Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 19
PETITIONER:
CHARAN LAL SAHU & OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GIANI ZAIL SINGH & ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT13/12/1983
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
BHAGWATI, P.N.
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
MADON, D.P.
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
CITATION:
1984 AIR 309 1984 SCR (2) 6
1984 SCC (1) 390 1983 SCALE (2)961
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1986 SC1253 (20)
R 1986 SC1534 (4)
R 1987 SC1577 (10)
F 1987 SC2371 (10)
ACT:
Constitution of India 1950, Articles 71(1) and 84(a)
Sec. 18(1) of Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
Act 1952-Whether ultra vires Article 71(1)
Presidential election-Candidate contesting such
election-Whether to take oath prescribed by Article 84(a).
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952
Section 13(a) read with section 14A (1)-‘Candidate’ at
presidential election- Who is-One duly nominated’-who has
locus standi to challenge election.
Section 18(1) and 19-Elections Act, petition-Whether
could be filed on ground that elected candidate not a
‘suitable person’ for holding the office.
Section 18(2)-Undue influence and bribery at an
election-Canvassing for a candidate-Whether amounts to undue
influence.
pleading & Practice: Election Petitions-Pleadings-
Precise specific and unambiguous-Necessity for.
Indian Penal Code-Section 171C-Undue influence at
elections Canvassing-Whether amounts to undue influence.
Words & Phrases-Meaning of.
"Connivance" whether means "consent".
HEADNOTE:
For the election to the office of the President of
India, the Returning officer accepted the nomination papers
of two candidates only viz. Giani Zail Singh and Shri
H.R.Khanna. The election was held on July 12,1982, and Giani
Zail Singh was declared as the successful candidate.
The petitioners in Election Petition Nos. 2 and 3 of
1982 who had filed their nomination papers, contested the
election on various grounds and alleged that Respondent 1.
Giani Zail Singh exercised undue influence over the voters
through his confidants.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 19
7
A preliminary objection to the maintainability of these
petitions was raised on behalf of Respondent no. 1 and the
Attorney General. It was contended that neither of the two
petitioners was a ‘candidate’ within the meaning of section
13(a) of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
Act, 1952 and since under section 14A, an election petition
can be filed only by a person who was a candidate at the
election, the petitioners had no standing to file the
petitions.
This Court framed the following preliminary issue:
"Does the petitioner have no locus standi to maintain the
petition on the ground that he was not a ‘candidate’ within
the meaning of section 13(a) read with section 14A of
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act 1952?
Election Petition No. 4 of 1982 was filed by 27 Members
of Parliaments challenging the election of Respondent No. 1,
Giani Zail Singh as the President of India. contending that
the petitioners jointly sponsored the candidature of Shri
Khanna, a former Judge and that Giani Zail Singh was not a
"Suitable person "for holding the high office of the
President of India and that Shri M.H. Beg former Chief
Justice and Chairman of the Minorities Commission, was
engaged by Respondent I and by the Prime Minister "for
influencing the votes of the Minority Communities";(2) that
a Cabinet Minister of the Union Government, a ‘supporter and
close associate ’of Respondent 1, exercised undue influence
over the voters by misusing the Government machinery and
that a statement was issued by him through the Press Info-
Bureau asking the voters to vote for Respondent 1, (3) that
the Prim, Min ter participated in the election campaign of
Respondent 1 and misused to Government machinery for that
purpose, (4) that the Prime Minister made a communal appeal
to the Akali Dal that its members should vote for Respondent
1, and (5) that Government helicopters and cars were misused
for the purpose of the election of Respondent 1, and that
these various acts were committed by supporters of
Respondent 1 with his connivance.
It was contended on behalf of Respondent I that even
assuming that the aforesaid allegation were true they did
not disclose any cause of action for setting aside the
election of respondent 1.
This Court framed the following issues : (1) "can the
election of a candidate to the office of the President of
India be challenged on the ground that he is not a suitable
person for holding that office",(2) "whether the averments
in the Election Petition, assuming them to be true and
correct; disclose any cause of action for setting aside the
election of the returned candidate (Respondent 1) on the
grounds stated in section 18 (1) (a) of the Act".
Dismissing the election Petitions,
^
HELD:
Election Petitions Nos. 2&3 of 1982.
1. The petitioners have no locus standi to file the
election petitions since they were neither duly nominated
nor can they claim to have been duly ominated as candidates
at the Presidential election.[16 H]
8
2. Three pre-conditions govern an election petition by
which a Presidential election is challanged. In the first
place such a petition has to be filed in the Supreme Court.
Secondly, the petition must disclose a challange to the
election on one or more grounds specified in sub-section (1)
of section 18 or section 19. Thirdly an election petition
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 19
can be presented only by a person who was a candidate at the
presidential election or by twenty or more electors. joined
together as petitioners.[14 E-F]
3. The definition of the word ‘candidate’ in section 13
(a) of the Act consists of two parts.‘Candidate’ means a
person who has either been duly nominated as a candidate at
a Presidential election or a person who claims to have been
duly nominated. Section 5B (1) (a) of the Act provides that
on or before the date appointed for making nominations, each
candidate shall deliver to the Returning Officer a
nomination paper completed in the prescribed form,
subscribed by the candidate as assenting to the nomination,
and "in the case of Presidential election, also by at least
ten electors as proposers and at least ten electors as
seconders".[14 G-H; 15 A]
In the instant case, neither of the two petitioners was
duly nominated. The nomination papers filed by them were not
subscribed by ten electors as proposers and ten electors as
seconders. It was precisely for this reason that their
nomination papers were rejected by the Returning Officer.
Since the nomination papers of the two petitioners were not
subscribed as required by section 5B (1) (a) of the Act, it
follows that they were not duly nominated as "candidates" at
the election. [15 A-B]
4. The occasion for a person to make a claim that he
was duly nominated can arise only if the nomination paper
complies with the statutory requirements which govern the
filing of nomination papers and not otherwise. The claim
that he was ‘duly’ nominated necessarily implies and
involves the claim that his nomination paper conformed to
the requirements of the statute. A contestant whose
nomination paper is not subscribed by at least ten electors
as proposers and ten electors as seconders, as required by
s. 58 (1) (a) of the Act, cannot therefore claim to have
been duly nominated, any more than a contestant who had not
subscribed his assent to his own nomination can. The claim
of a contestant that he was duly nominated must arise out of
his compliance with provision of the Act, and not out of the
violation of the Act. Otherwise, a person who had not filed
any nomination paper at all but who had only informed the
Returning Officer orally that he desired to contest the
election could also contend that he "claims to have been
duly nominated as a candidate". [15 F-H; 16A]
In the instant case, the nomination papers of the
petitioners were rightly rejected on the ground of non-
compliance with the mandatory requirement of s.58 (1)(a) of
the Act. Their claim that they have been duly nominated is
not within the framework of the Act but is dehors the Act.
It cannot therefore be entertained.[16 C]
Charan Lal Sahu v. Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed. (A.I.R.)
1975 S.C. 1288; Charan Lal Sahuv. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy,
[1978] 3 SCR 1, referred to.
9
5. It is of the essence of the functioning of a
democracy that elections to public offices must be open to
the scrutiny of an independent Tribunal. [17 D]
In the instant cases, it is regrettable that election
petitions challenging the election to the high office of the
President of India should be filed in a cavalier fashion.
The petitions have an extempore. appearance and not even a
second look, appears to have been given to the manner of
drafting these petitions or to the contents raised therein.
The court refrained from passing any order of costs and,
instead expressed disapproval of the light hearted and
indifferent manner in which these petitions were filed. [17
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 19
B-C]
Election petitions No. 4 of 1982.
1. The rights arising out of elections, including the
right to contest or challenge an election, are not common
law rights. They are creatures of the statutes which.
create, confer or limit those rights. Therefore, for
deciding the question whether an election can be set aside
on any alleged ground, the courts have to consult the
provisions of law governing the particular election. They
have to function within the framework of that law and cannot
travel beyond it. Only those persons on whom the right of
franchise is conferred by the statute can vote at the
election. [19 F-G]
In the instant case, that right is conferred on
every‘elector’ as defined in section 2(d) of the Act. Only
those person who are qualified to be elected to the
particular office can contest the election. That right is
regulated by section 5A of the Act. The election can be
called into question in the manner prescribed by the statute
and not in any other manner. Section 14(1) of the Act
provides that no election shall be called in question except
by presenting an election petition to the authority
specified in sub-section (2) which is the Supreme Court. The
grounds for setting aside the election to the office of the
President or the Vice-President and the ground on which a
candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared
to have been elected are laid down in sections 18 and 19 of
the Act. The election can neither be questioned nor set
aside on any other ground. Therefore, the challenge to the
election of the returned candidate on the ground of his want
of suitability to occupy the office of the President cannot
be entertained and must be rejected.[20 D-E]
K.Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narsimha Reddy [1969] I
SCR 679 at 684 and Charan Lal sahu v.Nandkishore
Bhatt,[1974] 1 SCR 294 at 296 referred to.
2. Suitability of a candidate is for the electorate to
judge and not for the court to decide. The court cannot
substitute its own assessment of the suitability of a
candidate for the verdict returned by the electorate. The
verdict of the electorate is a verdict on the suitability’
of the candidate. ‘Suitability’ is a fluid concept of
uncertain import. The ballot-box is, or has to be assumed to
be its sole judge. [20 G-2 1 A]
3. It is not open to a petitioner in an Election
Petition to plead in terms of synonyms. In Election
Petitions pleadings have to be precise, specific and
unambiguous so as to put the respondent on notice. The rule
of pleadings that facts constituting the cause of action
must be specifically pleaded is as fundamental as it is
elementary. [23 A]
10
4. Connivance may in certain situations amount
to‘consent’. Dictionaries give ‘consent’ as one of the
meanings of the word ‘connivance’. But it is not true to say
that ‘connivance’ invariably and necessarily means or
amounts to ‘consent’, that is to say, irrespective of the
context of the given situation. The two cannot, therefore,
be equated. Consent implies that parties are ad idem.
Connivance does not necessarily imply that parties are of
one mind. They may or may not be, depending upon the facts
of the situation. [23 B-C]
5. Precision in pleadings particularly in Election
Petitions is necessary. The importance of a specific
pleading in election petitions can be appreciated only if it
is realised that the absence of a specific plea puts the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 19
respondent at a great disadvantage. He must know what case
he has to meet. He cannot be kept guessing whether the
petitioner means what he says. The petitioner cannot be
allowed to keep his options open until the trial and adduce
such evidence as seems convenient and comes handy. It is
therefore impermissible to substitute the word consent for
the word ‘connivance’ which occurs in the pleadings of the
petitioners. [23 F, D-E]
6. In the absence or a pleading that the offence of
undue influence was committed with the "consent" of the
returned candidate, one of the main ingredients of section
18(1) (a) remains unsatisfied. [23 C]
7 When the Act was passed in 1952, section 18(1)(a)
provided that the Supreme Court shall declare the election
of the returned candidate void if it is of opinion that the
offence of bribery or undue influence has been committed by
the returned candidate or by any person "with the
connivance" of the returned candidate. This sub-section was
amended by section 7 of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Election (Amendment) Act, 5 of 1974. The word
‘connivance’ was substituted by the word ‘consent’ by the
Amendment Act. If ‘connivance’ carried the same meaning as
consent and if one was the same as the other, the Parliament
would not have taken the deliberate step of deleting the
word connivance a and substituting it by the word consent’.
The Amendment shows that connivance and consent connote
distinct concepts for the purpose of section 18 (I) (a).[23
G-24 B]
8. The mere Act of canvassing for a candidate cannot
amount to undue influence within the meaning of Section 171C
of the Penal Code. [26 C]
Baburao patel v. Dr. Zakir Hussain [1968] 2SCR 133;
Shiv Kirpal Singh v. Shri V.V Giri [1971] 2 SCR 197,320,
32]; and Ram Dialy santLal [1959] Suppl. 2 SCR 748 at 758,
759 referred to.
9. The laws of election are self-contained codes and
the rights arising out of elections are the off springs of
those laws. The provisions of the Representation of the
People Act 1951 cannot be engrafted upon the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential Elections Act 1952, to enlarge the
scope of an election petition filed to challenge a
Presidential or Vice-Presidential election. Such an election
can be set aside only on the grounds specified in section 18
(1) of the Act. [28 B-C]
10. The use of Government machinery, abuse of official
position and appeal to communal sentiments so long as such
appeal does not amount to
11
undue influence, are not considered by the Legislature to be
circumstances which would invalidate a Presidential or a
Vice-Presidential election. [27 M; 28 A]
11. The Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional on
the ground that it limits the challenge to the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential Election to the grounds set forth in
section 18 (1). While enacting a law in pursuance of the
power conferred by Article 71 (3), Parliament. is entitle to
specify the particular kind of doubts or disputes which
shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court. If
every kind of fanciful doubt or frivolous doubt will have to
be inquire into by this Court, election petitions will
became a fertile ground for fighting political battles. [28
F; 28 G-H]
12. A candidate who wants to contest the election for
the office of the President cannot take the oath in any of
the forms prescribed by the Third Schedule to the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 19
Constitution. That Schedule does not prescribe any form of
oath for a person who desires to contest a Presidential
election. [29 E]
In the instant case, the averments in the Election
petition, assuming them to be true and correct, do not
disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election
of the returned candidate on the ground stated in section 18
(1)(a) of the Act. [28 D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Election Petition No. 2
of 1982
(Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)
AND
Election Petition No. 3 of 1982.
(Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)
WITH
Election Petition No. 4 of 1982.
(Petition under Article 71 of the Constitution.)
Petitioner in person in Election Petition No. 2/82.
Hari Shanker Jain and K.K. Gupta for the Petitioner in
Election Petition No.3/82.
Shujaatullah Khan and K.K. Gupta for the Petitioner in
Election Petition No.4/82.
O.P Sharma, R.C. Gubrele, K.R Gupta and R.C. Bhatia for
the Respondents in Election Petition No.2/82.
P.R. Mridul, A.K. Sen. O.P. Sharma, R.C. Gubrele, K.R
Gupta and R.C. Bhatia for the respondent in Election
Petition No.3/82.
A.K. Sen, J.S. Basu, o.P. Sharma, R.C. Gubrele, K.R
Gupta and R.C. Election Petition No. 4/82.
12
K Parasaran, Att. General and R.D.Agarwala in all the
Election Petitions.
P.N Duda, H.L Tikkum, D.S. Narula, Vijay Pandit and
B.C. Agarwala for the interveners.
A.S. Pundir for the Interveners.
D.B. Vohra for the Interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.: These three Election petitions are
filed under section 14 of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections Act, 1952 to challenge the election
of Respondent 1, Giani Zail Singh, as the President of
India. The election to the office of the President of India
was held on July 12, 1982. In all, 36 candidates had filed
nomination papers including Shri Charan Lal Sahu who is the
petitioner in election Petition No. 2 of 1982 and Shri Nem
Chandra Jain who is the petitioner in election Petition No.3
of 1982. The Returning Officer accepted the nomination
papers of two candidates only: Gaini Zail Singh and Shri
H.R. Khanna, a retired Judge of this Court. The result of
the election was published in the Extraordinary Gazette of
India on July 15. 1982 declaring Giani Zail Singh as the
successful candidate. He took oath of office on July 25,
1982.
We will first take up for consideration Election
Petitions 2 and 3 of 1982 which are filed respectively by
Shri Charan Lal Sahu and Shri Nem Chandra Jain both of whom,
incidentally, are Advocates.
Election Petitions Nos. 2 & 3 of 1982:
In Petition No.2 of 1982, the petitioner asks for the
following reliefs:
"(1) That the Constitutional Eleventh Amendment Act
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 19
1961 be declared ultra-vires of the Constitution.
(2) That the sections 5 (B) 6 and 5 (c) 21 (3) of the
Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act
1952 (Amended) with Election Rules 1974 be
declared, illegal, void and unconstitutional,
under Article 58 of the Constitution.
13
(3) That is the post of Prime Minister and other
Ministers be declared that they are in office of
profit hence they have played undue influence in
the election of the returned Candidate.
(4) That the election of the (Returned Candidate)
Respondent No. 1 be declared void and nomination
of respondent No. 2 be declared illegally accepted
thus the petitioner be declared as elected as
President under the Constitution, as stated in the
petition u/s 18 of the Act.
(5) That the above system of election of President is
bad and unconstitutional therefore, it should be
held directly in future by all the electorals and
Union of India be directed to amend Articles 54,
55 and 56 of the Constitution of India.
(6) That sections 4(1) (2), 5, 6, 7, & 11 of the
Salaries and Allowances, of Ministers Act 1952
(Act No. 58 of 1952) along with sections 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Salaries and Allowances of
Members of Parliament Act, 1954 be declared void
and unconstitutional." (Advisedly, we have not
touched up the prayer-clauses.)
In Petition No. 3 of 1982, the petitioner prays that
the election of Respondent 1 be set aside on the various
grounds mentioned in the petition.
Apart from making several vague, loose and offhand
allegations, the petitioners allege that Respondent 1
exercised undue influence over the voters through his
confidants. We do not consider it necessary to reproduce
those allegations since we are of the opinion that these
petitions are not maintainable.
A preliminary objection is taken to the maintainability
of these petitions by Shri Asoke Sen who appears on behalf
of Respondent 1 and by the learned Attorney General. They
contend that neither of the two petitioners was a
’candidate’ within the meaning of section 13(1) of the Act
and since, under section 14A, an election petition can be
filed only by a person who was a candidate at the election,
the petitioners have no standing to file the petitions and
therefore, the petitions must be dismissed as not
maintainable.
14
Since the petitioners contested their alleged lack of
locus to file the petitions, the following issue was framed
by us a preliminary issue in each of the two election
petitions:
"Does the petitioner have no locus standi to
maintain the petition on the ground that he was not a
’candidate’ within the meaning of section 13(a) read
with section 14A of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections Act, 1952 ?"
Section 14 of the Act provides by sub-section (1) that
no election shall be called in question except by presenting
an election petition to the authority specified in sub-
section (2). According to sub-section (2), the authority
having jurisdiction to try an election petition is the
Supreme Court. By section 14A(1) of the Act, an election
petition may be presented on the grounds specified in
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 19
section 18(1) and 19 "by any candidate at such election" or,
"in the case of Presidential election, by twenty or more
electors joined together as petitioners". Section 13(a) of
the Act provides that unless the context otherwise requires,
’candidate’ means a person "who has been or claims to have
been duly nominated as a candidate at an election".
These provisions show that there are three pre-
conditions which govern an election petition by which a
Presidential election is challenged. In the first place,
such a petition has to be filed in the Supreme Court.
Secondly, the petition must disclose a challenge to the
election on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-
section (1) of section 18 or section 19. Thirdly, and that
is important for our purpose, an election petition can be
presented only by a person who was a candidate at the
Presidential election or by twenty or more electors joined
together as petitioners. Since the two election petition
which are at present under our consideration have not been
filed by twenty or more electors, the question which arises
for our consideration is whether the two petitioners in the
respective election petitions were ’candidate’ at the
election held to the office of the President of India.
The definition of the word ’candidate’ in section 13(a)
of the Act consists of two parts. ’Candidate’ means a person
who has either been duly nominated as a candidate at a
presidential election or a person who claims to have been
duly nominated. Neither of the two petitioners was duly
nominated. This is incontrovertible. Section 5B (1) (a) of
the Act provides that on or before the date appointed for
making nominations, each candidate shall deliver to the
Returning Officer a nomination paper completed in the
prescribed form, sub-
15
scribed by the candidate as assenting to the nomination, and
"in the case of Presidential election, also by at least ten
electors as proposers and at least ten electors as
seconders". It is common ground that the nomination papers
filed by the two petitioners were not subscribed by ten
electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders. In
fact, it is precisely for that reason that the nomination
papers filed by the two petitioners were rejected by the
Returning Officer. Since the nomination papers of the two
petitioners were not subscribed as required by section 5B
(1) (a) of the Act, it must follow that they were not duly
nominated as candidate at the election.
The petitioners, however, contend that even if it is
held that they were not duly nominated as candidates their
petitions cannot be dismissed on that ground since they
’claim to have been duly nominated’. It is true that in the
matter of claim to candidacy, a person who claims to have
been duly nominated is on par with a person who, in fact,
was duly nominated. But the claim to have been duly
nominated cannot be made by a person whose nomination paper
does not comply with the mandatory requirements of section
58 (1) (a) of the Act. That is to say a person whose
nomination paper, admittedly, was not subscribed by the
requisite number of electors as proposers and seconders
cannot claim that he was duly nominated. Such a claim can
only be made by a person who can show that his nomination
paper conformed to the provisions of section 58 and yet it
was rejected, that is, wrongly rejected by the Returning
Officer. To illustrate, if the Returning Officer rejects a
nomination paper on the ground that one of the ten
subscribers who had proposed the nomination is not an
elector, the petitioner can claim to have been duly
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 19
nominated if he proves that the said proposer was in fact an
’elector’.
Thus, the occasion for a person to make a claim that he
was duly nominated can arise only if his nomination paper
complies with the statutory requirements which govern the
filling of nomination papers and not otherwise. The claim
that he was ’duly’ nominated necessarily implies and
involves the claim that his nomination paper conformed to
the requirements of the statute. Therefore, a contestant
whose nomination paper is not subscribed by at least ten
electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders, as
required by section 58(1) (a) of the Act, cannot claim to
have been duly nominated, any more than a contestant who had
not subscribed his assent to his own nomination can. The
claim of a contestant that he was duly nominated must arise
out of his compliance with the provisions of the Act. It
cannot arise out of the violation of the Act. Otherwise, a
person who had not filed
16
any nomination paper at all but who had only informed the
Returning Officer orally that he desired to contest the
election could also contend that he "claims to have been
duly nominated as a candidate".
It is not the case of the petitioners that the
Returning Officer had wrongly rejected their nomination
papers even though they were subscribed by ten or more
electors as proposers and ten or more electors as seconders.
Not only were the nomination papers rightly rejected on the
ground of non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of
section 58(1) (a) of the Act, but the very case of the
petitioners is that their nomination papers could not have
been rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground of non-
compliance with the aforesaid provision. Thus, their claim
that they have been duly nominated is not within the
framework of the Act but is de hors the Act. It cannot be
entertained.
In Charan Lal Sahu v. Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed, the
petitioner claimed to have been duly nominated as a
candidate though his nomination paper was rightly rejected
on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of
sections 5B and 5C of the Act. It was held by this Court
that merely because a candidate is qualified under Article
58 of the Constitution, it does not follow that he is exempt
from compliance with the requirements of law which the
Parliament has enacted under Article 71(3) for regulating
the mode and the manner in which nominations should be
filed. Since the petitioner did not comply with the
provisions of the aforesaid two sections, it was held that
he could not claim to have been duly nominated and was
therefore not a "candidate". In the result, the election
petition was dismissed by the Court on the ground that the
petitioner did not have the locus standi to maintain it.
The challenge of the petitioners to the provision
contained in section 5B (1) (a) of the Act on the ground of
its alleged unreasonableness has no substance in it. The
validity of that provision was upheld by this Court in
Charan Lal Sahu v. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy. Besides, if the
petitioners have no locus to file the election petitions,
they cannot be heard on any of their contentions in these
petitions.
Accordingly, our finding on the preliminary issue is
against the petitioners. We hold that they have no locus
standi to file the election
17
petitions since they were neither duly nominated nor can
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 19
they claim to have been duly nominated as candidates at the
presidential election. In view of this finding, Election
Petition Nos, 2 and 3 of 1982 are dismissed.
It is regrettable that election petitions challenging
the election to the high Office of the President of India
should be filed in a fashion as cavalier as the one which
characterises these two petitions. The petitions have an
extempore appearance and not even a second look, leave alone
a second thought appears to have been given to the manner of
drafting these petitions or to the contentions raised
therein. In order to discourage the filing of such
petitions, we would have been justified in passing a heavy
order of costs against the two petitioners. But that is
likely to create a needless misconception that this Court,
which has been constituted by the Act as the exclusive forum
for deciding election petitions whereby a Presidential or
Vice-Presidential election is challenged, is loathe to
entertain such petitions. It is of the essence of the
functioning of a democracy that election to public offices
must be open to the scrutiny of an independent tribunal. A
heavy order of costs in these two petitions, howsoever
justified on their own facts, should not result in nipping
in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion.
Therefore, we refrain from passing any order of costs and,
instead, express our disapproval of the light-hearted and
indifferent manner in which these two petitions are drafted
and filed.
Election Petition No. 4 of 1982
This Election Petition is filed by 27 Members of the
Parliament to challenge the election of Giani Zail Singh as
the President of India. The petitioners belong to four
Opposition Parties: The Lok Dal, The Democratic Socialist
Party of India, the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Janata
Party. These parties had jointly sponsored the candidature
of Shri H.R. Khanna, a former Judge of this Court. Giani
Zail Singh was returned as the successful candidate by a
large margin of votes.
The petitioners, being Members of the Parliament, were
electors at the Presidential election. Their standing to
file this petition is unquestioned.
One of the principal challenges of the petitioners to
the election of Giani Zail Singh is that he is not a
"suitable person" for holding the high office of the
President of India. The petitioners have given their own
reasons in support of this contention in paragraphs 5 to 8
18
of the petition. No useful purpose will be served by
repeating those reasons in this judgment since, we are of
the opinion that the election to the office of the President
of India cannot be questioned on the ground that the
returned candidate is not a suitable person for holding that
office.
The following issue arises on the above contention
raised by the petitioners:
"Can the election of a candidate to the office of
the President of India be challenged on the ground that
he is not a suitable person for holding that office ?"
Section 18 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections Act, 1952, which specifies the "grounds for
declaring the election of a returned candidate to be void",
reads thus:
"18. (1) If the Supreme Court is of opinion,-
(a) that the offence of bribery or undue influence at
the election has been committed by the returned
candidate or by any person with the consent of the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 19
returned candidate; or
(b) that the result of the election has been
materially affected-
(i) by the improper reception or refusal of a
vote, or
(ii) by any non-compliance with the provisions of
the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or
orders made under this Act; or
(iii) by reason of the fact that the nomination of
any candidate (other than the successful
candidate), who has not withdrawn his candidature,
has been wrongly accepted; or
(c) that the nomination of any candidate has been
wrongly rejected or the nomination of the
successful candidate has been wrongly accepted;
the Supreme Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the offences of
19
bribery and undue influence at an election have
the same meaning as in Chapter IXA of the Indian
Penal Code,"
Section 19 of the Act which specifies the "grounds for
which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be
declared to have been elected" reads thus:
"If any person who has lodged an election petition
has, in addition to calling in question the election of
the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he
himself or any other candidate has been duly elected
and the Supreme Court is of opinion that in fact the
petitioner or such other candidate received a majority
of the valid votes, the Supreme Court shall, after
declaring the election of the returned candidate to be
void, declare the petitioner or such other candidate,
as the case may be, to have been duly elected:
Provided that the petitioner or such other
candidate shall not be declared to be duly elected if
it is proved that the election of such candidate would
have been void if he had been the returned candidate
and a petition had been presented calling in question
his election".
These being the only provisions of the Act under which
the election of a returned candidate can be declared void,
the question as to whether the returned candidate is
suitable for holding the office of the President is
irrelevant for the purposes of this election petition. While
dealing with an election petition filed under section 14 of
the Act, this Court cannot inquire into the question whether
the returned candidate is suitable for the office to which
he is elected. The rights arising out of elections,
including the right to contest or challenge an election, are
not common law rights. They are creatures of the statutes
which create, confer or limit those rights. Therefore, for
deciding the question whether an election can be set aside
on any alleged ground, the courts have to consult the
provisions of law governing the particular election. They
have to function within the framework of that law and cannot
travel beyond it. Only those persons on whom the right of
franchise is conferred by the statute can vote at the
election. In the instant case, that right is conferred on
every ’elector’ as defined in section 2(d) of the Act, which
provides:
"’elector’. in relation to a presidential
election, means a member of the electoral college
referred to in article 54, and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 19
20
in relation to a Vice-Presidential election, means a
member of the electoral college referred to in article
66".
Only those persons who are qualified to be elected to
the particular office can contest the election. In the
instant case, that right is regulated by section 5A of the
Act which provides:
"Any person may be nominated as a candidate for
election to the office of President or Vice-President
if he is qualified to be by elected to that office
under the Constitution".
The election can be called into question in the manner
prescribed by the statute and not in any other manner. In
the instant case, section 14(1) of the Act provides that no
election shall be called in question except by presenting an
election petition to the authority specified in sub-section
(2). By sub-section (2) of section 14, the Supreme Court is
constituted the sole authority for trying an election
petition. Finally, an election can be called into question
and set aside on those grounds only which are prescribed by
the statute. In the instant case, the grounds for setting
aside the election to the office of the President or the
Vice President and the grounds on which a candidate other
than the returned candidate may be declared to have been
elected are laid down in sections 18 and 19 of the Act. The
election can neither be questioned nor set aside on any
other ground. Therefore, the challenge to the election of
the returned candidate on the ground of his want of
suitability to occupy the office of the President cannot be
entertained and must be rejected out of hand. (See K.
Venkateswara Rao v. Bekkam Narsimha Reddy & Charan Lal Sahu
v. Nandkishore Bhatt.
Apart from the legal position that the rights flowing
out of an election are statutory and not common law rights,
it is impossible to conceive that any court of law can
arrogate to itself the power to declare an election void on
the ground that the returned candidate is not a suitable
person to hold the office to which he is elected.
Suitability of a candidate is for the electorate to judge
and not for the court to decide. The Court cannot substitute
its own assessment of the suitability of a candidate for the
verdict returned by the electorate. The verdict of the
electorate is a verdict on the suitability of the
21
candidate. ’Suitability’ is a fluid concept of uncertain
import. The ballot-box is, or has to be assumed to be, its
sole judge. Were the Court to exercise the power to set
aside an election on the ground that, in its opinion, the
returned candidate is not a suitable person for the office
to which he is elected, the statute will stand radically
amended so as to give to the Court a virtual right of veto
on the question of suitability of the rival candidates. And
then, an unsuccessful candidate will challenge the election
of the successful candidate on the ground that he is more
suitable than the latter. That is an impossible task for the
Courts to undertake and indeed, far beyond the limits of
judicial review by the most liberal standard.
Accordingly, the challenge to the election of the
returned candidate on the ground that he is not suitable for
holding the office of the President of India fails and is
rejected. Our finding on the issue is in the negative.
The other grounds on which the petitioners have
challenged the election of Respondent 1 are these; (1) That
Shri M.H. Beg, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 19
now Chairman of the Minorities Commission, was engaged by
Respondent 1 and by the Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi
"for influencing the votes of the Minority communities"; (2)
that Rao Birendra Singh, a cabinet Minister of the
Government of India, who is a "supporter and a close
associate" of Respondent 1, exercised undue influence over
the voters by misusing the Government machinery in that, a
statement issued by him asking the voters to vote for
Respondent 1 was published by the Press Information Bureau,
Government of India;(3) that the Prime Minister participated
in the election campaign of Respondent I and misused the
Government machinery for that purpose; (4) that the Prime
Minister made a communal appeal to the Akali Dal that its
members should vote for Respondent 1; and (5) that
Government helicopters and cars belonging to the Government
were misused for the purpose of election of Respondent 1. It
is alleged by the petitioners that these various acts were
committed by the well-wishers and supporters of Respondent 1
with his connivance.
It was contended by Shri Asoke Sen that, even assuming
that these allegations are true, they do not disclose any
cause of action for setting aside the election of Respondent
1. In view of these rival contentions, we framed the
following issue for consideration:
"Whether the averments in the Election Petition,
assum-
22
ing them to be true and correct, disclose any cause of
action for setting aside the election of the returned
candidate (Respondent 1) on the ground stated in
section 18(1) (a) of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Elections Act, 1952?"
Section 18(1) (a) of the Act which we have already set
out, provides that the Supreme Court shall declare the
election of the returned candidate to be void if it is of
opinion-
"that the offence of bribery and undue influence
at the election has been committed by the returned
candidate or by any person with the consent of the
returned candidate."
(emphasis supplied).
We may keep aside the question of bribery since there
is no allegation in that behalf. Nor is it alleged that the
offence of undue influence was committed by the returned
candidate himself. The allegation of the petitioners is that
the offence of undue influence was committed by certain
supporters and close associates of Respondent 1 with his
connivance. It is patent that this allegation, even if it is
true, is not enough to fulfil the requirements of section
18(1) (a). What that section, to the extent relevant,
requires is that the offence of undue influence must be
committed by some other person with the "consent" of the
returned candidate. There in no plea whatsoever in the
petition that undue influence was exercised by those other
persons with the consent of Respondent 1.
It is contended by Shri Shujatullah Khan who appears on
behalf of the petitioners, that connivance and consent are
one and the same thing and that, there is no legal
distinction between the two concepts. In support of this
contention, learned counsel relies upon the meaning of the
word ’connivance’ as given in Webster’s Dictionary (Third
Edition, Volume 1, p. 481); Random House Dictionary (p.
311); Black’s Law Dictionary (p. 274); Words and Phrases
(Permanent Edition, Volume 8A, p. 173); and Corpus Juris
Secundum (Volume 15A, p. 567). The reliance on these
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 19
dictionaries and texts cannot carry the point at issue any
further. The relevant question for consideration for the
decision of the issue is whether there is any pleading in
the petition to the effect that the offence of undue
influence was committed with the consent of the returned
candidate. Admittedly, there is no pleading of consent. It
is then no answer to say that the petitioners have pleaded
connivance and, according to dictionaries, connivance means
consent. The plea of
23
consent is one thing: the fact that connivance means consent
(assuming that it does) is quite another. It is not open to
a petitioner in an Election Petition to plead in terms of
synonyms. In these petitions, pleadings have to be precise,
specific and unambiguous so as to put the respondent on
notice. The rule of pleadings that facts constituting the
cause of action must be specifically pleaded is as
fundamental as it is elementary. ’Connivance’ may in certain
situations amount to consent, which explains why the
dictionaries give ’consent’ as one of the meanings of the
word ’connivance’. But it is not true to say that
’connivance’ invariably and necessarily means or amounts to
consent, that is to say, irrespective of the context of the
given situation. The two cannot, therefore, be equated.
Consent implies that parties are ad idem. Connivance does
not necessarily imply that parties are of one mind. They may
or may not be, depending upon the facts of the situation.
That is why, in the absence of a pleading that the offence
of undue influence was committed with the consent of the
returned candidate, one of the main ingredients of section
18(1) (a) remains unsatisfied.
The importance of a specific pleading in these matters
can be appreciated only if it is realised that the absence
of a specific plea puts the respondent at a great
disadvantage. He must know what case he has to meet. He
cannot be kept guessing whether the petitioner means what he
says, ’connivance’ here, or whether the petitioner has used
expression as meaning ’consent’. It is remarkable that, in
their petition, the petitioners have furnished no
particulars of the alleged consent, if what is meant by the
use of the word connivance is consent. They cannot be
allowed to keep their options open until the trial and
adduce such evidence of consent as seems convenient and
comes handy. That is the importance of precision in
pleadings, particularly in election petitions. Accordingly,
it is impermissible to substitute the word ’consent’ for the
word ’connivance’ which occurs in the pleadings of the
petitioners.
The legislative history of the statute lends support to
our view that for the purposes of section 18(1) (a),
connivance is not the same thing as consent. Originally,
when the Act was passed in 1952, section 18(1)(a) provided
that the Supreme Court shall declare the election of the
returned candidate void if it is of opinion that the offence
of bribery or undue influence has been committed by the
returned candidate or by any person ’with the connivance’ of
the returned candidate. This sub-section was amended by
section 7 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Elections (Amendment) Act, 5 of 1974, which came
24
into force on March 23, 1974. The word ’connivance’ was
substituted by the word ’consent’ by the Amendment Act. If
connivance carried the same meaning as consent and if one
was the same as the other. Parliament would not have taken
the deliberate step of deleting the word ’connivance’ and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 19
substituting it by the word ’consent’. The amendment made by
the Amendment Act of 1947 shows that connivance and consent
connote distinct concepts for the purpose of section 18(1)
(a) of the Act,
Since, admittedly, there is no pleading in the Election
Petition that the offence of undue influence was committed
with the consent of the returned candidate, the petition
must be held to disclose no cause of action for setting
aside the election of the returned candidate under section
18(1) (a) of the Act.
Apart from this, Shri Asoke Sen is right that granting
everything in favour of the petitioners and assuming that
all that they have alleged is true and correct, no case is
made out for setting aside the election of the returned
candidate under section 18(1) (a) of the Act. We will first
take up the allegation of the petitioners that Shri M.H.
Beg, Chairman of the Minorities Commission, canvassed
support for Respondent 1. The question which we have to
consider is whether, in doing so, Shri Beg is guilty of the
offence of undue influence. Section 18(2) of the Act
provides that for purposes of section 18, the offences of
bribery and undue influence at an election have the same
meaning as in Chapter IXA of the Penal Code. That Chapter
which was introduced into the Penal Code by Act 39 of 1920,
deals with "Offences relating to Elections". Sections 171B
and 171C of the Penal Code define the offences of bribery
and undue influence respectively, Section 171C reads thus:
"Undue influence at elections:
171C. (1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or
attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any
electoral right commits the offence of undue influence
at an election.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1), whoever-
(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any
person in whom a candidate or voter is
interested, with injury of any kind, or
25
(b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or
voter to believe that he or any person in
whom he is interested will become or will be
rendered an object of Divine displeasure or
of spiritual censure,
shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of
the electoral right of such candidate or voter, within
the meaning of sub-section (1).
(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of
public action or the mere exercise of a legal right
without intent to interfere with an electoral right,
shall not be deemed to be interference within the
meaning of this section."
The gravamen of this section is that there must be
interference or attempted interference with the ’free
exercise’ of any electoral right. ’Electoral right’ is
defined by section 171A(b) to mean the right of a person to
stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a
candidate or to vote refrain from voting at an election. In
so far as is relevant for our purpose, the election petition
must show that Shri Beg interfered with the free exercise of
the voters’ right to vote at the Presidential election. The
petition does not allege or show that Shri Beg interfered in
any manner with the free exercise of the right of the voters
to vote according to their choice or conscience. The
petition alleges that Shri Beg commented severely upon the
suitability of the rival candidate Shri H.R. Khanna by
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 19
pointing out the so-called infirmities in his judgment in
the Fundamental Rights case. On the supposition that Judges
constitute brotherhood and are bound by ties of
institutional loyalty, one may not approve of the tone and
temper of the personal attack made by Shri Beg on Shri H.R.
Khanna. But that is beside the point. We are neither
concerned with the propriety of the statement made by Shri
Beg nor with the question as to who, out of the two
candidates, is more suitable to be the President of India.
The point of the matter is that by conveying to the voters
that Respondent 1 was a much safer candidate than Shri
Khanna and that Shri Khanna would not be a suitable
candidate to hold the office of the President of India by
reason of a judgment of his, Shri Beg could not be said to
have interfered with the free exercise of the right of the
voters to vote at the election. If the mere act of
canvassing in favour of one candidate as against another
were to amount to undue influence, the very process of a
democratic election shall have been stifled because, the
right to canvass support for a candidate is as much
important as the
26
right to vote for a candidate of one’s choice. Therefore, in
order that the offence of undue influence can be said to
have been made out within the meaning of section 171C of the
Penal Code, something more than the mere act of canvassing
for a candidate must be shown to have been done by the
offender. That something more may, for example, be in the
nature of a threat of an injury to a candidate or a voter as
stated in sub-section 2(a) of section 171C af the Penal Code
or, it may consist of inducing a belief of divine
displeasure in the mind of a candidate or a voter as stated
in sub-section 2(b). The act alleged as constituting undue
influence must be in the nature of a pressure or tyranny on
the mind of the candidate or the voter. It is not possible
to enumerate exhaustively the diverse categorise of acts
which fall within the definition of undue influence. It is
enough for our purpose to say, that of one thing there can
be no doubt: The mere act of canvassing for a candidate
cannot amount to undue influence within the meaning of
section 171C of the Penal Code.
In Baburao Patel v. Dr. Zakir Husain, this Court while
emphasising the distinction between mere canvassing and the
exercise of undue influence, observed:
"It is difficult to lay down in general terms
where mere canvassing ends and interference or attempt
at interference with the free exercise of any electoral
right begins. That is a matter to be determined in each
case; but there can be no doubt that, if what is done
is merely canvassing, it would not be undue influence.
As sub-section (3) of section 171C shows, the mere
exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere
with an electoral right would not be undue influence".
In Shiv Kirpal Singh v. Shri V.V. Giri, the Court
observed that "if any acts are done which merely influence
the voter in making his choice between one candidate or
another, they will not amount to interference with the free
exercise of the electoral right", that the expression ’free
exercise’ of the electoral right must be read in the context
of an election in a democratic society and, therefore,
candidates and their supporters must be allowed to canvass
support by all legal and legitimate means. Accordingly, the
offence of undue influence can be said to have been
committed only if the voter is put under a
27
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 19
threat or fear of some adverse consequence, or if he is
induced to believe that he will become an object of divine
displeasure or spiritual censure if he casts or does not
cast a vote in accordance with his decision: "But, in cases
where the only act done is for the purpose of convincing the
voter that a particular candidate is not the proper
candidate to whom the vote should be given, that act cannot
be held to be one which interferes with the free exercise of
the electoral right",
Ram Dial v. Sant Lal was a case of undue influence
under proviso(a) (ii) to section 123(2) of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 The appellant therein
had circulated a poster under the authority of the supreme
religious leader of the Namdhari Sikhs in a constituency
where a large number of voters were Namdhari Sikhs. This
Court observed that there cannot be the least doubt that
even a religious leader has the right freely to express his
opinion on the comparative merits of the contesting
candidates and to canvass for such of them as he considers
worthy of the confidence of the electors. Such a course of
conduct on his part will only be a use of his great
influence amongst a particular section of the voters in the
constituency and that, it will amount to an abuse of his
great influence only if the words which he utters leave no
choice to the persons addressed by him in the exercise of
their electoral rights. On the facts of the case it was held
that the religious leader, by his exhortations and warnings
to the Namdhari eletors, that disobedience of his mandate
will carry divine displeasure and spiritual censure left no
choice to them to exercise their right of voting freely.
Thus, the allegation of the pestitioners that Shri Beg
asked the voters to cast their votes in favour of Respondent
1 and not to cast them for Shri H.R. Khanna on the ground
that the latter was not a safe or suitable candidate as
compared with Respondent 1, does not make out the offence of
undue influence as defined in Section 171C of the Penal
Code. It must follow that the Election Petition does not
disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election
of Respondent 1 on the ground of undue influence as
specified in section 18(1) (a) of the Act.
The remaining grounds alleged by the petitioners for
invalidating the election of Respondent 1 are misconceived.
The use of Government machinery, abuse of official position
and appeal to communal sentiments so long as such appeal
does not amount to
28
undue influence, are not considered by the Legislature to be
circumstances which would invalidate a Presidential or a
Vice-Presidential election. Assuming, therefore, that any
such acts were done, they cannot be relied upon for
declaring the election of Respondent 1 void. As we have said
already, the laws of election are self-contained codes and
the rights arising out of elections are the off-springs of
those laws. We cannot engraft the provisions of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 upon the statute
under consideration and thereby enlarge the scope of an
election petition filed to challenge a Presidential or Vice-
Presidential election. Such an election can be set aside on
the grounds specified in section 18(1) of the Act only.
Since the other allegations made by the petitioners do not
fall within the scope of that provision, they have to be
rejected.
For these reasons, our finding on the issue under
consideration is that the averments in the Election
Petition, assuming them to be true and correct, do not
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 19
disclose any cause of action for setting aside the election
of the returned candidate on the grounds stated in section
18(1)(a) of the Act.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the
Act would be unconstitutional if it is interpreted as
limiting the challenge to the Presidential or Vice-
Presidential election to the grounds set forth in section
18(1). In support of this argument reliance is placed by
learned counsel for the petitioners on the provisions
contained in Article 71(1) of the Constitution which says:
"All doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection
with the election of a President or Vice-President shall be
inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court whose
decision shall be final". It is urged that the Constitution
has conferred upon the Supreme Court the power to inquire
into and decide upon every kind of doubt or dispute arising
out of or in connection with a Presidential election and
since, section 18(1) restricts that power to the grounds
stated therein. it is ultra vires Article 71(1). This
argument overlooks that clause (3) of Art. 71 confers power
upon the Parliament, subject to the provisions of the
Constitution, to make a law for regulating matters relating
to or connected with the election of the President or the
Vice-President. While enacting a law in pursuance of the
power conferred by Article 71(3), the Parliament is entitled
to specify the particular kind of doubts or disputes which
shall be inquired into and decided by the Supreme Court. If
the petitioners were right in their contention, every kind
of fanciful doubt or frivolous dispute under the sun will
have to be inquired into by this Court and election
petitions
29
will become a fertile ground for fighting political battles.
That leaves for consideration one other contention.
Article 58(1) of the Constitution provides that no person
shall be eligible for election as President unless he (a) is
a citizen of India, (b) has completed the age of thiry-five
years, and (c) is qualified for election as a member of the
House of the People. Article 84(a) provides that a person
shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in
Parliament unless, inter alia he makes and subscribes an
oath or affirmation set out for the purpose in the Third
Schedule. The argument of the petitioners is that a
candidate contesting a Presidential election must take the
oath as prescribed by Article 84(a) and since Respondent 1
had not taken such oath, his election is unconstitutional.
This argument is untenable. Article 58 which prescribes
"Qualifications for elections as President", provides three
conditions of eligibility for contesting the Presidential
election. One of these conditions is that the candidate must
be qualified for election as a member of the House of the
People. Article 84 speaks of "qualifications for membership
of Parliament". No person can fill a seat in the Parliament
unless, inter alia, he subscribes to the oath or affirmation
according to the form set out in the Third Schedule. The
form prescribed by the Third Schedule shows that it is
restricted to candidates who desire to contest the election
to the Parliament. In the very nature of things, a candidate
who wants to contest the election for the office of the
President cannot take the oath in any of the forms
prescribed by the Third Schedule. That Schedule does not
prescribe any form of oath for a person who desires to
contest a Presidential election.
In the result, Election Petition No. 4 of 1982 is also
dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 19
N.V.K. Petitions dismissed.
30