Accamma Sam Jacob vs. The State Of Karnataka

2026 INSC 362
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@SLP(Criminal) No(s). of 2026)
(Diary No(s). 20175 of 2022)

ACCAMMA SAM JACOB ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
& ANR. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@ SLP(Criminal) No(s). 1749-1751 of 2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026
(@ (SLP(Criminal) No(s). of 2026)
(@Diary No(s). 20213 of 2022)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Leave granted.
4. These connected appeals by special leave, take
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.04.13
17:48:47 IST
Reason:
exception to the common judgment and order dated
1


th
28 September, 2016 passed by the High Court of
1
Karnataka at Bengaluru , and arise out of
substantially similar complaints relating to lands
forming part of Survey No.12 of Doddagubbi Village,
Bengaluru, and involve common accused persons,
interconnected transactions and identical issues
concerning the scope of interference by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
2
Procedure, 1973 . Though each complaint contains
certain individual-specific allegations with reference
to distinct plot numbers and instances of criminal
intimidation, etc. the gravamen of accusations,
namely the alleged creation of forged General Powers
3
of Attorney , execution of sale deeds, and subsequent
confirmation deeds in respect of the same survey
land, remains identical. Since the impugned order is
common in all the appeals and the factual
substratum is intertwined, the entire batch of
appeals was heard and is being decided together by
this common judgment.

1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
2
For short, ‘CrPC’.
3
For short, ‘GPAs’.
2


5. For the sake of convenience and to avoid
repetition, the facts are being noticed primarily from
Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Diary
No.20175 of 2022, which is treated as the lead
matter, and the conclusions recorded herein shall
govern the outcome of the connected appeals as well,
save and except where any distinguishing feature
warrants separate consideration.
Factual Matrix in the Lead Appeal
6. The substratum of allegations contained in the
complaint, insofar as they are relevant for the present
proceedings, are briefly noted hereunder.
7. Lands comprised in Survey No.12 of
Doddagubbi Village, Bengaluru, were originally
4
owned by Bajjappa and other co-owners . The said
landowners executed GPAs in the year 1994 in favour
of the developer-Joseph Chacko, pursuant to which
he undertook development of a residential layout
styled as “Athina Township – Stage I” .
5
8. The complainant-Accamma Sam Jacob , an NRI
residing in Toronto, Canada, purchased a residential
plot admeasuring 60 feet × 80 feet, bearing Plot No.

4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “original landowners”
5
Hereinafter, referred to as the “complainant”.
3


79 in the year 1994, in the said layout under a
registered sale deed executed by the developer-
Joseph Chacko. It is stated that the sale deed was
duly registered in the name of the complainant with
reference to the Gramathana House List numbers
assigned to the property and that the khatha was
subsequently transferred in her favour. Several
similarly placed purchasers, as the complainant, had
acquired the plots as investment properties and
therefore did not undertake immediate construction.
During the years 2003-2004, the developer-Joseph
Chacko is stated to have requested the NRI
purchasers to commence construction on their
respective plots.
9. Towards the end of 2006, which, according to
the complainant, marks the commencement of the
alleged conspiracy, she was informed by George
Varghese (also arraigned as an accused in the
present complaints), then an employee of the
developer-Joseph Chacko, that K.S. Shankar Reddy
(accused-respondent), K.S. Balasundar Reddy
(accused-respondent), B.K. Mohan Kumar, Satish
Kumar and others had forcibly entered the layout
and caused extensive damage. It was alleged that
4


compound walls, storm water drains and electricity
poles were demolished with the aid of heavy
machinery, and boards bearing the name “City Scape
Properties” were erected within the layout.
10.
Thereafter, George Varghese, Jacob Thomas,
and Raju C. Ninan (who are also arrayed as accused
in the present complaints) formed an association
styled as the “Athina Township Welfare Society”, with
Jacob Thomas as President, George Varghese as
Vice-President, and Raju C. Ninan as Secretary. It is
alleged that communications were circulated to
several NRI purchasers advising them to join the said
association for the purpose of initiating legal
proceedings against the developer-Joseph Chacko.
th
An e-mail dated 16 January 2007, placed on record,
indicated that a criminal petition was being prepared
against the developer-Joseph Chacko, in
consultation with legal advisors. According to the
complainant, the aforesaid narrative was false and
concocted and was projected by the said persons with
a view to mislead the plot purchasers.
11. In May 2007, George Varghese circulated an
MoU among several NRI purchasers seeking
authorisation to represent them before governmental
5


and revenue authorities. The purchasers were also
requested to hand over the original title documents
relating to their plots on the fraudulent
representation that legal complications had arisen in
respect of the lands forming part of Athina Township
Stage-I and that steps were required to rectify the
revenue records, including the RTC ( Pahani ) entries.
Monetary contributions were also sought from the
purchasers.
th
12. On 16 June 2009, the developer-Joseph
Chacko was arrested in connection with criminal
proceedings. The complainant was thereafter
informed that lands comprised in Survey No.12,
including the layout in question, had been sold to
third parties. She travelled to Bengaluru in July 2009
and was shown copies of sale deeds executed in
favour of K.V. Rajagopal Reddy (accused-
respondent).
13. During this period, she was asked to sign
certain documents and provide her photograph and
thumb impression on the assurance that the same
were required for filing proceedings in the civil Court.
At that time, her original sale deed was allegedly
6


taken away on the pretext of making copies, and she
was later handed a coloured photocopy in its place.
14. When enquiries were made with George
Varghese, he denied having custody of the original
documents. The complainant thereafter caused
enquiries to be made as to whether any civil
proceedings had been instituted on her behalf, and
was shocked to find that no such suit had ever been
filed in her name or on her behalf. Reference is also
made to O.S. No.392/2007, in which pleadings filed
by K.S. Shanker Reddy and B.K. Mohan Kumar
contained statements regarding their lack of
ownership or possession over the suit property. On
basis of these allegations, the complainant asserts
that the civil proceedings were collusive in nature
and that she had been misled into parting with
money and documents and had been deprived of her
lawfully owned piece of land.
15. Upon making enquiries regarding the status of
her plot, the complainant was informed that the
property had been transferred in the name of K.V.
Rajagopal Reddy on the basis of a confirmation deed
th
dated 20 July 2009, registered as Document No.
975/2009-10, which purportedly bore her signature.
7


She maintains that she never intended to execute any
such confirmation deed conveying or affirming
transfer of the property and that her signatures had
been obtained on the misrepresentation that the
same were required to swear affidavits and prepare
papers for instituting civil proceedings. The
confirmation deed was thereafter used to effect
transfer of the property in favour of K.V. Rajagopal
Reddy, though the complainant alleged that she had
neither consented to such transfer nor received any
consideration.
16. Based on these allegations, the complainant
contends that George Varghese and the other
accused persons misrepresented the nature of the
documents presented to her and procured her
signatures under false pretences, resulting in
execution and registration of the confirmation deed
without her informed consent and its subsequent use
to transfer the property. Criminal liability is also
attributed to K.V. Rajagopal Reddy and certain others
on the ground that they acted upon the said
confirmation deed and related documents despite
having complete knowledge of the attending
circumstances pertaining to fraud and
8


misrepresentation in execution thereof. On these
assertions, offences under various provisions of the
6
Indian Penal Code, 1860 , including those relating to
theft, criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery,
preparation and use of forged documents and
criminal conspiracy, have been invoked.
17. The complainant alleges that fresh GPAs were
subsequently obtained from the original landowners
and sale deeds were executed in favour of certain
accused persons, including K.V. Rajagopal Reddy
(accused-respondent). Confirmation deeds
purportedly bearing the signatures of certain NRI plot
purchasers were created without lawful authority
and were intended to retrospectively validate an
otherwise defective chain of title in respect of Survey
No.12. The confirmation deeds do not bear the
signatures of the original landowners, and no
independent sale deeds were executed reconveying
the plots from the NRI purchasers to them.
18. The complainant contends that the cumulative
effect of the aforesaid transactions was to
concentrate control over substantial portions of

6
For short, ‘IPC’.
9


Survey No. 12 in persons or entities associated with
the family of one K.C. Ramamurthy (arrayed as one
of the accused and alleged to be the principal
architect of the conspiracy), purportedly for the
benefit of the CMR Group of Institutions. It is the case
of the complainant that the accused acted in concert
pursuant to a premeditated design to deprive the NRI
plot purchasers of their properties through a series of
documentary instruments executed without lawful
authority.
19. It is further stated that when the developer-
Joseph Chacko had declined demands to transfer the
entire extent of Survey No. 12, this fraudulent design
was hatched and set in motion to exert pressure upon
him and the NRI purchasers.
20. A detailed complaint containing the above
allegations was submitted to the jurisdictional
Kothanuru Police Station, which declined to
entertain the same, upon which the complainant
presented a private complaint before the learned XI
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall,
Bengaluru, setting out the aforesaid allegations.
Upon consideration of the averments contained
th
therein, the ACMM, by order dated 6 November
10


2013, exercised powers under Section 156(3) of CrPC
and directed that the complaint be forwarded to the
jurisdictional police for registration of an FIR and
investigation in accordance with law.
21.
Pursuant to the said order, the jurisdictional
Police Station, i.e., Kothanuru P.S., Bengaluru City,
th
registered FIR in Crime No.162/2013 on 16
November, 2013, against sixteen accused persons,
namely, K.S. Balasundar Reddy, K.S. Shanker
Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajgopala Reddy,
George Varghese, Satish Kumar, Biju M. Parel, Raju
C. Ninan, Jacob Thomas @ Shaji Mangaltu, B.K.
Mohan Kumar, Jerry Soman, Soman Vazhayil
Abraham, Mohan Vazhayil Abraham, Suresh John,
Subramani Reddy, C.I. Ravindranath for offences
punishable under Sections 379, 381, 383, 415, 420,
409, 463, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 474, 477, 107,
115, 116(1), 117, 118, 120 and 120-B IPC.
22. Aggrieved by the registration of FIR, the
accused-respondents, namely, K.S. Shanker Reddy,
K.S. Balasundar Reddy, and K.V. Rajagopal Reddy,
approached the High Court by filing petitions under
Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal
11


proceedings emanating from the FIR in Crime No.162
of 2013.
23. The High Court, after hearing the parties,
allowed the petitions and quashed the proceedings
th
vide the common impugned judgment dated 28
September, 2016. It examined the nature of the rival
claims and noted that the sale deeds in favour of the
complainants pertained to specific layout plots
described by house list numbers, but without clear
reference to corresponding survey numbers, whereas
the sale deeds relied upon by the accused-
respondents related to larger extents of land
described by survey numbers and acreage. In view of
this clear distinction, the High Court opined that the
identity of the land and the question of overlap
between the rival claims constituted seriously
disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by
a competent civil Court.
24. Proceeding on this basis, the High Court
observed that unless the registered instruments
relied upon by the accused were cancelled and
delivered up in terms of Section 31 of the Specific
12


7
Relief Act, 1963 , a criminal Court could not proceed
on the premise that such sale deeds were void, as any
such determination would amount to a declaration of
civil invalidity lying beyond the domain of criminal
jurisdiction.
25. The High Court further observed that even the
order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3)
CrPC was unsustainable for want of proper
application of mind. Consequently, the criminal
proceedings emanating from the FIRs were quashed.
26. It is against the aforesaid common judgment
th
dated 28 September, 2016 that the appellants ( de-
facto complainants) have approached this Court by
way of present appeals arising out of special leave
petitions.
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
27. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants
vehemently and fervently contended that the High
Court erred in quashing the complaint and FIR at the
threshold. It was submitted that the allegations in the
complaint, taken at face value, clearly disclose
commission of cognizable offences, including those of

7
For short, “SRA”.
13


cheating, creation and, use of forged documents and
criminal conspiracy, and therefore the High Court
ought not to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC so as to quash the criminal
proceedings at the inception.
28. Learned counsel argued that the High Court fell
into serious error in holding that criminal
proceedings could not be initiated unless the sale
deeds relied upon by the accused were first cancelled
under Section 31 of SRA. It was submitted that
initiation of civil proceedings for cancellation is not a
sine qua non for launching criminal prosecution and
that civil and criminal remedies can proceed
simultaneously even where allegations are identical.
29. It was further contended that the High Court
failed to appreciate that the power under Section 482
CrPC is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases
where the complaint, even if accepted in entirety,
does not disclose any offence. It was urged that the
High Court undertook an expansive evaluation of
disputed questions of fact which exercise could only
be undertaken in a full-fledged trial. It prematurely
concluded that the dispute was purely civil in nature.
14


30. Learned counsel also submitted that the
Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) CrPC
directing investigation did not warrant interference,
particularly when the investigation had only
commenced, and the material collected by the
investigating agency prima facie supported the
allegations set out in the complaint.
31. It was submitted that the High Court erred both
on facts and in law in quashing the entire
proceedings in respect of all accused persons,
including those who were not parties before it. On
these grounds, the appellants have implored this
Court to set aside the impugned judgment and
restore the criminal prosecution at the stage where it
was quashed.
Submissions on behalf of the accused-
respondents

32. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
accused-respondents strenuously opposed the
submissions of learned Counsel for the appellants
and supported the impugned common judgment
passed by the High Court.
33. It was contended at the outset that the criminal
proceedings launched by the appellant-complainant
15


are a gross abuse of the process of law and are
nothing but an attempt to convert a purely civil
dispute over property rights into a criminal
prosecution with an oblique motive of pressurising
and harassing the respondents.
34. Learned counsel appearing for K.V. Rajagopal
Reddy urged that respondent-K.S. Balasundar Reddy
had obtained duly registered GPAs from the original
grantees/landowners of Survey No.12, Doddagubbi
Village, Bengaluru East Taluk, covering an extent of
approximately 11 acres 4½ guntas. On the strength
of such registered GPAs, sale deeds were executed in
his (K.V. Rajagopal Reddy’s) favour and other
purchasers for valid consideration. It was argued that
these are registered instruments and cannot be
casually labelled as “forged” or “fabricated” without
first seeking their cancellation in competent civil
proceedings.
35. It was further submitted that the allegations set
out by the appellants in the complaint pertain to title,
identity and alleged overlap of land parcels. Such
questions necessarily require adjudication by a civil
Court or by a competent Revenue Authority. Unless
the registered sale deeds validly executed in favour of
16


the respondents for consideration are cancelled
under Section 31 of SRA, criminal prosecution
cannot be permitted to proceed merely on the
allegation that such instruments are void as being
borne out of fraud and forgery unless such a
declaration is made by the competent civil Court.
36. It was submitted that appellants had purchased
plots from the developer-Joseph Chacko, and not
from the present respondents. Therefore, if any
grievance subsists, the appellants’ remedy lies
against their own vendor and not against the
respondents, who independently and lawfully
acquired title from the original landowners. There
being no dispute about the signatures of the vendor
on the registered sale deeds, the documents cannot
be termed to be forged and the necessary ingredients
of fraud and falsification of documents are totally
lacking upon a bare perusal of the complaint.
37. It was further contended that admittedly the
appellant(s) have instituted civil suits in respect of
the same subject matter and they suppressed
material facts while invoking criminal jurisdiction.
The belated filing of the appeals, after enormous
17


delay, was also highlighted as indicative of lack of
bona fides .
38. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-
respondents, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the
appeals and affirmation of the impugned judgment.
Discussion and Analysis
39. We have given our thoughtful consideration to
the submissions advanced by learned counsel at the
bar and have gone through the impugned judgment
and the material available on record.
40. Considered in light of the rival submissions, the
core question which arises for consideration is
whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the High
Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaint and FIR at
a stage when the learned Magistrate had merely
directed investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.
41. At the very outset, it would be apposite to note
that FIRs registered against the developer-Joseph
Chacko, involving substantially similar allegations,
were also quashed by the High Court vide judgment
th
and order dated 25 October, 2016, on more or less
the same line of reasoning. In those matters as well,
the complainants were Non-Resident Indians (NRIs)
18


who had allegedly purchased plots in the project
known as “Athina Township” and other layouts from
the said developer. It was alleged in those complaints
that the developer-Joseph Chacko had represented
that the layouts were duly converted lands and were
being developed with requisite infrastructure and
civic amenities. The purchasers were assured that
the plots carried valid house-list khatas and that the
layouts would be provided with roads, community
spaces, recreational facilities and other allied
amenities. However, upon making enquiries
subsequently, the purchasers allegedly discovered
that the khata numbers were bogus and that the
layouts had not been lawfully developed. It was
further alleged that when the purchasers attempted
to assert their possession over the plots, they were
obstructed and threatened, which ultimately led to
the registration of multiple criminal complaints
against the developer-Joseph Chacko, and other
accused persons.
42. A comparative reading of the complaints in the
said prosecution and the complaints in the present
set of appeals reveal that the substratum of
allegations is substantially similar. In both sets of
19


cases, it is alleged that the layout known as “Athina
Township” was trespassed upon, compound walls
and other demarcations were demolished, and
boards of an entity styled as “Cityscape Properties”
were erected upon the land.
43. The principal point of divergence lies not in the
nature of the incident, but in the identity of the
alleged perpetrators. While in the earlier batch, the
acts of trespass and demolition were attributed to the
developer-Joseph Chacko and his associates, the
present complaints attribute these acts to K.S.
Shankar Reddy, K.C. Ramamurthy, K.V. Rajagopal
Reddy, George Varghese and others, coupled with the
assertion that the earlier narrative itself formed part
of a larger fraudulent design. The complaints thus
present competing versions of the same occurrence,
each attributing culpability to a different set of
perpetrators.
44. Significantly, in both sets of complaints, the
allegations do not rest merely on physical acts of
trespass and destruction, but extend to a broader
scheme involving fraud, fabrication of documents,
and unlawful interference with property rights. The
alleged demolition of the layout is stated to have been
20


accompanied by, and indeed to have facilitated,
subsequent transactions and documentary
instruments affecting title to the land.
45. The High Court, while quashing the cases/FIRs
against developer-Joseph Chacko vide judgment
th
dated 25 October, 2016, adopted a line of reasoning
which is substantially similar to that contained in the
judgment impugned herein. The appellants have
placed before us a comparative chart juxtaposing the
th th
two judgments dated 25 October, 2016, and 28
September, 2016 (impugned judgment in the instant
appeals), highlighting the similarity in the reasoning
adopted therein. The said chart is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:

21

22

23

24

46. The special leave petitions arising out of the
th
judgment dated 25 October, 2016 were initially
heard along with the present batch of appeals, as the
allegations and legal issues involved appeared to be
th
substantially similar. However, by order dated 28
November, 2024, the present batch of appeals was
de-tagged from the earlier matters.
25


47. It is pertinent to note that by the self-same
8 th
order dated 28 November, 2024, this Court allowed
the appeals involving the developer-Joseph Chacko
th
and set aside the judgment dated 25 October, 2016.
48.
While allowing the appeals, this Court observed
that the High Court had quashed the proceedings in
a cryptic and cursory manner without assigning
cogent reasons. It was further noticed that in most of
those cases, charge-sheets had already been filed and
yet the High Court proceeded to quash the
proceedings.
49. This Court further observed that in cases where
serious allegations of fraud, forgery, trespass and
criminal conspiracy affecting a large group of persons
were involved, the High Court ought to have exhibited
restraint while invoking its inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC.
50. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on
the merits of the cases, this Court concluded that the
High Court had committed a gross error in quashing
the proceedings without properly considering the
serious allegations made against the accused therein

8
The State of Karnataka v. Joseph Chacko and Anr. , Criminal
Appeal Nos. 5207-5221 of 2024.
26


and without granting opportunity of hearing to the
complainants. Based on the said reasoning, the
th
impugned judgment therein, i.e., order dated 25
October, 2016 was set aside and the cases were
restored to the files of the concerned trial Court(s),
leaving all contentions open to be urged by the
accused before the trial Court.
51. In our considered view, the fact that the
th
judgment of the High Court dated 25 October, 2016
has already been set aside by this Court itself
furnishes a sufficient ground to condone the delay
and extend similar relief in the present batch of
appeals. Upon a careful perusal of the judgments
passed by the High Court i.e., one in the present
appeals and the other in the case involving Joseph
Chacko as the accused, we find that the reasoning
adopted by the High Court in both cases proceeds on
substantially identical lines and rests on the same
foundational premise, namely, that the dispute
between the parties is predominantly civil in nature
and that criminal proceedings could not be sustained
unless the registered sale deeds were first cancelled
by resorting to proceedings under Section 31 of SRA.
In such circumstances, the divergence in attribution
27


cannot be a ground to discard the present complaints
at the threshold. On the contrary, the existence of
rival narratives in respect of the similar allegations
underscores the necessity of a proper investigation to
ascertain the identity and role of the persons
involved.
52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings
were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely
exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC
and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be
gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to
merely peruse the application filed by the
complainant and examine whether the facts
disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary
ingredients of cognizable offences requiring
investigation by police. The Magistrate is not
expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of
evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the
allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion
that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed,
then he would be fully justified in directing the
concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with
investigation in accordance with law. The High Court,
28


while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in
interfering with such an exercise of power and ought
to intervene only where it is evident that the order
lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or
that the same may result in failure of justice.
53. In such circumstances, the High Court, while
exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel
beyond the allegations contained in the complaint
and the material placed by the complainant by
delving into the defences sought to be projected by
the accused-respondents.
54. The facts in the case at hand manifest that the
High Court proceeded to examine documents relied
upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale
deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same
as determinative of the dispute and observed that the
sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first,
before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such
an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope
of scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section
482 of CrPC. Consideration of defence material,
including sale deeds or other title documents would
necessarily involve adjudication on disputed
29


questions of fact, which fall squarely within the
domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any
such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of CrPC
would amount to conducting a mini-trial and would
be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence
material to be weighed at the threshold would
frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an
investigation by the police.
55. This Court has, time and again, emphasised
that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at
the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex
facie does not disclose the commission of any
cognizable offence or where continuation of the
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process
of law. The power of the High Court under Section
482 of CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India
to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great
circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty
of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable
offences. The said position has been eruditely
explained by this Court in Neeharika
30


9
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra ,
wherein it was observed as under: -
“In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse
of process of law by converting a civil dispute into a
criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the
accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint
itself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law.
The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In
such cases and in exceptional cases with
circumspection, the High Court may stay the further
investigation. However, at the same time, there may
be genuine complaints/FIRs and the
police/investigating agency has a statutory
obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable
offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck
between the rights of the genuine complainants
and the FIRs disclosing commission of a
cognizable offence and the statutory
obligation/duty of the investigating agency to
investigate into the cognizable offences on the
one hand and those innocent persons against
whom the criminal proceedings are initiated
which may be in a given case abuse of process of
law and the process. However, if the facts are
hazy and the investigation has just begun, the
High Court would be circumspect in exercising
such powers and the High Court must permit the
investigating agency to proceed further with the
investigation in exercise of its statutory duty
under the provisions of the Code.”
[Emphasis supplied]


9
(2021) 19 SCC 401.
31


Applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand,
it becomes evident that the High Court has
transgressed the well-settled boundaries governing
the exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC at the
threshold stage. The order impugned before the High
Court was one passed by the learned Magistrate
under Section 156(3) of CrPC, whereby the police
were merely directed to register an FIR and to
undertake investigation in accordance with law. At
such a stage, the Court is only required to ascertain
whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence warranting
investigation.
56. In the facts and circumstances noted above, it
was not at all justified for the High Court to have
quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the
dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled
that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by
itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations
disclose commission of a cognizable
prima facie
offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute
on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing
investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the
investigative process at its inception. Such an
32


approach runs contrary to the principles consistently
laid down by this Court.
57. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the High Court clearly fell
into error while quashing the proceedings at a stage
when the Magistrate had merely directed registration
of FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of CrPC
(Corresponding to Section 175(3) of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).
58. Accordingly, the common impugned judgment
th
and order dated 28 September, 2016, passed by the
High Court is set aside. The FIRs and the proceedings
arising therefrom are revived and restored to the file
of the concerned Police Station and/or Magistrate,
for being proceeded in accordance with law.
59. It goes without saying that the parties shall be
at liberty to produce material to indicate their
defence(s)/position during the course of the police
investigation, as also before the Court concerned, in
accordance with law, at the appropriate stage.
60. Before parting, we deem it appropriate to clarify
that the observations made in the present judgment
are confined to the adjudication of the issues arising
in these appeals. The same shall not be construed as
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an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and
shall neither prejudice nor influence the proceedings
pending before the competent court/forum.
61. The appeals stand allowed in the aforesaid
terms.
62. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.


….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)


...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 13, 2026.




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