Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 340
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8166 of 2022)
MAURICE W. INNIS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
LILY KAZROONI @ LILY ARIF SHAIKH …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The dispute in this appeal is in connection with the
execution of a compromise decree dated 14.07.2017
passed in a Civil Suit No. 68 of 2012.
4. The suit land measures 51R (54895 sq. feet). It is a non-
agricultural land of plot No.396(A) situate in village
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2026.04.09
17:06:00 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
1
Panchgani, Taluka Mahabaleshwar, Satara in the State of
Maharashtra.
5. The plaintiff-appellant had purchased 97.12R area of land
of plot no. 396(A) in village Panchgani as referred to above.
The plaintiff-appellant initially sold 57R of the aforesaid
land purchased by him to the defendant-respondent.
Thus, retaining only 40.12R with himself. The purchaser
i.e., the defendant-respondent sold back 6R of the said
land to the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the plaintiff-appellant
became the owner of a total of 46.12R of the aforesaid plot
of land. The defendant-respondent after selling 6R to the
plaintiff-appellant, remained with only 51R of the land out
of the 57R initially purchased by him. The dispute is
regarding this 51R of land retained by the defendant-
respondent.
6. The defendant-respondent entered into an agreement to
sell the aforesaid 51R of land to the plaintiff-appellant vide
registered agreement dated 17.04.2009. The plaintiff-
appellant filed suit no.68 of 2012 against the defendant-
respondent praying for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 17.04.2009. In the said suit,
2
parties entered into a compromise on 08.07.2017. The said
compromise inter alia provided that 10R of the said land
would remain a common land in common ownership of
both the partners. The remaining 41R of land would be
equally divided between them to the extent of 20.5R each.
The area of 20.5R to be retained by each one of them would
be ascertained by the surveyor and the value of the
bungalow and the plinth level construction existing on part
of the said land would be determined by the Government
valuer. Accordingly, a decree would be drawn.
7. It appears that on the basis of the aforesaid compromise,
the suit was decreed after completing the formalities of the
survey and valuation. Finally, a decree was drawn on
14.07.2017 incorporating the respective areas falling into
the share of each party.
8. The aforesaid compromise decree states that the plaintiff-
appellant who had purchased 97.12R of plot No.396(A) of
village Panchgani had a sanctioned map dated 09.04.2010
which is part and parcel of the compromise and that both
parties agree to the said map. The disputed land is only
51R which is situate on the western side of plot No.396(A).
3
The area of 10R is common land for exercise of
easementary right as common road for access to their
properties.
9.
The aforesaid compromise decree in unequivocal terms
provided that the area of residential bungalow and the area
of construction up to the plinth level towards the southern
side of the bungalow plus the area on the western side of
plot No.396(A) including two bungalows shown in the
sanctioned map, having a total area of 20.5R goes to the
share of the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the area of 20.5R
falling into the share of plaintiff-appellant was clearly
described.
10. Similarly, the area of 20.5R falling into the share of
defendant-respondent was described as situate on the
western side of the bungalow of the plaintiff-appellant and
includes structures up to the plinth level extending up to
the boundary of the two bungalows on eastern side.
11. The decree also provided that the defendant-respondent
shall execute the sale deed of the property falling into the
share of the plaintiff-appellant on consideration of Rs.10
lakhs which is already paid.
4
12. The said decree was put into execution by both the parties
separately. The plaintiff-appellant filed Execution Petition
No.38 of 2020, which allegedly remains pending as on
date. The defendant-respondent filed a separate Execution
Petition No.21 of 2018 for the execution of the aforesaid
compromise decree dated 14.07.2017 claiming himself to
be the decree holder.
13. Accordingly, the defendant-respondent became the decree
holder and the plaintiff-appellant became the judgment
debtor.
14. The Executing Court in Execution Petition No.21 of 2018
of the defendant-respondent passed an order on
19.07.2021 and issued certain directions, modifying the
area of land allotted to the parties in the final compromise
decree, to the Court Commissioner to execute the decree.
The aforesaid modifications were made in the area allotted
to the parties inter alia for the reason that the permanent
constructions made to the extreme western side of the plot
were not as per the sanctioned plan and, therefore, it was
not practicable to allot that area to the defendant-
respondent. It was also not considered to be practicable to
5
allot the portion towards the extreme western side to the
defendant-respondent as it was likely to cause
inconvenience to her in future and that the area of 10R of
the suit plot towards the extreme western side had already
been sold by plaintiff-appellant to the third party.
15. In short, the Executing Court varied the area allotted to
the parties under the compromise decree and allotted
them some different portions, thus in effect modifying the
compromise decree.
16. The defendant-respondent was not satisfied and filed a
review petition seeking further modification of the above
order passed by the Executing Court. The aforesaid review
petition was allowed by the order dated 26.08.2021 and
the modifications made by the Executing Court in the
original compromise decree were further modified.
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order allowing
the review petition, plaintiff-appellant filed a writ petition
before the High Court challenging the orders passed by the
Executing Court dated 19.07.2021, order passed on review
petition dated 26.08.2021 as well as the order dated
11.10.2021 directing the delivery of possession. Finally,
6
the writ petition was dismissed on 21.04.2022. Thus, the
orders passed by the Executing Court were upheld.
18. The plaintiff-appellant has thus preferred this appeal.
19.
It is in this background that we have heard Shri Shoeb
Alam, senior counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Shri
Gopal Jha, counsel for the defendant-respondent.
20. The primary argument of the plaintiff-appellant is that the
Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and has to
execute the decree as it stands without making any
modifications therein. Therefore, the Executing Court
manifestly erred in passing the order dated 19.07.2021
and the order dated 26.08.2021 on review petition.
21. From the side of the defendant-respondent, it is submitted
that the Executing Court has rightly interpreted the decree
and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent rightly allotted portions so that the
decree does not become inexecutable. The Executing
Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, had
correctly passed the orders dated 19.07.2021 and
26.08.2021.
7
22. The counsel for the defendant-respondent relied upon a
three judges bench decision in the case of Jai Narain Ram
1
Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. to contend that
the Executing Court is not powerless to ensure that the
parties are given the very thing that the decree directs and
if there is any dispute in this regard, it is for the Executing
Court to decide it and as such, there was no error on part
of the Executing Court in passing the order dated
19.07.2021 or 26.08.2021
23. In order to address the controversy arising in this appeal,
it would be profitable to first place Section 47 of Code of
2
Civil Procedure which provides for the questions to be
determined by the Executing Court. The aforesaid Section
47 CPC is reproduced hereinbelow :-
“ 47. Questions to be determined by the
Court executing decree
: -
(1) All questions arising between the
parties to the suit in which the decree was
passed, or their representatives, and
relating to the execution, discharge or
satisfaction of the decree, shall be
determined by the Court executing the
decree and not by a separate suit.
(2) (omitted)
(3) Where a question arises as to
whether any person is or is not the
1
(1956) 1 SCC 75
2
In short ‘CPC’
8
representative of a party, such question
shall, for the purposes of this section, be
determined by the Court.”
24. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear
that the Executing Court is empowered to decide questions
relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree and has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree
sought to be executed. In other words, it has to execute the
decree as it is without changing the same. It is settled in
law that the jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to
give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the
role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place
of that expressed under the decree.
25. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul
3
Rehman and Ors. , it has been held as under :-
6.
“ A court executing a decree cannot go
behind the decree: between the parties or
their representatives it must take the
decree according to its tenor, cannot
entertain any objection that the decree was
incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set
aside by an appropriate proceeding in
appeal or revision, a decree even if it be
erroneous is still binding between the
parties.”
3
(1970) 1 SCC 670
9
26. The aforesaid view has been reiterated and fortified by the
4
Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash . The
relevant portion is reproduced hereinbelow :-
“ 3. Now, the law is well settled that an
executing court cannot go behind the decree
nor can it question its legality or correctness.
But there is one exception to this general rule
and that is that where the decree sought to
be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent
jurisdiction in the court passing it, its
invalidity can be set up in an execution
proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent
jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the
competence of the court to try the case and a
decree which is a nullity is void and can be
declared to be void by any court in which it is
presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever
and wherever it is sought to be enforced or
relied upon and even at the stage of execution
or even in collateral proceedings. The
executing court can, therefore, entertain an
objection that the decree is a nullity and can
refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the
executing court would not incur the reproach
that it is going behind the decree, because the
decree being null and void, there would really
be decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 and Seth Hiralal
Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199]. It is,
therefore, obvious that in the present case, it
was competent to the executing court to
examine whether the decree for eviction was
a nullity on the ground that the civil court had
no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in
which the decree for eviction was passed. If
4
(1977) 2 SCC 662
10
the decree for eviction was a nullity, the
executing court could declare it to be such
and decline to execute it against the
respondent.”
27.
In view of the above case laws, the Executing Court has to
strictly conform to the decree under execution and if the
decree provides for reciprocal obligations, it must ensure
compliance of those conditions by both the parties in pith
and substance, unless the decree is a nullity which is not
the case herein.
28. In so far as the case relied upon by the defendant-
respondent i.e. Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), it cuts
no ice in her favour. The aforesaid decision simply states
that if there are reciprocal obligations under the decree
which are interlinked, the court must ensure compliance
of reciprocal obligations. It further states that the
Executing Court has power to determine that one party
gives the very thing to the other party which the decree
directs and in case any dispute in this regard arises it can
be decided by the Executing Court, otherwise the
Executing Court must execute the decree as it stands and
cannot go beyond the decree and vary its term.
11
29. The above decision in clear terms states that the Executing
Court has no jurisdiction to vary the terms of the decree.
It is only where the dispute as to the identity of the land
which has to be given as part of the obligation to the other
side arises, the court can decide the same.
30. In the instant case, there is no dispute of identity of the
land falling into the shares of both the parties. The
compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land
falling into the shares of the parties. Therefore, the
Executing Court has to ensure that both the parties fulfil
their obligations and exchange the land as per the decree
and to see that the sale deed is executed as directed.
Merely for the reasons that exchange of some portions of
the land may not be practicable for the reason that
constructions on it are not as per the sanctioned map or
that part of it has been sold off, are all immaterial. Since
the Executing Court in passing the orders dated
19.07.2021 and 26.08.2021 has gone beyond its
jurisdiction and instead of directing for the execution of
the decree as it stands, has altered its terms by changing
certain portions of the land allotted to the parties, the same
12
are unsustainable in law. Accordingly, both the above
orders dated 19.07.2021 and 26.08.2021 and the
consequential order dated 11.10.2021 are hereby set
aside.
31. The appeal is allowed and the Execution Court is directed
to execute the decree in its terms and tenor.
32. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
…………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
…………………………….. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 09, 2026.
13
2026 INSC 340
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8166 of 2022)
MAURICE W. INNIS …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
LILY KAZROONI @ LILY ARIF SHAIKH …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The dispute in this appeal is in connection with the
execution of a compromise decree dated 14.07.2017
passed in a Civil Suit No. 68 of 2012.
4. The suit land measures 51R (54895 sq. feet). It is a non-
agricultural land of plot No.396(A) situate in village
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2026.04.09
17:06:00 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
1
Panchgani, Taluka Mahabaleshwar, Satara in the State of
Maharashtra.
5. The plaintiff-appellant had purchased 97.12R area of land
of plot no. 396(A) in village Panchgani as referred to above.
The plaintiff-appellant initially sold 57R of the aforesaid
land purchased by him to the defendant-respondent.
Thus, retaining only 40.12R with himself. The purchaser
i.e., the defendant-respondent sold back 6R of the said
land to the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the plaintiff-appellant
became the owner of a total of 46.12R of the aforesaid plot
of land. The defendant-respondent after selling 6R to the
plaintiff-appellant, remained with only 51R of the land out
of the 57R initially purchased by him. The dispute is
regarding this 51R of land retained by the defendant-
respondent.
6. The defendant-respondent entered into an agreement to
sell the aforesaid 51R of land to the plaintiff-appellant vide
registered agreement dated 17.04.2009. The plaintiff-
appellant filed suit no.68 of 2012 against the defendant-
respondent praying for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 17.04.2009. In the said suit,
2
parties entered into a compromise on 08.07.2017. The said
compromise inter alia provided that 10R of the said land
would remain a common land in common ownership of
both the partners. The remaining 41R of land would be
equally divided between them to the extent of 20.5R each.
The area of 20.5R to be retained by each one of them would
be ascertained by the surveyor and the value of the
bungalow and the plinth level construction existing on part
of the said land would be determined by the Government
valuer. Accordingly, a decree would be drawn.
7. It appears that on the basis of the aforesaid compromise,
the suit was decreed after completing the formalities of the
survey and valuation. Finally, a decree was drawn on
14.07.2017 incorporating the respective areas falling into
the share of each party.
8. The aforesaid compromise decree states that the plaintiff-
appellant who had purchased 97.12R of plot No.396(A) of
village Panchgani had a sanctioned map dated 09.04.2010
which is part and parcel of the compromise and that both
parties agree to the said map. The disputed land is only
51R which is situate on the western side of plot No.396(A).
3
The area of 10R is common land for exercise of
easementary right as common road for access to their
properties.
9.
The aforesaid compromise decree in unequivocal terms
provided that the area of residential bungalow and the area
of construction up to the plinth level towards the southern
side of the bungalow plus the area on the western side of
plot No.396(A) including two bungalows shown in the
sanctioned map, having a total area of 20.5R goes to the
share of the plaintiff-appellant. Thus, the area of 20.5R
falling into the share of plaintiff-appellant was clearly
described.
10. Similarly, the area of 20.5R falling into the share of
defendant-respondent was described as situate on the
western side of the bungalow of the plaintiff-appellant and
includes structures up to the plinth level extending up to
the boundary of the two bungalows on eastern side.
11. The decree also provided that the defendant-respondent
shall execute the sale deed of the property falling into the
share of the plaintiff-appellant on consideration of Rs.10
lakhs which is already paid.
4
12. The said decree was put into execution by both the parties
separately. The plaintiff-appellant filed Execution Petition
No.38 of 2020, which allegedly remains pending as on
date. The defendant-respondent filed a separate Execution
Petition No.21 of 2018 for the execution of the aforesaid
compromise decree dated 14.07.2017 claiming himself to
be the decree holder.
13. Accordingly, the defendant-respondent became the decree
holder and the plaintiff-appellant became the judgment
debtor.
14. The Executing Court in Execution Petition No.21 of 2018
of the defendant-respondent passed an order on
19.07.2021 and issued certain directions, modifying the
area of land allotted to the parties in the final compromise
decree, to the Court Commissioner to execute the decree.
The aforesaid modifications were made in the area allotted
to the parties inter alia for the reason that the permanent
constructions made to the extreme western side of the plot
were not as per the sanctioned plan and, therefore, it was
not practicable to allot that area to the defendant-
respondent. It was also not considered to be practicable to
5
allot the portion towards the extreme western side to the
defendant-respondent as it was likely to cause
inconvenience to her in future and that the area of 10R of
the suit plot towards the extreme western side had already
been sold by plaintiff-appellant to the third party.
15. In short, the Executing Court varied the area allotted to
the parties under the compromise decree and allotted
them some different portions, thus in effect modifying the
compromise decree.
16. The defendant-respondent was not satisfied and filed a
review petition seeking further modification of the above
order passed by the Executing Court. The aforesaid review
petition was allowed by the order dated 26.08.2021 and
the modifications made by the Executing Court in the
original compromise decree were further modified.
17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order allowing
the review petition, plaintiff-appellant filed a writ petition
before the High Court challenging the orders passed by the
Executing Court dated 19.07.2021, order passed on review
petition dated 26.08.2021 as well as the order dated
11.10.2021 directing the delivery of possession. Finally,
6
the writ petition was dismissed on 21.04.2022. Thus, the
orders passed by the Executing Court were upheld.
18. The plaintiff-appellant has thus preferred this appeal.
19.
It is in this background that we have heard Shri Shoeb
Alam, senior counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and Shri
Gopal Jha, counsel for the defendant-respondent.
20. The primary argument of the plaintiff-appellant is that the
Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and has to
execute the decree as it stands without making any
modifications therein. Therefore, the Executing Court
manifestly erred in passing the order dated 19.07.2021
and the order dated 26.08.2021 on review petition.
21. From the side of the defendant-respondent, it is submitted
that the Executing Court has rightly interpreted the decree
and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, respondent rightly allotted portions so that the
decree does not become inexecutable. The Executing
Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, had
correctly passed the orders dated 19.07.2021 and
26.08.2021.
7
22. The counsel for the defendant-respondent relied upon a
three judges bench decision in the case of Jai Narain Ram
1
Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. to contend that
the Executing Court is not powerless to ensure that the
parties are given the very thing that the decree directs and
if there is any dispute in this regard, it is for the Executing
Court to decide it and as such, there was no error on part
of the Executing Court in passing the order dated
19.07.2021 or 26.08.2021
23. In order to address the controversy arising in this appeal,
it would be profitable to first place Section 47 of Code of
2
Civil Procedure which provides for the questions to be
determined by the Executing Court. The aforesaid Section
47 CPC is reproduced hereinbelow :-
“ 47. Questions to be determined by the
Court executing decree
: -
(1) All questions arising between the
parties to the suit in which the decree was
passed, or their representatives, and
relating to the execution, discharge or
satisfaction of the decree, shall be
determined by the Court executing the
decree and not by a separate suit.
(2) (omitted)
(3) Where a question arises as to
whether any person is or is not the
1
(1956) 1 SCC 75
2
In short ‘CPC’
8
representative of a party, such question
shall, for the purposes of this section, be
determined by the Court.”
24. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear
that the Executing Court is empowered to decide questions
relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the
decree and has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree
sought to be executed. In other words, it has to execute the
decree as it is without changing the same. It is settled in
law that the jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to
give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the
role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place
of that expressed under the decree.
25. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul
3
Rehman and Ors. , it has been held as under :-
6.
“ A court executing a decree cannot go
behind the decree: between the parties or
their representatives it must take the
decree according to its tenor, cannot
entertain any objection that the decree was
incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set
aside by an appropriate proceeding in
appeal or revision, a decree even if it be
erroneous is still binding between the
parties.”
3
(1970) 1 SCC 670
9
26. The aforesaid view has been reiterated and fortified by the
4
Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash . The
relevant portion is reproduced hereinbelow :-
“ 3. Now, the law is well settled that an
executing court cannot go behind the decree
nor can it question its legality or correctness.
But there is one exception to this general rule
and that is that where the decree sought to
be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent
jurisdiction in the court passing it, its
invalidity can be set up in an execution
proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent
jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the
competence of the court to try the case and a
decree which is a nullity is void and can be
declared to be void by any court in which it is
presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever
and wherever it is sought to be enforced or
relied upon and even at the stage of execution
or even in collateral proceedings. The
executing court can, therefore, entertain an
objection that the decree is a nullity and can
refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the
executing court would not incur the reproach
that it is going behind the decree, because the
decree being null and void, there would really
be decree at all. Vide Kiran Singh v. Chaman
Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 and Seth Hiralal
Patni v. Sri Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199]. It is,
therefore, obvious that in the present case, it
was competent to the executing court to
examine whether the decree for eviction was
a nullity on the ground that the civil court had
no inherent jurisdiction to entertain the suit in
which the decree for eviction was passed. If
4
(1977) 2 SCC 662
10
the decree for eviction was a nullity, the
executing court could declare it to be such
and decline to execute it against the
respondent.”
27.
In view of the above case laws, the Executing Court has to
strictly conform to the decree under execution and if the
decree provides for reciprocal obligations, it must ensure
compliance of those conditions by both the parties in pith
and substance, unless the decree is a nullity which is not
the case herein.
28. In so far as the case relied upon by the defendant-
respondent i.e. Jai Narain Ram Lundia (supra), it cuts
no ice in her favour. The aforesaid decision simply states
that if there are reciprocal obligations under the decree
which are interlinked, the court must ensure compliance
of reciprocal obligations. It further states that the
Executing Court has power to determine that one party
gives the very thing to the other party which the decree
directs and in case any dispute in this regard arises it can
be decided by the Executing Court, otherwise the
Executing Court must execute the decree as it stands and
cannot go beyond the decree and vary its term.
11
29. The above decision in clear terms states that the Executing
Court has no jurisdiction to vary the terms of the decree.
It is only where the dispute as to the identity of the land
which has to be given as part of the obligation to the other
side arises, the court can decide the same.
30. In the instant case, there is no dispute of identity of the
land falling into the shares of both the parties. The
compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land
falling into the shares of the parties. Therefore, the
Executing Court has to ensure that both the parties fulfil
their obligations and exchange the land as per the decree
and to see that the sale deed is executed as directed.
Merely for the reasons that exchange of some portions of
the land may not be practicable for the reason that
constructions on it are not as per the sanctioned map or
that part of it has been sold off, are all immaterial. Since
the Executing Court in passing the orders dated
19.07.2021 and 26.08.2021 has gone beyond its
jurisdiction and instead of directing for the execution of
the decree as it stands, has altered its terms by changing
certain portions of the land allotted to the parties, the same
12
are unsustainable in law. Accordingly, both the above
orders dated 19.07.2021 and 26.08.2021 and the
consequential order dated 11.10.2021 are hereby set
aside.
31. The appeal is allowed and the Execution Court is directed
to execute the decree in its terms and tenor.
32. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
…………………………….. J.
(PANKAJ MITHAL)
…………………………….. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 09, 2026.
13