DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD. vs. A.J. AGROCHEM

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 04-10-2019

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1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5120 OF 2019 Duncans Industries Ltd. .. Appellant Versus A. J. Agrochem .. Respondent J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment   and   order   dated   20.06.2019   passed   by   the   National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (for short “NCLAT”) by which the learned Appellate Tribunal has allowed the said appeal preferred by the respondent herein and has quashed and set aside the order dated  05.10.2018  passed  by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata   (for   short   “NCLT”),   holding   that   the   respondent’s application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (for short “IBC”) would be maintainable, the original respondent has preferred the present appeal.  2 2. The facts of the case in nutshell are as under: 2.1 That the appellant is a Corporate Debtor. It is a company which owns and manages 14 tea gardens.  Out of 14 tea gardens, the Central Government vide notification dated 28.01.2016, in exercise of its power under Section 16E of the Tea Act, 1953 has taken over the control of 7 tea gardens.    2.2 That   the   respondent   is   an   operational   creditor   of   the appellant.   It used to supply pesticides, insecticides, herbicides etc. to the appellant.     According to the respondent­operational creditor, a sum of Rs.41,55,500/­ was due and payable by the appellant­corporate   debtor   to   the   respondent­operational creditor.   That the respondent initiated the proceedings against the appellant­corporate debtor before the NCLT under Section 9 of the IBC.   Initiation of the proceedings under the IBC by the respondent­operation   creditor   was   opposed   by   the   appellant­ corporate   debtor   mainly   and   solely   on   the   ground   that,   as provided   under   Section   16G(1)(c)   of   the   Tea   Act,   once   the management   of   tea   unit   has   been   taken   over   by   the   Central Government, then the proceedings for winding up or appointment of receiver cannot be initiated without the consent of the Central Government.  It was the case on behalf of the appellant­corporate debtor that, in the present case, as the prior approval of the 3 Central   Government   has   not   been   taken,   as   required   under Section   16G   of   the   Tea   Act,   the   insolvency   proceeding   under Section 9 of the IBC would not be maintainable.     That, by an order dated 05.10.2018, learned NCLT held that in view of the statutory provisions under Section 16G of the Tea Act and as the prior consent of the Central Government has not been obtained, the   proceedings   under   Section   9   of   the   IBC   shall   not   be maintainable.       In   an   appeal   before   the   NCLAT   by   the respondent­operational creditor, by the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT has reversed the order passed by the NCLT, Kolkata and has held that the respondent’s application under Section 9 of the IBC would be maintainable even without the consent of the Central Government in terms of Section 16G of the Tea Act.   Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment   and   order   dated   20.06.2019   passed   by   the   learned NCLAT, allowing the respondent’s appeal thereby holding that the insolvency petition filed under Section 9 of the IBC would be maintainable,   the   original   respondent­corporate   debtor   has preferred the present statutory appeal. 3. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant­corporate debtor and Shri Amar Dave, 4 learned   Advocate   has   appeared   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­ operational creditor. 4. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant­corporate debtor has taken us through the relevant provisions of the Tea Act, 1953, more particularly Section 16.   He has also taken us through the objects and the purpose of the Tea Act. 4.1 It   is   submitted   by   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the Tea Act is a special Act for the purpose of providing control by the Union of India of the Tea Industry.   It is submitted that Section 16D(1) of the Tea Act, 1953 provides for taking over the tea unit and the tea undertaking inter alia if the Central Government is of the opinion that the tea unit is being managed in a manner highly detrimental   to   the   tea   industry   or   to   public   interest.       It   is submitted   that   Section   16D(4)   provides   that   the   Central Government shall take such steps as may be necessary for the purpose of efficiently managing the business of the undertaking. It is submitted that any notification under Section 16D is to have effect for a period not exceeding five years which can only be extended if the Central Government is of the opinion that it is expedient   to   do   so   in   public   interest,   for   such   period   not 5 exceeding one year at a time, and for total period not exceeding six years.   It is submitted that Section 16E refers to the power of the Central Government to restart the tea undertaking if it is found   necessary   in   the   interest   of   the   general   public.     It   is submitted that Section 16G specifically deals with a situation such   as   in   the   present   application.     It   is   submitted   that   an insolvency process is also meant to culminate in liquidation, if there is no revival.   It is submitted that since the Tea Act permits for the Central Government to take over the management of a tea estate  which   is   not  run  properly,   the   prior   permission   under Section 16G is applicable to such an estate, the management of which has been taken over by the Government.   4.2 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the “winding up”   process   under   the   Companies   Act,   1956   includes   the insolvency   proceedings   under   the   IBC.     It   is   submitted   that, therefore,   initiation   of   any   proceedings   for   winding   up   or liquidation by way of insolvency proceedings under the IBC shall be maintainable only after the consent of the Central Government is obtained, as required under Section 16G of the Tea Act which, in the present case, is lacking.   6 4.3 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in the present case,   in   the   proceedings   challenging   the   Central   Government notification dated 28.01.2016 authorising the Tea Board to take over the management and to take control of the 7 tea estates of the   appellant­corporate   debtor,   the   High   Court   of   Calcutta though has not stayed the notification, but only made an interim arrangement for the management of 7 tea estates and the High Court has directed/permitted the appellant to run the gardens in a prudent business­like manner and to pay both the current and arrear dues of the workers.     It is submitted that the interim order   has   been   passed   for   improving   the   conditions   of   the workers as also that of the tea estates.   4.4 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of the Tea Act, 1953 apply to tea units, the management of which have   been   taken   over   for   the   purpose   of   stimulating   the production and manufacturing of tea.   It is submitted that the control by the Tea Board of the manufacturing of tea from the tea units is in public interest.   It is also a welfare legislation.  The Tea Act is a Central Act and applies only to companies which are having   tea  gardens   or   tea   units.     It   is   submitted   that   if   the 7 provisions   of   the   Tea   Act   are   applicable,   then   on   a   conjoint reading of Section 16G, Section 16J and Section 16M of the Tea Act, an application under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC would not be maintainable and cannot be proceeded with without the consent of the Central Government.   4.5 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that, in the present case, by passing the impugned judgment and order, the learned NCLAT has erroneously relied upon Section 238 of the IBC to hold that the IBC will have an overriding effect over the Tea Act. It is submitted that Section 238 of the IBC will be applicable if there   is   any   conflict   between   the   two   legislations.         It   is submitted that, in the present case, there is no such conflict between the Tea Act and the IBC.  It is submitted that even the learned NCLAT in the impugned order recognizes and/or records that   the   provisions   of   the   IBC   and   the   Tea   Act   are   not inconsistent   with   each   other.     It   is   submitted   that   the   IBC process can be started if the permission is obtained from the Central   Government   by   a   financial   creditor   or   an   operational creditor.     It is submitted that the provisions of Section 7 or Section 9 may not require the consent of the Central Government to initiate such proceedings, but when the management of the tea 8 gardens have been taken over by the Central Government under the Tea Act, one will have to consider the provisions of the Tea Act which requires the consent of the Central Government.  It is submitted that, therefore, the process of insolvency resolution under the IBC has not been stopped, but what it requires is an additional   permission   under   the   Tea   Act   for   the   purpose   of initiation of such insolvency proceeding.     It is submitted that this should be logical as the management of the tea gardens is already under the Central Government under the Tea Act for public interest and for the interest of workers of the tea gardens. 4.6 It is further submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that both IBC and the Tea Act are welfare legislations.   IBC is a general Act for corporate resolution process for all corporates, but the Tea Act protects corporates which have tea gardens.   The Tea Act is a special legislation enacted by the Parliament for protecting the Tea Industries and Tea Gardens and provides for taking over the management by the Tea Board or the Central Government or any person authorized by the Central Government for running the tea gardens   or   protection   of   the   workers.   It   is   submitted   that, therefore, its provisions can be harmoniously construed along with the IBC.   9 4.7 Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court  in  the   case   of   Macquarie   Bank  Ltd.   v.   Shilpi   Cable Technologies   Ltd.   (2018)   2   SCC   674   as   well   as   the   recent decision of this Court dated 14.08.2019 in the case of  K. Kishan v. M/s. Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd.  (2018) 17 SCC 662, on non­applicability of Section 238 of the IBC.   Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions of this Court, it is submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant­corporate debtor that since there is no inconsistency between the Tea Act and the IBC, there is no occasion to apply Section 238 of the IBC to give overriding effect.    4.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appeal and   quash   and   set   aside   the   impugned   judgment   and   order passed by the learned NCLAT and restore the order passed by the NCLT, Kolkata by holding that in absence of the consent of the Central Government as provided under Section 16G of the Tea Act,   the   insolvency   proceedings   initiated   by   the   respondent­ operational   creditor   under   Section   9   of   the   IBC   shall   not   be maintainable.   10 5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Amar Dave, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent­ operational creditor. 5.1 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   Shri   Amar   Dave,   learned Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   respondent­operational creditor that the IBC is a complete Code in itself.  It is submitted that the IBC is a consolidating and amending law relating to re­ organization and insolvency resolution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.   It is submitted that the Code, which was promulgated in 2016, has not provided for the pre­ requisite of obtaining consent from the Central Government for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process like the Tea Act, which is an earlier Act enacted in 1953.   It is submitted that, thus,   such   a   pre­requisite   of   obtaining   consent   cannot   be imported   and/or   read   into   the   Code   when   the   self­contained Code itself does not provide for it.   5.2 It is further submitted that importing the requirement of obtaining consent of the Central Government prior to initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process would be completely contrary to the over­riding nature of the Code, and of the clear legislative intent of keeping the arms of the Government away from the resolution process and of not delaying the process of 11 resolution. It is further submitted that an examination of Chapter IIIA of the Tea Act reveals that the object of restarting/revival of the tea company is a writ large in the scheme of the Tea Act.  It is submitted that the said object of restarting/revival is borne out from Section 16B(2), Section 16E(1)(b), Section 16I(1) and Section 16K of the Tea Act.  It is submitted that restarting/revival of the company   is   also   the   object   of   the   IBC,   as   is   clear   from   the Preamble of the IBC and also as observed by this Court in the case of   [AIR 2019 SC Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 739 : (2019) 4 SCC 17].   It is submitted that therefore in the event of any conflict between the two legislations, the provisions of the IBC would prevail by virtue of Section 238 of the IBC. 5.3 It is submitted by Shri Dave, learned Advocate appearing on behalf  of   the   respondent­operational   creditor   that   the   present case is not one where Section 16G of the Tea Act applies at all, as the   management   has   not   been   “taken   over”   by   the   Central Government   or   the   Tea   Board.     It   is   submitted   that   the notification dated 28.01.2016 was issued under Section 16E(1) of the Tea Act.  It is submitted that, according to the sub­section (2) thereof, the provisions of Section 16G shall apply to a notified order made under Section 16E(1).   It is submitted that Section 16G(1)   shall   be   applicable   when   the   management   of   a   tea 12 undertaking or tea unit owned by a company has been taken over by the Tea Board.  It is submitted that thus Section 16G(1) of the Tea Act does not automatically get triggered with the issuance of a notification under Section 16E(1) of the Tea Act, but becomes applicable once the management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a company has been taken over by the Tea Board.  It is submitted   that,   in   the   present   case,   pursuant   to   the   interim order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in which the notification dated 28.01.2016 is challenged by the corporate debtor, the appellant­corporate debtor continues to be in  management  and   control  of   the   tea  units/gardens.       It  is submitted   that   therefore   application   of   Section   16E(1)   is   no longer prevalent and consequently Section 16G of the Tea Act shall not be applicable at all.  5.4 It   is   further   submitted   by   Shri   Dave,   learned   Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent­operational creditor that Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is applicable to a proceeding for “winding up” and not to proceeding for initiation of “corporate insolvency resolution process”, as the both are not one and the same proceedings.   It is submitted that winding up of a company is   provided   for,   and   governed   by,   the   Companies   Act.     It   is submitted   that,   on   the   other   hand,   initiation   of   corporate 13 insolvency resolution process is provided for, and governed by, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.  It is submitted that both   these   processes   are   distinct   from   one   another   and   not synonymous with one another.  It is submitted that the power of the Parliament to make any law relating to winding up can be traced to Entry nos. 33 and 34 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  It is submitted that, on the other hand, the power of the Parliament to make any law relating to insolvency can be traced to Entry no. 9 of the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.  It is submitted that, thus, winding up and insolvency proceedings are not one and the same as they have been mentioned under two separate entries in two separate lists in the Seventh Schedule.   It is submitted that, as such, Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, which mandates that no winding up proceeding can lie in any court against a company which has been taken over by the Tea Board without consent of the Central Government, does not and cannot be interpreted to mean that the said section applies to any proceeding for initiation of   corporate   insolvency   resolution   process   against   a   company which has been taken over by the Tea Board.  It is submitted that the learned NCLAT has rightly held that Section 16G(1)(c) relates to winding up and, on the other hand, Section 9 of the IBC is not 14 a   proceeding   for   winding   up,   but   for   initiation   of   “corporate insolvency resolution process” to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and from corporate debt by liquidation.   In support of his above submissions, Shri Dave, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent­operational creditor, has heavily replied upon the decisions of this Court in  Innoventive [AIR 2017 SC 4084 at paras 16, Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank  51 and 56 : (2018) 1 SCC 407],   Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd.   [AIR 2019 SC 739 at paras 10 to 12 : (2019) 4 SCC 17] and  a decision in  (2018) 18 SCC 786. PCIT v. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd.  Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the   above decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal and to confirm the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned NCLAT. 6. The short question which is posed for consideration of this Court   is   whether   before   initiation   of   the   proceedings   under Section 9 of the IBC, a consent of the Central Government as provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953 is required and/or whether in absence of any such consent of the Central Government   the   proceedings   initiated   by   the   respondent­ 15 operational   creditor   under   Section   9   of   the   IBC   would   be maintainable or not? 7. Sections 16G of the Tea Act reads as under: “ .—(1) Where 16G. Application of Act 1 of 1956 the   management  of   a  tea  undertaking   or   tea  unit owned by a company has been taken over by any person or body of persons authorised by the Central Government   under   this   Act,   then,   notwithstanding anything   contained   in   the   said   Act   or   in   the memorandum   or   articles   of   association   of   such company,—  (a)  it shall not be lawful for the shareholders of such   company   or   any   other   person   to nominate   or   appoint   any   person   to   be   a director of the company;  (b)   no   resolution   passed   in   a   meeting   of   the shareholders of such company shall be given effect   to   unless   approved   by   the   Central Government;  (c)   no   proceeding   for   the   winding   up   of   such company or for the appointment of receiver in   respect   thereof   shall   lie   in   any   court except   with   the   consent   of   the   Central Government.  (2)   Subject   to   the   provisions   contained   in   sub­ section (1), and to the other provisions contained in this   Act,   and   subject   to   such   other   exceptions, restrictions   and   limitations,   if   any,   as   the   Central Government   may,   by   notification   in   the   Official Gazette specify  in this  behalf, the  Companies Act, 1956, shall continue to apply to such company in the same manner as it applied thereto before the issue of the notified order.” 7.1 In the present case, it is true that by notification dated 28.01.2016 issued under Section 16E of the Tea Act, the Central 16 Government   authorised   the   Tea   Board   to   take   over   the management or the control of the seven tea estates mentioned in the said notification.  However, the appellant challenged the said notification before the High Court of Calcutta and the learned Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the   said   petition. However, in an appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta vide the interim order dated 20.09.2016 has permitted the appellant­corporate debtor to continue with the management of the said tea estates.  Therefore, in effect, the appellant herein has been continued to be in management and control of the tea estates,   despite   the   notification   under   Section   16E   dated 28.01.2016.     At   this   stage,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act was issued by the Central Government and the Central Government authorised the Tea Board to take steps to take over the management and control of the seven tea estates, having satisfied that the said seven tea gardens were being managed by the appellant in a manner highly detrimental to the tea industry and public interest.  Despite the same, very surprisingly, by an interim arrangement, the Division Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Calcutta   has   handed   over   the management   and   control   of   the   seven   tea   gardens   to   the appellant, because of whose mis­management, it has deteriorated 17 the condition of the tea gardens run by the appellant.  Be that as it   may,   the   fact   remains   that,   pursuant   to   the   interim arrangement/order  passed by the  Division  Bench of  the High Court   dated   29.09.2016,   the   appellant­corporate   debtor   is continued to be in management and control of the seven tea gardens and they are running the tea gardens.  Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, and more particularly when, despite the notification under Section 16E of the Tea Act, the appellant­corporate debtor is continued to be in management and control of the tea gardens/units and are running the tea gardens as   if   the   notification   dated   under   Section   16E   has   not   been issued, Section 16G of the Tea Act, more particularly Section 16G(1)(c), shall not be applicable at all.   On a fair reading of Section 16G of the Tea Act, we are of the opinion that Section 16G of the Tea Act shall be applicable only in a case where the actual management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a company has been taken over by any person or body of persons authorised   by   the   Central   Government   under   the   Tea   Act. Therefore, taking over the actual management and control by the Central   Government   or   by   any   person   or   body   of   persons authorised by the Central Government is   sine qua non   before Section 16G of the Tea Act is made applicable.  Therefore, in the 18 facts and circumstances of the case, Section 16G(1)(c) shall not be   applicable   at   all,   as   the   appellant­corporate   debtor   is continued   to   be   in   management   and   control   of   the   tea units/gardens. 7.2 Now,   so   far   as   the   main   issue,   namely,   whether   before initiation of the proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC, a prior consent of the Central Government as provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is required or not and/or in absence of any such consent of the Central Government, the proceedings under   Section   9   of   the   IBC   shall   be   maintainable   or   not,   is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that the IBC is a complete Code in itself.  In a recent decision of this Court in the case   of   Swiss   Ribbons   Pvt.   Ltd.   (supra),   this   Court   had   an occasion to consider the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the IBC and also the Preamble of the IBC, which when noted by this Court   in   its   earlier   decision   in   Innoventive   Industries   Ltd. (supra), in paragraphs 25 and 26 in the case of  Swiss Ribbons (supra), this Court has referred to the Statement of Pvt. Ltd.   Objects and Reasons of the IBC and the Preamble of the IBC. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are as under: 19 25.  The  Statement  of   Objects   and  Reasons   for the   Code   have   been   referred   to   in  Innoventive Industries  [ Innoventive   Industries   Ltd.  v.  I CICI  Bank , (2018) 1 SCC 407 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356] which states: (SCC pp. 421­22, para 12) “12.   …   The   Statement   of   Objects   and Reasons of the Code reads as under: ‘Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons.— There is no single law in India that deals with insolvency   and   bankruptcy.   Provisions relating   to   insolvency   and   bankruptcy   for companies can be found in the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the Securitisation and Reconstruction   of   Financial   Assets   and Enforcement   of   Security   Interest   Act,   2002 and the Companies Act, 2013. These statutes provide for creation of multiple fora such as Board   of   Industrial   and   Financial Reconstruction   (BIFR),   Debts   Recovery Tribunal   (DRT)   and   National   Company   Law Tribunal (NCLT) and their respective Appellate Tribunals.   Liquidation   of   companies   is handled   by   the   High   Courts.   Individual bankruptcy   and   insolvency   is   dealt   with under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and is dealt with by the courts. The existing framework for insolvency and bankruptcy is inadequate, ineffective and results in undue delays in resolution, therefore, the proposed legislation. 2. The   objective   of   the   Insolvency   and Bankruptcy Code, 2015 is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency   resolution   of   corporate   persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time­ bound manner for maximisation of value of 20 assets   of   such   persons,   to   promote entrepreneurship,   availability   of   credit   and balance the interests of all the stakeholders including alteration in the priority of payment of   government   dues   and   to   establish   an Insolvency   and   Bankruptcy   Fund,   and matters   connected   therewith   or   incidental thereto. An effective legal framework for timely resolution   of   insolvency   and   bankruptcy would support development of credit markets and   encourage   entrepreneurship.   It   would also   improve   Ease   of   Doing   Business,   and facilitate more investments leading to higher economic growth and development. 3.  The   Code   seeks   to   provide   for designating   NCLT   and   DRT   as   the adjudicating authorities for corporate persons and   firms   and   individuals,   respectively,   for resolution   of   insolvency,   liquidation   and bankruptcy. The Code separates commercial aspects   of   insolvency   and   bankruptcy proceedings from judicial aspects. The Code also seeks to provide for establishment of the Insolvency   and   Bankruptcy   Board   of   India (Board)   for   regulation   of   insolvency professionals,   insolvency   professional agencies   and   information   utilities.   Till   the Board is established, the Central Government shall   exercise   all   powers   of   the   Board   or designate   any   financial   sector   regulator   to exercise   the   powers   and   functions   of   the Board. Insolvency professionals will assist in completion   of   insolvency   resolution, liquidation   and   bankruptcy   proceedings envisaged   in   the   Code.   Information   Utilities would   collect,   collate,   authenticate   and disseminate financial information to facilitate such proceedings. The Code also proposes to establish a fund to be called the Insolvency and   Bankruptcy   Fund   of   India   for   the purposes specified in the Code. 21
4. The Code seeks to provide for<br>amendments in the Indian Partnership Act,<br>1932, the Central Excise Act, 1944, Customs<br>Act, 1962, the Income Tax Act, 1961, the<br>Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial<br>Institutions Act, 1993, the Finance Act, 1994,<br>the Securitisation and Reconstruction of<br>Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security<br>Interest Act, 2002, the Sick Industrial<br>Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act,<br>2003, the Payment and Settlement Systems<br>Act, 2007, the Limited Liability Partnership<br>Act, 2008, and the Companies Act, 2013.
5. The Code seeks to achieve the above<br>objectives.’”
26. The Preamble of the Code states as follows:
“An Act to consolidate and amend the<br>laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency<br>resolution of corporate persons, partnership<br>firms and individuals in a time­bound manner<br>for maximisation of value of assets of such<br>persons, to promote entrepreneurship,<br>availability of credit and balance the interests<br>of all the stakeholders including alteration in<br>the order of priority of payment of government<br>dues and to establish an Insolvency and<br>Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters<br>connected therewith or incidental thereto.”
7.3 After noticing and considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the IBC and the Preamble to the Code, thereafter this Court has observed and held in paragraphs 27 and 28 as under: 22
“27. As is discernible, the Preamble gives an<br>insight into what is sought to be achieved by the<br>Code. The Code is first and foremost, a Code for<br>reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate<br>debtors. Unless such reorganisation is effected in a<br>time­bound manner, the value of the assets of such<br>persons will deplete. Therefore, maximisation of value<br>of the assets of such persons so that they are<br>efficiently run as going concerns is another very<br>important objective of the Code. This, in turn, will<br>promote entrepreneurship as the persons in<br>management of the corporate debtor are removed and<br>replaced by entrepreneurs. When, therefore, a<br>resolution plan takes off and the corporate debtor is<br>brought back into the economic mainstream, it is<br>able to repay its debts, which, in turn, enhances the<br>viability of credit in the hands of banks and financial<br>institutions. Above all, ultimately, the interests of all<br>stakeholders are looked after as the corporate debtor<br>itself becomes a beneficiary of the resolution scheme<br>—workers are paid, the creditors in the long run will<br>be repaid in full, and shareholders/investors are able<br>to maximise their investment. Timely resolution of a<br>corporate debtor who is in the red, by an effective<br>legal framework, would go a long way to support the<br>development of credit markets. Since more<br>investment can be made with funds that have come<br>back into the economy, business then eases up,<br>which leads, overall, to higher economic growth and<br>development of the Indian economy. What is<br>interesting to note is that the Preamble does not, in<br>any manner, refer to liquidation, which is only<br>availed of as a last resort if there is either no<br>resolution plan or the resolution plans submitted are<br>not up to the mark. Even in liquidation, the<br>liquidator can sell the business of the corporate<br>debtor as a going concern.<br>(See ArcelorMittal [ArcelorMittal (India) (P)<br>Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1] at para<br>83, fn 3).
23 28.  It can thus be seen that the primary focus of the legislation is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor   from   its   own   management   and   from   a corporate death by liquidation. The Code is thus a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors. The interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been bifurcated and separated from that of its promoters/those who are in management. Thus, the resolution process is not adversarial to the corporate   debtor   but,   in   fact,   protective   of   its interests. The moratorium imposed by Section 14 is in the interest of the corporate debtor itself, thereby preserving the assets of the corporate debtor during the resolution process. The timelines within which the resolution process is to take place again protects the corporate debtor's assets from further dilution, and   also  protects   all  its   creditors   and   workers   by seeing that the resolution process goes through as fast as possible so that another management can, through   its   entrepreneurial   skills,   resuscitate   the corporate debtor to achieve all these ends. 7.4 Section 16G(1)(c) refers to the proceeding for winding up of such   company   or   for   the   appointment   of   receiver   in   respect thereof.  Therefore, as such, the proceedings under Section 9 of the IBC  shall not  be   limited  and/or  restricted  to  winding   up and/or   appointment   of   receiver   only.       The   winding up/liquidation of the company shall be the last resort and only on   an   eventuality   when   the   corporate   insolvency   resolution process fails.   As observed by this Court in  Swiss Ribbons Pvt.   (supra), referred to hereinabove, the primary focus of the Ltd. 24 legislation   while   enacting   the   IBC   is   to   ensure   revival   and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and from a corporate debt by liquidation and such corporate insolvency resolution process is to be completed in a time­bound manner.   Therefore, the  entire “corporate   insolvency   resolution   process”   as   such   cannot   be equated with “winding up proceedings”.   Therefore, considering Section 238 of the IBC, which is a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, 1953, shall be applicable and the provisions of the IBC shall have an over­riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953.     Any other view would   frustrate   the   object   and   purpose   of   the   IBC.     If   the submission on behalf of the appellant that before initiation of proceedings   under   Section   9   of   the   IBC,   the   consent   of   the Central Government as provided under Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is to be obtained, in that case, the main object and purpose   of   the   IBC,   namely,   to   complete   the   “corporate insolvency resolution process” in a time­bound manner, shall be frustrated.     The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that the provisions of the IBC would have an over­riding effect over the Tea Act, 1953 and that no prior consent of the Central Government before initiation of the proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC would be required and even 25 without such consent of the Central Government, the insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC initiated by the operational creditor shall be maintainable.    8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.  The impugned judgment and order dated 20.06.2019 passed by the learned NCLAT holding that insolvency petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016   initiated   by   the   respondent­operation   creditor   shall   be maintainable, is hereby confirmed.  No costs. ..................................J. (ARUN MISHRA) ...................................J. (M. R. SHAH) New Delhi                                              ...................................J. October 04, 2019                                   (B. R. GAVAI)