall not apply
to any land acquired under the State Acts in
question. The added proviso is identical in
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both the State Acts. This clearly implies that
where acquisition was made under the
provisions of the land Acquisition Act, as
modified, the legislature did not intend to
deprive the claimants of solatium as provided
under the Land Acquisition Act. But solatium
was not payable in cases of acquisition under
the State Acts. There are provisions in both
the State Acts which permit the State to
acquire lands for the purposes of the schemes
without resorting to the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act such as acquisition by
purchase, lease, exchange, or otherwise, or
acquisitions contemplated under deferred
street scheme, development scheme and
expansion scheme. In respect of such
acquisitions solatium is not payable. Such
cases are similar to the acquisitions under
Section 53 of the Bombay Town Planning Act
which was considered by this Court in
Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat. In
these circumstances with a view to save the
law from the vice of arbitrary and hostile
discrimination, the provisions must be
construed to mean, in the absence of anything
to the contrary, that the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act as amended by the 1984
Act relating to determination and payment of
compensation would apply to acquisition of
land for the purposes of the State Acts. It
must, therefore, be held that while
incorporating the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act in the State Acts, the intention
of the legislature was that amendments in the
Land Acquisition Act relating to
determination and payment of compensation
would be applicable to acquisition of lands for
the purposes of the State Acts."
The learned Judges held that the claimants were entitled to the
benefits conferred by Section 23 (1-A), if applicable, and
Sections 23(2) and 28 of L.A. Act as amended by 1984 Act.
In the light of the analysis we have made of the provisions
of MRTP Act and the two verdicts of this Court handed down
by three Judge Benches, we must reject the contention
advanced on behalf of the appellants and uphold the view
taken by the High Court. The award of the district Judge,
Nashik, in the Reference Case where- under the
benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and Section 28 of the
L.A. Act as amended by the 1984 Act were extended to the
respondents, calls for no interference.
Some attempt was made to assail the conclusion of the
Reference Court and the High Court vis--vis the quantum of
market value. It is contended that the amount claimed by the
land-holders/respondents is much less than what was awarded
by the court. No such contention was raised before the High
Court nor any material placed before us to substantiate this
contention. Moreover, we are informed that a Review Petition
was filed in the High Court and the same was dismissed. But
no S.L.P. has been filed against that order. We need not dilate
further on this contention.
In the result the appeal is dismissed, but, without costs.
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