Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
2024 INSC 322
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
[Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 8922 of 2022]
MANEESHA YADAV AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024
[Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 3698 of 2023]
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP(CRIMINAL) NO. 8922 OF 2022
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal challenges the order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at
rd
Allahabad dated 23 August 2022, rejecting the petition filed
by the present appellants for quashing of the First
Information Report (for short, ‘FIR’).
3. The complainant had filed the complaint that the initial
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2024.04.25
12:18:06 IST
Reason:
permission for providing admission was granted to Raj
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School of Nursing and Paramedical College, Gorakhpur (for
short, ‘the said institute’) for sixty seats but subsequently the
permission was reduced to forty seats. However, in spite of
reduction of number of seats, the said institute had admitted
sixty students. When the result of twenty students was not
published, the said students came to know about the fact
that twenty students were illegally admitted and as such the
complaints came to be filed by some of those students. One
of such complaints was filed by Respondent No.2 herein. On
the basis of such complaints, an FIR bearing Case Crime
No.18 of 2015 came to be registered in Police Station Kotwali,
District Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh.
4. The averments made in the FIR are that one Dr.
Rajaram Yadav is the Manager of the said institute, Dr.
Abhishek Yadav is the Director and Dr. C. Prasad is the
Principal of the said institute. The averments are that sixty
seats were advertised in the newspapers and the complainant
was given allurement that her admission was against a
sanctioned strength and as such she was induced to pay a
huge amount. The FIR was registered for the offences
punishable under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 406,
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504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’).
5. Subsequently, the complainant realized that her
admission was not against the sanctioned strength. As such,
she lodged the complaint alleging therein that she was
induced to take admission in the college by giving an
impression that her admission was against a sanctioned seat
and further induced her to pay a huge amount. As such, it
was averred that the accused persons had cheated the
complainant.
6. The three petitioners (appellants herein), invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”), filed a
petition for quashing of the said FIR on the ground that no
case was made out against them. The High Court, while
referring to the various judgments of this Court, observed
that the defence of the accused cannot be considered at this
stage. The High Court further observed that the petitioners
(appellants herein) had an alternative remedy to apply for
discharge under Section 239 or 227 or 245 of the Cr.P.C.
The High Court, therefore refused to entertain the petition
th
and rejected it in limine . This Court, vide order dated 30
September 2022, issued interim direction restraining the
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respondents from taking any coercive steps against the
appellants herein.
7. We have heard Shri Prem Prakash, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and Shri Ravindra Kumar
Raizada, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of
Uttar Pradesh.
8. Shri Prem Prakash, learned counsel, submits that the
appellants herein are not at all involved with the said
institute; they are neither the office bearers nor entrusted
with the duties of the day-to-day management of the said
institute. It is therefore submitted that the High Court erred
in refusing to quash the proceedings against the appellants
herein.
9. Shri Raizada, per contra, submits that one of the
appellants is the wife of the Director and the second
appellant is the sister of the Director and daughter of the
Manager and the third appellant is an employee of the said
institute. It is submitted that, as such the appellants herein
were not involved in the illegalities committed by the said
institute. It is further submitted that in any case, since the
charge-sheet has already been filed, the appellants can very
well apply for discharge.
10. No doubt that at the stage of quashing of the
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proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not
required to take into consideration the defence of the
accused. However, the FIR, even if taken at its face value,
should disclose the material which would be sufficient to
constitute the ingredients of the offences for which the FIR
was lodged.
11. Taken at its face value, the averments made in the FIR
against the appellants herein are that Smt. Maneesha Yadav
is the wife of Dr. Abhishek Yadav. Dr. Poonam Yadav is the
sister of Dr. Abhishek Yadav and daughter of Dr. Rajaram
Yadav. Insofar as Shobhita Nandan Yadav i.e. appellant No.3
is concerned, the averment is that he is an employee of the
said institute. Apart from that, there is not a single line in
the entire FIR, which would show as to how the aforesaid
appellants are concerned with the management of the said
institute. No specific role of inducement by the complainant
is attributed to any of the appellants herein. Merely because
the appellants are close relatives of the Manager or Director
of the said institute, cannot be a ground to involve them in
criminal proceedings. Unless some material was placed on
record to show that the appellants herein were in-charge of
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the affairs of the said institute or had any role to play in the
management of the institute or were involved in inducing the
complainant and other students to give them admission
against the unrecognized seats; in our view, the continuation
of the criminal proceedings would be nothing else but an
abuse of process of law.
12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana and Others v.
1
Bhajan Lal and Others :
| “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the<br>various relevant provisions of the Code under Chap-<br>ter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by<br>this Court in a series of decisions relating to the ex-<br>ercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226<br>or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the<br>Code which we have extracted and reproduced<br>above, we give the following categories of cases by<br>way of illustration wherein such power could be ex-<br>ercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any<br>court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,<br>though it may not be possible to lay down any pre-<br>cise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and<br>inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an<br>exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein<br>such power should be exercised. | ||
|---|---|---|
| (1) Where the allegations made in the fri st<br>information report or the complaint, even<br>if they are taken at their face value and<br>accepted in their entirety do not prima fa- |
1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1990 INSC 363
6
cie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first infor-
mation report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investiga-
tion by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order
of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec-
tion 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evi-
dence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any of-
fence and make out a case against the ac-
cused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inher-
ently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just con-
clusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the pro-
ceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned
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| Act, providing efficacious redress for the<br>grievance of the aggrieved party. | ||
|---|---|---|
| (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mani-<br>festly attended with mala fide and/or<br>where the proceeding is maliciously insti-<br>tuted with an ulterior motive for wreaking<br>vengeance on the accused and with a<br>view to spite him due to private and per-<br>sonal grudge. | ||
| 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that<br>the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should<br>be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection<br>and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the<br>court will not be justified in embarking upon an en-<br>quiry as to the reliability or genuineness or other-<br>wise of the allegations made in the FIR or the com-<br>plaint and that the extraordinary or inherent pow-<br>ers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the<br>court to act according to its whim or caprice.” | ||
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in
the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint
even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission
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of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are
of the considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the
case of Bhajan Lal and Others (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another v. State
2
(NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and Another :
| “14. First, we would like to deal with the submis-<br>sion of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2<br>that once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for<br>quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any<br>merit in this submission, keeping in mind the posi-<br>tion of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of<br>Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat,<br>(2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph<br>Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat,<br>(2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] , this<br>Court while deciding the question whether the High<br>Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for<br>quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was fli ed by<br>the police during the pendency of the Section 482<br>petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) | ||
|---|---|---|
| “16. Thus, from the general conspectus of<br>the various sections under which the ap-<br>pellant is being charged and is to be pros-<br>ecuted would show that the same are not<br>made out even prima facie from the com-<br>plainant's FIR. Even if the charge-sheet<br>had been filed, the learned Single Judge<br>[Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat,<br>2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have<br>still examined whether the offences al- |
2 (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060
9
| leged to have been committed by the ap-<br>pellant were prima facie made out from<br>the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, doc-<br>uments, etc. or not.” | ||
|---|---|---|
| 15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the<br>provision invoked by the accused before the High<br>Court is Section 482 CrPC and that this Court is<br>hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482<br>CrPC. Section 482 CrPC reads as follows: | ||
| “482. Saving of inherent powers of the<br>High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall<br>be deemed to limit or affect the inherent<br>powers of the High Court to make such<br>orders as may be necessary to give effect<br>to any order under this Code, or to pre-<br>vent abuse of the process of any court or<br>otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” | ||
| 16. There is nothing in the words of this section<br>which restricts the exercise of the power of the<br>Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or<br>miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It<br>is settled principle of law that the High Court can<br>exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even<br>when the discharge application is pending with the<br>trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2<br>SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Ku-<br>mar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 :<br>(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237] .<br>Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceed-<br>ings initiated against a person can be interfered<br>with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced<br>and the allegations have materialised into a charge-<br>sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the<br>abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if<br>the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after<br>investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to<br>prevent abuse of process of power of any court.” |
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15. Insofar as the reasoning of the High Court that the
appellants herein can file an application for discharge is
concerned, this Court, in a catena of decisions, has held that
merely because the charge-sheet is filed cannot be a ground
for the High Court to not invoke its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. Continuation of the criminal proceedings
would not be in the interest of justice and would result only
in the harassment of the appellants herein when there is no
material against them. In our view, this would be abdicating
the jurisdiction vested with the High Court.
16. We find that, in the present case, the High Court has
not even referred to the averments made in the FIR but has
mechanically dismissed the petition by observing that the
appellants herein can file an application for discharge.
17. In that view of the matter, we find that continuation of
criminal proceedings against the appellants herein would
result in undue harassment when there is no material
against them and may result in the abuse of process of law.
18. The appeal is therefore allowed. The impugned order of
the High Court is quashed and set aside and the FIR bearing
Case Crime No.18 of 2015 and consequential charge-sheet
filed against the appellants herein shall also stand quashed
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and set aside.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP(CRIMINAL) NO. 3698 OF 2023
| Leave granted. | |
|---|---|
| For the reasons recorded while allowing the appeal |
arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 8922 of 2022, the present
| appeal is also allowed. | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3. | The impugned order dated 20 | th | December 2022 passed |
by the High Cout of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal
Misc. Writ Petition No. 17002 of 2022 is quashed and set
aside and the pending proceedings qua the appellants
herein filed under the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social
| Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 are quashed and set aside. | |
|---|---|
| 4. | Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. |
..............................J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
..............................................J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 09, 2024 .
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