Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 4007 of 1999
PETITIONER:
Virendra Nath Thr. P.A. Holder R.R. Gupta
RESPONDENT:
Mohd. Jamil & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/07/2004
BENCH:
Shivaraj V. Patil & D.M. Dharmadhikari.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Dharmadhikari J.
This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated
07.8.1997 of the High Court of Allahabad whereby revisional order
dated 10.2.1975 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Allahabad, has been set aside and the order dated 26.3.1974 passed
by the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation has been
restored.
Relevant facts leading to filing of this appeal are as under :-
In relation to the lands in question, an objection was filed by
Jan Mohammad (represented now by the respondents) in the court of
Consolidation Officer under provision of section 9A of Uttar Pradesh
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 [for short the Consolidation Act,
1953] for declaring and recording him on the land as Sirdar in
accordance with section 210 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
& Land Reforms Act, 1950 [for short the Abolition Act]. The claim of
Jan Mohammad was on the basis of his alleged adverse possession on
the land for long period of 40 years. The Consolidation Officer
accepted case of Jan Mohammad and recorded him as Sirdar on the
land.
The recorded owners of the lands preferred an appeal under
section 11 of the Consolidation Act to Assistant Settlement Officer of
Consolidation. In the appeal, it was pointed out that in the basic
years of Fasali 1359 and 1361 in the revenue papers i.e. Khasras
name of Jan Mohammad was recorded in respect of the lands as a
mortgagee [Murtheen]. The case of the petitioners before Appellate
Authority was that Jan Mohammad came in possession of the
property as a mortgagee and could not acquire any title by adverse
possession. The appellate authority took the view that the mortgage
of the land was for a loan of more than Rs.100/- and the mortgage-
deed required compulsory registration. The appellate court came to
the conclusion that as the alleged mortgage is not evidenced by any
registered document, the oral evidence of mortgage cannot be relied.
The Appellate Authority, therefore, dismissed the appeal and
maintained the order of the Consolidation Officer directing recording
of name of Jan Mohammad as having acquired ownership to the land
by adverse possession.
The petitioners then preferred a revision under section 48 of
the Consolidation Act to the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Allahabad. The revisional authority took the view that though the
unregistered written mortgage-deed being in possession of the
mortgagee, could not be produced, oral evidence was admissible to
ascertain the nature of possession of Jan Mohammad on the land.
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The revisional authority relied on the earliest entries in the Khasaras
of basic years to come to the conclusion that Jan Mohammad came
into possession of the land as mortgagee. His possession could not be
held to be adverse. His possession would be deemed to be only
permissive as a mortgagee. The revisional authority, therefore,
relying on the entry in khasaras of fasli 1359 where Jan Mohammad
is recorded as a mortgagee, allowed the revision and dismissed his
claim for being recorded as Sirdar of the land.
The legal representatives of Jan Mohammad preferred writ
petition to the High Court of Allahabad.
The High Court in the writ petition reversed the judgment of the
revisional authority on the ground that the plea of relationship of
mortgage and mortgagee and the possession of Jan Mohammad to be
permissive was raised for the first time in revision. The High Court
held that the revisional authority was in error in upsetting orders of
the lower authorities.
Learned counsel representing the original recorded owner of the
lands in this appeal submits that claim of Jan Mohammad was based
on alleged adverse possession on the land. It was an error on the
part of the High Court to hold that relationship of mortgage and
mortgagee never came up for consideration before the Consolidation
Officer and Assistant Settlement Office of Consolidation. The order of
the appellate authority has been placed on record of this appeal
which clearly shows that the alleged relationship of mortgage and
mortgagee between the parties was under discussion. Despite the
entry in the remarks column of the Khasara of the fasli years 1359
and 1361 showing Jan Mohammad as mortgagee on the land, his
possession was held to be adverse and his claim for recording him as
Sirdar on the land was allowed.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has filed written
submissions. In opposing the appeal, it is contended that the
revisional Authority exceeded its powers of revision under section 48
of the Consolidation Act.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing
the record we find that the High Court had no justification to upset
the decision of the revisional Authority. The earliest khasara records
clearly show nature of possession of Jan Mohammad on the lands as
mortgagee. Even though, mortgage-deed which was unregistered and
being in possession of mortgagee, could not be produced by the
mortgagor, evidence could be admitted for collateral purpose of
ascertaining the nature of possession of Jan Mohammad. There is no
evidence that the possession of Jan Mohammad as mortgagee ever
became adverse to the knowledge of the original owner that is the
mortgagor. The claim for recording Jan Mohammad as Sirdar on the
land was filed under section 210 of the Abolition Act which reads as
under :-
"210. Consequences of failure to file suit under section 209. -If
a suit for eviction from any land under section 209 is not
instituted by a bhumidhar or asami, or a decree for eviction
obtained in any such suit is not executed within the period of
limitation provided for institution of such suit or the execution of
such decree, as the case may be, the person taking or retaining
possession shall \026
a) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with
transferable rights, become a bhumidhar with transferable
rights of such land and the right, title and interest of an
asami, if any, in such land shall be extinguished;
b) where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar with
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non-transferable rights, become a bhumidhar with non-
transferable rights and the right, title and interest of an
asami, if any, in such land shall be extinguished;
c) where the land forms part of the holding of an asami on
behalf of the Gaon Sabha, become an asami of the holding
from year to year.
Provided that the consequences mentioned in clauses (a) to (c)
shall not ensue in respect of any land held by a bhumidhar or
asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.
Section 209 of the Abolition Act confers right on a recorded
owner of the land to eject persons occupying land without title. In
case of a mortgage, the mortgagor has no right in law to eject a
mortgagee until the mortgage is redeemed. Even though, the
mortgage was not by any registered instrument, it is not disputed
that the possession of the land was taken by Jan Mohammad as a
mortgagee. If his entry on the land was as mortgagee, nature of his
possession would continue to be as mortgagee unless there is
evidence to show that, at any point of time, he asserted his adverse
title, by repudiating his possession as mortgagee and continued in
adverse possession for the prescribed period of more than 12 years
to the knowledge of the mortgagor. From none of the orders either of
the original or appellate authority, any evidence seems to have been
led to establish date or period from which the possession of Jan
Mohammad became adverse to the knowledge of the recorded owner.
In the state of above evidence on record, the revisional court was
fully justified in coming to the conclusion that Jan Mohammad, who
came in possession of the land as mortgagee, cannot be recorded as
Sirdar or Bhumidar under section 210 of the Abolition Act.
The High Court in reversing the order of the revisional Authority
erroneously attached undue importance to the fact that there was no
specific plea or evidence led on behalf of the recorded owner that the
possession of Jan Mohammad on the land was permissive. From the
orders passed by the authorities under the Consolidation Act, it is
apparent that throughout the stand of the original recorded owner,
was that Jan Mohammad came in possession of the land as a
mortgagee. The argument of permissive possession was advanced
before the revisional Authority on the plea of mortgage. The High
Court committed a serious error in upsetting the judgment of the
revisional court on the ground of alleged want of plea of permissive
possession by the original recorded owner.
Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned
judgment dated 07.8.1997 of the High Court of Allahabad and restore
the revisional order dated 10.2.1975 of Deputy Director,
Consolidation.
In the circumstances, we, however, make no order as to costs.