Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BHOPAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SINDHI SAHITI MULTIPURPOSE TRANSPORTCO-OP. SOCIETY LTD. & A
DATE OF JUDGMENT24/07/1973
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 2420 1974 SCR (1) 274
1973 SCC (2) 478
CITATOR INFO :
F 1987 SC1339 (6)
ACT:
Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961-Bye-laws made under
provisions s. 358 (7) (f) and (m) read with s. 349 (ii) of
Act-Bye-law 2 providing for motor-buses Plying for hire to
be compulsorily parked at Municipal bus stand Bye-laws 3 to
7 providing for fee payable for parking-Bye-law 2 does not
fall under s. 349(ii) or s. 358(7) (f) or (m) of Act and is
invalid-Consequently bye-laws 3 to 7 providing for levy of
fee also invalid.
Motor Vehicles Act 4 of 1939 s. 68(2)-Power to specify place
of Bus-stand under section rests with State Government and
not with Dist. Magistrate-Cannot he delegated to
District Magistrate.
HEADNOTE:
The Municipal Council of Bhopal made bye-laws under the
provisions of s. 358(7)(f) and (m) read with section
349(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.
Bye-law 2 provided that no person inching of a motor-bus
plying for hire shall for the purpose of taking up or
setting down of passengers, park or stop his bus anywhere
within the limits of the municipality ,except at the
municipal Bus Stand. The other bye-laws provided for a levy
of a fee of Re. 1 /- for every 8 hours or part thereof in
respect of the use of the bus stand by such buses and for
the issue of a permit on such payment. The respondent filed
a writ in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the
said bye-laws. The High Court held that bye-law 1 (c).
which defined the expression ’Municipal Bus Stand’ and bye-
law 2 were valid but held bye-laws 3 to 7. which provided
for the payment of fee and the giving of permit etc., as
invalid and restrained the Municipal Council from giving
effect to those bye-laws in any manner.
Dismissing the appeal by certificate filed by the Municipal
Council.
HELD : (i) Section 349(ii) was not applicable to the case.
The section itself does not enable the Municipal Council to
require that permission should be obtained for any purpose.
It deals with levy- of fees for permissions which are
required to be taken for various purposes under other
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sections of the Act such as sections 187(3), 194 and 223(4).
The relevant words in the section deal with permissions
granted to individuals to temporarily occupy municipal land.
It would be doing violence to that section to hold that it
deals with the provision of a bus-stand. In the context of
that section it was difficult to hold that when people were
compelled to use the bus stand constructed by the Municipal
Council it was a permission for temporary occupation of land
belonging to the Council. [276F]
(ii) It was not possible to relate the provision of clause
(f) of sub-section 7 ,of section 358 as having anything to
do with the provision of a bus-stand. As regards clause (m)
of sub-section 7, "the regulating and prohibiting the
stationing of carts..... on any ground under the control of
the Council or the using of such ground as halting place of
vehicles cannot be said to relate to the provision of
Municipal bus stand. The power to regulate or prohibit the
use of Municipal land as halting place of vehicles cannot
be used to compel people use such land as halting places.
Such a power must be specifically given. The power to
compel persons in charge of motor buses to stop only at
certain places for the purpose of taking up or setting down
of passengers is a matter which relates to motor traffic and
there is a specific provision in section 68 (2) (4) and (s)
of the Motor Vehicles Act for this specific purpose. [277H]
2 75
T. B. Ibrahim v. S.T.C. Tanjore, [1953] S.C.R. 290. and
Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State. Transport Authority,
Rajasthan, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373, referred to.
(iii) The bye-laws compel persons in charge of motor
buses to use the Municipal bus stand, which the Municipality
had no power to do. Consequently it must be held that bye-
law 2 is not valid and with it must go the other bye-laws.
(iv) Further, in the present case the District Magistrate
had admittedly declared the Bhopal Municipal Bus Stand as
bus stand. Power to specify the place under section 68(2)
(r) and (s) vests in the State Government. It has not been
shown that the State Government had any power to delegate
their power under this section to the District Magistrate,.
It has also not shown that the District Magistrate issued
any notification specifying the’ Bhopal Bus Stand as one
under the provisions of section 68(2)(r) and (s) of the
Motor Vehicles Act. If at all the District Magistrate had
taken any action it could only be under s. 76. But that
section does not enable him to specify places for setting
down or picking up of passengers.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1547 of
1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated
October 18, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at
Jabalpur in Misc. Petition No. 557 of 1960.
M. C. Chagla, Rameshwar Nath and Seeta Vaidialingam, for
the appellant.
M. N. Phadke and A,. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No.
1.
I. N. Shroff and R. P. Kapur, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-On 6-11-1964 the Municipal Council of Bho-
pal made bye-laws under the provisions of s. 356.(7) (f) &
(x) read with s. 349(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1961 after previous publication in the
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M. P. Rapatra as required under s. 357(4) and confirmation
by the State Government under s. 357(3) in respect of a
Municipal bus stand. Bye-law 2 of the bye-laws provided
that no person in charge of a motor-bus plying for hire
shall for the purpose of taking up or setting down of
passengers, park or stop his bus anywhere within the limits
of the Bhopal Municipality except at the Municipal Bus
Stand. The other bye-laws provided for a levy of a fee of
Re. 1/for every eight hours or part thereof in respect of
the, use of the bus stand by such buses and for the issue of
a permit on such payment. On 13-11-1964 the respondents
filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
challenging the said bye-laws. The High Court held that
bye-law 1 (c), which defined the expression ’Municipal Bus
Stand’ and bye-law 2, which has been set out earlier, were
valid, but held by laws 3 to 7, which provided for the
payment of fee and the giving of a permit etc., as invalid,
and restrained the Municipal Council from giving effect to
those bye-laws in any manner. The Municipal Council was
also directed to refund the fee collected from the
respondents., This appeal has been filed by the Municipal
Council by certificate granted by the High Court.
276
Section 349(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act
reads
’The Council may charge such fee as may be
prescribed by bye-laws for-
(i)...........................
(ii) any permission granted under this Act
for making any temporary erection or for
putting up any projection or for the temporary
occupation of any public street or any land or
building belonging to the Council; and
(iii)........................
Section 358 in so far as it is relevant for
the purpose of this case reads:
"In addition to any power specially conferred
by this Act, the Council may, and if so
required by the State Government shall, make
bye-laws for-
(1)
(7) Public, Health, Safety, Nuisance and
Sanitation-
(f) prohibiting or regulating with a view to
sanitation or the prevention of disease, any
act which occasions or which is likely to
occasion a public nuisance and for the
prohibition or regulation of which no
provision is made under this heading;
(n) regulating and prohibiting the
stationing of carts or picketing of animals on
any ground under the control-of the Council or
the using of such ground as halting place, of
vehicles or animals or as a place for
encampment or the causing or permitting of any
animal to stray.
It appears to us that S. 349(ii) does not
apply to this case. The relevant portion of
that section reads :
"The Council may charge such fee as may be
prescribed.for any permission granted under
this Act ..........for the temporary
occupation of any land ..........belonging
to the Council."
The section itself does not enable the Municipal Council to
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require that permission should be obtained for any
purpose. It deals with levy of fees for permissions which
are required to be taken for various purposes under other
sections of the Act. Section 187(3) which deals with
permission to erect, alter, add to or reconstruct buildings,
and section 194 which deals with permission to the owners or
occupiers of buildings in public street to put up verandahs,
balconies or rooms, to project from any upper Story thereof
are instances in point. The, permission mentioned in
section 194 is one of the matters for ’which fees can be
prescribed under section 349(ii). Section 223(4) deals
with’, allowing any temporary occupation or erection in any
public street on occasions of festivals and ceremonies, or
allowing the occupation of, or temporary erection of
structures for any other purpose.
2 7 7
Fees can be prescribed under section 349(ii) in respect of
these matters. The words above mentioned in that section
deal with permission granted to individuals to temporarily
occupy municipal land. It would be doing violence to that
section to hold that it deals with the provision of a bus-
stand. In the context of that section it is difficult to
hold that when people are compelled to use a bus stand
constructed by the Municipal Council it is a permission for
temporary occupation of land belonging to the Council.
Let us now consider if under the provisions of section 358,
already extracted, the Municipal Council can validly make
the present bylaws. It is not possible to relate the
provision of clause (f) of subsection (7) as having anything
to do with the provision of a bus stand. As regards clause
(in) of sub-section (7) "the regulating and prohibiting the
stationing of carts...... on any ground under the control of
the Council or the using of such ground as halting place of
vehicles" cannot be said to relate to the provision of a
Municipal bus stand. The power to regulate or prohibit the
use of municipal land as halting place of vehicles cannot be
used to compel people use such land as halting places. Such
a power must be specifically given. Compare this section
with sections 270-B and 270-C of the Madras District
Municipalities Act, 1920, which read as follows
"270-B. (1) The municipal council may
construct or provide and maintain public
landing places, halting places and cart stands
and may levy fees for the use of the same.
(1-A)............................
(2)...A statement in English and a vernacular
language of the district of the fees fixed by
the council for the use of such place shall be
put up in a conspicuous part thereof.
Explanation:A cart stand shall be for the
purposes of this Act includes a stand for
carriages including motor vehicles within the
meaning of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1914
and animals."
"270-C. Where a municipal council has
provided a public landing place, halting place
or cart-stand, the executive authority may
prohibit the use for the same purpose by any
person within such distance thereof, as may be
determined by the municipal council, of any
public place or the sides of any public
street."
Even these sections deal with use of landing places, halting
places and cart-stands outdo not deal with places for
setting down or taking up of passengersIt is well to keep
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clear in one’s mind the distinction between halting places
which would be the equivalents of garages of private persons
and places where passengers may be set down and taken up
which can properly be called bus stands. The power to com-
pel persons in charge of motor buses to stop only at certain
places for the purpose of taking up or setting down of
passengers is a matter which relates to motor traffic and
there is a specific provision in sec-
278
tion 68 (2) (r) & (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act for this
specific purpose. They read as follows :
"68. (2) Without prejudice to the generality
of the’ foregoing power, rules under this
section may be made with respect to all or any
of the following matters, namely
(r) prohibiting the picking up or setting
down of passengers by stage or contract
carriages at specified places or in specified
areas or at places other than duly notified
stands or halting places and requiring the
driver of a stage carriage to stop and remain
stationary for a reasonable time when so
required by a passenger desiring to board or
alight from the vehicle at a notified halting
place;
(s) the requirements which shall be complied
with in the construction or use of any duly
notified stands or halting place, including
the provision of adequate equipment and
facilities for the convenience of all users
thereof, the fees, if any, which may be
charged for the use of such facilities, the
records which shall be maintained at such
stands or places, the staff to be employed
thereat, and the duties and conduct of such
staff, and generally for maintaining such
stands and places in a serviceable and clean
condition."
This Court in T. B. Ibrahim v. R.T.C., Tanjore() held that
the expression ’duly notified stand’ in the Motor Vehicles
Act means ’a stand duly notified by the Transport
Authority’. It was contended before this Court that section
68(2) (r) of the Motor Vehicles Act did not confer the power
upon the transport authority to direct the fixing or the
alteration of a bus-stand. This Court rejected that
contention. It pointed out that the section gives power to
the Government to prohibit a specified place from being used
for picking up or setting down passengers. This Court held
that section 270-B, 270-C and 270-E of the Madras District
Municipalities Act do not affect the power of the Transport
Authority to regulate traffic control or impose restrictions
upon the licence of any such cart-stand. In Municipal.
Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan (2)
this Court pointed out that a ’bus stand’ meant a place
where bus service commenced or terminated and that section
86 dealt with _parking places referred to in section 91(2)
(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The fixation of bus stands
was held to be within section 68 (2) (r) of the Act and the
power to issue the necessary notification was held to be
implied in that clause.
Under section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act the State
Government or any-authority authorized in this behalf by the
State Government may in consultation with the local
authority having jurisdiction in the area concerned,
determine places at which motor vehicles may stand either
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indefinitely or for a specified period of time, and may
determine the places at which public service vehicles may
stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up
and setting down of passengers. Unlike section 68 which
confers power on the State Government alone this
(1)[1953] S.C.R. 290.
(2) (1963) Supp. (2) S.C.R. 373.
27 9
section enables the State Government to authorize any
authority to take action under it. As is clear from a
reading of section 76, it does not deal with a bus stand in
the sense of a place for taking up and setting down of
passengers, which is dealt with under section 68 (2) (r).
While section 258(7)(n) may enable the Municipal Council to
regulate or prohibit the use of any ground under its control
it does not enable it to compel any body to use it as
halting place etc. much less to prescribe that no place
other than the one provided by the Municipal Council shall
be used for setting down and taking up of passengers. That
can be done only under a provision like the one contained
in section 68 (2) (r) & (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
It is interesting to note that in this case the respondents
as well as the Municipal Council had stated that the
District Magistrate had declared the Bhopal Municipal Bus
Stand as a bus stand. Power to specify the place under
section 68 (2) (r) & (s) vests in the State Government.
Neither party has been able to show us that there is any
power in the State Government to delegate their power under
this section to the District Magistrate nor have we been
shown any notification by the District Magistrate specifying
the Bhopal Municipal Bus Stand as one under the provisions
of section 68(2) (r) & (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Apparently both the parties proceeded on a misapprehension.
If at all the District Magistrate had taken any action it
could only be under section 76. But that section does not
enable him to specify places for setting down or picking up
of passengers as we pointed out earlier. Therefore, we must
hold that the Madhya Pradesh High Court was in error in
holding bye-law 2 valid.
Mr. M. C. Chagla, appearing for the Municipal Council, made
those four points
1. There is no compulsion on any body to
park his bus within the municipal limits and
that he can park it outside the municipal
limits for the purpose of picking up and
setting down passengers.
2. That if he parks the bus in the
municipal bus stand he is using municipal
land.
3...... That this is with the permission of
the Municipality.
4. That for this permission a permit is
issued and a fee is charged.
The first proposition has only to be stated to be rejected.
The person plying a motor bus for hire cannot exercise ’his
trade or profession effectively if he is not allowed to set
down or take up passengers within the limits of a town. The
Municipal Council cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly. It cannot compel buses to go outside the munici-
pal limits in order to set down or pick up passengers. This
argument is as fallacious as the one put forward by Mr.
Phadke on behalf of the respondent that he had a fundamental
right to use the Municipal bus stand. Nobody has a
fundamental right to use a land belonging to
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another without that persons permission or paying for it if
necessary. While the Municipal Council has no power to
compel persons plying motor buses for hue to use only the
Municipal bus stand for the purpose of taking up and setting
down passengers, there can be no objection to its providing
a bus stand for anybody who chooses to use it ,voluntarily
and to such person being required to pay for such use. In
that sense propositions 2 and 3 put forward by Mr. Chagla
are unexceptionable. If for this permission the formality
of the issue of a permit is followed and a fee is charged it
cannot be said to be objectionable. In that case the
charges may be such as may be agreed upon between the
parties, i.e. if the Municipality charges a certain rate
only people who are prepared to pay at that rate would
resort to that place. Nobody can be compelled to go to that
place. Such a provision is permissible not under any
provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act but
arises out of the right which the Municipal Council, like
the owner of any other property has, to permit people to use
any property belonging to it only on certain conditions.
The bylaws compel persons in charge of motor buses to use
the Municipal bus stand, which the Municipality has no power
to do. Consequently we hold bye-law 2 as not valid and with
it go the other bye-laws. As we have held bye-laws not
valid we do not consider it necessary to deal with the
argument advanced by Mr. Phadke based on section 6 of the
Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947.
In the result the appeal is dismissed; the appellant win pay
the respondents’ costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.
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