Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3555-3560 OF 2012
Sarla Performance Fibers Limited ... Appellant(s)
Etc.
Versus
Commissioner of Central Excise, ... Respondent(s)
Surat-II
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
The appellant is a company registered under the
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Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged, inter alia, in the
manufacture of excisable goods, namely, synthetic yarn and
for that purpose it has a factory at Unit-I, Survey No.
59/1/14, Amli, Piparia Industrial Estate, Silvassa (U.T. of
D.N.&H). The said factory is a 100% Export Oriented Unit
th
(EOU). Prior to 6 November, 2006, Sarla Performance Fibers
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Limited was known as Sarla Polyesters Ltd. Shri Madhusudan
Jhunjhunwala and Shri Satish Kumar Sharma were the
| Limited. | Shri Di |
|---|
the dispatch in-charge of M/s. Hindustan Cotton Company, a
partnership firm, engaged inter alia , in trading of Polyester
Textured/Twisted Dyed Yarn since 1988. Sh. Gopal Bhagwan
Dutt Sharma was the Manager of Sarla Performance Fibers
Limited at the relevant time. The reference to appellants
herein will mean and include all the appellants.
2. The appellants had procured partial oriented yarn (POY)
falling under Chapter 54 without payment of duty for the
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manufacture of various types of yarn, namely, polyester
texturised yarn, nylon covered yarn and polyester covered
yarn. A show cause notice No. V(Ch.54)15-6/OA/2000 dated
th
16 May, 2001 was issued by the Commissioner of Central
Excise, Surat – II requiring the appellant to explain why
central excise duty of Rs.32,92,854/-should not be recovered
on the texturised yarn allegedly removed by the appellants
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without payment of duty. The said show cause notice also
required the appellants to explain why penalty should not be
| . That a | part, th |
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sought to confiscate the nylon covered yarn valued at
Rs.1,72,186/-and further to recover duty thereon of
Rs.55,202.96.
3. After the show cause notice was issued, the appellants
made payment aggregating to Rs.14,89,349.00 as against the
duty payable under Section 3(1) of the Act (after taking into
account the cum-duty benefit) and Rs.11,19,775.00 payable in
the event the benefit of Notification No. 2/05 was allowed.
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4. After the reply to the show cause notice was filed, the
Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat-II, by his
st
order-in-original no. 11/MP/2002 dated 21 March, 2002 (i)
confiscated the seized nylon covered yarn weighing 245.980
kgs. valued at Rs.1,72,186/- and appropriated a sum of
Rs.86,093/- which was given as bank guarantee; (ii)
demanded Rs.55,202.96 as differential duty on the confiscated
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goods which were released provisionally before the
adjudication; and (iii) confirmed the central excise duty
| and imp | osed a p |
|---|
on the appellants. The adjudicating authority also imposed
penalties on various persons set out in the impugned order.
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant
preferred appeals before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax
Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) (for short, ‘the tribunal’) under
Section 35B of the Act to the extent the said order was adverse
to it. The revenue also preferred an appeal before the tribunal
as certain aspects were adverse to it. The tribunal referred the
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issue to the Larger Bench of the tribunal for consideration
whether the goods cleared by the appellant were eligible for
exemption under Notification No. 125/84 dated 26.05.1984.
The Larger Bench vide order dated 03.08.2007 held that in
case the goods cleared by the 100% EOU and sold in India
whether with or without permission, the assessment shall be
made under proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act and the
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exemption under Notification No. 125/84 shall not be
applicable. After the matter was placed before the Division
| decision | and reit |
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Bench by opining that the goods cleared by the 100% EOU
and sold in India whether with or without permission of the
Development Commissioner, the assessment shall be made
under proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act and exemption under
Notification No. 125/84 shall not be applicable but granted
some relief as regards the imposition of penalty. Resultantly,
the tribunal vide order dated 15.11.2007 disposed of the
appeal of the appellants and dismissed the appeal of the
revenue.
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6. As the facts would unfold, the appellants filed an
application before the tribunal for recall of order dated
15.11.2007 in terms of judgment in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.
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Collector of Central Excise , which was dismissed on the
ground that appeals were decided on merits and a detailed
1
1996 (86) ELT 472 (SC)
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order considering all aspects was passed by the tribunal and
as such it could not be said that the Bench defaulted in
in Writ Petition No. 4758 of 2008 and the Division Bench of
the High Court taking note of the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties, directed as follows:-
“3. There were certain Appeals filed by the
Petitioners and also there were certain Appeals
filed by the Department. Mr. Desai, the learned
Senior Counsel for the Respondents, has no
objection if all the Appeals are heard together
denovo including the Appeals filed by the
Department since the Petitioners were not heard
in the Appeals. The learned Counsel for the
Petitioners also has no objection for the same.
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4. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
st
both the impugned orders dated 21 April, 2008
th
and 15 November, 2007 passed by the CESTAT
in the aforesaid Appeals are hereby quashed and
set aside, and all the aforesaid Appeals stand
restored to file. The CESTAT is directed to hear
all the Appeals mentioned hereinabove afresh
denovo without being influenced by their earlier
orders in any manner.”
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8. After the remit, it was contended before the tribunal that
the allegation of clandestine removal was based on a computer
| artment | to estab |
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were the invoices issued by Hindustan Cotton Company; and
that the appellant SPL is a 100% EOU and when case goods
were cleared without permission of the Development
Commissioner according to the department duty was payable
under Section 3(1) of the Act and exemption was available
under notification no. 125/84 CE. To sustain the stand,
reliance was placed on SIV Industries Ltd. v. CCE &
2
Customs . Be it stated that the reliance was placed on Larger
bench decision of the tribunal in Shrichakra Tyres Ltd. v.
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3
CCE Madras and on that base it was contended that the
amount utilized by the assessee was to be treated as duty
price and no penalty could have been imposed on individuals
since no evidence had been brought on record to show that
they were aware of the transactions.
2
(2000) 3 SCC 367
3
1999 (108) ELT 61 (Tribunal)
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9. The stand of the assessee was resisted by the revenue
contending, inter alia , that the benefit of exemption
| conditio | ns to be |
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conditions were fulfilled, exemption could not be allowed; that
the benefit of cum-duty price could not be extended and
invocation of a wrong section or rule in the show cause notice
would not be a bar for imposition of penalty under the correct
rule or section, and that appellant was not eligible for
treatment of clearances under Section 3(1) of the Act. On
behalf of the revenue reliance was placed on Sterlite Optical
4
Technologies Ltd. v. CC&CE Aurangabad .
JUDGMENT
10. At this juncture, it is relevant to state that Member,
Technical came to hold that all the sales to DTA were
clandestinely done in contravention of the provisions of the
EXIM policy and the appellant-company did not raise any
contention that the price charged included the component of
excise duty. On the contrary the appellants claimed exemption
4
2005 (188) ELT 201 (Trib.-Mumbai)
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under notification no. 125/84 and, therefore, the question of
SPL having recovered any cum-duty price from the customers
| en made | by SPL i |
|---|
Cotton Company and M.M. Sanghavi and the demands had
been raised on the invoices raised. The transaction itself was
artificial and no justification had been shown to treat the same
as cum-duty price and, therefore, the decision of the
Commissioner not to treat the price as cum-duty price
deserved to be upheld. As regards penalty on the company, the
learned member held that it had been rightly imposed under
Section 11AC of the Act read with Rule 173Q of the Central
Excise Rules. As far as the individuals were concerned, the
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learned Member opined that the imposition on some was
justified and imposition on certain individuals was not
warranted. He, however, dismissed the appeal preferred by
the department.
11. The Member, Judicial concurred with the view of the
Member, Technical as regards the clandestine removal and
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consequent confirmation of demand of duty and imposition of
penalty on various appellants but, however, as far as the
| zation m | ade by |
|---|
were required to be treated as cum-duty and as such, the
benefit had to be extended to the appellant on the above
count. She further observed that:-
“Admittedly no duty has been recovered by them
from their buyers. When the duty is being
subsequently demanded from them on the same
realization, it is, in my view, required to be
treated as cum duty and the assessable value
has to be arrived at by deduction of the duty now
being confirmed against the assessee. This has
been the declaration of law in all the judgments
relied upon by the learned Advocate. The fact as
to whether the duty is being demanded on
clandestine removal or on any other issue,
should not make a difference”.
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12. The learned Member placed reliance on CCE Delhi v.
5
M/s. Maruti Udyog Ltd. , reproduced a passage from the
same and opined that the entire realization was required to be
considered as cum-duty-price and the benefit of the same had
5
2002 (141) ELT 3 (SC)
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to be extended to the assessee and for the said purpose, the
matter needed to be remanded for recalculation of the
| Member, | Technic |
|---|
required to be remanded for imposing penalty equivalent to
the duty calculated on the determination of the quantum.
13. The two Members noted three points as difference of
opinion. For the sake of completeness, we think it appropriate
to reproduce the same:-
“a. Whether the entire sales value of the goods
removed clandestinely is required to be
considered as cum-duty and benefit of the same
is to be extended to M/s. Sarla Polyester Ltd.
(Appellant no.1 herein) or not?
b. Whether the ratio of law declared by this
Hon’ble Court in the case of CCE Delhi vs. M/s.
Maruti Udyog Ltd. reported in 2002(141) ELT 3
applies to the facts of the present case or not and
as to whether the benefit of the same is to be
extended to the said assessee or not?
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c. Whether the matter is required to be
remanded for quantification of the duty by
treating entire realization as cum-duty price, as
held by the Member (Judicial) or the appellant’s
plea on the above issue is required to be rejected
by upholding the decision of the Commissioner
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not to treat the price as cum-duty price, as
observed by learned Member (Technical)?
| lyester L<br>f duty re | td. woul<br>confirme |
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14. It is necessary to state here that before the
pronouncement of Order on 13.10.2010, counsel on behalf of
the present assesee mentioned that the controversy was no
more res integra in view of the decision rendered in CCE v.
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NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. Thereafter the matter was
heard on another day and on behalf of the Bench, the learned
Member, Technical passed the order. He took note of the stand
of the revenue that ratio of the said decision was not
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applicable as it was based on the principle stated in earlier
decision i.e. SIV Industries Ltd. (supra). The learned Member
also took note of the fact that the Larger Bench of the tribunal
had distinguished the decision in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra)
which was relied upon in NCC Blue Water products Ltd.
(supra). At this juncture, we think it appropriate to reproduce
6
(2010) 12 SCC 761 : 2010 (258)_ ELT 161
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a passage from the order passed by the Member, Technical on
behalf of the Bench:-
| ’ble Sup<br>se of SIV | reme Co<br>Industr |
|---|
15. After so stating, the learned Member quoted copiously
from the Larger Bench. We think it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant part:-
JUDGMENT
“14. We have considered the submissions. We
find that the wordings of proviso to Section 3(1) of
the Central Excise Act and Notification 125/84
which we have been called upon to interpret are
similar and the basic dispute is as to how the
words “allowed to be sold in India” are to be
interpreted. After going through the various
submissions made by both sides, we find that
100% EOUs were allowed to be established with
the sole purchase of exporting 100% of their
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| 100%<br>other th | EOU fro<br>an 100% |
|---|
16. Thereafter, the learned Member proceeded to state
certain aspects which are not necessary and then reproduced
the following passage:-
“We also agree with the observation of the Larger
Bench that the decision of the Supreme court in
SIV Industries case is distinguishable for the
reason stated therein, as in that case the main
thrust was that whether on the date of removal
the 100% EOU ceased to be 100% EOU and
therefore the provisions relating to 100% EOU
could not have been applied to them. For the
same purpose we hold that exemption under
Notification 125/84 shall not be applicable in
respect of goods manufactured by 100% EOU but
sold in India.”
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17. After reproducing number of passages from the Larger
Bench, the learned Member observed thus:-
| e decisi<br>of SIV | on of<br>Industri |
|---|
8. To sum up, two decisions of Larger Bench of
the Tribunal have considered the issue and
distinguished the decision in the case of SIV
Industries Ltd. and the decision of Larger Bench
in the present case on a reference made in the
appellant’s case itself had considered, all aspects
and the history of 100% EOU, statutory
provisions and precedent decisions to reach
conclusion that duty is chargeable under proviso
to Section 3(1) of Central Excise Act, 1944.”
18. Being of this view, the Bench reiterated the difference of
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opinion and the questions framed thereunder. After the
judgment was delivered by the tribunal, the appellant
preferred W.P. No. 714 of 2011. The High Court noted the
submissions of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners and
opined that keeping in view the concept of self-restraint and
the requirement of judicial propriety, it was desirable for the
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assessee to prefer an appeal before this Court. Being of this
view, the High Court declined to interfere. Hence, the present
is a 100% EOU and under the EOU scheme it was required to
export the goods manufactured by it. The stand of the
assessee is that it was eligible to clear goods up to a certain
specified limit after obtaining due permission from the
Development Commissioner in terms of Export Import (EXIM)
Policy read with Handbook of Procedure (HBP). It is the
submission of Mr. V. Lakshmi Kumaran, learned counsel for
the appellant that even if it is held that finished goods were
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removed by the assessee without requisite permission from the
Development Commissioner, central excise duty is leviable in
terms of Section 3(1) of the Act. It is contended by him that
the tribunal has erroneously followed the Larger Bench
decision of the tribunal in Himalaya International Ltd. v.
7
Commissioner of C.Ex. Chandigarh . Learned counsel
7
(2003) 154 ELT 580
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would submit that if the submission of the assessee is
accepted, he will be entitled to refund as it has paid more than
3(1) of the Act.
20. Mr. K. Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing
for the revenue, per contra , would contend that the appellant
which is a continuing EOU, was bound to export finished
goods and as there has been non-fulfilment of the obligation
and the goods have been cleared without permission of the
competent authority, the appellants are liable to pay the duty
as determined by the tribunal. It is his further argument that
the assessee cannot be assessed under Section 3(1) of the Act
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but under the proviso as held by the tribunal. Learned senior
counsel would submit that the decision in SIV Industries
Ltd. (supra) and NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra) when
seemly applied, the 100% EOU which was cleared in DTA
without permission cannot be allowed to pay duty under
Section 3(1) of the Act.
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21. To understand the controversy, it is necessary to
scrutinize the relevant provisions, circulars in the field and the
| tentious | part of S |
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to amendment w.e.f. 11.05.2001 read as follows:-
“Section 3. Duties specified in the First
Schedule and the Second Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 to be levied –
(1) There shall be levied and collected in such
manner as may be prescribed,-
(a) a duty of excise on all excisable goods which
are produced or manufactured in India as, and at
the rates, set forth in the First Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986);
(b) a special duty of excise, in addition to the
duty of excise specified in clause (a) above, on
excisable goods specified in the Second Schedule
to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986)
which are produced or manufactured in India, as,
and at the rates, set forth in the said Second
Schedule.
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Provided that the duties of excise which shall be
levied and collected on any excisable goods which
are produced or manufactured, --
(i) in a free trade zone and brought to any
other place in India; or
(ii) by a hundred per cent export-oriented
undertaking and allowed to be sold in India,
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| ms are c<br>e value | hargeab<br>of such |
|---|
22. After the amendment the relevant part of the provision
reads as under:-
“Section 3. Duties specified in the First
Schedule and the Second Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 to be levied –
(1) There shall be levied and collected in such
manner as may be prescribed,-
(a) a duty of excise to be called the Central
Value Added Tax (CENVAT) on all excisable goods
excluding goods produced or manufactured in
special economic zones which are produced or
manufactured in India as, and at the rates, set
forth in the First Schedule to the Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986);
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(b) a special duty of excise, in addition to the
duty of excise specified in clause (a) above, on
excisable goods excluding goods produced or
manufactured in special economic zones specified
in the Second Schedule to the Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986) which are produced
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or manufactured in India, as, and at the rates,
set forth in the said Second Schedule.
| r manufa | ctured, |
|---|
(ii) by a hundred per cent export-oriented
undertaking and brought to any other place in
India,
shall be an amount equal to the aggregate of the
duties of customs which would be leviable under
the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) or any other
law for the time being in force, on like goods
produced or manufactured outside India if
imported into India, and where the said duties of
customs are chargeable by reference to their
value; the value of such excisable goods shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other
provision of this Act, be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Customs
Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and the Customs Tariff
Act, 1975 (51 of 1975).”
JUDGMENT
23. Having noted the relevant provisions, it is apposite to
appreciate what has been held in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra).
In the said case, the appeal was preferred challenging the
order of the tribunal whereby it had directed that the duty of
central excise was not payable under Section 3(1) of the Act
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but under the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act. The appellant
therein was granted permission to set up a 100% Export
| mugal in | Coimba |
|---|
of Tamil Nadu. The letter of intent dated 18.12.1991 was
issued to the appellant for the purpose by the Secretariat for
Industrial Approvals (SIA), Ministry of Industry, Government of
India. On 08.09.1993 the appellant therein made an
application to the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce,
Government of India and sought debonding of its unit from
100% EOU, i.e., withdrawal from 100% EOU Scheme. By letter
dated 18.10.1993 of the Ministry of Commerce it was agreed in
principle to allow the appellant to withdraw from the 100%
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EOU Scheme subject to the conditions on which withdrawal
was permitted. Once the debonding of the unit was permitted,
finished goods earlier manufactured in the 100% EOU could
be cleared for domestic tariff area (DTA) on levy of duty of
central excise. The dispute arose as to what rate of duty was to
be levied. The contention of the assessee was that excise duty
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is payable on the finished goods under the main Section 3(1)
of the Act together with customs duty on the imported raw
| he Reve | nue on t |
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that excise duty under the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act
was payable on the finished goods and with no customs duty
being levied on the raw materials gone into the manufacture of
finished goods. The Court encapsulated the issue by stating
that the expression “allowed to be sold in India” appearing in
the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act was the bone of
contention between the parties. The assessee contended that
for the application of the proviso to Section 3(1) two conditions
have to be cumulatively and simultaneously satisfied, viz., (1)
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goods should have been produced or manufactured by an
existing 100% EOU, and (2) these goods should have been
allowed to be sold in India. After analyzing various aspects
and the circulars dated 17.02.1983 clarifying the introduction
of the proviso and the circular dated 29.05.1984 explaining
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further amendment to the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act,
the Court held :-
| n of the R<br>from t<br>sell in In | evenue i<br>he Sche<br>dia, i.e., |
|---|
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| time to<br>to Secti | time a<br>on 3 |
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24. After so stating the Court noted the stand of the revenue
that by debonding permission had been granted by BoA for
selling the closing stock of finished goods in India. Negativing
the said contention, the Court held:-
JUDGMENT
“By its application dated 8-9-1993 the appellant
had only asked the Central Government for
permission to debond the unit. Pending formal
debonding clearance, the appellant requested the
Central Government that it might allow it to sell
the goods in India. This request of the appellant
was never acceded to by the authority concerned
and letter of debonding was issued. This
application of the appellant, therefore, could not
be treated as an application for permission to sell
in India as contended by the Revenue and the
debonding letter of BoA cannot be construed as
permission to sell in India. The argument of the
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| by a deb<br>ing are d | onded 1<br>ifferent.” |
|---|
25. Eventually, the Court interpreting the provision and
notification issued under the relevant Rules held thus:-
“Chapter V-A of the Central Excise Rules
contains provisions for removal from a free trade
zone or from a 100% EOU of excisable goods for
home consumption. This chapter was made
applicable to units under the EOU Scheme by
Notification No. 130/84-CE dated 26-5-1984.
This chapter contains Rules 100-A to 100-H.
Rule 100-A provides that the provisions of this
chapter shall apply to a person permitted under
any law for the time being in force to produce or
manufacture excisable goods in a 100%
export-oriented undertaking and who has been
allowed by the proper officer to remove such
excisable goods for being sold in India on
payment of duty of excise leviable thereon. It will
be thus seen that this Chapter V-A would not be
applicable where EOU is outside the EOU
Scheme after the unit is debonded. Under Rule
100-H, Rule 57-A and other Rules mentioned
therein shall not apply to excisable goods
produced or manufactured by a 100%
export-oriented undertaking. Rule 57-A relates to
allowing credit of any duty of excise or the
additional duty under Section 3 of the Customs
Tariff Act, 1975 as may be specified by the
Central Government in the notification, paid on
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| aforesai | d positio |
|---|
view that the tribunal was not right in holding that duty was
to be leviable in terms of the proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act
and, accordingly, it set aside the judgment of the tribunal and
restored that of the adjudicating authority.
27. The aforesaid judgment of this Court was distinguished
by the Larger Bench of the tribunal in Himalaya
International Ltd. (supra). The Larger Bench referred to
circular No. 618/9/2002-CX dated 13.02.2002 and ruled
thus:-
JUDGMENT
“A reading of the above circular would show that
it was issued pursuant to the decision of the
Supreme Court in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra),
but without understanding the position that the
Supreme Court did not deal with a case where
clearance was made to DTA by 100% EOU in
excess of the permission granted. It is contended
on behalf of the assessee that the interpretation
given in the circular referred to above is binding
on the Revenue and therefore, this Tribunal
cannot give a different interpretation to Section
3(1) and the proviso at the instance of the
Revenue. In support of the above contention
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| Court ob<br>ion place | served t<br>d by it o |
|---|
JUDGMENT
28. To appreciate the whole controversy in completeness, we
may reproduce the said circular dated 13.2.2002:-
“Subject: Removal of goods by 100% EOUs to
DTA – Non-levy of duty under Section 3(1) of
Central Excise Act, 1944.
I am directed to invite reference to Supreme
Court’s judgment in case of SIV Industries v. CCE
[2000 (117) E.L.T. 281 (S.C.)] vide which the Apex
Court had held that “proviso to Section 3(1)
regarding the duty chargeable on goods cleared
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| oviso to<br>44 shall | Section<br>not be |
|---|
2. It has come to the notice of the Board that field
formations are interpreting the judgment of Apex
Court to the effect that if the goods cleared by
EOUs are not allowed to be sold into India, the
Section 3(1) of Central Excise Act, 1944 is not
applicable and duty can be demanded under the
provisions of Customs Act, 1962 only. Board has
taken a serious view of this mis-interpretation.
The provisions of Central Excise Act, 1944 shall
apply to all goods manufactured or produced in
India for which Section 3 is the charging section.
EOUs are also situated in India and the
chargeability under Central Excise Act is never in
doubt. Therefore, it is clarified that prior to
11-05-2001, the clearances from EOUs if not
allowed to be sold in India, shall continue to be
chargeable to duty under main Section 3(1) of
Central Excise Act, 1944. Appropriate action may
be taken immediately to safeguard revenue and
all pending decisions may be settled accordingly.”
JUDGMENT
29. The said circular, as is perceptible, is in accord with the
decision rendered in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra). The said
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circular while so indicating also clearly lays down the
expression “allowed to be sold” has been replaced with
| nce Act, | 2001 (14 |
|---|
being in consonance with the decision in SIV Industries Ltd.
(supra) and rightly so, it was absolute unnecessary on the part
of the Larger Bench of the tribunal to say that this Court in
SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) did not deal with the case where
clearance was made to DTA by 100% EOU in excess of the
permission granted. The attempt to distinguish the circular,
in our considered opinion, was not only unnecessary but also
absolutely erroneous.
30. After the judgment of the Larger Bench, the Central
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Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi brought out a
circular dated 05.01.2004. The relevant part of the said
circular reads as follows:-
“Subject: Withdrawal of Board’s Circular
No.618/9/2002-CX., dated 13-2-2002 – Removal
of goods by 100% EOU to DTA – Clarification
regarding levy of duty on removal of goods by
100% EOU to DTA.
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| shall con<br>ain Secti | tinue to<br>on 3(1) |
|---|
2. However, attention is now invited to the
decision of Larger Bench of CESTAT in the case
of M/s. Himalaya International Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh
[2003 (154) E.L.T. 580 (Tri. – LB)], wherein it has
been held that “Rate of duty as per the proviso to
Section 3(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944
would be applicable for assessing all the
excisable goods, which were cleared by 100%
EOU to DTA whether in terms of permission
granted or in excess of permission granted”. In
view of the said judgment of the CESTAT, it is
now clear that all the goods manufactured by
EOU and cleared into DTA before final debonding
of the EOU shall be chargeable to duty under
proviso to Section 3(1) of the Central Excise Act,
1944 and under no condition, goods produced in
100% EOU can be charged under main Section
3(1) of Central Excise Act, 1944.
JUDGMENT
3. In view of the above judgment of the
CESTAT, the matter has been re-considered by
the Board and it has been decided to withdraw
the Board’s Circular No. 618/9/2002-CX., dated
13-2-2002. The above-mentioned judgment of
CESTAT, which has been accepted by Board, may
kindly be taken into consideration in deciding
similar pending cases.”
Page 30
31
31. Having noted the circular, we may refer to the authority
in NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra). In the said case,
| p seeds | produc |
|---|
assessee-respondent, a 100% export-oriented unit (EOU), in
the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) without the approval of the
Development Commissioner, would be payable under Section
3(1) of the Act and not under the proviso appended thereto.
The two-Judge Bench taking note of the fact that during the
period 1994-1995 to 1997-1998, the assessee produced and
sold 11,15,29,540 number of shrimp seeds and 48,365 kg of
shrimps in DTA without obtaining the permission of the
Development Commissioner; without issuing proper invoices
JUDGMENT
as mandated under Rule 100-E of the Central Excise Rules,
1944 (for short “the Rules”) and without payment of excise
duty. Besides, the assessee also undertook certain job-work
whereby it processed 864.238 MT of shrimps and 905.580 MT
of fish and cleared the said goods in DTA. According to the
assessee, these goods were ultimately exported by DTA units.
Page 31
32
The said action of the assessee compelled the authority to
issue a show cause notice requiring the assessee to show
| not be l | evied un |
|---|
read with Rule 9(2) read with proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 11-A of the Act and interest and penalty thereon. The
matter was contested by the assessee and eventually the
tribunal ruled in favour of the assessee. Before this Court, it
was contended that since as per Note 1 of Section I of the First
Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, any reference in
that section “to a particular genus or species of an animal,
except where the context otherwise requires, includes a
reference to the young of that genus or species” and, therefore,
JUDGMENT
both live shrimps and shrimp seeds are classifiable under
Sub-Heading 0306.23 of Chapter 3 of the First Schedule to the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975. It was also urged that the tribunal
committed an error in relying on the decision of this Court in
SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) because unlike in that case the
assessee had sought permission of the Development
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33
Commissioner, who in turn had advised them to approach the
SIA for permission to clear shrimps and shrimp seeds which,
| to Sectio | n 3(1) of |
|---|
that under the Exim Policy, an EOU is obliged to make exports
of the entire production itself and not through any other
entity. The Court posed the following question:-
“The core question for our consideration,
therefore, is whether the sales of shrimps and
shrimp seeds by the assessee in DTA, without
requisite permission from the Development
Commissioner, are to be assessed to excise duty
under Section 3(1) of the Act or under the proviso
to the said section?”
32. To deal with the said question, the Court referred to
Section 3 and it expressed understanding of the provision in
JUDGMENT
the following terms:-
“It is manifest that all excisable goods produced
or manufactured in India are exigible to duty of
excise under Section 3 of the Act, the charging
section, at the rates set forth in the Schedule to
the Tariff Act. However, the proviso to the said
section provides that the duties of excise on any
excisable goods, which are produced or
manufactured by a 100% EOU and allowed to be
sold in India shall be an amount equal to the
aggregate of the duties of customs which would
Page 33
34
| sales cou<br>e proviso | ld be lev<br>. To put |
|---|
33. After so stating the two-Judge Bench referred to the
decision in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) and opined that:-
“A similar issue fell for consideration of this
Court in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) In that case,
the assessee was a 100% EOU. Later on, they
sought permission to withdraw from 100% EOU
Scheme, for which the Ministry accorded the
necessary permission. However, some of the
goods lying in the unit were removed prior to the
debonding. A dispute arose regarding the rate of
duty payable on such sales. The plea taken by
the assessee was that they were liable to pay duty
under Section 3(1) of the Act together with
customs duty on the imported raw material used
in the manufacture of said finished goods, lying
in the stock whereas the stand of the Revenue
was that excise duty under the proviso to Section
3(1) of the Act was payable on the finished goods
with no customs duty being leviable on the raw
materials used in the manufacture of finished
goods. Thus, the bone of contention in that case
was also with regard to the interpretation of the
JUDGMENT
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35
expression “allowed to be sold in India” appearing
in the said proviso. Interpreting the said
expression, this Court held that the expression
“allowed to be sold in India” used in the proviso
to Section 3(1) of the Act is applicable only to
sales made in DTA up to 25% of the production
by 100% EOUs, which are allowed to be sold into
India as per the provisions of the Exim Policy. No
permission was required to sell the goods
manufactured by 100% EOU lying with it at the
time the approval is accorded to debond. The
Court opined that the goods having been sold
without permission of the Central Government to
debond the unit, the duty on the goods sold by
the assessee was leviable under main Section 3(1)
of the Act.”
[Emphasis added]
34. It is necessary to state here that after so stating the
Court also noted that after pronouncement of the decision in
SIV Industries Ltd. (supra), the circular was issued on
JUDGMENT
13.02.2002 clarifying the position. Interpreting the said
circular, the Court held:-
“19. As aforesaid, according to the Exim Policy
1992-1997 read with Appendix XXXIII of the
Handbook of Procedures, an EOU may sell 50%
of its production in value terms into a DTA only
on issuance of a removal authorisation by the
Development Commissioner.
Page 35
36
20. In the instant case, admittedly at the time of
sales of shrimps and shrimp seeds by the
assessee in DTA, the Development Commissioner
had not issued the requisite removal
authorisation. Therefore, in view of the dictum of
this Court in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) , with
which we are in respectful agreement, and the
afore-extracted circular issued by the Board
following the said decision, excise duty on such
sales is chargeable under main Section 3(1) of the
Act.”
[Emphasis added]
35. The impugned order, as is manifest, relies on the Larger
Bench decision. It is to be noted that after the judgment in
NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra) the said decision was
brought to the notice of the tribunal but it has opined that
parent judgment in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) was
distinguished by the Larger Bench and further the circular
JUDGMENT
dated 05.01.2004 was not taken note of by this Court in the
subsequent judgment. On a careful scrutiny of the authority
in NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra), we are of the
considered opinion that it concurs with the view expressed in
SIV Industries Ltd. (supra). The circular dated 05.01.2004
came into existence after the Larger Bench decision in
Page 36
37
Himalaya International Ltd. (supra). We have already stated
that there was no justification for distinguishing the decision
| ent after | the deci |
|---|
Products Ltd. (supra) was brought to the notice of the
tribunal has absolutely improperly noted that the circular
dated 05.01.2004 was not brought to the notice of this Court.
The Court in NCC Blue Water Products Ltd. case had not
based its conclusion on the basis of the circular dated
13.02.2002. It is clear as day that it has concurred with the
ratio laid down in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra). It has been
clearly opined that the expression “allowed to be sold in India”
used in proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act would be applicable
JUDGMENT
only to sales made in DTA of the production by 100% EOUs,
which are allowed to be sold into India as per the provisions of
the Exim Policy.
36. The said authority has also made it clear that the
circular issued in 2002 is in consonance with the authority in
SIV Industries Ltd. (supra). Thus, the view expressed by NCC
Page 37
38
Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra) has given the stamp of
approval to the circular. It is a binding precedent on all the
| r Bench | of the Tr |
|---|
could not have distinguished the judgment in SIV Industries
Ltd. (supra). The later circular issued on 05.01.2004 on which
reliance was placed by the revenue before the tribunal which
has been taken note of in the impugned judgment is clearly
indicative of an erroneous approach. The decision in NCC
Blue Water Products Ltd. (supra) was bound to be followed
and the tribunal could not have stated that 2004 circular was
not taken note of. The tribunal should have appropriately
appreciated that this Court was interpreting the statutory
JUDGMENT
provision and it is also worthy to note that after the judgment
delivered in SIV Industries Ltd. (supra) an amendment was
brought into the provision. Therefore, the transaction prior to
the date of amendment would be governed by SIV Industries
Ltd. (supra) which has been followed in NCC Blue Water
Page 38
39
Products Ltd. (supra). Be it clarified that we are not
concerned with the amended provision in this case.
| rder pass | ed by th |
|---|
adjudicating authority are set aside. The assessee shall be
liable to pay the excise duty as per Section 3(1) of the Act. The
competent authority is directed to compute the duty
accordingly and proceed thereafter as per law. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
JUDGMENT
........................................J.
[SHIVA KIRTI SINGH]
NEW DELHI;
June 03, 2016
Page 39