UNION OF INDIA vs. DHARAM PAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 804 OF 2019 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 498 of 2016]

O R D E R Leave granted. 2. The   instant   criminal   appeal   is   directed   by   the   State against the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No. 7436 of 2013 (O&M) whereby the High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent Dharam Pal, and commuted the death sentence awarded to him to life imprisonment. The Respondent was tried and convicted under Section 302/34 of the Indian 1 Penal Code (hereinafter, “IPC”) for the commission of murder of five persons belonging to the same family.  3. The brief facts leading to the impugned Writ Petition are that, the Respondent Dharam Pal, in an earlier incident, was convicted   under   Section   376/452   of   the   IPC   vide   judgment dated  04.07.1992   passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge, Sonepat,   in   Sessions   Case   11   of   1991   and   sentenced   to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The Respondent was released on bail by the High Court while admitting his appeal, however on the intervening night of 09.06.1993 and 10.06.1993 at around 03:30 a.m., the Respondent accompanied by   his   brother   Nirmal   Singh   committed   the   murder   of   five persons who were the family members of the prosecutrix for whose rape the Respondent was convicted. 4. The Respondent and his brother were tried and convicted under   Section   302/34   of   the   IPC   by   the   Sessions   Court, Sonepat in Sessions Case No. 65 of 1993. Vide its judgment dated 05.05.1997, the said Court sentenced both the accused to be hanged until death. Death Reference was heard and the conviction and sentence was affirmed by the High Court by its 2 judgment dated 29.09.1998. The Respondent and his brother, further filed an appeal before this Court, which came to be partly   allowed,   commuting   the   death   sentence   of   the Respondent’s brother Nirmal Singh into life imprisonment, but upheld   the   death   sentence   of   the   Respondent   taking   into account his conviction in the rape case, and commission of murder of five family members of the prosecutrix of that case while on bail. Thus, this Court vide judgment and order dated 18.03.1999 confirmed his death sentence and directed that he be hanged until death. 5. The Respondent filed a mercy petition before the Governor of the State of Haryana under Article 161 of the Constitution of India, which came to be rejected after which, on 02.11.1999, the Respondent sought pardon from the President of India in exercise   of   powers   under   Article   72   of   the   Constitution. However, on 25.03.2013, the President rejected his application, after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 13 years and 5 months, and a date was fixed for his execution. It is pertinent to mention that in the meantime, the Respondent had filed an appeal against his conviction in Sessions Case No. 11 of 1991 3 under Section 376/452 of the IPC before the High Court, which came to be allowed acquitting him for the said offence vide order dated 19.11.2003. 6. It is under these circumstances that the Respondent filed the impugned Writ Petition before the High Court praying for his death sentence to be commuted to life imprisonment in light of the change in circumstances viz. his acquittal in the rape case, which was an important deciding factor by this Court in negating his appeal. He also challenged it on grounds of delay in deciding his mercy petition by the President, among other grounds.  7. The High Court while allowing his Writ Petition held that it is   a   case   of   violation   of   the   fundamental   rights   of   the Respondent,   which   makes   him   eligible   for   getting   his   death sentence   commuted   to   life   imprisonment,   and   orders   were passed accordingly. The State has filed this appeal against the decision of the High Court. 8. In   the   Statement   of   Objections   filed   by   the   State   of Haryana   before   the   High   Court,   it   is   admitted   that   the Respondent has remained in solitary confinement for a period 4 of 18 years, and has undergone imprisonment for a total period of more than 25 years till date. It is also an admitted position that the order of acquittal of the Respondent in the Sessions Case No. 11 of 1991 was not put to the notice of the President while deciding the mercy petition, the failure of which is argued to be pivotal in deciding the mercy petition causing prejudice against the Respondent. 9. The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   argued   that   the impugned judgment is erroneous as the delay in disposing the mercy petition pending before the President was justified. He tried to explain the various stages and reasons for the delay in deciding the petition. He further brought to our attention the nature of the offence committed by the Respondent, i.e. the gruesome   cold­blooded   murder   of   five   persons.   He   finally prayed  the   impugned   judgment   be   set  aside   and   orders   for executing the Respondent be passed. Per   contra,   the   counsel   for   the   Respondent   supported   the judgment of the High Court inasmuch as there is a real and apparent violation of the Respondent’s fundamental rights due to the inordinate delay in deciding the mercy petition, 18 years 5 of solitary confinement before the rejection of the mercy petition and that the acquittal in the rape case was not put on record before the President at the time of deciding the mercy petition causing grave prejudice and injustice against the Respondent. He   prayed   that   the   appeal   may   be   dismissed,   and   the Respondent be released from prison upon remission of sentence as he has already spent over 25 years in prison. 10. We have heard the parties at length and have perused the case records. It is our considered opinion that the High Court is entirely   justified   in   allowing   the   Writ   Petition   filed   by   the Respondents.   We   find   no   error   or   illegalities   with   the   order passed, and concur with its findings.  11. As mentioned supra, it is admitted that the Respondent has undergone incarceration for a total period of over 25 years, out of which 18 years were in solitary confinement. Throughout the period of deciding his mercy petition by the President, he was   kept   in   solitary   confinement   in   various   jails.   Solitary confinement prior to the disposal of the mercy petition is per se illegal and amounts to separate and additional punishment not 6 authorized by law. It is pertinent to quote Section 30 of the Prisoners Act, 1894 at this juncture.  “30. Prisoners under sentence of death­ (1)  Every prisoner under sentence of death shall, immediately   on   his   arrival   in   the   prison   after sentence, be searched by, or by order of, the Jailer and all articles shall be taken from him which the Jailer deems it dangerous or inexpedient to leave in his possession. (2)  Every such prisoner shall be confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners, and shall be placed by day and by night under the charge of a guard.” In the case of  Sunil Batra  v.  Delhi Admn.  [(1978) 4 SCC 494, (Constitution   Bench)],   the   interpretation   of   the   words “prisoners   under   sentence   of   death”   fell   for   consideration before   this   Court.   Krishna   Iyer,   J.   concurring   with   the majority, in paragraphs 89 to 91 and 110 to113 of the said judgment held thus: “89. xxx… This  [Section 30, Prisoners Act]  falls in Chapter V relating to discipline of prisoners and has   to   be   read   in   that   context.   Any   separate confinement   contemplated   in   Section   30   (2)   has this disciplinary limitation as we will presently see. If we pull to pieces the whole provision it becomes clear   that   Section   30   can   be   applied   only   to   a prisoner “under sentence of death”. Section 30(2) which   speaks   of   “such”   prisoners   necessarily relates   to   prisoners  .   We under   sentence   of   death have to discover when we can designate a prisoner as one  under sentence of death. 7 90. The next attempt is to discern the meaning of   confinement   “in   a   cell   apart   from   all   other prisoners”. The purpose is to maintain discipline and discipline is to avoid disorder, fight and other untoward incidents, if apprehended. 91. Confinement   inside   a   prison   does   not necessarily import cellular isolation. Segregation of one   person   all   alone   in   a   single   cell   is   solitary confinement. That is a separate  punishment  which the   Court   alone   can   impose.   It   would   be   a subversion of this statutory provision (Sections 73 and 74 IPC) to impart a meaning to Section 30(2) of the Prisons Act whereby a disciplinary variant of solitary confinement can be clamped down on a prisoner, although no court has awarded such a punishment, by a mere construction, which clothes an   executive   officer,   who   happens   to   be   the governor of the jail, with harsh judicial powers to be   exercised   by   punitive   restrictions   and unaccountable   to   anyone,   the   power   being discretionary and disciplinary. x x x x x x 110. The ingenious arguments to keep Batra in solitudinous cell must fail and he shall be given facilities and amenities of common prisoners even before he is ‘ under sentence of death’. 111. Is he under sentence of death?  Not yet. 112. Clearly, there is a sentence of death passed against   Batra   by   the   Sessions   Court   but   it   is provisional   and   the   question   is   whether   under Section 30(2) the petitioner can be confined in a cell all by himself under a 24­hour guard. The key words which call for humanistic interpretation are “under sentence of death” and “confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners.” 113. A convict is ‘ under sentence of death’  when, and   only   when,   the   capital   penalty   inexorably operates   by   the   automatic   process   of   the   law 8 without   any   slip   between   the   cup   and   the   lip. Rulings   of   this   Court   in  Abdul Azeez  v.  Karnataka  [(1977) 2 SCC 485 : 1977 SCC (Cri)   378   :   (1977)   3   SCR   393]   and  D.K. Sharma  v.  M.P. State  [(1976) 1 SCC 560 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 85 : (1976) 2 SCR 289] , though not directly on this point strongly suggest this reasoning to be sound.” It is worthwhile to cite the relevant portion of the majority opinion through the words of Desai, J. in paragraphs 220 and 223 of the same judgment. “220. xxx… Sub­section (2) of Section 30 merely provides   for   confinement   of   a   prisoner   under sentence   of   death   in   a   cell   apart   from   other prisoners and he is to be placed by day and night under the charge of a guard. Such confinement can neither   be   cellular   confinement   nor   separate confinement and in any event it cannot be solitary confinement.   In   our   opinion,   sub­section   (2)   of Section 30 does not empower the jail authorities in the garb of confining a prisoner under sentence of death, in a cell apart from all other prisoners, to impose   solitary   confinement   on   him.   Even   jail discipline   inhibits   solitary   confinement   as   a measure of jail punishment. It completely negatives any suggestion that because a prisoner is under sentence of death therefore, and by reason of that consideration alone, the jail authorities can impose upon him additional and separate punishment of solitary confinement. They have no power to add to the   punishment   imposed   by   the   Court   which additional punishment could have been imposed by the   Court   itself   but   has   in   fact   been   not   so imposed. Upon a true construction, sub­section (2) of Section 30 does not empower a prison authority 9 to   impose   solitary   confinement   upon   a   prisoner under sentence of death.     x  x  x  x       x 223. The expression “prisoner under sentence of death” in the context of sub­section (2) of Section 30 can only mean the prisoner whose sentence of death   has   become   final,   conclusive   and indefeasible which cannot be annulled or voided by any judicial or constitutional procedure. In other words, it must be a sentence which the authority charged with the  duty  to execute  and  carry  out must   proceed   to   carry   out   without   intervention from any outside authority. …xxx… Therefore, the prisoner can be said to be under the sentence of death   only   when   the   death   sentence   is   beyond judicial scrutiny and would be operative without any intervention from any other authority. Till then the   person   who   is   awarded   capital   punishment cannot be said to be a prisoner under sentence of death in the context of Section 30, sub­section (2). This interpretative process would, we hope, to a great extent relieve the torment and torture implicit in   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   30,   reducing   the period of such confinement to a short duration.” The   sum   and   substance   of   the   judgment   in   Sunil   Batra (supra), is that even if the Sessions Court has sentenced the convict   to   death,   subject   to   the   confirmation   of   the   High Court, or even if the appeal is filed before the High Court and the   Supreme   Court   against   the   imposition   of   death punishment and the same is pending, the convict cannot be said to be “under sentence of death” till the mercy petition 10 filed before the Governor or the President is rejected. This Court in  Shatrughan Chauhan  v.  Union of India  [(2014) 3 SCC 1, (3 Judge Bench)] with approval of  Sunil Batra  (supra) has observed thus: “90. It   was,   therefore,   held   in  Sunil   Batra case  [ Sunil   Batra  v.  Delhi   Admn. ,   (1978)   4   SCC 494   :   1979   SCC   (Cri)   155]   that   the   solitary confinement,   even   if   mollified   and   modified marginally, is not sanctioned by Section 30 of the Prisons Act for prisoners “under sentence of death”. The crucial holding under Section 30(2) is that a person is not “under sentence of death”, even if the Sessions Court has sentenced him to death subject to confirmation by the High Court. He is not “under sentence of death” even if the High Court imposes, by confirmation or fresh appellate infliction, death penalty, so long as an appeal to the Supreme Court is likely to be or has been moved or is pending. Even if this Court has awarded capital sentence, it was held that Section 30 does not cover him so long   as   his   petition   for   mercy   to   the   Governor and/or   to   the   President   permitted   by   the Constitution, has not been disposed of. Of course, once rejected by the Governor and the President, and   on   further   application,   there   is   no   stay   of execution by the authorities, the person is under sentence   of   death.   During   that   interregnum,   he attracts   the   custodial   segregation   specified   in Section 30(2), subject to the ameliorative meaning assigned to the provision. To be “under sentence of death”   means   “to   be   under   a   finally   executable death sentence”. 91. Even   in  Triveniben  [ Triveniben  v.  State   of Gujarat , (1989) 1 SCC 678 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 248] , this   Court   observed   that   keeping   a   prisoner   in 11 solitary   confinement   is   contrary   to   the   ruling in  Sunil Batra  [ Sunil Batra  v.  Delhi Admn. , (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] and would amount to inflicting “additional and separate” punishment not authorised by law. It is completely unfortunate that despite enduring pronouncement on judicial side, the actual implementation of the provisions is far from reality. We take this occasion to urge to the Jail Authorities to comprehend and implement the actual intent of the verdict in  Sunil Batra  [ Sunil  v.  , (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC Batra Delhi Admn. (Cri) 155].” 12. Thus, solitary confinement prior to the rejection of mercy   petition,   which  has   taken   place   in   spite   of   various decisions of this Court to the contrary, is unfortunate and palpably   illegal.   In   the   present   case,   the   Respondent underwent such a long period of solitary confinement that too, prior to his mercy petition being rejected, thereby making it a formidable case for commuting his death sentence into life imprisonment, as rightly held by the High Court. 13. The   next   main   ground   of   challenge   is   the unexplained   and   inordinate   delay   in   disposing   the Respondent’s mercy petition by the President. Although the appellants tried to justify the delay citing various bona fide reasons, the same cannot be accepted as the prolonged delay 12 in execution of a sentence of death has a dehumanizing effect and   this   has   the   constitutional   implication   of   depriving   a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way so as to offend the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.   The   High   Court   placed   apt   reliance   on   the judgment of this Court in   Shatrughan Chauhan   (supra) for condemning the inordinate delay and thereby commuting the sentence of the Respondent.  Some important observations of  Shatrughan Chauhan  (supra) are reiterated herewith:

  47. It is clear that after the completion of the judicial process, if the convict files a mercy petition to the Governor/President, it is incumbent on the 13 authorities to dispose of  the  same expeditiously. Though no time­limit can be fixed for the Governor and the President, it is the duty of the executive to expedite the matter at every stage viz. calling for the   records,   orders   and   documents   filed   in   the court, preparation of the note for approval of the Minister concerned, and the ultimate decision of the   constitutional   authorities.   This   Court, in  Triveniben  [ Triveniben  v.  State of Gujarat , (1989) 1 SCC 678], further held that in doing so, if it is established that there was prolonged delay in the execution of death sentence, it is an important and relevant consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed or not. 48 .  Accordingly, if there is undue, unexplained and inordinate delay in execution due to pendency of mercy petitions or the executive as well as the constitutional authorities have failed to take note of/consider the relevant aspects, this Court is well within   its   powers   under   Article   32   to   hear   the grievance of the convict and commute the death sentence   into   life   imprisonment   on   this   ground alone however, only after satisfying that the delay was   not   caused   at   the   instance   of   the   accused himself.   To   this   extent,   the   jurisprudence   has developed in the light of the mandate given in our Constitution   as   well   as   various   Universal Declarations and directions issued by the United Nations. 49. The   procedure   prescribed   by   law,   which deprives a person of his life and liberty must be just,   fair   and   reasonable   and   such   procedure mandates   humane   conditions   of   detention preventive or punitive. In this line, although the petitioners were sentenced to death based on the procedure   established   by   law,   the   inexplicable delay on account of executive is inexcusable. Since it   is   well   established   that   Article   21   of   the Constitution does not end with the pronouncement 14

15 14. In our considered opinion, the High Court examined the inordinate delay in disposing the mercy petition in the right perspective to hold it illegal, and thereafter commuted the   sentence   to   life   imprisonment   in   light   of   the aforementioned  principles  of   law  laid   down  in   Shatrughan Chauhan   (supra). These aspects, coupled with the fact that the   authorities   did   not   place   the   records   regarding   the acquittal   of   the   Respondent   in   the   rape   case   before   the President for consideration of the mercy petition has caused grave   injustice   and   prejudice   against   the   Respondent.   On receipt of a mercy petition, the Department concerned has to call   for   all   the   records   and   materials   connected   with   the conviction. When the matter is placed before the President, it is incumbent on the part of the concerned authority to place all the materials such as judgments of the courts, as well as any other relevant material connected with the conviction. In the   present   case,   this   Court   while   upholding   the   death sentence of the Respondent and commuting the sentence of his brother to life imprisonment had placed reliance on the fact that the Respondent was convicted in the rape case, and 16 the persons who he had killed were the family members of the prosecutrix   of   the   rape   case.   The   fact   that   he   was subsequently acquitted for that case has great bearing on the quantum   on   sentence   that   ought   to   be   awarded   to   the Respondent and the same should have been brought to the notice   of   the   President   while   deciding   his   mercy   petition. Failure to do so has caused irreparable prejudice against the Respondent. 15. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, it is our considered opinion that the High Court has not   erred   in   setting   aside   the   sentence   of   death   of   the Respondent and commuting the same into life imprisonment. Considering   the   aforementioned   reasons   discussed   by   us such as the unconscionable delay of more than 13 years in deciding   the   mercy   petition,   the   failure   to   produce   the relevant   documents   regarding   the   Respondent   before   the President   for   deciding   the   mercy   petition,   and   that   the Respondent   has   undergone   18   years   of   illegal   solitary confinement, we find no reason to interfere with the decision of the  High Court.  However,  considering the  fact  that the 17 Respondent had violated the conditions of bail imposed on him by the High Court in criminal appeal, inasmuch as he had   committed   the   murder   of   five   persons   while   on   bail, cannot be overlooked while quantifying the actual sentence. In our considered opinion, having regard to the totality of facts   and   circumstances,   and   for   the   reasons   mentioned supra, it would be appropriate to direct the release of the Respondent   after   the   completion   of   35   years   of   actual imprisonment   including   the   period   already   undergone   by him.  16. Ordered accordingly. The appeal is disposed of in the aforementioned terms.       ............................................J. (N.V. Ramana)     ............................................J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)   ……………………………………..J. (S. Abdul Nazeer) New Delhi; April 24, 2019. 18