Full Judgment Text
NON REPORTABALE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.229 OF 2005
M.D. HINDUSTAN PHOTO FILMS
AND ANR. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
H.B. VINOBHA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.
1. In our view, this appeal shall succeed on a very short
question. Order of termination issued against the respondents
was quashed in writ application filed by the respondents before
the High Court of Judicature at Madras. Accordingly, a learned
Single Judge of the High Court directed reinstatement of the
respondents in service and also a direction was issued to revoke
the order of termination passed against them. The appellants
filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.
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The Division Bench, however, dismissed the appeal. Feeling
aggrieved, the appellants filed a special leave petition in this
Court, which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of
learned counsel for the parties.
2. The Division Bench in the impugned order made the
following observations:
“14. The action taken by the employer can by no
means could be regarded as lacking in bonafides.
The facts in relation to this company already
referred to make it abundantly clear that the
company was so sick that it could not complete in
the market. Had it not been a public sector
company, the company would probably have
closed down long ago. The mere fact that the
company is not liquidated as of today does not
imply that the company is financially sound or is
capably of being revived. The company having
become a sick company long ago the formal
declaration of sickness was only a recognition of
the sickness that had set in much earlier by reason
of which the termination of the services of these
trainees had become necessary.
15. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that
the termination of these trainees was lawful and
did not call for any interference. Moreover, this
was a case where the persons, could approach the
court claim to be the workman covered by the
definition of workmen under Section 2[s] of the
Industrial Disputes Act. The union had also
sought to raise and industrial dispute regarding
the termination. The proper course for this Court
would have been to direct the workmen to pursue
their remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act,
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and not proceed to adjudicate on contested
questions of fact and proceed to compel the
employer to re-employ as many as 109 trainees,
who had undergone training for a period of less
than two years. On this ground also, we must hold
that the order of the learned Single Judge is not
sustainable. We have examined the claim on
merits in the light of the arguments advanced
before us.”
3. A reading of these findings of the Division Bench clearly
shows that the order of the learned single judge was not
sustainable and the claim of the respondents on merit could not
be sustained. In spite of such findings made by the Division
Bench, it affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge only on
the ground that since an interim order granted by the learned
Single Judge during the pendency of the writ petition continued
for the last ten years, it would be inequitable and unjust to
deprive them of their employment at this stage. Only on this
ground, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was affirmed
and the services of the respondents, who were taken as trainees,
were directed to be regularized. We are unable to accept these
findings of the Division Bench of the High Court when the
Division Bench itself had come to the conclusion that the order
of regularization of the respondents who were appointed as
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trainees could not be sustained because the respondents were
appointed as trainees for a particular period and at a fixed salary
and that period had also expired. Only because of an interim
order, the services of the respondents were directed to be
continued, which cannot be a ground to hold that they should be
regularized as regular employees of the appellants.
4. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside
and the order of termination is upheld. The appeal is thus
allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as
to costs.
………….……………….J.
[ TARUN CHATTERJEE ]
NEW DELHI ……..………………………J.
MAY 13, 2009 [V.S. SIRPURKAR ]
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