Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1351
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5001 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6906 of 2025)
SAMADHAN S/O SITATRAM MANMOTHE …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASTHRA & ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 06.03.2025 passed by the
Bombay High Court at Aurangabad in Criminal Application No.
601 of 2025 dismissing the application filed by the appellant under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for
Signature Not Verified
short “BNSS”) seeking quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024, registered
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.11.24
16:44:59 IST
Reason:
with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Page 1 of 24
Sambhajinagar City on 31.08.2024, for the offences punishable
under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short “IPC”), the appellant is before this Court.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned
counsel for respondent No.1-State and learned Amicus Curiae , Ms.
Radhika Gautham, for respondent No.2 as the latter has not
responded to the notice issued and served on her.
4. Briefly stated the facts of this case as per the prosecution are
that respondent No.2 had lodged a complaint with City Chowk
Police Station, District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City, stating
that she was married to a person ABC in the year 2019 and had a
minor daughter out of the said wedlock. However, due to
matrimonial discord with her husband and in-laws, she had been
residing separately since May 2020 and was living with her parents
at Rajangaon, Taluka Paithan, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar.
5. In July 2020, respondent No.2 had filed a complaint against
her husband at the Women’s Grievance Redressal Centre, Office of
Superintendent of Police, Chatrapati Sambhajinagar. However,
owing to the failure of reconciliation between them, respondent
Page 2 of 24
No.2 initiated proceedings against her husband seeking alimony/
maintenance from him.
6. It is in connection with the said proceedings that respondent
No.2, on 27.01.2022, was introduced to the appellant, who is a
practising advocate in the courts of Aurangabad. Later, appellant
took respondent No.2’s contact number and the two regularly kept
in touch on WhatsApp and through phone calls. Over a period of
time, the appellant and respondent No.2 developed a close
relationship. It was then that the appellant proposed to meet
respondent No.2 in person at Vivekananda Garden in TV Centre.
During the course of their meeting, the appellant expressed his
desire to marry respondent No.2. However, owing to her troubled
marital past, respondent No.2 declined the proposal. Despite her
reluctance, the appellant continued to insist on marriage at each
subsequent meeting.
7. On 12.03.2022, the appellant called respondent No.2 to Hotel
Citizen, near Mill Corner, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, where he
once again expressed his desire to marry her and assured her that
he would marry her despite her concern that his mother might not
Page 3 of 24
approve of the alliance. Based on such assurance, the appellant
established physical relations with her.
8. Subsequently, in September 2022, the complainant
discovered that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child.
However, with the consent of the appellant, she aborted the child.
Thereafter, when respondent No.2 decided to part ways with the
appellant, he continued to assure her of marriage and engaged in
further sexual relations with her, as a result of which she got
pregnant again in July 2023 and later in May 2024. Both the
pregnancies were terminated.
9. On 20.05.2024, the appellant once again called respondent
No.2 to Hotel Citizen, where he engaged in physical acts with her.
Later, when respondent No.2 insisted on marriage, the appellant
flatly refused to marry her and further threatened to kill her if she
disclosed the matter to anybody.
10. Based on the aforesaid facts, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated
31.08.2024 came to be registered against the appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the
IPC at City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar City.
Page 4 of 24
11. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an anticipatory bail
application bearing Criminal Bail Application No. 1841 of 2024
before the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad (hereinafter
referred to as “Trial Court”). The Trial Court, by order dated
19.09.2024, allowed the application and enlarged the appellant on
anticipatory bail. During the course of the investigation, both
respondent No. 2 and her mother, in their statements, supported
the prosecution’s version of events. Subsequently, on completion
of the investigation, a charge-sheet bearing No. 143 of 2024 dated
25.10.2024 came to be filed against the appellant under Sections
376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.
12. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an application
bearing Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025 before the Bombay
High Court at Aurangabad under Section 528 of the BNSS, seeking
quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024.
13. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court
refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the
appellant in FIR No. 294 of 2024 on the ground that a chargesheet
had already been filed and the matter was ready for trial; the
appellant could not sufficiently prove that the instant case was a
Page 5 of 24
clearly case of consensual relationship; that the relationship
between the appellant and respondent No.2 could be termed as a
fiduciary relationship inasmuch as the appellant was discussing
the maintenance case of respondent No.2 with her; and that in view
of the aforesaid, the facts of the present case warranted the
conduct of a trial to test the veracity of the allegations made by
respondent No.2 and to ascertain whether the acts alleged to have
occurred between the appellant and respondent No.2 were against
her will or otherwise.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent-State and learned Amicus on behalf of
respondent No.2.
15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that
the appellant has been falsely implicated as there is no evidence
against him with respect to the commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.
16. It is further submitted that the respondent No.2 is a well-
educated lady who is married and has a minor daughter. It was
contended that there is no divorce decree passed between
respondent No.2 and her husband. Therefore, during the
Page 6 of 24
subsistence of her marriage, respondent no.2 consequently entered
into a relationship with the appellant for a period of three years.
Further, during the subsistence of their relationship, no complaint
whatsoever was ever lodged by respondent No.2 against the
appellant. It was only in August 2024 after the appellant refused
to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- demanded by respondent No.2, that
in a fit of anger, she lodged the present criminal case against him.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand,
supported the impugned order and submitted that the allegations
made by respondent No.2 discloses commission of a cognisable
offence and warrants no interference at the threshold. It is
submitted that the veracity of the defence taken by the appellant
is a matter for trial and not for adjudication under the limited
jurisdiction of a petition for quashing.
18. Learned Amicus also supported the respondent-State by
contending that there is no merit in this appeal.
19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having perused the material on record, the only question that
needs to be addressed is whether FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated
Page 7 of 24
31.08.2024, along with Chargesheet No.143 of 2024 filed on
25.10.2024 against the appellant herein, should be quashed.
20. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under
Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC. An offence of rape, if
established in terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under
Section 376 of the IPC. In the present case, the second description
of Section 376 is relevant which is set out below:
“376. Punishment for rape. – (1). Whoever, except in the
cases provided for in sub- section (2), commits rape, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than ten
years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
2. Whoever, -
xxx
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural
life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation .—For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air forces
and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted
under any law for the time being in force, including the
paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under
the control of the Central Government or the State
Government;
Page 8 of 24
(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and
includes the precincts of any institution for the reception
and treatment of persons during convalescence or of
persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;
(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned
to the expression “police” under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of
1861);
(d) “women's or children's institution” means an institution,
whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected
women or children or a widow's home or an institution
called by any other name, which is established and
maintained for the reception and care of women or
children.”
21. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the
same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the
remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision
is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the
offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the
same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision
is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual
assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.
Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series
Page 9 of 24
of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a
single transaction.
22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the
pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual
assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity,
or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable
and unable to escape the situation.
23. In the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR and the
statement on record reveals that respondent No.2 met the
appellant, who is a practising advocate, for the first time in
reference to a case which was instituted by respondent No.2
against her husband. Thereafter, they exchanged numbers and
regularly kept in touch. Over a passage of time, respondent No.2
and the appellant developed a close relationship and started
meeting each other frequently. During this time, they established
sexual relations multiple times between 12.03.2022 to 20.05.2024.
The appellant contends that during the course of their relationship,
not once did respondent No.2 file a complaint regarding the alleged
non-consensual sexual relations, and it is inconceivable that the
appellant would force himself upon her for so many years without
Page 10 of 24
there being any protest or complaint from the side of respondent
No.2. Notably, it was only in August of 2024 when the appellant
refused to fulfil respondent No.2’s demand of payment of
Rs.1,50,000/- that the instant criminal case came to be instituted
against the appellant.
24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether
the appellant engaged in physical relationship with respondent
No.2 based on a deception or a false promise to marry.
25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on
respondent No.2’s claim that appellant established physical
relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the
appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of marriage
whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the
appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first
marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why,
despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No.2
continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations
with him even though she was already married.
26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September
2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with
Page 11 of 24
the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and
I will live my life”. At that time, the appellant again assured her
that they would get married and asked for some time from
respondent No.2, to which she refused. However, despite her
refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet
him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations with him.
27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of
this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein
the following observations were made:
“27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual
relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if
he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical
relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise
made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have
physical relationship other than the promise of marriage
made by the man, such as personal liking for the male
partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.
28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is
maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the
woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said
physical relationship was purely because of the alleged
promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless
it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely
because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct
nexus with the physical relationship without being
influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said
Page 12 of 24
that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of
fact.”
(underlining by us)
28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant
lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then
vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long
years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close
and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that
occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be
retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely
because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the
disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are
given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the
gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists
genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To
convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the
accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances
transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the
Page 13 of 24
criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound
concern and calls for condemnation.
30. In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764,
this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed
that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple
cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship
does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted
as under:
“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the
charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the
offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of
the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section
164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of
marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship
in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is
accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the
complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the
appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage
from the appellant. The relationship between the parties
was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break
up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot
result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial
stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the
said relationship does not fructify into a marital
relationship. Further, both parties are now married to
someone else and have moved on in their respective lives.
Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in
Page 14 of 24
the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the
process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution.”
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a
country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social
and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a
woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to
physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would
culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such
circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very
foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than
absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand
vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was
illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of
fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain
sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and
dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC
be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the
same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible
Page 15 of 24
evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated
allegations or moral conjecture.
32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,
we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the
invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present
case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a
consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious.
33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the
subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever
raised by respondent No.2 regarding the absence of consent in their
physical relations. It was only upon the appellant’s refusal to fulfil
her demand for payment of the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- that the
present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore,
the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between
12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on
31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of
sexual intimacy.
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation
that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled
respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it
Page 16 of 24
disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the
part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the
only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her
own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is
also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought
up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the
proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent
No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was
premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is
devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court
in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2025) 4 SCC 197 ,
whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in
a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its
nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such
relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise
of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot
be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant
portion of the judgment is extracted as under:
“33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards,
the complainant and the appellant were residing in
Page 17 of 24
different towns. The complainant is an educated woman
and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which
could have prevented her from filing a police complaint
against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations
were under duress or were being established under a false
assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even
portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby,
dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant
was to cheat her right from the inception of the
relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was
mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the
appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence of
any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One
Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly
clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the
appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when
she had proposed that they should marry and live together,
the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all
there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR
should have been registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the
complainant that the appellant was getting married to
another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed
aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also
admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and
therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the
offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain
sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a
prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account
of her love and passion for the accused.”
(underlining by us)
Page 18 of 24
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court
observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was
consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by
him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was
merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High
Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
(2013) 7 SCC 278 , wherein this Court had stated that unless there
was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence
cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to
appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals
that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual,
inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he
expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2,
being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own
volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the
marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the
foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material
Page 19 of 24
on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties
was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised
in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when
the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court
in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:
“29 . It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false
promise to amount to misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from
the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman
to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore,
if it is established that such consent was given under a
misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not
a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in
which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 &
24)
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and
in a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had actually wanted
to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and
had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit
of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
Page 20 of 24
examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for
the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or
where an accused on account of circumstances
which he could not have foreseen, or which were
beyond his control, was unable to marry her,
despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can
be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was
mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term “misconception of
fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety,
and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless
the court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended
to marry her.”
(underlining by us)
Page 21 of 24
39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 , this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not
necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to
the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may
be appropriate:
“102. xxx
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
xxx”
40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with
the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present
case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of
respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship
devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as
Page 22 of 24
contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In
our opinion, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction
under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained
of in the present case occurred within the contours of a
relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The
continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing
short of an abuse of the court machinery.
41. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 06.03.2025 in
application under Section 528 BNSS bearing Criminal Application
No. 601 of 2025. The said application accordingly stands allowed.
Consequently, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024, registered
with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar City under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the
IPC and Chargesheet No. 143 of 2024 dated 25.10.2024, filed in
rd
the Court of the 3 Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aurangabad,
accordingly stands quashed.
42. We express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered
by Ms. Radhika Gowtam, learned Advocate-on-Record who had
been appointed as Amicus Curiae in the matter. Registry of this
Page 23 of 24
Court is directed to pay honorarium of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen
Thousand only) to the learned Amicus Curiae .
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 24, 2025.
Page 24 of 24
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5001 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6906 of 2025)
SAMADHAN S/O SITATRAM MANMOTHE …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASTHRA & ANOTHER …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 06.03.2025 passed by the
Bombay High Court at Aurangabad in Criminal Application No.
601 of 2025 dismissing the application filed by the appellant under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for
Signature Not Verified
short “BNSS”) seeking quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024, registered
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.11.24
16:44:59 IST
Reason:
with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Page 1 of 24
Sambhajinagar City on 31.08.2024, for the offences punishable
under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short “IPC”), the appellant is before this Court.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned
counsel for respondent No.1-State and learned Amicus Curiae , Ms.
Radhika Gautham, for respondent No.2 as the latter has not
responded to the notice issued and served on her.
4. Briefly stated the facts of this case as per the prosecution are
that respondent No.2 had lodged a complaint with City Chowk
Police Station, District Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City, stating
that she was married to a person ABC in the year 2019 and had a
minor daughter out of the said wedlock. However, due to
matrimonial discord with her husband and in-laws, she had been
residing separately since May 2020 and was living with her parents
at Rajangaon, Taluka Paithan, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar.
5. In July 2020, respondent No.2 had filed a complaint against
her husband at the Women’s Grievance Redressal Centre, Office of
Superintendent of Police, Chatrapati Sambhajinagar. However,
owing to the failure of reconciliation between them, respondent
Page 2 of 24
No.2 initiated proceedings against her husband seeking alimony/
maintenance from him.
6. It is in connection with the said proceedings that respondent
No.2, on 27.01.2022, was introduced to the appellant, who is a
practising advocate in the courts of Aurangabad. Later, appellant
took respondent No.2’s contact number and the two regularly kept
in touch on WhatsApp and through phone calls. Over a period of
time, the appellant and respondent No.2 developed a close
relationship. It was then that the appellant proposed to meet
respondent No.2 in person at Vivekananda Garden in TV Centre.
During the course of their meeting, the appellant expressed his
desire to marry respondent No.2. However, owing to her troubled
marital past, respondent No.2 declined the proposal. Despite her
reluctance, the appellant continued to insist on marriage at each
subsequent meeting.
7. On 12.03.2022, the appellant called respondent No.2 to Hotel
Citizen, near Mill Corner, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, where he
once again expressed his desire to marry her and assured her that
he would marry her despite her concern that his mother might not
Page 3 of 24
approve of the alliance. Based on such assurance, the appellant
established physical relations with her.
8. Subsequently, in September 2022, the complainant
discovered that she was pregnant with the appellant’s child.
However, with the consent of the appellant, she aborted the child.
Thereafter, when respondent No.2 decided to part ways with the
appellant, he continued to assure her of marriage and engaged in
further sexual relations with her, as a result of which she got
pregnant again in July 2023 and later in May 2024. Both the
pregnancies were terminated.
9. On 20.05.2024, the appellant once again called respondent
No.2 to Hotel Citizen, where he engaged in physical acts with her.
Later, when respondent No.2 insisted on marriage, the appellant
flatly refused to marry her and further threatened to kill her if she
disclosed the matter to anybody.
10. Based on the aforesaid facts, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated
31.08.2024 came to be registered against the appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the
IPC at City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar City.
Page 4 of 24
11. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an anticipatory bail
application bearing Criminal Bail Application No. 1841 of 2024
before the Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad (hereinafter
referred to as “Trial Court”). The Trial Court, by order dated
19.09.2024, allowed the application and enlarged the appellant on
anticipatory bail. During the course of the investigation, both
respondent No. 2 and her mother, in their statements, supported
the prosecution’s version of events. Subsequently, on completion
of the investigation, a charge-sheet bearing No. 143 of 2024 dated
25.10.2024 came to be filed against the appellant under Sections
376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.
12. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an application
bearing Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025 before the Bombay
High Court at Aurangabad under Section 528 of the BNSS, seeking
quashing of FIR No. 294 of 2024.
13. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court
refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the
appellant in FIR No. 294 of 2024 on the ground that a chargesheet
had already been filed and the matter was ready for trial; the
appellant could not sufficiently prove that the instant case was a
Page 5 of 24
clearly case of consensual relationship; that the relationship
between the appellant and respondent No.2 could be termed as a
fiduciary relationship inasmuch as the appellant was discussing
the maintenance case of respondent No.2 with her; and that in view
of the aforesaid, the facts of the present case warranted the
conduct of a trial to test the veracity of the allegations made by
respondent No.2 and to ascertain whether the acts alleged to have
occurred between the appellant and respondent No.2 were against
her will or otherwise.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent-State and learned Amicus on behalf of
respondent No.2.
15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that
the appellant has been falsely implicated as there is no evidence
against him with respect to the commission of the offences
punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC.
16. It is further submitted that the respondent No.2 is a well-
educated lady who is married and has a minor daughter. It was
contended that there is no divorce decree passed between
respondent No.2 and her husband. Therefore, during the
Page 6 of 24
subsistence of her marriage, respondent no.2 consequently entered
into a relationship with the appellant for a period of three years.
Further, during the subsistence of their relationship, no complaint
whatsoever was ever lodged by respondent No.2 against the
appellant. It was only in August 2024 after the appellant refused
to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- demanded by respondent No.2, that
in a fit of anger, she lodged the present criminal case against him.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, on the other hand,
supported the impugned order and submitted that the allegations
made by respondent No.2 discloses commission of a cognisable
offence and warrants no interference at the threshold. It is
submitted that the veracity of the defence taken by the appellant
is a matter for trial and not for adjudication under the limited
jurisdiction of a petition for quashing.
18. Learned Amicus also supported the respondent-State by
contending that there is no merit in this appeal.
19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having perused the material on record, the only question that
needs to be addressed is whether FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated
Page 7 of 24
31.08.2024, along with Chargesheet No.143 of 2024 filed on
25.10.2024 against the appellant herein, should be quashed.
20. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under
Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the IPC. An offence of rape, if
established in terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under
Section 376 of the IPC. In the present case, the second description
of Section 376 is relevant which is set out below:
“376. Punishment for rape. – (1). Whoever, except in the
cases provided for in sub- section (2), commits rape, shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which shall not be less than ten
years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine.
2. Whoever, -
xxx
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural
life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation .—For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air forces
and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted
under any law for the time being in force, including the
paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under
the control of the Central Government or the State
Government;
Page 8 of 24
(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and
includes the precincts of any institution for the reception
and treatment of persons during convalescence or of
persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;
(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned
to the expression “police” under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of
1861);
(d) “women's or children's institution” means an institution,
whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected
women or children or a widow's home or an institution
called by any other name, which is established and
maintained for the reception and care of women or
children.”
21. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced
punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the
same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the
remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision
is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the
offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the
same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision
is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual
assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.
Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series
Page 9 of 24
of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a
single transaction.
22. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the
pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of sexual
assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure, captivity,
or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered vulnerable
and unable to escape the situation.
23. In the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR and the
statement on record reveals that respondent No.2 met the
appellant, who is a practising advocate, for the first time in
reference to a case which was instituted by respondent No.2
against her husband. Thereafter, they exchanged numbers and
regularly kept in touch. Over a passage of time, respondent No.2
and the appellant developed a close relationship and started
meeting each other frequently. During this time, they established
sexual relations multiple times between 12.03.2022 to 20.05.2024.
The appellant contends that during the course of their relationship,
not once did respondent No.2 file a complaint regarding the alleged
non-consensual sexual relations, and it is inconceivable that the
appellant would force himself upon her for so many years without
Page 10 of 24
there being any protest or complaint from the side of respondent
No.2. Notably, it was only in August of 2024 when the appellant
refused to fulfil respondent No.2’s demand of payment of
Rs.1,50,000/- that the instant criminal case came to be instituted
against the appellant.
24. Another question which arises for consideration is whether
the appellant engaged in physical relationship with respondent
No.2 based on a deception or a false promise to marry.
25. The allegation of rape in the present case hinges entirely on
respondent No.2’s claim that appellant established physical
relations with her on false pretext of marriage. It is alleged by the
appellant that respondent No.2 opposed the idea of marriage
whenever the appellant broached the said idea; however, the
appellant kept on insisting possibly this was because her first
marriage was in subsistence. It is, however, not clear as to why,
despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, respondent No.2
continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations
with him even though she was already married.
26. The FIR in the present case also states that in September
2022, when respondent No.2 found out that she was pregnant with
Page 11 of 24
the appellant’s child, she told the appellant, “You live your life and
I will live my life”. At that time, the appellant again assured her
that they would get married and asked for some time from
respondent No.2, to which she refused. However, despite her
refusal to be with the appellant, respondent No.2 continued to meet
him at Hotel Citizen and engaged in physical relations with him.
27. In this regard, it becomes relevant to refer to the decision of
this Court in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398, (“Mahesh Damu”) wherein
the following observations were made:
“27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual
relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if
he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical
relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise
made and not qualified by other circumstances or
consideration. A woman may have reasons to have
physical relationship other than the promise of marriage
made by the man, such as personal liking for the male
partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.
28. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is
maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the
woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said
physical relationship was purely because of the alleged
promise made by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless
it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely
because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct
nexus with the physical relationship without being
influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said
Page 12 of 24
that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of
fact.”
(underlining by us)
28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant
lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then
vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long
years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close
and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that
occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be
retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely
because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.
29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the
disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are
given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the
gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists
genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To
convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only
trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the
accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances
transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the
Page 13 of 24
criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound
concern and calls for condemnation.
30. In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764,
this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed
that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple
cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages
cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship
does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted
as under:
“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the
charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the
offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of
the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section
164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of
marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship
in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is
accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the
complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the
appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage
from the appellant. The relationship between the parties
was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break
up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot
result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a
consensual relationship between the parties at the initial
stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the
said relationship does not fructify into a marital
relationship. Further, both parties are now married to
someone else and have moved on in their respective lives.
Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in
Page 14 of 24
the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the
process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by
continuing the prosecution.”
(underlining by us)
31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a
country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social
and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a
woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to
physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would
culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such
circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very
foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than
absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand
vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was
illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of
fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain
sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and
dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC
be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the
same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible
Page 15 of 24
evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated
allegations or moral conjecture.
32. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,
we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the
invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present
case unmistakably indicate that it is a classic instance of a
consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious.
33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the
subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever
raised by respondent No.2 regarding the absence of consent in their
physical relations. It was only upon the appellant’s refusal to fulfil
her demand for payment of the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- that the
present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore,
the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between
12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on
31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of
sexual intimacy.
34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation
that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled
respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it
Page 16 of 24
disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the
part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the
only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her
own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is
also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought
up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the
proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent
No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was
premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is
devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.
35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court
in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2025) 4 SCC 197 ,
whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in
a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its
nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such
relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise
of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot
be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant
portion of the judgment is extracted as under:
“33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards,
the complainant and the appellant were residing in
Page 17 of 24
different towns. The complainant is an educated woman
and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which
could have prevented her from filing a police complaint
against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations
were under duress or were being established under a false
assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even
portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby,
dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant
was to cheat her right from the inception of the
relationship.
34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was
mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the
appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are
convinced that the relationship between the complainant
and the appellant was consensual without the existence of
any element of deceit or misconception.
35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One
Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3-2022, makes it abundantly
clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the
appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when
she had proposed that they should marry and live together,
the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all
there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR
should have been registered immediately after this incident.
However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the
complainant that the appellant was getting married to
another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed
aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also
admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and
therefore, his marriage must be stopped.
xxx
39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the
offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain
sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a
prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account
of her love and passion for the accused.”
(underlining by us)
Page 18 of 24
36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court
observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant
that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was
consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by
him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was
merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High
Court on the case of Ganga Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
(2013) 7 SCC 278 , wherein this Court had stated that unless there
was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence
cannot be inferred.
37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to
appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals
that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual,
inasmuch as respondent No.2 met the appellant whenever he
expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2,
being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated
with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own
volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the
marriage of respondent No.2 was subsisting. In light of the
foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material
Page 19 of 24
on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties
was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express
statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised
in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when
the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.
38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court
in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made:
“29 . It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false
promise to amount to misconception of fact within the
meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from
the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman
to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore,
if it is established that such consent was given under a
misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not
a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , in
which it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 &
24)
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced
or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and
in a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had actually wanted
to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and
had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit
of cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
Page 20 of 24
examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be
a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual
intercourse on account of her love and passion for
the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or
where an accused on account of circumstances
which he could not have foreseen, or which were
beyond his control, was unable to marry her,
despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently. An accused can
be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was
mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
xxx
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term “misconception of
fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety,
and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless
the court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended
to marry her.”
(underlining by us)
Page 21 of 24
39. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 , this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(now Section 528 of the BNSS) could be exercised. While it is not
necessary to revisit all these parameters, a few that are relevant to
the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may
be appropriate:
“102. xxx
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
xxx”
40. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are unable to concur with
the findings recorded by the High Court, inasmuch as the present
case pertains to a consensual relationship, and the acts of
respondent No.2 clearly manifest consent to such a relationship
devoid of any coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation as
Page 22 of 24
contemplated in Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In
our opinion, the High Court’s refusal to exercise its jurisdiction
under Section 528 of BNSS is unsustainable. The acts complained
of in the present case occurred within the contours of a
relationship that was, at the time, voluntary and willing. The
continuation of the prosecution in such facts would be nothing
short of an abuse of the court machinery.
41. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court dated 06.03.2025 in
application under Section 528 BNSS bearing Criminal Application
No. 601 of 2025. The said application accordingly stands allowed.
Consequently, FIR No. 294 of 2024 dated 31.08.2024, registered
with City Chowk Police Station, District Chhatrapati
Sambhajinagar City under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the
IPC and Chargesheet No. 143 of 2024 dated 25.10.2024, filed in
rd
the Court of the 3 Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aurangabad,
accordingly stands quashed.
42. We express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered
by Ms. Radhika Gowtam, learned Advocate-on-Record who had
been appointed as Amicus Curiae in the matter. Registry of this
Page 23 of 24
Court is directed to pay honorarium of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen
Thousand only) to the learned Amicus Curiae .
…………………………………..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J.
(R. MAHADEVAN)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 24, 2025.
Page 24 of 24