Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 23.01.2012
Judgment pronounced on: 27.01.2012
+ W.P.(C) 301/2012
MAHENDER SINGH … Petitioner
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. … Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : M.M.Sudan alongwith petitioner-in-person.
For Respondent : Mr Viraj Datar
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN
V.K. JAIN, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 04.7.2011, passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred
to as “the Tribunal”) in OA No. 1719/2010, filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
2. The petitioner is a Head Constable in Delhi Police. He was charge-sheeted
on the allegation that on 19.2.2008, while posted at Aaya Nagar Police Picket, he
stopped a van carrying SI Sanjay Gupta and Head Constable Ranbir of Vigilance
Branch of Delhi. The petitioner pointed out to SI Sanjay Gupta and Head
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 1 of 13
Constable Ranbir that they had not put on their seat belts and asked SI Sanjay
Gupta to show his driving licence. It was further alleged that the petitioner told
them that they were liable to pay Rs 1200/- as fine. Thereafter, SI Sanjay Gupta
talked to the petitioner so as to settle the matter without issue of challan. The
petitioner told him that the matter could be settled on payment of Rs 200/- which
he should pay to one Constable Jagdish, who was standing nearby. At this stage,
Inspector Raj Singh switched on the video camera and took photographs of
Constable Jagdish accepting two currency notes of Rs 100/- each from SI Sanjay
Gupta and putting them in his pocket. The currency was recovered from the pocket
of the trouser, which Constable Jagdish was wearing. The petitioner was caught on
the spot, but, taking advantage of a scuffle which ensued there, Constable Jagdish
pushed Inspector Raj Singh aside and fled from the spot.
3. The Inquiry Officer concluded that it had been established that the petitioner
and Constable Jagdish Singh had indulged in corrupt practice since the petitioner
has stopped the vehicle, settled the matter for Rs 200/- for not challaning SI Sanjay
Gupta, and Constable Jagdish Singh, on instructions from him, had accepted the
amount of Rs 200/-, which was later recovered by the Vigilance Team from his
pocket. Vide order dated 16.11.2009, the petitioner was removed from service.
The appeals filed by the petitioner as well as Constable Jagdish were dismissed by
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 2 of 13
the Appellate Authority. The OA filed by the petitioner having been dismissed by
the Tribunal, he is before us by way of this writ petition.
4. The impugned order has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that (i)
the inquiry was held in violation of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police Act (Punishment &
Appeals) Rules 1980 and (ii) the CD relied upon during the course of inquiry was
not supplied to the petitioner which prejudiced him in making his defence before
the Inquiry Officer.
5. The contention with respect to breach of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police
(Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 was also raised before the Tribunal. The
contention was rejected on the ground that the charge against the petitioner was
purely a matter of internal checking by the Vigilance Team and could not be
compared with other crimes committed by the police officials and, therefore,
compliance with the provision need not insisted upon in such cases.
Rule 15 (2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 reads as
under:
“15(2) In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence by a police
officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with
the public, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after
obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner
of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should
be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry
should be held.”
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 3 of 13
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before us that the
allegations against the petitioner indicate that while, striking a deal with SI Sanjay
Gupta, the petitioner presumed him to be a general member of the public and not a
police officer and, therefore, the case is clearly covered by Rule 15(2) of Delhi
Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980. It would be seen from a perusal of
the Rule that when the preliminary inquiry discloses that the act committed by a
police officer in his official relations with the public discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the Additional Commissioner of Police has to take a decision
as to whether the delinquent police officer should be proceeded against
departmentally or a criminal case should be registered against him. No third course
of action is envisaged in the Rule. The petitioner before this Court has been
proceeded departmentally instead of a criminal case being registered against him.
The act and conduct of the petitioner disclosed commission of an offence
punishable under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with
Section 13(1)(d) thereof. The punishment prescribed for the said offence is
imprisonment which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven
years and the accused of such an offence is also liable to pay fine. Therefore,
proceeding departmentally was a course of action comparatively favourable to the
delinquent than registering a criminal case against him under Section 7 and
13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Since the petitioner was subjected to a
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 4 of 13
treatment which would be considered rather soft as against the other treatment
which the Additional Commissioner acting under Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police
(Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 could possibly have given to him, it cannot
be said that any prejudice was caused to the petitioner on account of prior approval
of the Additional Commissioner of Police having not been obtained, in terms of
Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the
charge against an accused is required to be established beyond reasonable doubt,
whereas the charge in a departmental inquiry can be established on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities, it cannot be said that the course of action adopted
in this case was favourable to the petitioner and therefore, no prejudice has been
caused to him on account of the designated officer not applying his mind in terms
of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980. We are unable
to accept the contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The
standard of proof, in our view, is not the determinative factor to decide whether a
departmental inquiry or a criminal trial is harsher to a delinquent police officer.
We cannot lose sight of the fact that in a departmental inquiry, the maximum
punishment which can be awarded to an employee is dismissal from service,
whereas in a criminal trial, if charge is proved, he can be sentenced to
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 5 of 13
imprisonment up to seven years in addition to the fine which can be imposed on
him.
We, therefore, hold that since no prejudice was caused to the petitioner on
account of the designated officer having not applied his mind as to whether to
subject the petitioner to a departmental inquiry or to a criminal trial, the finding
recorded by the Disciplinary Authority was not vitiated.
6. Coming to the second contention on behalf of the petitioner, we find that the
aforesaid contention was dealt with by the Tribunal in para 15 of the order which
inter alia reads as under:
……………, it is the admitted position that the enquiry officer
has played the CD before the Applicant during the enquiry
proceedings and he has not disputed it. Neither the Applicant
has asked for a copy of the same nor the enquiry
officer/disciplinary authority has refused to supply the same.
Further, before starting the enquiry proceedings the Applicant
himself has admitted before the enquiry officer that he
received copies of all the documents and he did not consider
that the copy of the CD was necessary for him to defend his
case…………
During the course of hearing before us, the petitioner was present in the
Court and stated that the CD was not played in his presence. He also volunteered
to file an affidavit to this effect. The order passed by the Tribunal clearly shows
that the petitioner had admitted, during the course of hearing, before it, that the
Inquiry Officer had played the CD in his presence during the inquiry proceedings
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 6 of 13
and he had not disputed the same. In case, no such admission was made by the
petitioner, he ought to have filed an appropriate application before the Tribunal,
seeking correction of the order dated 4.7.2011, to the extent it referred to the
admission made by him. We pointedly asked the learned Counsel for the petitioner
as to whether he had stated in the Writ Petition that no such admission was made
by the petitioner before the Tribunal and to this extent the order passed by the
Tribunal proceeds on an incorrect premise. He very fairly conceded that no such
plea has been taken in the Writ Petition. We, therefore, feel that the oral statement
made by the petitioner in the Court is just after thought and no credence can be
given to it. The Tribunal also noted that before commencement of the inquiry
proceedings, the petitioner himself had admitted that he had received copies of all
the documents and he had not considered copy of the CD to be necessary in order
to enable him to defend his case. Nowhere in the Writ Petition has petitioner
denied having made such an admission before the Inquiry Officer. Though it is
stated in the petition that the petitioner had requested the Inquiry Officer to supply
the copy of CD to him, the record does not indicate any such request having been
made to the Inquiry Officer.
However, even if, we exclude the CD from consideration, on the premise
that the aforesaid CD could not have been taken by the Inquiry Officer into
consideration, we find that there is other evidence on record to establish the guilt
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 7 of 13
attributed to the petitioner. We find that Inspector Raj Singh, who was a member
of the Vigilance Team which travelled in the vehicle which was stopped by the
petitioner at Aaya Nagar Police Picket on 19.2.2008, stated before the Inquiry
Officer that their vehicle was stopped by Head Constable Mahender Singh, the
petitioner before this Court, and Constable Jagdish saying that they were not
wearing the seat belt and that Rs 1200/- had to be paid for traffic challan. He
further stated that the petitioner told SI Sanjay Gupta that the matter could be
sorted out for Rs 200/- and thereupon SI Sanjay Gupta gave Rs 200/- to Constable
Jagdish Singh who put the same in his pocket and later on that amount was
recovered from him. PW-1 Constable Ram Lal proved the duty roster showing the
petitioner posted at Aaya Nagar Police Picket. We also note that during the inquiry
proceedings the petitioner did not dispute his being on duty at Aaya Nagar Police
Picket on 19.2.2008. PW-3 HC Rambir Singh and PW-4 SI Sanjay Gupta also
deposed against the petitioner. Since the oral deposition of the witnesses was also
taken into consideration by the Inquiry Officer, it cannot be said that the charge
against the petitioner could not be established during inquiry. A perusal of the
inquiry report would show that during cross examination of PW-3 to PW-5, the
emphasize of the petitioner was on the fact that departure/arrival of the surveillance
team was not recorded. This was considered to be procedural lapse by the Inquiry
Officer and rightly so. The failure to record departure/arrival does not wash away
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 8 of 13
the positive evidence of the witnesses who deposed during the course of inquiry.
Discussion of evidence by the Inquiry Officer would show that the finding
recorded by him was based primarily on the oral deposition of the witnesses and
not upon what was captured in the CD. In his analysis of evidence, the Inquiry
Officer did not even refer to what was captured in the CD.
7. With respect to the power of the Tribunal or for that matter this Court to
interfere with the finding recorded in a Departmental Inquiry, this Court in a recent
judgment dated 19.1.2012 in WPC 2431/2011 Ex. Head Constable Manjeet Singh
v. Union of India & Ors inter alia observed as under:
It is by now a settled proposition of law that the Court, while
considering challenge to the orders passed in disciplinary
proceedings does not act as an Appellate Authority and does
not reassess the evidence led in the course of the inquiry nor
can it interfere on the ground that another view in the matter is
possible on the basis of the material available on record. If the
Court finds that the inquiry has been conducted in a fair and
proper manner and the findings rendered therein are based on
evidence, the adequacy of evidence or the reliability of the
evidence are not the grounds on which the Court can interfere
with the findings recorded in the departmental inquiries. It is
not open to the Court to interfere with the finding of fact
recorded in such inquiries unless it is shown that those findings
are based on „no evidence‟ or are clearly perverse. A finding
would be considered to be perverse if no reasonable person
could have recorded such a finding on the basis of material
available before him. Another ground on which the Court can
interfere with the findings recorded in a disciplinary proceeding
is violation of principles of natural justice or statutory rules or if
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 9 of 13
it is found that the order passed in the inquiry is arbitrary, mala
fide or based on extraneous considerations. This proposition of
law has been reiterated by Supreme Court in a number of cases
including B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India: 1995(6) SCC
749, Union of India v. G.Gunayuthan: 1997 (7) SCC 463,
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana: 1999 (5) SCC 762
and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shahsi Kant S.
Patil: 2001 (1) SCC 416.
8. In the case before this Court, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by
the Inquiry Officer was based on „no evidence‟ or was a finding which no
reasonable person acting on the material placed before him, after excluding the CD
from consideration, could have recorded. No plea of the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority being arbitrary, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations has been raised before us. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere
with the finding of the guilt recorded against the petitioner.
9. As regards quantum of punishment, this Court in Manjeet Singh (supra)
inter alia observed as under:
It is a settled proposition of law that neither the Central
Administrative Tribunal nor the Writ Court can interfere with
the punishment awarded in a departmental proceeding, unless it
is shown that the punishment is so outrageously
disproportionate, as to suggest lack of good faith. While
reviewing an order of punishment passed in such proceedings,
the Court cannot substitute itself for the Appellate Authority
and impose a lesser punishment, merely because it considers
that the lesser punishment would be more reasonable as
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 10 of 13
compared to the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority. The Court or for that matter even the Tribunal can
interfere with the punishment only if it is shown to be so
disproportionate to the nature of the charge against the
delinquent official that no person, acting as a Disciplinary
Authority would impose such a punishment. The following
observations made by Supreme Court in V.Ramana v.
A.P.SRTC And Others: (2005) III LLJ 725 SC are pertinent in
this regard:
“The common thread running through in all these decisions is
that the court should not interfere with the administrator‟s
decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in
the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In
view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court
would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its
decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial
review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process
and not the decision.
To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the
conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for
interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by
recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course
if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it
would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”
In B.C.Chaturvedi (supra) , Supreme Court, after
considering a Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa
And Others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra: (1963) ILLJ 239 SC
and some other decisions, inter alia held as under:
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 11 of 13
A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority,
being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider
the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are
invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment
keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct.
The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on
penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional
and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent
reasons in support thereof.
10. The Disciplinary Authority in our view rightly observed that indulgence of a
public servant in activities such as demand and accepting money needs to be dealt
with a heavy hand and retention of police officials indulging into such activities is
undesirable and not warranted in public interest. The Appellate Authority found no
reason to interfere with the punishment awarded to the petitioner. Considering the
nature of the charge established against the petitioner, it cannot be said that the
penalty imposed on him is wholly disproportionate to the charge proved against
him or is such as to shock the conscience of the Court. We are in agreement with
the view that a police official indulging into such corrupt activities should not be
allowed to continue in service and needs to be weeded out from the police force.
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 12 of 13
11. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs we find no merit in the
Writ Petition and the same is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs.
V.K.JAIN, J
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
JANUARY 27, 2012
bg/vn
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 13 of 13
% Judgment reserved on: 23.01.2012
Judgment pronounced on: 27.01.2012
+ W.P.(C) 301/2012
MAHENDER SINGH … Petitioner
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS. … Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : M.M.Sudan alongwith petitioner-in-person.
For Respondent : Mr Viraj Datar
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN
V.K. JAIN, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 04.7.2011, passed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred
to as “the Tribunal”) in OA No. 1719/2010, filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
2. The petitioner is a Head Constable in Delhi Police. He was charge-sheeted
on the allegation that on 19.2.2008, while posted at Aaya Nagar Police Picket, he
stopped a van carrying SI Sanjay Gupta and Head Constable Ranbir of Vigilance
Branch of Delhi. The petitioner pointed out to SI Sanjay Gupta and Head
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 1 of 13
Constable Ranbir that they had not put on their seat belts and asked SI Sanjay
Gupta to show his driving licence. It was further alleged that the petitioner told
them that they were liable to pay Rs 1200/- as fine. Thereafter, SI Sanjay Gupta
talked to the petitioner so as to settle the matter without issue of challan. The
petitioner told him that the matter could be settled on payment of Rs 200/- which
he should pay to one Constable Jagdish, who was standing nearby. At this stage,
Inspector Raj Singh switched on the video camera and took photographs of
Constable Jagdish accepting two currency notes of Rs 100/- each from SI Sanjay
Gupta and putting them in his pocket. The currency was recovered from the pocket
of the trouser, which Constable Jagdish was wearing. The petitioner was caught on
the spot, but, taking advantage of a scuffle which ensued there, Constable Jagdish
pushed Inspector Raj Singh aside and fled from the spot.
3. The Inquiry Officer concluded that it had been established that the petitioner
and Constable Jagdish Singh had indulged in corrupt practice since the petitioner
has stopped the vehicle, settled the matter for Rs 200/- for not challaning SI Sanjay
Gupta, and Constable Jagdish Singh, on instructions from him, had accepted the
amount of Rs 200/-, which was later recovered by the Vigilance Team from his
pocket. Vide order dated 16.11.2009, the petitioner was removed from service.
The appeals filed by the petitioner as well as Constable Jagdish were dismissed by
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 2 of 13
the Appellate Authority. The OA filed by the petitioner having been dismissed by
the Tribunal, he is before us by way of this writ petition.
4. The impugned order has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that (i)
the inquiry was held in violation of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police Act (Punishment &
Appeals) Rules 1980 and (ii) the CD relied upon during the course of inquiry was
not supplied to the petitioner which prejudiced him in making his defence before
the Inquiry Officer.
5. The contention with respect to breach of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police
(Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 was also raised before the Tribunal. The
contention was rejected on the ground that the charge against the petitioner was
purely a matter of internal checking by the Vigilance Team and could not be
compared with other crimes committed by the police officials and, therefore,
compliance with the provision need not insisted upon in such cases.
Rule 15 (2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 reads as
under:
“15(2) In cases in which a preliminary enquiry discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence by a police
officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with
the public, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after
obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner
of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should
be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry
should be held.”
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 3 of 13
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before us that the
allegations against the petitioner indicate that while, striking a deal with SI Sanjay
Gupta, the petitioner presumed him to be a general member of the public and not a
police officer and, therefore, the case is clearly covered by Rule 15(2) of Delhi
Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980. It would be seen from a perusal of
the Rule that when the preliminary inquiry discloses that the act committed by a
police officer in his official relations with the public discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the Additional Commissioner of Police has to take a decision
as to whether the delinquent police officer should be proceeded against
departmentally or a criminal case should be registered against him. No third course
of action is envisaged in the Rule. The petitioner before this Court has been
proceeded departmentally instead of a criminal case being registered against him.
The act and conduct of the petitioner disclosed commission of an offence
punishable under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with
Section 13(1)(d) thereof. The punishment prescribed for the said offence is
imprisonment which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to seven
years and the accused of such an offence is also liable to pay fine. Therefore,
proceeding departmentally was a course of action comparatively favourable to the
delinquent than registering a criminal case against him under Section 7 and
13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. Since the petitioner was subjected to a
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 4 of 13
treatment which would be considered rather soft as against the other treatment
which the Additional Commissioner acting under Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police
(Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980 could possibly have given to him, it cannot
be said that any prejudice was caused to the petitioner on account of prior approval
of the Additional Commissioner of Police having not been obtained, in terms of
Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the
charge against an accused is required to be established beyond reasonable doubt,
whereas the charge in a departmental inquiry can be established on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities, it cannot be said that the course of action adopted
in this case was favourable to the petitioner and therefore, no prejudice has been
caused to him on account of the designated officer not applying his mind in terms
of Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeals) Rules, 1980. We are unable
to accept the contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The
standard of proof, in our view, is not the determinative factor to decide whether a
departmental inquiry or a criminal trial is harsher to a delinquent police officer.
We cannot lose sight of the fact that in a departmental inquiry, the maximum
punishment which can be awarded to an employee is dismissal from service,
whereas in a criminal trial, if charge is proved, he can be sentenced to
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 5 of 13
imprisonment up to seven years in addition to the fine which can be imposed on
him.
We, therefore, hold that since no prejudice was caused to the petitioner on
account of the designated officer having not applied his mind as to whether to
subject the petitioner to a departmental inquiry or to a criminal trial, the finding
recorded by the Disciplinary Authority was not vitiated.
6. Coming to the second contention on behalf of the petitioner, we find that the
aforesaid contention was dealt with by the Tribunal in para 15 of the order which
inter alia reads as under:
……………, it is the admitted position that the enquiry officer
has played the CD before the Applicant during the enquiry
proceedings and he has not disputed it. Neither the Applicant
has asked for a copy of the same nor the enquiry
officer/disciplinary authority has refused to supply the same.
Further, before starting the enquiry proceedings the Applicant
himself has admitted before the enquiry officer that he
received copies of all the documents and he did not consider
that the copy of the CD was necessary for him to defend his
case…………
During the course of hearing before us, the petitioner was present in the
Court and stated that the CD was not played in his presence. He also volunteered
to file an affidavit to this effect. The order passed by the Tribunal clearly shows
that the petitioner had admitted, during the course of hearing, before it, that the
Inquiry Officer had played the CD in his presence during the inquiry proceedings
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 6 of 13
and he had not disputed the same. In case, no such admission was made by the
petitioner, he ought to have filed an appropriate application before the Tribunal,
seeking correction of the order dated 4.7.2011, to the extent it referred to the
admission made by him. We pointedly asked the learned Counsel for the petitioner
as to whether he had stated in the Writ Petition that no such admission was made
by the petitioner before the Tribunal and to this extent the order passed by the
Tribunal proceeds on an incorrect premise. He very fairly conceded that no such
plea has been taken in the Writ Petition. We, therefore, feel that the oral statement
made by the petitioner in the Court is just after thought and no credence can be
given to it. The Tribunal also noted that before commencement of the inquiry
proceedings, the petitioner himself had admitted that he had received copies of all
the documents and he had not considered copy of the CD to be necessary in order
to enable him to defend his case. Nowhere in the Writ Petition has petitioner
denied having made such an admission before the Inquiry Officer. Though it is
stated in the petition that the petitioner had requested the Inquiry Officer to supply
the copy of CD to him, the record does not indicate any such request having been
made to the Inquiry Officer.
However, even if, we exclude the CD from consideration, on the premise
that the aforesaid CD could not have been taken by the Inquiry Officer into
consideration, we find that there is other evidence on record to establish the guilt
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 7 of 13
attributed to the petitioner. We find that Inspector Raj Singh, who was a member
of the Vigilance Team which travelled in the vehicle which was stopped by the
petitioner at Aaya Nagar Police Picket on 19.2.2008, stated before the Inquiry
Officer that their vehicle was stopped by Head Constable Mahender Singh, the
petitioner before this Court, and Constable Jagdish saying that they were not
wearing the seat belt and that Rs 1200/- had to be paid for traffic challan. He
further stated that the petitioner told SI Sanjay Gupta that the matter could be
sorted out for Rs 200/- and thereupon SI Sanjay Gupta gave Rs 200/- to Constable
Jagdish Singh who put the same in his pocket and later on that amount was
recovered from him. PW-1 Constable Ram Lal proved the duty roster showing the
petitioner posted at Aaya Nagar Police Picket. We also note that during the inquiry
proceedings the petitioner did not dispute his being on duty at Aaya Nagar Police
Picket on 19.2.2008. PW-3 HC Rambir Singh and PW-4 SI Sanjay Gupta also
deposed against the petitioner. Since the oral deposition of the witnesses was also
taken into consideration by the Inquiry Officer, it cannot be said that the charge
against the petitioner could not be established during inquiry. A perusal of the
inquiry report would show that during cross examination of PW-3 to PW-5, the
emphasize of the petitioner was on the fact that departure/arrival of the surveillance
team was not recorded. This was considered to be procedural lapse by the Inquiry
Officer and rightly so. The failure to record departure/arrival does not wash away
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 8 of 13
the positive evidence of the witnesses who deposed during the course of inquiry.
Discussion of evidence by the Inquiry Officer would show that the finding
recorded by him was based primarily on the oral deposition of the witnesses and
not upon what was captured in the CD. In his analysis of evidence, the Inquiry
Officer did not even refer to what was captured in the CD.
7. With respect to the power of the Tribunal or for that matter this Court to
interfere with the finding recorded in a Departmental Inquiry, this Court in a recent
judgment dated 19.1.2012 in WPC 2431/2011 Ex. Head Constable Manjeet Singh
v. Union of India & Ors inter alia observed as under:
It is by now a settled proposition of law that the Court, while
considering challenge to the orders passed in disciplinary
proceedings does not act as an Appellate Authority and does
not reassess the evidence led in the course of the inquiry nor
can it interfere on the ground that another view in the matter is
possible on the basis of the material available on record. If the
Court finds that the inquiry has been conducted in a fair and
proper manner and the findings rendered therein are based on
evidence, the adequacy of evidence or the reliability of the
evidence are not the grounds on which the Court can interfere
with the findings recorded in the departmental inquiries. It is
not open to the Court to interfere with the finding of fact
recorded in such inquiries unless it is shown that those findings
are based on „no evidence‟ or are clearly perverse. A finding
would be considered to be perverse if no reasonable person
could have recorded such a finding on the basis of material
available before him. Another ground on which the Court can
interfere with the findings recorded in a disciplinary proceeding
is violation of principles of natural justice or statutory rules or if
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 9 of 13
it is found that the order passed in the inquiry is arbitrary, mala
fide or based on extraneous considerations. This proposition of
law has been reiterated by Supreme Court in a number of cases
including B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India: 1995(6) SCC
749, Union of India v. G.Gunayuthan: 1997 (7) SCC 463,
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana: 1999 (5) SCC 762
and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shahsi Kant S.
Patil: 2001 (1) SCC 416.
8. In the case before this Court, it cannot be said that the finding recorded by
the Inquiry Officer was based on „no evidence‟ or was a finding which no
reasonable person acting on the material placed before him, after excluding the CD
from consideration, could have recorded. No plea of the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority being arbitrary, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations has been raised before us. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere
with the finding of the guilt recorded against the petitioner.
9. As regards quantum of punishment, this Court in Manjeet Singh (supra)
inter alia observed as under:
It is a settled proposition of law that neither the Central
Administrative Tribunal nor the Writ Court can interfere with
the punishment awarded in a departmental proceeding, unless it
is shown that the punishment is so outrageously
disproportionate, as to suggest lack of good faith. While
reviewing an order of punishment passed in such proceedings,
the Court cannot substitute itself for the Appellate Authority
and impose a lesser punishment, merely because it considers
that the lesser punishment would be more reasonable as
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 10 of 13
compared to the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority. The Court or for that matter even the Tribunal can
interfere with the punishment only if it is shown to be so
disproportionate to the nature of the charge against the
delinquent official that no person, acting as a Disciplinary
Authority would impose such a punishment. The following
observations made by Supreme Court in V.Ramana v.
A.P.SRTC And Others: (2005) III LLJ 725 SC are pertinent in
this regard:
“The common thread running through in all these decisions is
that the court should not interfere with the administrator‟s
decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in
the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In
view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court
would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its
decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial
review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process
and not the decision.
To put it differently unless the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the
conscience of the court/Tribunal, there is no scope for
interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by
recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course
if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it
would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.”
In B.C.Chaturvedi (supra) , Supreme Court, after
considering a Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa
And Others v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra: (1963) ILLJ 239 SC
and some other decisions, inter alia held as under:
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 11 of 13
A review of the above legal position would establish that the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority,
being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider
the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are
invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment
keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct.
The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial
review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on
penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority
shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would
appropriately mould the relief, either directing the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty
imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional
and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent
reasons in support thereof.
10. The Disciplinary Authority in our view rightly observed that indulgence of a
public servant in activities such as demand and accepting money needs to be dealt
with a heavy hand and retention of police officials indulging into such activities is
undesirable and not warranted in public interest. The Appellate Authority found no
reason to interfere with the punishment awarded to the petitioner. Considering the
nature of the charge established against the petitioner, it cannot be said that the
penalty imposed on him is wholly disproportionate to the charge proved against
him or is such as to shock the conscience of the Court. We are in agreement with
the view that a police official indulging into such corrupt activities should not be
allowed to continue in service and needs to be weeded out from the police force.
W.P(C) 301/2012 Page 12 of 13
11. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs we find no merit in the
Writ Petition and the same is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs.
V.K.JAIN, J
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
JANUARY 27, 2012
bg/vn
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