Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HARBANS KUMARI AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/10/1978
BENCH:
ACT:
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
(Act 1 of 1951) Section 39 (1) (e), interpretation of-
Computation of compensation.
HEADNOTE:
on the vesting of the forests belonging to the
appellants in the State of U.P. by virtue of Section 4 of
the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act
1 of 1951), the question arose about the assessment and
payment of compensation therefor to the heirs of the
intermediary. The compensation officer held that the average
annual income from the said forests which could be taken
into consideration while computing its compensation was Rs.
4551/- as disclosed by the appellants’ accounts for a period
of 22 years preceding the date of vesting in terms of clause
(i) of Section 39(1)(e) of the Act and Rs. 450/- was its
annual yield on the date of vesting as per terms of clause
(ii) of Section 39(1)(e) of the Act. The compensation
officer held that Rs. 5001/- was the annual income from the
aforesaid forest to the intermediaries. The High Court in
appeal held that Rs. 2000/- and not Rs. 450/ was the income
under clause (ii) of Section 39(1)(e) of the Act and
therefore came to the conclusion that Rs. 3000/- was the
average annual income on the basis of which gross assets had
to be calculated in computation of compensation in respect
of the said forest.
Dismissing the appeals by certificate the Court,
^
HELD: 1. The opening words of Section 39(1)(e) of the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950 which is couched in very
emphatic terms govern not only clause (1), but also clause
(ii) of the Section. Consequently neither of the two factors
mentioned in Section 39(1)(e) of the Act can be ignored
while computing the average annual income. The connotation
of the word ’average’ does not admit of any doubt. [31A-B]
(ii) On a true construction of Section 39(1)(e) of the
Act, it is clear that the Legislature cast an obligation on
the compensation officer to work out the compensation by
computing the average annual income giving due weight to
both the factors mentioned in the aforesaid clauses (i). and
(ii). He cannot adopt either of these sub-clauses. Under sub
clause (ii) the annual yield on the date of vesting is to be
appraised by taking into consideration, inter alia, the
number and age of the trees, the area under forest and the
produce. [31C, 32E]
Durgi Devi and Ors. v. State of U.P. [1978] 3 SCR p.
595, Ganga Devi v. State of U.P., [1972] 3 S.C.C. 126;
applied.
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 171,
171A 171D of 1969.
From the Judgment and decree dated 10-12-1963 of the
Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 511/55.
Lal Narain Sinha, P. P. Singh, J. B. Dadachanji, K.
John and J. Sinha for the Appellants.
G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JASWANT SINGH, J. These five appeals by certificates
under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution granted by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall be disposed of
by this judgment as they raise a common question relating to
the interpretation of section 39(1) (e) of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act No. 1 of
1951) (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).
As the facts giving rise to these appeals are
identical, it shall suffice to narrate the facts of the case
culminating in Appeal No. 171 of 1969. The predecessor-in-
interest of the appellants, the late Jodha Mal, owned
several private forests in the State of U.P. including the
one consisting of three compartments comprising a total area
of 484.57 acres in village Rajiwala Attick Farm, Mahal
Sansar in District Dehradun. On the vesting of the said
forest in the State of U.P. by virtue of section 4 of the
Act, the question arose about the assessment and payment of
compensation therefor to the heirs of the intermediary. On
service of draft compensation roll prepared under section 40
of the Act, each one of the appellants, filed separate
objections in regard thereto before the Compensation
officer, Dehradun, who disposed of the same by his order
dated August 31, 1953 holding that the average annual income
for the said forest which could be taken into consideration
while computing its compensation was Rs. 4,551/- as
disclosed by the appellants’ accounts for a period of 22
years preceding the date of vesting in terms of clause (i)
of section 39(1)(e) of the Act and Rs. 450/- was its annual
yield on the date of vesting as per terms of clause (ii) of
section 39(1) (e) of the Act. Dividing the sum total of
these two figures by 2, the Compensation officer held that
Rs. 5,001/- was the annual income from the aforesaid forest
to the intermediaries. Aggrieved by the computation of
compensation, the respondent preferred an appeal to the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad under section SO of the
Act. The appellant’s also filed cross appeals claiming that
the average annual income as assessed by the Compensation
officer was too low. Being of the view that while com-
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puting the average annual income from the forest, both the
results arrived at by working both the clauses of section
39(1)(e) of the Act had to be looked into and considered and
it had to be objectively decided as to what the average
annual income from the forest would be, the High Court held
that Rs. 2,000/- and not Rs. 450/- was the income under
clause (ii) of section 39(1)(e) of the Act. On the aforesaid
basis, the High Court came to the conclusion that Rs. 3,000/
and not Rs. 5,001/- was the average annual income on the
basis of which gross assets had to be calculated in
computation of compensation in respect of the aforesaid
forest. The High Court by its judgment and decree dated
December 10, 1963, disposed of the appeal and the cross
appeal in the manner indicated above. Aggrieved by the
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judgment and decree of the High Court, the appellants have
come up in appeal to this Court. The respondent has also
filed objections with regard to the item of Rs. 2,000/-.
Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha appearing on behalf of the
appellants has raised a very short point. Assailing the
method adopted by the High Court in computing the
compensation, he has urged that the High Court has missed
the real purport and meaning of the provisions relating to
the computation of compensation and that the relevant
portion of section 39 of the Act did not authorise the High
Court to calculate the compensation by taking a mean of the
aforesaid two figures. He has further urged that having
worked out the average annual income according to the method
indicated in clause (i) of section 39(1)(e) of the Act, the
High Court was not required to work out the annual yield of
the forest on the date of vesting. We regret, we cannot
accede to this contention. Section 39(1) (e) of the Act
provides as follows:-
"39.Gross assets of a mahal.--(1) Gross assets as
respects a mahal shall be the aggregate gross income of
the land or estate comprised in the mahal and such
income shall comprise ................
(e)average annual income from forests, which shall
be computed-
(i) on the basis of the income for a period
of twenty to forty agricultural years
immediately preceding the date of
vesting as the Compensation officer may
consider reasonable, and
(ii) on the appraisement of the annual yield
of the forest on the date of vesting."
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It will be noticed that the opening words of the above
quoted section which is couched in very emphatic terms
govern not only clause (i) but also clause (ii ) of section
39 ( 1 ) (e) of the Act. Consequently neither of the two
factors mentioned in section 39(1)(e) of the Act can be
ignored while computing the average annual income. Now so
far as the connotation of the word ’average’ is concerned,
it does not admit of any doubt. According to shorter oxford
English Dictionary, the word ’average’ means arithmetical
mean to estimate by dividing the aggregate of a series by
the number of its units’. The same is the connotation of the
word ’average’ according to the Random House Dictionary of
the English Language where the total receipt has been stated
to mean the total receipt from sales divided by the number
of the units sold.
On a true construction of section 39(1)(e) of the, Act,
it appears to us that the legislature cast an obligation on
the Compensation officer to work out the compensation by
computing the average annual income giving due weight to
both the factors mentioned in the aforesaid clauses (i) and
(ii). Accordingly, we are of the view that the High Court
was correct in computing the average income by adding up to
two figures i.e. Of Rs. 4,551/- and Rs. 2,000/- and arriving
at a mean on that basis. The position is also not res
integra as in Smt. Durgi Devi & Ors. v. State of U.P.(l)
this Court held that the average annual income has to be
arrived at by taking into consideration not only the income
referred to in clause (i) of section 39(1) (e) but also the
estimated annual yield of the forest on the date of vesting.
The following observations made therein are apposite.
"A plain reading of clause (e) of section 39(1)
shows that its sub-clauses (i) and (ii) do not provide
for two alter native methods of calculating the average
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annual income of the forest. The conjunction ’and’ at
the end of sub-clause (i) cannot be read as "or". It
conjoins the two sub-clauses, and in effect, read in
the context of "shall" in the opening part of clause
(e), mandates the compensation officer to take both the
factors into consideration in assessing the average
annual income from the forest. The reason why the
legislature has made compliance with the requirement of
this sub clause (ii), also, obligatory, appears to be
to ensure that the compensation assessed has a
reasonable nexus and proportion to the actual and
potential value of the forest as on the date of
vesting. If a forest has been repeatedly, wholly and
indiscriminately exploited within forty years or less
imme-
(1) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 595=[1978] 3 S.C.C. 101.
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diately before the vesting, its actual and potential
value as a forest on the date of the vesting might be
far less than the one calculated on the basis of its
average annual income of the preceding 20 to 40 years
as the case may be. In such a case, average annual
income calculated merely on the basis of the income for
a period of 20 to 40 years preceding the vesting, may
cause fortuitous inflation in the assessment of
compensation. Conversely, if a forest has been very
little exploited in the preceding forty years and is
well-preserved and well-developed on the date of
vesting than calculation of its average annual income
on the basis of sub-clause (i) alone, without taking
into account its potential yield on the date of the
vesting, will make the compensation assessed wholly
illusory, having no relation whatever to the value of
the forests as at the date of vesting. Entry of the
appraised annual yield of the forest on the date of
vesting, into computation under clause (e), operates as
a counterpoise against fortuitous inflation or
deflation in the assessment."
Again in Ganga Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh(1) it
was pointed out by this Court that in computing the average
annual income under clause (e) of section 39(1), the
compensation officer has to refer to both these sub-clauses
(i) and (ii). He cannot adopt either of these sub-clauses.
It was also pointed out that under sub-clause (ii) the
annual yield on the date of vesting is to be appraised by
taking into consideration, inter alia the number and age of
the trees, the area under forest and the produce.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in these
appeals which are dismissed with costs.
S.R. Appeals dismissed.
(1) [1972] 3 S.C.C. 126.
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