Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SUBHASH CHANDRA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/02/1980
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
DESAI, D.A.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 800 1980 SCR (2)1024
1980 SCC (2) 324
CITATOR INFO :
R 1983 SC 988 (1,2)
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 51(2)-Whether
Regional Transport Authority imposing a condition that no
permit shall be renewed in respect of vehicles which are 7
years old is ultra-vires Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution-Competency of the R.T.A. to impose such a
condition.
HEADNOTE:
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court
^
HELD: 1. Mere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the
sensible humanism writ large on s. 51(2)(x). If Indian life
is not ultra vires Indian law every condition to save life
and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision.
[1025G]
2. Section 51(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is
geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a
solemn duty not to be deterred by any pressure except the
pressure of social justice to Indian lives moving in buses,
walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top
killer-road accident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51
and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. In this
spirit-although backtracking from 4-year-old models to 7-
year-old models-the state imposed condition 18. Section
51(2) (x) authorises the impost of "any condition" of course
having a nexus with the statutory purpose. Human safety is
one such purpose.
[1025D-F,
H]
3. From the point of view of the human rights of road
users, the condition regarding the model of the permitted
bus is within jurisdiction and not to prescribed such safety
clauses is abdication of statutory duty. There is no
conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the
condition as an additional requirement and safety factor in
the shape of the year and the model. This is an extra
measure, a further insurance against machine failure and
cannot contradict the ’fitness’ provision. [1126D, 1027A-B]
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
No. 1262 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19-2-1979 of the
Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 184 of 1975.
S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S. Markendeya for
the Petitioners.
The Order of the Court was delivered by
KRISHNA IYER, J.-An order draped in relative brevity is
sufficient since we are refusing leave to appeal although
the issue raised is vires of a provision.
After due fulfillment of the obligation for oral
hearing, we have considered the impact of two earlier
decisions cited by Shri Kaicker sup-
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posedly striking a note contrary to the judgment under
attack but feel free-why, bound-to dismiss the petition for
special leave not merely because the High Court is right but
because justice to the travelling public-a lost cause on our
made roads-conscientises to that course.
Tersely put, the petitioner is the grantee of permits
to ply minibuses as contract carriages and in the grant a
condition has been fastened that the vehicle shall not be
more than seven years old. Condition No. 18, relating to
Mini-Buses Contract Carriage permits, and the source of
power, s. 51 (2) (x) read thus:
That the vehicle covered by the permit shall be
not more than four years old counted from the date of
registration at any time during the validity of the
permit.
51(2) The Regional Transport Authority, if it
decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may,
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act,
attach to the permit any one or more of the following
conditions, namely:-
(x) any other conditions which may be prescribed.
Section 51(2) (x) any other.
’Four years’ have been relaxed to seven years since
September 23, 1978, the beneficiaries being the bus owners
and the potential victims being the unknown casualties who
have no ’poor lobby’ power. The State must remember that it
has responsibilities not merely to mini-bus owners, but also
to avoid the daily tragedies on the Indian high ways under
the lethal wheels of these whirling carriages. Section 51
(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to public
safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be
deterred by any pressure except the pressure of social
justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or
even standing on margins. If the top killer-road accident-is
to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions must
receive severe enforcement. In this spirit-although
backtracking from 4-year-old models to 7-year-old models-the
state imposed condition 18. This was challenged artfully but
unsuccessfully before the High Court and is attacked before
us as ultra vires s. 51(2) of the Act. We will examine
briefly the submission to reach the conclusion that mere
lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ
large on s. 51(2) (x). If Indian life is not ultra vires
Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra
vires such salvationary provision. This perspective of
social justice simplifies the problem and upholds the High
Court.
Section 51(2) (x) authorises the impost of any
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condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory
purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such
purpose. The State’s neglect in this area of policing
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public transport is deplorable but when it does act by
prescribing a condition the court cannot be persuaded into
little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question
is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at a
seven-year old model one is relevant to the condition of the
vehicle and its passengers’ comparative safety and comfort
on our chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the
model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures
being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates
new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new
model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less
likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less
susceptible to wear and tear and moral fatigue leading to
unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine
why do we look for the latest model ? Vintage vehicles are
good for centenarian display of curios and cannot but be
mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We
have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the
human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the
model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not
to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory
duty.
Two decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate(1)
and In re: Ramesh Chandra Tewari etc.(2) were cited as
striking a contrary note. The first deals with s. 48(3) of
the Act and prescription of the model or year of the make
was held ultra vires because, lexically read, it was held
that the expression specified description in s. 48(3) did
not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of
manufacture of the vehicle. We extract Black’s Law
Dictionary on ’description’ to show how the model of a
vehicle is obviously a facet of its description.
’Description’ means: (3)
A delineation or account of a particular subject
by the recital of its characteristic accidents and
qualities.
So, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large,
apart from the plain function of the court to gather the
meaning, not under the dictatorship of dictionaries but
guided by the statutory purpose without being deflected by
logamachic exercises, the mischief to be countered and the
public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later
model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the
point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model
are part of the description.
1027
The unreported ruling in Civil Writ No. 7317 of 1975
interprets s. 38 of the Act and the non-issuance of the
fitness certificate because the model was not recent enough.
May be the vehicle, regardless of the year of its make, may
be fit and the refusal to certify fitness merely because it
is old may not always be right. But we see no conflict
between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an
additional requirement and safety factor, in the shape of
the year of the model. This is an extra measure, a further
insurance against machine failure and cannot contradict the
’fitness’ provision.
More reasons are, superogatory, less discussion will
leave the law obscure. We hold the ration of the impugned
ruling to be right and refuse leave to appeal.
S.R. Petition dismissed.
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