Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1316 of 2008
Munna Kumar Upadhyaya @
Munna Upadhyaya … Appellant
Versus
The State of Andhra Pradesh through
Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad,
Andhra Pradesh … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Swatanter Kumar, J .
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the
High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dated
th
28 March, 2007, confirming the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence passed by the learned Third Additional
nd
Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar on 22
January, 2007.
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Facts in Brief
2. One Shri Baldevraj Seth was working as Chief Track
Engineer, South Central Railway. He was living in Bungalow
No.100, Railways Officer’s Colony, South Lalaguda of
Secunderabad, the official residence allotted to him along with
his family members, i.e., his wife, Prabha Seth, son, Master
Rishab Seth and daughter Kanika Seth. Accused Chandra
Bhushan Upadhyay (Accused No.1) was working as office peon in
South Central Railways, Secunderabad and was attached to the
bungalow of Shri Baldevraj Seth for the last 7 years. Accused
No.1 was married in the year 1997 and was residing in the
servant quarters of the said bungalow. In fact, he had been given
two servant quarters. Accused No.1 was arrogant, evasive and in
the habit of revolting against Smt. Prabha Seth who was a strict
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person and demanded better performance of duties by accused
No.1. The wife of accused No.1, on the occasion of dussehra
festival, went to her native place in Bihar, to which all the
accused belong. After her departure, accused No.1 became more
arrogant. Nearly a week before the occurrence, Smt. Prabha Seth
had scolded accused No.1 for his shabby looks and had asked
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him to have a haircut. This aggravated the grudge of accused
No.1 towards her. On the very next day, accused No.1 met his
elder brother’s son, Munna Kumar Upadhyay (Accused No.2), his
brother-in-law, Maheshwar Upadhyay (Accused No.4) and their
friend, Monu Singh (Accused No.3). As already noticed, all of
them belong to the same village in the State of Bihar. Accused
No.3 was working in Bharat Steels. Because of the serious
grudge of accused No.1 towards Smt. Prabha Seth, they all
planned to kill the entire family of Shri Baldevraj Seth and to
decamp with the gold ornaments, etc.
3. In furtherance to their plan, accused No.1 is stated to have
purchased two knives from a road side hawker in the market. He
also told Accused Nos.2 to 4 to come to the bungalow in the
th
morning of the next Monday to execute their plan. On 17
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March, 2003, at about 9.30 a.m., Baldevraj Seth left for his office.
At about 10 a.m., accused No.2 to 4 came to the entrance of the
bungalow, not permitting their entry from the main gate, accused
No.1 took them to the bathroom in the back varandah and closed
the door. Accused No.1 closed all the doors from inside. He did
not permit the washerwoman to come inside the house and gave
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her clothes from outside. When the maid servants who used to
come to the house everyday to clean the house, came at their
respective times, they were sent back by accused No.1 on the
pretext that Smt. Prabha Seth wanted the house to be cleaned
with acid and phenyl and therefore, they should come on another
day. A carpenter, Janagama Maheshwar, PW23 had also come to
the premises for fixing some poster beds. However, accused No.1
did not permit him to come into the house and when the
carpenter insisted on completing the work, accused No.1 told him
that Smt. Prabha Seth was not well and does not want to be
disturbed. At about 10.30 a.m., Smt. Prabha Seth went into the
bathroom. ACCUSED NO.1 went to the room of Master Rishab,
who was watching the television, and on the pretext of showing
him something, called him to another bathroom. When Rishab
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reached the bathroom, accused Nos.2 to 4 held the boy while
accused No.1 cut his throat, as a result of which he died
instantaneously. His body was kept in the bathroom itself.
Thereafter when Smt. Prabha Seth came out of the bathroom,
accused No.1 immediately attacked her and accused No.3, Monu
Singh, opened fire on her with a countrymade pistol. When she
was trying to get free from the grip of accused No.1, there was a
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scuffle and because of the resultant misfire, accused No.3 himself
received injury on his leg. Then, accused No.1, with the knife,
succeeded in cutting the throat of Smt. Prabha Seth. Thereafter,
the accused shifted her body also to the bathroom. Accused No.1
cleaned the blood stains from the room and watched for Kanika
Seth, daughter of Baldevraj Seth, to arrive. She arrived at 11.45
a.m. from the school. When she pressed the call button, accused
No.1 directed her to enter from the back door. The moment she
stepped in, accused Nos.2 and 4 held her and accused No.1 cut
her throat with a knife, as a result of which she collapsed. Her
body was then shifted to the bathroom. After killing these three
members of the family, they ran towards the bedroom, opened
the almirah, took gold ornaments like necklace, chains, rings,
wrist watch and net cash of Rs.44,560/-, which they distributed
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among themselves.
4. Accused No.3, Monu Singh was bleeding as a result of the
bullet injury that he suffered. The other accused took him to the
premises of Bharat Steel, where he was working as a security
guard. There, one Shashidhar Pandey advised them to take
accused No.3 to a doctor. The doctor, after observing the injury
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of accused No.3, asked them to shift the patient to Gandhi
Hospital, Secunderabad. In fact, the doctor helped them to get
admitted and receive the treatment. accused No.1 gave
Rs.2,000/- to the said doctor for medical expenses and after
giving that money, accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 left the place. Accuse
No.1 sent away Pandu, the watchman, who had come to the
residence of Baldevraj Seth, on the pretext of securing sweets.
At about 6.50 p.m., Baldevraj Seth, returned from his office to his
bungalow. He noticed that the lights of the bungalow were off.
As a routine, the driver used to bring the briefcase of Baldevraj
Seth inside the bungalow, but on that day, he was prevented
from doing so by Accused No.1, who brought the briefcase inside
himself. Baldevraj Seth, entered the house and immediately
thereafter, accused fired at him and killed him. After killing him,
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he shifted his body also into the bathroom and cleaned the floor
of the hall with phenyl and acid. He called Smt. Anju, accused
No.5, who is his sister and was residing with him, to clean the
floor, whereafter accused No.1 went away to Mahindra Hills to
meet his brother in law. Thereafter, accused Nos.1, 2 and 4
returned to the bungalow and found that Pandu, the watchman
was sleeping in the guardroom at the main gate. The accused
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waited there and at about 11 p.m. and then they took the car
from the garage, shifted the dead bodies to the car putting the
body of Baldevraj Seth in the dickey of the car. Accuse Nos.1
and 2 took the car near the railway garage. They also dumped
their blood stained clothes, as well as those of the deceased, in
the car. After taking the car near the railway tracks at SP
Nagar, Malkajgiri, and parking there, accused Nos.1 and 2 came
back to Tarnaka to buy petrol. Accused No.2 purchased ten
litres of petrol at Osmania University filling station, Tarnaka.
They brought the petrol to the place where the accused had
parked the car, put the petrol on the car and burnt the dead
bodies with the car.
5. Thereafter, accused No.1 returned to the bungalow. Upon
returning, in the next morning at 6 a.m., the accused informed
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the neighbour, one Sanjay Kumar Mishra (PW3) and others that
Baldevraj Seth had gone with his family for dinner outside, on
th
17 March, 2003 at about 7.30 p.m. and did not return again.
th
On 18 March, 2003 at about 6.45 a.m., Municipal Counsellor,
PW-1 made a report in Malkajgiri Police Station stating that he
had come to know that a car was in flames at SP Nagar Road,
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Malkajgiri, near Railway water tank. The Maruti car was
completely burnt and some dead bodies were found in the car, so
PW-1 requested the police to take necessary action. Upon this,
Sub-Inspector of Police, Malkajgiri, PW-47 registered a case
under Sections 302, 201 IPC noted the engine No. and chassis
No. of the vehicle and thereby traced the owner. The dog squad
was also put into service. In the meanwhile, the Chief Engineer
along with other senior officers visited the spot and informed the
police that one Meenal Seth, PW-12, the other daughter of
Baldevraj Seth, was on the way from Delhi to Hyderabad in
Rajdhani Express and had telephoned them stating that she was
calling the phone numbers of the family members, but no one
was responding. Thus, he had sent his peon to the house of
Baldevraj Seth. However, accused No.1 had given him the same
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excuse that he had given to the neighbours that the family had
gone out. In the morning, he had been told that the family had
not returned. The dead bodies, on the basis of the articles
recovered from the car itself, were identified. After establishing
the identity of the deceased, the investigating officer prepared the
inquest report and started the investigation.
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6. During the course of investigation, the investigating officer
recorded the statements of different witnesses. From the very
initial stages, accused No.1 appears to have been the prime
suspect. It was for this reason that Pandu, PW8 had informed
the investigating officer that he was not permitted to enter the
bungalow and the accused had insisted that he remain at the
front gate and he was then sent to buy sweets, which he gave to
Accused No.5 on his return. When the bungalow of the
deceased was examined, at number of places, blood marks were
found sprinkled on the wall and the floor had become sticky as it
had been washed with phenyl and acid. Since accused No.1
failed to explain all these suspicious circumstances, he was
arrested and it is the case of the prosecution that he finally
th
confessed to the offence on 19 March, 2003, upon interrogation
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conducted in the presence of two mediators. He also admitted
that the offence was committed with the assistance of Accused
Nos.2 to 4 and Accused No.5. The cell phone and the knife
which were used in the commission of the crime were thrown by
the accused in the dustbin near the church at Mettuguda. In
furtherance to the confessional statement of the accused and at
his instance, the cell phone, a portion of the gold ornaments,
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cash and knife were recovered. On the basis of the
information supplied by accused No.1, accused No.5 was also
arrested and gold ornaments were seized from her. At the
instance of Accused No.2, one country made revolver and one
7.62 M rib and OFV 9208 live cartridge, which were hidden near
the railway track, were recovered and seized along with the
portion of the gold ornaments recovered from him. The detailed
confessional statement and seizure reports were prepared in the
presence of witnesses. Finger prints of accused Nos.1 to 5 were
collected and sent for comparison with that of chance prints
obtained from the house of Baldevraj Seth. Upon recognition,
forensic science experts, headed by Dr. Rajagopal Reddy,
Professor of Forensic Medicine, Gandhi Medical College,
Hyderabad visited the spot and held autopsy. The incriminating
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articles and other collected materials were also sent for DNA
Analysis to the laboratory. The investigating officer recorded the
statement of a number of witnesses, obtained the report from the
laboratory and finally filed the charge-sheet before the court of
competent jurisdiction. All the accused were committed to the
Court of Sessions, which charged the accused as follows:-
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“Against A1 – Under Sections 302, 201, 435,
380 or alternatively U/s 411 IPC and U/s
25(1)(a) and 27 of Arms Act.
Against A2 – Under section 302, 302 R/w
34, 201, 435, 380 or alternatively 411 IPC.
Against A3 – Under section 302, 380 or
alternatively 411 IPC and 25(1)(a) and 27 of
Arms Act.
Against A4 – Under Section 302, 302 R/w
34, 201, 380 or alternatively U/s 411 IPC.
Against A5 – Under Section 201, 380 or
alternatively U/s 411 IPC.”
7. They were tried in accordance with law and by a very
th
detailed judgment dated 24 January, 2007, the trial court found
all the accused guilty of different offences as charged and
punished them as follows:-
“a) A1 (Chandra Bushan Upadhyay) is
sentenced to death for the offence U/s 302
IPC. A1 is also sentenced to suffer R.I. for
3 years each for the other offences U/ss.
201, 435, 411 IPC and section 25(1) (a) and
27(1) of Arms Act. All these sentences shall
run concurrently.
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b) A2 (Munna Kumar Upadhyay @ Munna
Upadhyaya) is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for life for the offence U/s.
302 R/w 34 IPC. He is also sentenced to
suffer RI for 3 years each for the offences
U/ss. 201, 435 and 411 IPC. All the
sentences shall run concurrently.
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c) A3 (Monu Singh) is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for life for the offence U/s.
302 R/w 34 IPC. He is also sentenced to
suffer R.I. for 3 years each for the offences
U/ss. 411 IPC and 25(1)(a), 27 of the Arms
Act. All the sentences shall run
concurrently.
d) A4 (Maheshwar Upadhyay) is sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for life for the offence
U/s. 302 R/w 34 IPC. He is also sentenced
to suffer R.I. for 3 years each for the
offences U/ss. 201, and 411 IPC. All the
sentences shall run concurrently.
e) A5 (Smt. Anju Choubey) is sentenced to
suffer R.I. for 3 years each for the offence
U/s 201 and 411 IPC respectively. The
period of detention already undergone by A5
shall be given set off against the sentence
imposed as per Sec. 428 Cr.PC. Both the
sentences shall run concurrently.”
8. Being aggrieved from the judgment of the trial court, all the
accused preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High
th
Court, vide its judgment dated 28 March, 2007, acquitted the
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Accused Nos 3 and 4, namely, Monu Singh and Maheshwar
Upadhyay, of all offences with which they were charged.
However, it affirmed the conviction of accused No.1, Chandra
Bhushan Upadhyay, accused No.2, Munna Kumar Upadhyay and
accused No.5, Anju Choubey.
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9. While dealing with the order of sentence, the High Court
partially accepted the plea of accused No. 1 and commuted the
death sentence awarded to him by the trial court, to life
imprisonment. Accused No. 5 had only been convicted for the
offence under Sections 201 and 411 IPC and she has not
preferred any appeal before this Court. The State has also not
preferred any appeal before this Court against the acquittal of
accused Nos. 3 and 4. Accused No. 1, Chandra Bhushan
Upadhyay, had filed an appeal challenging the judgment of the
High Court, but the same was dismissed at the SLP stage itself,
th
as being withdrawn, vide order of this Court dated 6 August,
2007. Thus, in the present appeal, we are only concerned with
the contentions raised on behalf of accused No. 2. The learned
counsel appearing for the said appellant has contended :
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A. The case being one of circumstantial evidence, the entire
evidence is of very weak nature. The prosecution has not
been able to establish the chain of circumstances which
undoubtedly points only towards the guilt of the accused.
B. The High Court has entirely based its order of conviction on
the finger prints found at the place of occurrence and there is
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no evidence as to how the finger prints of the accused persons
were collected by the Police and how they were dispatched to
the forensic laboratory for the purposes of comparison. The
vital link in the evidence relating to finger prints is missing
and as such, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set
aside.
C. The test identification parade, firstly, was not held in
accordance with law and secondly, it was held after
considerable unexplained delay, that too, when the
photographs of the accused had been published in the
newspapers. Thus, the courts could not have relied upon the
identification parade in returning a finding of guilt against the
accused.
D. Lastly, the contention is that the acquittal of accused Nos. 3
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and 4 by the High Court on merits is clear indication that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, the High Court ought to have acquitted the
present appellant as well.
10. There can be no doubt that the present case is one of
circumstantial evidence. There is no witness to the commission
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of crime. Thus, there is a definite requirement of law that a
heavy onus upon the prosecution be discharged to prove the
complete chain of events and circumstances which will establish
the offence and would undoubtedly only point towards the guilt
of the accused. To prove this chain of events, prosecution had
examined as many as 49 witnesses. This included the persons
who were working at the bungalow, neighbours, the worker at the
petrol pump from which Accused no.2 purchased petrol, the
doctors, forensic experts, fingerprint expert and the only
surviving member of the family i.e., daughter Meenal Seth, PW12.
This ocular evidence is obviously in addition to the documentary
and expert evidence brought by the prosecution on record. A
case of circumstantial evidence is primarily dependent upon the
prosecution story being established by cogent, reliable and
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admissible evidence. Each circumstance must be proved like
any other fact which will, upon their composite reading,
completely demonstrate how and by whom the offence had been
committed. This Court has clearly stated the principles and the
factors that would govern judicial determination of such cases.
Reference can be made to the case of Sanatan Naskar and Anr.
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Vs. State of West Bengal [(2010) 8 SCC 249], where the Court
held as follows:-
“27. There cannot be any dispute to the fact
that it is a case of circumstantial evidence
as there was no eyewitness to the
occurrence. It is a settled principle of law
that an accused can be punished if he is
found guilty even in cases of circumstantial
evidence provided, the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt complete
chain of events and circumstances which
definitely points towards the involvement
and guilt of the suspect or accused, as the
case may be. The accused will not be
entitled to acquittal merely because there is
no eyewitness in the case. It is also equally
true that an accused can be convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence subject
to satisfaction of the accepted principles in
that regard.
28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra held as under: (SCC pp. 184-
85, paras 152-54)
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“ 152 . Before discussing the cases
relied upon by the High Court we
would like to cite a few decisions on
the nature, character and essential
proof required in a criminal case which
rests on circumstantial evidence alone.
The most fundamental and basic
decision of this Court is Hanumant
Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.
This case has been uniformly followed
and applied by this Court in a large
number of later decisions up-to-date,
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for instance, the cases of Tufail v.
State of U.P. and Ram Gopal v. State of
Maharashtra . It may be useful to
extract what Mahajan, J. has laid
down in Hanumant case : (AIR pp. 345-
46, para 10)
‘ 10 . … It is well to remember that
in cases where the evidence is of
a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should in the first instance be
fully established, and all the facts
so established should be
consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the
circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency
and they should be such as to
exclude every hypothesis but the
one proposed to be proved. In
other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of
the accused and it must be such
as to show that within all human
probability the act must have
been done by the accused.’
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153 . A close analysis of this decision would
show that the following conditions must be
fulfilled before a case against an accused
can be said to be fully established:
( 1 ) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established.
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It may be noted here that this Court
indicated that the circumstances concerned
‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’
established. There is not only a grammatical
but a legal distinction between ‘may be
proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’
as was held by this Court in Shivaji
9
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra
where the observations were made: [SCC p.
807, para 19 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
‘ 19 . … Certainly, it is a primary
principle that the accused must be and
not merely may be guilty before a court
can convict and the mental distance
between “may be” and “must be” is
long and divides vague conjectures
from sure conclusions.’
(emphasis in original)
( 2 ) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the
accused is guilty,
( 3 ) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
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( 4 ) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be
proved, and
( 5 ) there must be a chain of evidence
so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
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154 . These five golden principles, if we may
say so, constitute the panchsheel of the
proof of a case based on circumstantial
evidence.”
11. Now, let us examine the prosecution evidence in this case
before considering the contentions raised on behalf of the
appellant. PW-47 is the police officer who had registered the
First Information Report, Ext.P-134. PW-48 and 49 are the
investigating officers who conducted the investigation of the case.
The identity of all the deceased and the fact that they were
residents of the bungalow in question, that accused Nos. 1 and 5
were living in the premises and that accused No. 2 was nephew of
accused No. 1 have been fully established on record by the
statements of PW-3 to PW-8 and PW-12, Meenal Seth, daughter
of Baldevraj Seth.
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12. The identity of the deceased persons as well as the
connection of accused No. 3 with the commission of crime has
duly been proved by Ext. P-96, the DNA Report from the Forensic
Science Laboratory Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh which was
specifically recorded and supported by the evidence of PW-39, Dr.
G.V. Jagdamba. According to this witness, he had received the
requisition from the Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad for
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performing DNA test. He stated that he conducted the DNA test
on the items which were received by him. The analysis was
taken up by organic extraction process and thereby he could
establish the identity of deceased, Kanika Seth and Prabha Seth
as also the involvement of Monu Singh, accused No. 3 after
examination of the submitted blood samples .
13. In fact, there can be no doubt as to the fact that the
accused No. 1 was working as domestic servant of Baldevraj Seth
and living in the servant quarters. The reason for commission of
crime, as per the case of the prosecution, was the persistent
grudge of accused No. 1 towards Prabha Seth, the deceased.
14. All the accused planned and then killed all the four
members of the family, one by one. They committed the crime
in a most brutal manner by cutting the throat of each one of the
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deceased. Of course, in the process, when accused No. 3 wanted
to shoot Prabha Seth in the scuffle, he suffered the gun injury
and later they killed Prabha Seth by causing a knife injury at her
throat.
15. To this entire occurrence, there is no eye-witness but the
attendant circumstances have fully been established by the
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prosecution. The forensic expert as well as the neighbours and
the Investigating Officers had seen the blood stained walls, the
floor, having been washed with phenyl and acid, which was
sticky and various incriminating items seized in the presence of
the witnesses after confessions of the accused.
16. Furthermore, PW-8, Pandu clearly stated that when he had
come to the bungalow, it was accused No. 1 who did not permit
him to go inside the house and asked him to wait outside at the
main gate and then, had even sent him to get the sweets from the
market, which he brought and gave to accused No. 5. Similarly,
Janagana Maheshwar, carpenter, PW-23, who had come to repair
the wooden bedsteads was again not allowed admission into the
house and was sent away to work outside, on the pretext that
Prabha Seth was not feeling well and did not want to be
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disturbed. PW-3 identified accused No.1, accused No.2 and
accused No.5 as he had seen them in the bungalow on various
occasions. PW-4, Sabita also stated that she was working as a
maid servant for sweeping and mopping the floor of the bungalow
and on the fateful day, was not permitted by accused No.1 to do
her routine job. She found that the rear door from where she
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used to enter the house normally had been closed from inside
and after she called for the accused, he asked her to go away
because Prabha Seth was not feeling well. On similar lines were
the statements of PW5 and PW6. The following portion of the
statement of PW-6, in fact, completely brings out the involvement
of accused No. 1 in the commission of the crime.
“Then A1 asserted that madam had gone to
a movie, got wild and in an angry mood
asked me to go away. I noticed the floor of
the hall sticky and wet. Then I asked A1
why the floor in the hall is sticky and wet.
A1 replied me that madam asked him to
clean the floor of the hall with an acid and
accordingly he washed the floor of the hall
with an acid and asked me to go away, in an
angry mood. Then I returned home. As
soon as I came out of the house, A1 closed
the rear door from inside. I returned to my
house. On the next day i.e. on 18-03-2003
at about 7.30 a.m., I was returning home by
purchasing milk from a nearby milk booth.
I found A1 and the wife of PW3 talking with
each other. She was asking A1 whether
B.R. Seth and his family members had come
back or they gave any information through
telephone, for which A1 replied her that
Seth and his family members have not come
back. I returned to my house. At about
11.00 a.m. on 18-03-2003, police officials
and railway official came to the official
bungalow of B.R. Seth. Then I came to
know about the death of B.R. Seth and his
family.”
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17. Besides all this is the statement of PW-12, the sole surviving
member of Seth family, which has fully corroborated the
statement of all these witnesses, as well as that of neighbour
PW3. She was travelling from Delhi to Secunderabad by train.
A number of times, she claims to have called up the numbers of
her father and other family members, but none responded.
Upon this, she had rang up PW-3 to find out what had happened.
It was only on her arrival at Secunderabad that she came to
know about the unfortunate event where her entire family had
been murdered by the accused. Accused had disappeared from
the premises in question. Prior thereto, he had even told the
neighbour, who made enquiry in furtherance to the phone calls
by PW-12, that Baldevraj Seth and the family had gone out in the
th
car on the evening of 17 March, 2003, but had never returned
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back. There is no occasion for so many witnesses to depose
falsely implicating the accused in the commission of crime. The
statement of these witnesses seen in conjunction with the
circumstance that the accused had given different and conflicting
versions to different persons (servants and neighbours) at
different times, either for not permitting their entry into the
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th
house, or claiming that the family had gone out on 17 March,
2003, fully support the case of the prosecution.
18. PW25 is again a very material witness, who has proved the
involvement of accused No. 2 in the commission of the crime.
According to this witness, he was working as a helper in the
University Filling Station petrol pump. He knew only accused
th
No.2. On the evening of 17/18 March, 2003, at about 12.30 –
1.00 a.m. accused No. 2 had come to the petrol pump and asked
for 10 litres of petrol. Accused No. 2 was carrying a plastic
container for that purpose. Upon enquiry from this witness, he
told this witness that he needed the petrol because his family
was travelling in a car and the petrol in the car had finished. On
this pretext, he purchased 10 litres of petrol. Accused No. 2 paid
this witness Rs.350/- and had to collect Rs.3 as change. When
JUDGMENT
PW-25 was looking for the change, the accused did not wait and
went away. This witness duly identified MO 74, the plastic cane
in which he had given petrol to the accused. This petrol,
according to the prosecution, had been used in burning the car
as well as the dead bodies of the deceased persons. PW36, M.
Sanjiv Kumar, is the forensic expert who had been sent various
24
Page 24
items collected from the scene of the car. According to him, he
was asked to analyze for detection of flammable material on these
items. Upon analysis, he gave a report that the items 1 to 8, 24
and 31 were detected for flammable material. From the burnt
clothes, he reported that they bore traces of flammable material.
Smell of petrol was also present at the scene and this fact stood
confirmed by the statement of PW48, the Investigating Officer.
Thus, it is clear that accused No. 2 had taken the petrol from the
petrol pump and used it, along with other accused, for the
purpose of putting the car and the dead bodies of the deceased
persons on fire.
19. PW45, another forensic expert, had found human blood in
the rooms where the crime was committed and also on the items
which were sent to him for his opinion. The presence of human
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blood (B+) on these items, including the clothes which were sent
for serological examination, clearly indicates that in that house,
murder of some human being had been committed. Identities of
those human beings stands completely established not only by
expert evidence but by the evidence of the neighbours also.
25
Page 25
20. The prosecution had also examined the ballistics expert as
PW-37. He expressed his opinion that item No. 2 was a live
cartridge and he opined that it was a country made pistol with
7.62 MM calibre and that the cartridges recovered had been fired
from the recovered pistol. The cartridges were recovered from the
bungalow while the pistol and live cartridge was recovered in
furtherance to the confessional statements made by accused
Nos.2 and 3.
21. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had argued
with some vehemence that the reliance placed by the High Court
on the evidence relating to finger prints is misplaced, as it has
not even been proved in accordance with law. Firstly, we may
notice that the judgments of the Courts below do not solely rely
upon the evidence of finger prints, but this was only one of the
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factors which were taken into consideration by the trial Court.
Secondly, the contention itself is without any substance.
22. PW-38, the finger print expert had visited the site and lifted
some chance finger prints on the steel almirahs from near the
inner lock door and another set of finger prints from the rear side
of the bathroom. During the course of investigation, the
26
Page 26
investigating officer PW-48, with the leave of the Court, had
taken the sample finger prints of all the accused, i.e., accused
No.1 to accused No.5. These finger prints were sent to the
forensic laboratory to be compared with the chance finger prints
that had been lifted by the expert. The Investigating Officer had
sent them vide Ext. P52 to the finger print expert. These were
examined by the expert, who submitted his Report vide Ext. P73
to the Court and in particular vide Ext. P38, he clearly stated
that the chance finger prints matched with the finger prints of
accused Nos.1 and 2. This expert was examined as PW38 in
the Court. In his statement, he clearly stated that he had not
found any chance print, either on the plastic tin or on the burnt
car, but with regard to the chance finger prints collected from the
bungalow, i.e. inner lock door of steel almirah and the back door
JUDGMENT
of the house, he clearly stated that those matched the finger print
slip containing the finger prints of Munna Kumar Upadhyay
(accused No. 2), which are marked as “P”. This witness was
cross-examined at length, without any material to favour the
accused. Even in his cross-examination, he clearly stated that
when they went to the bungalow, the steel almirah of the
bedroom was open. He also examined the wooden door planks
27
Page 27
of the rear side bathroom and had taken a chance print from
there, which was later proved to match the prints of accused
No.1.
23. No suggestion was put to this witness in his cross-
examination that he never went to the site, never collected the
finger prints or that the finger prints of the accused were never
sent by the police to him. We may also notice that, even to the
investigating officer, this suggestion was never put. The attempt
on behalf of the accused to object to the evidence of the finger
prints on the ground that the investigating officer has not told in
his examination-in-chief that he had taken the finger prints of
the accused and sent them to the expert does not carry much
weight in view of the above documentary, ocular and expert
evidence. It was expected of the Investigating Officer to make a
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statement in that behalf, but absence of such statement would
not weight so much against the prosecution that the court
should be persuaded to reject the evidence of PW38 along with
the clinching evidence of Ext. P-52, P-72 and P-73 respectively.
24. Equally without merit is the submission on behalf of the
appellant that the finger print could be there upon the almirah in
28
Page 28
the normal course of business, as accused No. 1 was the
domestic servant working in the bungalow. What is important
is that the presence of finger prints of accused No. 2 found in the
house and particularly on the almirah in the bedroom of the
deceased, remain unexplained and secondly, no attempt was
made by any of the accused persons to take a stand to explain
their conduct.
25. The reliance upon the case of Chandran @ Surendran and
Anr. Vs. State of Kerala [1991 Supp. (1) SCC 39, para 21 and 24]
is again not of help to the accused inasmuch as the facts of that
case were totally different and the accused had taken up the plea
that the finger prints upon the glass had been taken by the police
by coercion. The Court, on the facts of that case and upon the
evidence before the Court, came to the conclusion that finger
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print evidence was not reliable because among all glass pieces,
only two had matching finger prints and no appropriate
explanation has been given.
26. In the present case, lifting of chance finger prints and on
comparison being found to be matching with the sample finger
prints of the accused, taken by the Police, is not the only piece of
29
Page 29
evidence. There is corroborating evidence of the prosecution
witnesses on the one hand, and on the other, evidence of PW-12,
the daughter of the deceased, who identified the gold ornaments,
which were stolen by the accused from the almirah, as belonging
to her deceased mother and which were recovered from the
possession of accused persons.
27. This Court, in the case of B.A. Umesh v. Registrar General,
High Court of Karnataka [(2011) 3 SCC 85], where the finger
prints were found on the handle of a steel almirah to which the
persons from outside had no access, held as under:-
“75. The aforesaid position is further
strengthened by the forensic report and that
of the fingerprint expert to establish that the
fingerprints which had been lifted by PW 13
from the handle of the steel almirah in the
room, matched the fingerprint of the
appellant which clearly established his
presence inside the house of the deceased.
The explanation attempted to be given for
the presence of the fingerprints on the
handle of the almirah situated inside the
room of the deceased does not inspire any
confidence whatsoever. In a way, it is the
said evidence which scientifically
establishes beyond doubt that the appellant
was present in the room in which the
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deceased was found after her death and had
been identified as such not only by PW 2,
who actually saw him in the house
immediately after Jayashri was murdered,
30
Page 30
but also by PWs 10 and 11, who saw him
coming out of the house at the relevant
point of time with the bag in his hand. The
fingerprint of the appellant found on the
handle of the almirah in the room of the
deceased proves his presence in the house
of the deceased and that he and no other
caused Jayashri's death after having violent
sexual intercourse with her against her
will.”
28. In light of the above, we have no hesitation in rejecting this
contention of the appellant. The prosecution has by other
evidence, clearly been able to establish the physical contact
between the accused and the articles within the almirah, and
therefore, the almirah door also.
29. In the present case, as far as the deceased persons are
concerned, because of the burnt condition of bodies, there could
be no other evidence of cause of death except identification of the
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deceased persons, which has already been established by the
prosecution. The accused persons, particularly, accused Nos. 1,
2 and 3 have suffered physical injury. Accused No. 3 had even
suffered bullet injury which has been proved on record by the
statement of PW-46, the doctor, as also PW-33 and PW-43, all
doctors. PW-18, who was running a clinic in the name of “Baba
Clinic” NFC Main Road, stated that he knew the accused and on
31
Page 31
th
17 March, 2003, the accused persons had come to his residence
and informed him that accused No.3 had suffered injury on
account of a fall due to drunken stage. After examining accused
No.3, he found two bullet gun shots on the left leg of accused
No.3, who was also in intoxicated condition. They were sent to
hospital for treatment and they paid money for treatment.
Thereafter, leaving Accused No. 3 in the hospital, the rest of the
accused went missing. These are the circumstances which
connect the accused persons with the crime.
30. The High Court has declined to rely upon any of the extra
judicial confessions made by the accused persons to various
other persons. It is stated by the prosecution that the Panch
witnesses P. Chiranjeevi, PW-41 and Sudarshan Rao, PW-34
were called to the bungalow by the investigating officer PW-49,
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and it was this mediator Shri P. Chiranjeevi, PW-41 who made
inquiries. When the inquiry was made from Accused No. 1,
Accused No. 1 is voluntarily stated to have confessed to opening
the almirah and taking out the cash and jewellery. He also
confessed that he had murdered the deceased and had hid the
knife and cell phone in the MCH dustbin near Mettuguda. In
32
Page 32
furtherance to his statement Ext. P-37, recoveries were also
effected.
31. Accused No. 2 had also made a confessional statement to
Panchas. From the statements of accused No. 2, they had got
recovered the cartridges and pistol, etc. also.
32. PW33, Dr. D. Sudha Rani who had treated the accused for
their injuries, stated in her statement that the accused persons
th
had told her that they had suffered injuries on 17 March, 2003
while committing the murder and at different times, when they
killed each of the deceased.
33. The High Court was right in not relying upon such
confessions, but it ought to have rejected only the part which is
inadmissible in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of
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the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
34. The statements in so far as they concern the use of various
articles in commission of crime and recovery of such articles and
stolen items, would form a valid and admissible piece of evidence
for the consideration of the court. The history given to the
doctor at the time of treatment would not be strictly an extra
33
Page 33
judicial confession, but would be a relevant piece of evidence, as
these documents had been prepared by PW33 in the normal
course of her business. Even the accused do not dispute that
they were given treatment by the doctor in relation to these
injuries. Thus, it was for the accused to explain this aspect.
This Court has had the occasion to discuss the effect of extra-
judicial confessions in a number of decisions.
35. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [1995 Supp. (4) SCC
259], this Court stated the principle that an extra-judicial
confession, by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence
and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution.
Where an extrajudicial confession is surrounded by suspicious
circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its
importance.
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36. In Pakkirisamy v. State of T.N. [(1997) 8 SCC 158], the Court
held that it is well settled that it is a rule of caution where the
court would generally look for an independent reliable
corroboration before placing any reliance upon such extra-
judicial confession.
34
Page 34
37. Again, in Kavita v. State of T.N. [(1998) 6 SCC 108], the
Court stated the dictum that there is no doubt that conviction
can be based on extrajudicial confession, but it is well settled
that in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence.
It is to be proved just like any other fact and the value thereof
depends upon veracity of the witnesses to whom it is made.
38. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing
the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial
confession, this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180] stated the principle that an extra-
judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state
of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will
have to be proved like any other fact. The value of evidence as to
confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of
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the witness to whom it has been made. The Court further
expressed the view that such a confession can be relied upon and
conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the
confession comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be
unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in
respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to
35
Page 35
indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful
statement to the accused.
39. In the case of Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of W.B. [(2007) 12
SCC 230], the Court, while holding that reliance on extra-judicial
confession by the lower courts in absence of other corroborating
material, was unjustified, observed:
“87. Confession ordinarily is admissible in
evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted
upon. Confession may under certain
circumstances and subject to law laid down
by the superior judiciary from time to time
form the basis for conviction. It is, however,
trite that for the said purpose the court has
to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness
of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the
confession; (iii) corroboration.
XXX XXX XXX
89. A detailed confession which would
otherwise be within the special knowledge of
the accused may itself be not sufficient to
raise a presumption that confession is a
truthful one. Main features of a confession
are required to be verified. If it is not done,
no conviction can be based only on the sole
basis thereof.”
JUDGMENT
40. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession,
the Court in the case of Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan
[(2010) 10 SCC 604] held that :-
36
Page 36
“29. There is no absolute rule that an
extra-judicial confession can never be the
basis of a conviction, although ordinarily
an extra-judicial confession should be
corroborated by some other material. [Vide
Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of
Mysore, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P.,
Sivakumar v. State (SCC paras 40 and 41 :
AIR paras 41 & 42), Shiva Karam
Payaswami Tewari v. State of Maharashtra
and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B.]
30. In the present case, the extra-judicial
confession by Balwan has been referred to
in the judgments of the learned Magistrate
and the Special Judge, and it has been
corroborated by the other material on
record. We are satisfied that the confession
was voluntary and was not the result of
inducement, threat or promise as
contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence
Act, 1872.”
41. Dealing with the situation of retraction from the extra
judicial confession made by an accused, the Court in the case of
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Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 5 SCC
740], held as under :
“It appears therefore, that the appellant has
retracted his confession. When an extra-
judicial confession is retracted by an
accused, there is no inflexible rule that the
court must invariably accept the retraction.
But at the same time it is unsafe for the
court to rely on the retracted confession,
unless, the court on a consideration of the
37
Page 37
entire evidence comes to a definite
conclusion that the retracted confession is
true.”
42. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and
made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the
witnesses must be clear, unambiguous and should clearly convey
that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-
judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of
conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial
confession should inspire confidence and the court should find
out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to
support it. [Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. [(2011) 11 SCC 754]
and Pancho v. State of Haryana [(2011) 10 SCC 165].
43. Thus, all the above circumstances have to be examined in
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light of the above principles. We have discussed in some detail
the evidence led by the prosecution and the above cases would
squarely apply to the present case.
44. Another contention of the accused is in relation to the
identification of the accused being conducted in a manner
contrary to law. The counsel, while relying upon the case of
Rajesh Govind Jagesha Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1999) 8 SCC
38
Page 38
428], submitted that the identification parade of the accused was
th
conducted much after their arrest. They were arrested on 19
March, 2003 and the identification parade of the accused was
th
conducted on 20 June, 2003. Furthermore, the photograph of
th
the accused had been published in the newspaper on 19 March,
2003. In the case relied upon by the appellant, the accused who
was stated to be having a beard and long hair and was so
described in the First Information Report was required to be
clean-shaven by the police. The fact that no person similar to
the person whose description was given in FIR was included in
the Test Identification Parade, the Court expressed
dissatisfaction and held that it was required for the prosecution
to show how
and under what circumstances the complainant and the
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witnesses came to recognise the accused. This case on facts,
therefore, is of no assistance to the accused.
45. There was some delay in holding the identification parade.
But the delay per se cannot be fatal to the validity of holding an
identification parade, in all cases, without exception. The
purpose of the identification parade is to provide corroborative
39
Page 39
evidence and is more confirmatory in its nature. No other
infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant, in the holding of the identification parade. The
identification parade was held in accordance with law and the
witnesses had identified the accused from amongst a number of
persons who had joined the identification parade. There is
nothing on record before us to say that the photographs of the
accused were actually printed in the newspaper. Even if that be
so, they were printed months prior to the identification parade
and would have lost their effect on the minds of the witnesses
who were called upon to identify an accused.
46. However, we hasten to clarify that it is always appropriate
for the investigating agency to hold identification parade at the
earliest, in accordance with law, so that the accused does not
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face prejudice on that count. We may refer to the judgment of
this Court in a more recent judgment in the case of Sidhartha
Vashisht alias Manu Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6
SCC 1], where law in relation to purpose of holding an
identification parade, the effect of delay and its evidentiary value
were discussed. The Court held as under:-
40
Page 40
“ 256. The law as it stands today is set out
in the following decisions of this Court
which are reproduced as hereinunder:
Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P. :
(SCC pp. 642-45, paras 16-17 & 19)
“ 16 . As was observed by this Court
in Matru v. State of U.P. identification
tests do not constitute substantive
evidence. They are primarily meant for
the purpose of helping the investigating
agency with an assurance that their
progress with the investigation into the
offence is proceeding on the right lines.
The identification can only be used as
corroborative of the statement in court.
(See Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain .)
The necessity for holding an
identification parade can arise only
when the accused are not previously
known to the witnesses. The whole idea
of a test identification parade is that
witnesses who claim to have seen the
culprits at the time of occurrence are
to identify them from the midst of other
persons without any aid or any other
source. The test is done to check upon
their veracity. In other words, the main
object of holding an identification
parade, during the investigation stage,
is to test the memory of the witnesses
based upon first impression and also
to
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enable the prosecution to decide
whether all or any of them could be
cited as eyewitnesses of the crime. The
identification proceedings are in the
nature of tests and significantly,
therefore, there is no provision for it in
the Code and the Evidence Act. It is
desirable that a test identification
parade should be conducted as soon as
41
Page 41
after the arrest of the accused. This
becomes necessary to eliminate the
possibility of the accused being shown
to the witnesses prior to the test
identification parade. This is a very
common plea of the accused and,
therefore, the prosecution has to be
cautious to ensure that there is no
scope for making such an allegation. If,
however, circumstances are beyond
control and there is some delay, it
cannot be said to be fatal to the
prosecution.
17 . It is trite to say that the
substantive evidence is the evidence of
identification in court. Apart from the
clear provisions of Section 9 of the
Evidence Act, the position in law is well
settled by a catena of decisions of this
Court. The facts, which establish the
identity of the accused persons, are
relevant under Section 9 of the
Evidence Act. As a general rule, the
substantive evidence of a witness is the
statement made in court. The evidence
of mere identification of the accused
person at the trial for the first time is
from its very nature inherently of a
weak character. The purpose of a prior
test identification, therefore, is to test
and strengthen the trustworthiness of
that evidence. It is, accordingly,
considered a safe rule of prudence to
generally look for corroboration of the
sworn testimony of witnesses in court
as to the identity of the accused who
are strangers to them, in the form of
earlier identification proceedings. This
rule of prudence, however, is subject to
exceptions, when, for example, the
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42
Page 42
court is impressed by a particular
witness on whose testimony it can
safely rely, without such or other
corroboration. The identification
parades belong to the stage of
investigation, and there is no provision
in the Code which obliges the
investigating agency to hold or confers
a right upon the accused to claim a
test identification parade. They do not
constitute substantive evidence and
these parades are essentially governed
by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to
hold a test identification parade would
not make inadmissible the evidence of
identification in court. The weight to be
attached to such identification should
be a matter for the courts of fact. In
appropriate cases it may accept the
evidence of identification even without
insisting on corroboration. (See Kanta
Prashad v. Delhi Admn. , Vaikuntam
Chandrappa v. State of A.P. , Budhsen
v. State of U.P. and Rameshwar Singh
v. State of J&K .)
19 . In Harbajan Singh v. State of J&K ,
though a test identification parade was
not held, this Court upheld the
conviction on the basis of the
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identification in court corroborated by
other circumstantial evidence. In that
case it was found that the appellant
and one Gurmukh Singh were absent
at the time of roll call and when they
were arrested on the night of 16-12-
1971 their rifles smelt of fresh
gunpowder and that the empty
cartridge case which was found at the
scene of offence bore distinctive
markings showing that the bullet
43
Page 43
which killed the deceased was fired
from the rifle of the appellant. Noticing
these circumstances this Court held:
(SCC p. 481, para 4)
‘ 4 . In view of this corroborative
evidence we find no substance in
the argument urged on behalf of
the appellant that the
investigating officer ought to
have held an identification
parade and that the failure of
Munshi Ram to mention the
names of the two accused to the
neighbours who came to the
scene immediately after the
occurrence shows that his story
cannot be true. As observed by
this Court in Jadunath Singh v.
State of U.P. absence of test
identification is not necessarily
fatal. The fact that Munshi Ram
did not disclose the names of the
two accused to the villagers only
shows that the accused were not
previously known to him and the
story that the accused referred to
each other by their respective
names during the course of the
incident contains an element of
exaggeration. The case does not
rest on the evidence of Munshi
Ram alone and the corroborative
circumstances to which we have
referred to above lend enough
assurance to the implication of
the appellant.’
JUDGMENT
Malkhansingh v. State of M.P. : (SCC
pp. 751-52, para 7)
44
Page 44
“ 7 . It is trite to say that the
substantive evidence is the
evidence of identification in court.
Apart from the clear provisions of
Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the
position in law is well settled by a
catena of decisions of this Court.
The facts, which establish the
identity of the accused persons,
are relevant under Section 9 of
the Evidence Act. As a general
rule, the substantive evidence of
a witness is the statement made
in court. The evidence of mere
identification of the accused
person at the trial for the first
time is from its very nature
inherently of a weak character.
The purpose of a prior test
identification, therefore, is to test
and strengthen the
trustworthiness of that evidence.
It is accordingly considered a safe
rule of prudence to generally look
for corroboration of the sworn
testimony of witnesses in court as
to the identity of the accused who
are strangers to them, in the form
of earlier identification
proceedings. This rule of
prudence, however, is subject to
exceptions, when, for example,
the court is impressed by a
particular witness on whose
testimony it can safely rely,
without such or other
corroboration. The identification
parades belong to the stage of
investigation, and there is no
provision in the Code of Criminal
Procedure which obliges the
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45
Page 45
investigating agency to hold, or
confers a right upon the accused
to claim a test identification
parade. They do not constitute
substantive evidence and these
parades are essentially governed
by Section 162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Failure to
hold a test identification parade
would not make inadmissible the
evidence of identification in court.
The weight to be attached to such
identification should be a matter
for the courts of fact. In
appropriate cases it may accept
the evidence of identification even
without insisting on
corroboration.”
259. In Mullagiri Vajram v. State of A.P.62 it
was held that though the accused was seen
by the witness in custody, any infirmity in
TIP will not affect the outcome of the case,
since the depositions of the witnesses in
court were reliable and could sustain a
conviction. The photo identification and TIP
are only aides in the investigation and does
not form substantive evidence. The
substantive evidence is the evidence in the
court on oath.”
JUDGMENT
47. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are
unable to accept the plea that merely because of delay, the Court
should reject the entire evidence of identification of the accused
in the present case. More so, the accused persons were duly
46
Page 46
identified by these very witnesses in the upon court, while they
were deposing.
48. From the above discussion, it is clear that the prosecution
had been able to comprehensively and reliably establish the
chain of circumstances. The evidence produced on record does
not leave any major loopholes in the case of the prosecution.
With the help of the prosecution witnesses, the presence of the
accused in the bungalow, their intention of committing such
heinous crime, the manner in which the accused persons had
destroyed the evidence, i.e., the car, dead bodies and blood
stained cloths of the deceased and the accused themselves, from
where and how they had procured the incriminating articles
which they used in the crime, like knife, petrol etc. and finally
the conduct of the accused prior to and after commission of the
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crime have been established by the prosecution.
49. Most importantly, the recovery of incriminating articles,
cash and jewellery belonging to the deceased, the finger prints of
the accused and the false stories given by the accused to different
persons who came to the bungalow of the deceased during
th th
17 /18 March, 2003, to ensure that none of them enter the
47
Page 47
house of the deceased stand unequivocally established. Besides
all this circumstantial evidence, another very significant aspect of
the case is that none of the accused, particularly accused No.2,
offered any explanation during the recording of their statements
under Section 313 CrPC. It is not even disputed before us that
the material incriminating evidence was put to accused No. 2
while his statement under Section 313 CrPC was recorded.
Except for a vague denial, he stated nothing more. In fact, even
in response to a question relating to the injuries that he had
suffered, he opted to make a denial, which fact had duly been
established by the statements of the investigating officers,
doctors and even the witnesses who had seen him immediately
after the crime. It is a settled law that the statement of Section
313 CrPC is to serve a dual purpose, firstly, to afford to the
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accused an opportunity to explain his conduct and secondly to
use denials of established facts as incriminating evidence against
him. In this regard, we may refer to some recent judgements of
this Court.
This Court in the case of Asraf Ali v. State of Assam [(2008)
16 SCC 328] has observed as follows :
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“ 21. Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on
the court to put in an enquiry or trial
questions to the accused for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any of the
circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him. It follows as a necessary
corollary therefrom that each material
circumstance appearing in the evidence
against the accused is required to be put to
him specifically, distinctly and separately
and failure to do so amounts to a serious
irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that
the accused was prejudiced.
22. The object of Section 313 of the Code
is to establish a direct dialogue between the
court and the accused. If a point in the
evidence is important against the accused,
and the conviction is intended to be based
upon it, it is right and proper that the
accused should be questioned about the
matter and be given an opportunity of
explaining it. Where no specific question
has been put by the trial court on an
inculpatory material in the prosecution
evidence, it would vitiate the trial. Of
course, all these are subject to rider
whether they have caused miscarriage of
justice or prejudice. This Court also
expressed a similar view in S. Harnam Singh
v. State (Delhi Admn.) while dealing with
Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1898 (corresponding to Section 313 of the
Code). Non-indication of inculpatory
material in its relevant facts by the trial
court to the accused adds to the
vulnerability of the prosecution case.
Recording of a statement of the accused
under Section 313 is not a purposeless
exercise.”
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Again, in its recent judgment in Manu Sao v . State of Bihar
[(2010) 12 SCC 310], a Bench of this Court to which one of us,
Swatanter Kumar, J., was a member, has reiterated the above-
stated view as under :
“ 12. Let us examine the essential features of
this Section 313 CrPC and the principles of
law as enunciated by judgments, which are
the guiding factors for proper application
and consequences which shall flow from the
provisions of Section 313 of the Code.
13. As already noticed, the object of
recording the statement of the accused
under Section 313 of the Code is to put all
incriminating evidence against the accused
so as to provide him an opportunity to
explain such incriminating circumstances
appearing against him in the evidence of the
prosecution. At the same time, also to
permit him to put forward his own version
or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to
his involvement or otherwise in the crime.
The court has been empowered to examine
the accused but only after the prosecution
evidence has been concluded. It is a
mandatory obligation upon the court and
besides ensuring the compliance therewith
the court has to keep in mind that the
accused gets a fair chance to explain his
conduct. The option lies with the accused to
maintain silence coupled with simpliciter
denial or in the alternative to explain his
version and reasons for his alleged
involvement in the commission of crime.
This is the statement which the accused
makes without fear or right of the other
party to cross-examine him. However, if the
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statements made are false, the court is
entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass
consequential orders, as may be called for,
in accordance with law. The primary
purpose is to establish a direct dialogue
between the court and the accused and to
put to the accused every important
incriminating piece of evidence and grant
him an opportunity to answer and explain.
Once such a statement is recorded, the next
question that has to be considered by the
court is to what extent and consequences
such statement can be used during the
enquiry and the trial. Over the period of
time, the courts have explained this concept
and now it has attained, more or less,
certainty in the field of criminal
jurisprudence.
14. The statement of the accused can be
used to test the veracity of the exculpatory
nature of the admission, if any, made by the
accused. It can be taken into consideration
in any enquiry or trial but still it is not
strictly evidence in the case. The provisions
of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the
answers given by the accused may be taken
into consideration in such enquiry or trial
and put in evidence against the accused in
any other enquiry or trial for any other
offence for which such answers may tend to
show he has committed. In other words, the
use is permissible as per the provisions of
the Code but has its own limitations. The
courts may rely on a portion of the
statement of the accused and find him
guilty in consideration of the other evidence
against him led by the prosecution,
however, such statements made under this
section should not be considered in
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isolation but in conjunction with evidence
adduced by the prosecution.”
50. In view of the above principles, it was expected of the
accused to render proper explanation for his injuries and his
conduct. However, he opted to deny the same and in fact even
gave false replies to the questions posed to him.
51. If the accused gave incorrect or false answers during the
course of his statement under Section 313 CrPC, the Court can
draw an adverse inference against him.
52. In the present case, we are of the considered opinion that
the accused has not only failed to explain his conduct, in the
manner in which every person of normal prudence would be
expected to explain but had even given incorrect and false
answers. In the present case, the Court not only draws an
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adverse inference, but such conduct of the accused would also
tilt the case in favour of the prosecution.
53. For the above reasons, we see no infirmity in the judgments
under appeal. There is no merit in the submissions raised on
behalf of the accused. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed.
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…………………………….,J.
[A.K. Patnaik]
…………………………….,J.
[Swatanter Kumar]
New Delhi;
May 8, 2012
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