Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 560
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2551 OF 2024
PRAMILA DEVI & ORS. …APPELLANTS
A1: PRAMILA DEVI
A2: SATYANARAIN SAHU
A3: KRISHNA KUMAR
VERSUS
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
R1: THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
R2: JYOTI BECK
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellants against
the Final Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2022 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) [ 2022:JHHC:9512 ] in Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No.235 of 2017 passed by the High Court of
Jharkhand at Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.04.23
17:58:15 IST
Reason:
which the High Court set aside the cognizance Order dated 13.06.2019
Page 1 of 16
passed in connection with SC/ST Case No.08 of 2017 arising out of
Argora P.S. Case No.385 of 2016, by the learned Additional Judicial
Commissioner-XII, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Additional
Judicial Commissioner’) and remitted the matter for passing order
afresh.
BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
2. Respondent No.2 (Informant) claims to be the second wife of one
Vishnu Sahu (Deceased). Appellant No.1 is the first wife of Late Vishnu
Sahu, and Appellants No.2 and 3 are their children. It was alleged that
the deceased posing himself as unmarried about 25-30 years ago
befriended Respondent No.2 and married her in 1990 at Jagannath
Temple under Hindu customs and traditions and lived peacefully for
more than 26 years. From their marriage (Vishnu Sahu and Respondent
No.2), three children were born, namely Reshma Kumari, Rupa Kumari,
and Vishal Kumar. It was pleaded that after 26 years, Respondent No.2
filed a written complaint against Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants which
culminated into First Information Report No.385/2016 dated 27.11.2016
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) under Sections 498A, 406 and 420
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) and
Page 2 of 16
Section 3(1)(iv) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SC/ST
Act’).
3. The allegations made in the FIR are that Vishnu Sahu posing
himself to be unmarried, performed marriage with Respondent No.2 in
1990, and two daughters and a son were born to them from the said
wedlock. By taking a loan in her name from a bank and at her expense,
a pakka house was constructed upon the land purchased by her father
in her name, and she was living in the said house with her family. She
also alleged that Vishnu Sahu along with the first wife and the children,
born from wedlock of Vishnu Sahu and his first wife (Appellant No.1)
started to harass and assault her and ultimately, in the year 2013, she
and her children were ousted by them from the said house. It is further
alleged that she has been deprived of her land and house, that she is
facing hardship, her daughters are of marriageable age and that she was
humiliated and abused by Vishnu Sahu, his first wife (Appellant No.1)
and their children in the name of Adivasi Kol. Bhurung, etc.
4. Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants moved Anticipatory Bail Petition
No.1799 of 2016 before the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-1
at Ranchi, who on 19.12.2016 passed an Order directing that no
Page 3 of 16
coercive steps shall be taken against them and adjourned the matter
with direction to put up on 20.01.2017. On 20.01.2017, an Order was
passed rejecting the application for anticipatory bail as the allegation
illustrates commission of offence(s) under the SC/ST Act.
5. The Additional Judicial Commissioner took cognizance against
Vishnu Sahu and Appellants on 13.06.2019 in SC/ST Case No.08/2017.
Though before the High Court, the Appellants had initially sought
quashing of the FIR, in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.235/2017 the
prayer was later amended by filing an Interlocutory Application
challenging the Order taking cognizance dated 13.06.2019. The High
Court in the Impugned Judgment, instead of going into the question of
whether the FIR itself was fit to be quashed, focused only on the
cognizance-taking Order dated 13.06.2019. Even before this Court, the
Appellants challenged the Impugned Judgment to the extent the matter
was remanded to pass order afresh after disclosure of the prima facie
material against the Appellants. No prayer was pressed to quash FIR
No.385/2016. In such view, we would proceed only with regard to the
challenge whether the High Court by the Impugned Judgment ought to
have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for disclosure of the prima
facie material against the Appellants.
Page 4 of 16
6. The High Court, by way of the Impugned Judgment, set aside the
cognizance Order and remitted the matter to the Additional Judicial
Commissioner to pass order afresh as in the cognizance Order, prima
facie material against the Appellants had not been disclosed.
SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANTS:
7. Learned counsel for the Appellants submits that Respondent No.2
is habituated to lodging false cases, as earlier also she had lodged Case
No.311/2014 against the Appellants under Sections 341, 323, 506 and
498A of the IPC, presently pending adjudication, wherein the Appellants
have been granted bail on 30.09.2014.
8. Learned counsel contended that in the present FIR dated
27.11.2016, the allegations are totally baseless, since they have come
nearly 26 years after the alleged marriage. It was further submitted that
Respondent No.2’s entire case is based on the allegation that the land
on which the house is built had been purchased by her father in Village
Argora bearing Khata No.199, Plot No.1734, which makes it an entirely
civil dispute that has been masked as a criminal case under the
provisions of the IPC and the SC/ST Act.
Page 5 of 16
9. Learned counsel for the Appellants summed up his arguments
submitting that despite Civil Suit No.1465/2014 having been filed by
Vishnu Sahu with regard to purchase of land in Village Argora bearing
Khata No.199, Plot No.1734, these criminal cases (present FIR and
Case No.311/2014) are foisted by Respondent No.2 to harass the
Appellants. It was urged that the High Court ought to have quashed the
entire criminal proceedings on the grounds that there was no prima facie
case, in the absence of any evidence being placed before the Trial
Court, but instead, the Appellants are being forced to revisit proceedings
that would lead to further harassment. It was prayed that the appeal be
allowed and the decision to remit the matter to the Additional Judicial
Commissioner for a fresh decision be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1-STATE:
10. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-State prayed for
dismissal of the appeal as prima facie , a case was made out under the
IPC and the SC/ST Act against the Appellants and the High Court has
remitted the case back to the Additional Judicial Commissioner, only for
the limited purpose of disclosing the prima facie material. It was urged
that the Impugned Judgment did not require interference.
Page 6 of 16
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.2-INFORMANT:
11. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that Vishnu Sahu
constructed the house on the property belonging to her by taking loan in
her name and in 2013, she was forcibly evicted from the house by
Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants, and this act by the
Appellants discloses the commission of offence(s) under the SC/ST Act.
12. Learned counsel contended that Chargesheet No.80/2019 dated
30.04.2019 had been filed against the Appellants under Sections 498A,
406 and 420 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(g) of the SC/ST Act.
Subsequently, on 13.06.2019, the Additional Judicial Commissioner took
cognizance of the above-mentioned offences. It was submitted that the
statements of the prosecution witness(es), which are not on record
before this Court, clearly establish the commission of offence(s) by the
Appellants. It was advanced that the appeal deserved dismissal.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
13. We have considered the matter in its entirety. Two basic issues
arise for consideration.
Page 7 of 16
14. Firstly , whether the Additional Judicial Commissioner while taking
cognizance has to record detailed reasons for taking cognizance?
Secondly , whether the FIR itself was instituted with mala fide intention
and was liable to be quashed?
15. Coming to the first issue, we have no hesitation to record that the
approach of the High Court was totally erroneous. Perusal of the Order
taking cognizance dated 13.06.2019 discloses that the Additional
Judicial Commissioner has stated that the ‘ case diary and case record ’
have been perused, which disclosed a prima facie case made out under
Sections 498(A), 406 and 420 of the IPC and Section 3 (1)(g) of the
SC/ST Act against the accused including appellants. Further, we find the
approach of the Additional Judicial Commissioner correct inasmuch as
while taking cognizance, it firstly applied its mind to the materials before
it to form an opinion as to whether any offence has been committed and
thereafter went into the aspect of identifying the persons who appeared
to have committed the offence. Accordingly, the process moves to the
next stage; of issuance of summons or warrant, as the case may be,
against such persons.
Page 8 of 16
16. In the present case, we find that the Additional Judicial
Commissioner has taken cognizance while recording a finding that - from
a perusal of the case diary and case record, a prima facie case was
made out against the accused, including the Appellants. In Bhushan
Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi) , (2012) 5 SCC 424 , this Court held that
an order of the Magistrate taking cognizance cannot be faulted only
because it was not a reasoned order; relevant paragraphs being as
under:
‘ 14. Time and again it has been stated by this Court that
the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code
requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is
imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of
the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations
made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.
15. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC
722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] the following passage will be
apposite in this context: (SCC p. 726, para 12)
“12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial
court should write an order showing the reasons
for framing a charge, why should the already
burdened trial courts be further burdened with
such an extra work. The time has reached to
adopt all possible measures to expedite the court
procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all
roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a
Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different
stages merely because the counsel would
address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced
progress of proceedings in trial courts would
further be slowed down. We are coming across
interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions
Judges running into several pages. We can
appreciate if such a detailed order has been
Page 9 of 16
passed for culminating the proceedings before
them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed
orders at other stages, such as issuing process,
remanding the accused to custody, framing of
charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] this
Court held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to
enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits
of the case. It was further held that in deciding whether a
process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into
consideration improbabilities appearing on the face of the
complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in
support of the allegations. The Magistrate has been given
an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion
has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further held
that: (SCC p. 741, para 5)
“5. … Once the Magistrate has exercised his
discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this
Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of
the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits
with a view to find out whether or not the
allegations in the complaint, if proved, would
ultimately end in conviction of the accused.”
17. In Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal
Agarwal [(2003) 4 SCC 139: 2003 SCC (Cri) 788] this
Court, in para 9, held as under: (SCC pp. 145-46)
“9. In determining the question whether any
process is to be issued or not, what the
Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether
the evidence is adequate for supporting the
conviction, can be determined only at the trial and
not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing
the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not
required to record reasons. This question was
considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 745]
and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti
Page 10 of 16
Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722:
2000 SCC (Cri) 303] it was held as follows: (U.P.
Pollution case [(2000) 3 SCC 745], SCC p. 749,
para 6)
‘6. The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain situations
such as dismissal of a complaint without
issuing process. There is no such legal
requirement imposed on a Magistrate for
passing detailed order while issuing
summons. The process issued to the
accused cannot be quashed merely on
the ground that the Magistrate had not
passed a speaking order.’”
18. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Bhupendra Kumar
Modi [(2009) 2 SCC 147: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 679] this
Court, in para 23, held as under: (SCC p. 154)
“23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage
of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly
concerned with the allegations made in the
complaint or the evidence led in support of the
same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied
whether there are sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the accused.”
19. This being the settled legal position, the order passed
by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the
ground that the summoning order was not a reasoned
order. ’
(emphasis supplied)
17. The view in Bhushan Kumar ( supra ) was reiterated in Mehmood
Ul Rehman v Khazir Mohammad Tunda , (2015) 12 SCC 420 and
State of Gujarat v Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta , (2019) 20 SCC 539 .
This Court in Rakhi Mishra v State of Bihar , (2017) 16 SCC 772
Page 11 of 16
restated the settled proposition of law enunciated in Sonu Gupta v
Deepak Gupta , (2015) 3 SCC 424 , as under:
‘ 4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties. We are of the considered opinion that the High
Court erred in allowing the application filed by
Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and quashing the
criminal proceedings against them. A perusal of the FIR
would clearly show that the appellant alleged cruelty
against Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. This Court
in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak
Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] held
as follows: (SCC p. 429, para 8)
“8. … At the stage of cognizance and summoning
the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial
mind only with a view to take cognizance of the
offence … to find out whether a prima facie case
has been made out for summoning the accused
persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is
not required to consider the defence version or
materials or arguments nor is he required to
evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of
the complainant, because the Magistrate must not
undertake the exercise to find out at this stage
whether the materials would lead to conviction or
not.”
5. The order passed by the trial court taking cognizance
against R-2 and R-4 to R-9 is in conformity with the law
laid down in the above judgment. It is settled law that the
power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised by the High
Court only in exceptional circumstances only when a
prima facie case is not made out against the accused.
The test applied by this Court for interference at the initial
stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontroverted
allegations prima facie establish a case. ’
(emphasis supplied)
Page 12 of 16
18. Coming to the second point which the Appellants canvassed
before this Court viz . the background of lodging of the FIR to impress
that the same is mala fide , an afterthought and at best, a civil dispute
being tried to be settled through criminal proceedings by way of arm-
twisting. On this point, need for a detailed discussion is obviated in view
of our answer on the first point supra and the paragraphs infra .
19. Perusal of the entire gamut of the pleadings of the Appellants does
not disclose any categorical statement to the effect that during
investigation by the police, no evidence has emerged to warrant taking
of cognizance, much less against the Appellants. The only averment
which has been made is that the Trial Court had not recorded the prima
facie material against the Appellants because it does not exist. This is
too simplistic an argument and does not shift the burden from the
Appellants of taking a categorical stand that no material whatsoever for
taking cognizance is available in the police papers/case diary against the
Appellants. Be it noted, the State has argued that sufficient material
warranting cognizance has been unearthed during the course of
investigation.
Page 13 of 16
20. Here, the Court would pause to delve on what is the scope of the
exercise of application of mind on the police papers/case diary for
deciding as to whether to take cognizance or not - it has only to be seen
whether there is material forthcoming to indicate commission of the
offence(s) alleged. The concerned Court is not empowered to go into the
veracity of the material at that time. That is why, the law provides for a
trial where it is open to both the parties i.e., the prosecution as well as
the defence to lead evidence(s) either to prove the materials which have
come against the accused or to disprove such findings. This Court vide
Order dated 13.09.2024 directed the Appellants to file a translated copy
of the chargesheet, as the State filed the chargesheet in Hindi along with
an application seeking exemption from filing official translation (I.A.
No.198073/2024). As this Court [Coram: Sudhanshu Dhulia and
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.] is well-conversant with Hindi, the language
in which the chargesheet is and which has been brought on record, we
have examined the same. However, the Appellants failed to comply with
the specific direction issued on 13.09.2024. Be that as it may, we find
that chargesheet mentions that on the basis of investigation, site
inspection and statements of the complainant, the police has found the
allegations true against all the accused including appellants.
Page 14 of 16
21. For reasons aforesaid and on an overall circumspection of the
facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel
for the parties, we find that the Order taking cognizance dated
13.06.2019, being in accordance with law, was not required to be
interfered with by the High Court.
22. Though no cross-appeal against the Impugned Judgment has
been filed by Respondent No.2, yet to render complete justice as also
set right the error committed by the High Court, on the legal issue of
requirement of recording detailed grounds/reasons for taking
cognizance, the Impugned Judgment is set aside in toto .
23. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The
Appellants shall appear before the Additional Judicial Commissioner,
where the matter is pending, on the next date fixed in the case,
whereupon the case shall proceed in accordance with law. Registry to
communicate this Judgment to the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi
forthwith through the Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court.
24. We would add that the Appellants shall have full liberty of putting
forth their case before the Court concerned at the appropriate stage viz .
Page 15 of 16
framing of charge(s) and can press for discharge, inter alia , by pointing
out that the investigation has not come up with any material to warrant
trial. We further clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the matter. Our observations are only for the purpose of
deciding the instant appeal. All contentions in law and fact are reserved
to the prosecution and the defence.
25. No order as to costs.
…………………….....................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
.…………………...................…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 23, 2025
Page 16 of 16
2025 INSC 560
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2551 OF 2024
PRAMILA DEVI & ORS. …APPELLANTS
A1: PRAMILA DEVI
A2: SATYANARAIN SAHU
A3: KRISHNA KUMAR
VERSUS
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
R1: THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
R2: JYOTI BECK
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellants against
the Final Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2022 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) [ 2022:JHHC:9512 ] in Criminal
Miscellaneous Petition No.235 of 2017 passed by the High Court of
Jharkhand at Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) by
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.04.23
17:58:15 IST
Reason:
which the High Court set aside the cognizance Order dated 13.06.2019
Page 1 of 16
passed in connection with SC/ST Case No.08 of 2017 arising out of
Argora P.S. Case No.385 of 2016, by the learned Additional Judicial
Commissioner-XII, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Additional
Judicial Commissioner’) and remitted the matter for passing order
afresh.
BRIEF FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
2. Respondent No.2 (Informant) claims to be the second wife of one
Vishnu Sahu (Deceased). Appellant No.1 is the first wife of Late Vishnu
Sahu, and Appellants No.2 and 3 are their children. It was alleged that
the deceased posing himself as unmarried about 25-30 years ago
befriended Respondent No.2 and married her in 1990 at Jagannath
Temple under Hindu customs and traditions and lived peacefully for
more than 26 years. From their marriage (Vishnu Sahu and Respondent
No.2), three children were born, namely Reshma Kumari, Rupa Kumari,
and Vishal Kumar. It was pleaded that after 26 years, Respondent No.2
filed a written complaint against Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants which
culminated into First Information Report No.385/2016 dated 27.11.2016
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) under Sections 498A, 406 and 420
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) and
Page 2 of 16
Section 3(1)(iv) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SC/ST
Act’).
3. The allegations made in the FIR are that Vishnu Sahu posing
himself to be unmarried, performed marriage with Respondent No.2 in
1990, and two daughters and a son were born to them from the said
wedlock. By taking a loan in her name from a bank and at her expense,
a pakka house was constructed upon the land purchased by her father
in her name, and she was living in the said house with her family. She
also alleged that Vishnu Sahu along with the first wife and the children,
born from wedlock of Vishnu Sahu and his first wife (Appellant No.1)
started to harass and assault her and ultimately, in the year 2013, she
and her children were ousted by them from the said house. It is further
alleged that she has been deprived of her land and house, that she is
facing hardship, her daughters are of marriageable age and that she was
humiliated and abused by Vishnu Sahu, his first wife (Appellant No.1)
and their children in the name of Adivasi Kol. Bhurung, etc.
4. Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants moved Anticipatory Bail Petition
No.1799 of 2016 before the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-1
at Ranchi, who on 19.12.2016 passed an Order directing that no
Page 3 of 16
coercive steps shall be taken against them and adjourned the matter
with direction to put up on 20.01.2017. On 20.01.2017, an Order was
passed rejecting the application for anticipatory bail as the allegation
illustrates commission of offence(s) under the SC/ST Act.
5. The Additional Judicial Commissioner took cognizance against
Vishnu Sahu and Appellants on 13.06.2019 in SC/ST Case No.08/2017.
Though before the High Court, the Appellants had initially sought
quashing of the FIR, in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.235/2017 the
prayer was later amended by filing an Interlocutory Application
challenging the Order taking cognizance dated 13.06.2019. The High
Court in the Impugned Judgment, instead of going into the question of
whether the FIR itself was fit to be quashed, focused only on the
cognizance-taking Order dated 13.06.2019. Even before this Court, the
Appellants challenged the Impugned Judgment to the extent the matter
was remanded to pass order afresh after disclosure of the prima facie
material against the Appellants. No prayer was pressed to quash FIR
No.385/2016. In such view, we would proceed only with regard to the
challenge whether the High Court by the Impugned Judgment ought to
have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for disclosure of the prima
facie material against the Appellants.
Page 4 of 16
6. The High Court, by way of the Impugned Judgment, set aside the
cognizance Order and remitted the matter to the Additional Judicial
Commissioner to pass order afresh as in the cognizance Order, prima
facie material against the Appellants had not been disclosed.
SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANTS:
7. Learned counsel for the Appellants submits that Respondent No.2
is habituated to lodging false cases, as earlier also she had lodged Case
No.311/2014 against the Appellants under Sections 341, 323, 506 and
498A of the IPC, presently pending adjudication, wherein the Appellants
have been granted bail on 30.09.2014.
8. Learned counsel contended that in the present FIR dated
27.11.2016, the allegations are totally baseless, since they have come
nearly 26 years after the alleged marriage. It was further submitted that
Respondent No.2’s entire case is based on the allegation that the land
on which the house is built had been purchased by her father in Village
Argora bearing Khata No.199, Plot No.1734, which makes it an entirely
civil dispute that has been masked as a criminal case under the
provisions of the IPC and the SC/ST Act.
Page 5 of 16
9. Learned counsel for the Appellants summed up his arguments
submitting that despite Civil Suit No.1465/2014 having been filed by
Vishnu Sahu with regard to purchase of land in Village Argora bearing
Khata No.199, Plot No.1734, these criminal cases (present FIR and
Case No.311/2014) are foisted by Respondent No.2 to harass the
Appellants. It was urged that the High Court ought to have quashed the
entire criminal proceedings on the grounds that there was no prima facie
case, in the absence of any evidence being placed before the Trial
Court, but instead, the Appellants are being forced to revisit proceedings
that would lead to further harassment. It was prayed that the appeal be
allowed and the decision to remit the matter to the Additional Judicial
Commissioner for a fresh decision be set aside.
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1-STATE:
10. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-State prayed for
dismissal of the appeal as prima facie , a case was made out under the
IPC and the SC/ST Act against the Appellants and the High Court has
remitted the case back to the Additional Judicial Commissioner, only for
the limited purpose of disclosing the prima facie material. It was urged
that the Impugned Judgment did not require interference.
Page 6 of 16
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.2-INFORMANT:
11. Learned counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that Vishnu Sahu
constructed the house on the property belonging to her by taking loan in
her name and in 2013, she was forcibly evicted from the house by
Vishnu Sahu and the Appellants, and this act by the
Appellants discloses the commission of offence(s) under the SC/ST Act.
12. Learned counsel contended that Chargesheet No.80/2019 dated
30.04.2019 had been filed against the Appellants under Sections 498A,
406 and 420 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(g) of the SC/ST Act.
Subsequently, on 13.06.2019, the Additional Judicial Commissioner took
cognizance of the above-mentioned offences. It was submitted that the
statements of the prosecution witness(es), which are not on record
before this Court, clearly establish the commission of offence(s) by the
Appellants. It was advanced that the appeal deserved dismissal.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
13. We have considered the matter in its entirety. Two basic issues
arise for consideration.
Page 7 of 16
14. Firstly , whether the Additional Judicial Commissioner while taking
cognizance has to record detailed reasons for taking cognizance?
Secondly , whether the FIR itself was instituted with mala fide intention
and was liable to be quashed?
15. Coming to the first issue, we have no hesitation to record that the
approach of the High Court was totally erroneous. Perusal of the Order
taking cognizance dated 13.06.2019 discloses that the Additional
Judicial Commissioner has stated that the ‘ case diary and case record ’
have been perused, which disclosed a prima facie case made out under
Sections 498(A), 406 and 420 of the IPC and Section 3 (1)(g) of the
SC/ST Act against the accused including appellants. Further, we find the
approach of the Additional Judicial Commissioner correct inasmuch as
while taking cognizance, it firstly applied its mind to the materials before
it to form an opinion as to whether any offence has been committed and
thereafter went into the aspect of identifying the persons who appeared
to have committed the offence. Accordingly, the process moves to the
next stage; of issuance of summons or warrant, as the case may be,
against such persons.
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16. In the present case, we find that the Additional Judicial
Commissioner has taken cognizance while recording a finding that - from
a perusal of the case diary and case record, a prima facie case was
made out against the accused, including the Appellants. In Bhushan
Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi) , (2012) 5 SCC 424 , this Court held that
an order of the Magistrate taking cognizance cannot be faulted only
because it was not a reasoned order; relevant paragraphs being as
under:
‘ 14. Time and again it has been stated by this Court that
the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code
requires no explicit reasons to be stated because it is
imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of
the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations
made in the police report and the materials filed therewith.
15. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC
722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] the following passage will be
apposite in this context: (SCC p. 726, para 12)
“12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial
court should write an order showing the reasons
for framing a charge, why should the already
burdened trial courts be further burdened with
such an extra work. The time has reached to
adopt all possible measures to expedite the court
procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all
roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a
Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different
stages merely because the counsel would
address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced
progress of proceedings in trial courts would
further be slowed down. We are coming across
interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions
Judges running into several pages. We can
appreciate if such a detailed order has been
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passed for culminating the proceedings before
them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed
orders at other stages, such as issuing process,
remanding the accused to custody, framing of
charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] this
Court held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to
enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits
of the case. It was further held that in deciding whether a
process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into
consideration improbabilities appearing on the face of the
complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in
support of the allegations. The Magistrate has been given
an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion
has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further held
that: (SCC p. 741, para 5)
“5. … Once the Magistrate has exercised his
discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this
Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of
the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits
with a view to find out whether or not the
allegations in the complaint, if proved, would
ultimately end in conviction of the accused.”
17. In Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal
Agarwal [(2003) 4 SCC 139: 2003 SCC (Cri) 788] this
Court, in para 9, held as under: (SCC pp. 145-46)
“9. In determining the question whether any
process is to be issued or not, what the
Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether
the evidence is adequate for supporting the
conviction, can be determined only at the trial and
not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing
the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not
required to record reasons. This question was
considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 745]
and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti
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Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722:
2000 SCC (Cri) 303] it was held as follows: (U.P.
Pollution case [(2000) 3 SCC 745], SCC p. 749,
para 6)
‘6. The legislature has stressed the need
to record reasons in certain situations
such as dismissal of a complaint without
issuing process. There is no such legal
requirement imposed on a Magistrate for
passing detailed order while issuing
summons. The process issued to the
accused cannot be quashed merely on
the ground that the Magistrate had not
passed a speaking order.’”
18. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Bhupendra Kumar
Modi [(2009) 2 SCC 147: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 679] this
Court, in para 23, held as under: (SCC p. 154)
“23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage
of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly
concerned with the allegations made in the
complaint or the evidence led in support of the
same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied
whether there are sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the accused.”
19. This being the settled legal position, the order passed
by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the
ground that the summoning order was not a reasoned
order. ’
(emphasis supplied)
17. The view in Bhushan Kumar ( supra ) was reiterated in Mehmood
Ul Rehman v Khazir Mohammad Tunda , (2015) 12 SCC 420 and
State of Gujarat v Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta , (2019) 20 SCC 539 .
This Court in Rakhi Mishra v State of Bihar , (2017) 16 SCC 772
Page 11 of 16
restated the settled proposition of law enunciated in Sonu Gupta v
Deepak Gupta , (2015) 3 SCC 424 , as under:
‘ 4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties. We are of the considered opinion that the High
Court erred in allowing the application filed by
Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and quashing the
criminal proceedings against them. A perusal of the FIR
would clearly show that the appellant alleged cruelty
against Respondents 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. This Court
in Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak
Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265] held
as follows: (SCC p. 429, para 8)
“8. … At the stage of cognizance and summoning
the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial
mind only with a view to take cognizance of the
offence … to find out whether a prima facie case
has been made out for summoning the accused
persons. At this stage, the learned Magistrate is
not required to consider the defence version or
materials or arguments nor is he required to
evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of
the complainant, because the Magistrate must not
undertake the exercise to find out at this stage
whether the materials would lead to conviction or
not.”
5. The order passed by the trial court taking cognizance
against R-2 and R-4 to R-9 is in conformity with the law
laid down in the above judgment. It is settled law that the
power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised by the High
Court only in exceptional circumstances only when a
prima facie case is not made out against the accused.
The test applied by this Court for interference at the initial
stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontroverted
allegations prima facie establish a case. ’
(emphasis supplied)
Page 12 of 16
18. Coming to the second point which the Appellants canvassed
before this Court viz . the background of lodging of the FIR to impress
that the same is mala fide , an afterthought and at best, a civil dispute
being tried to be settled through criminal proceedings by way of arm-
twisting. On this point, need for a detailed discussion is obviated in view
of our answer on the first point supra and the paragraphs infra .
19. Perusal of the entire gamut of the pleadings of the Appellants does
not disclose any categorical statement to the effect that during
investigation by the police, no evidence has emerged to warrant taking
of cognizance, much less against the Appellants. The only averment
which has been made is that the Trial Court had not recorded the prima
facie material against the Appellants because it does not exist. This is
too simplistic an argument and does not shift the burden from the
Appellants of taking a categorical stand that no material whatsoever for
taking cognizance is available in the police papers/case diary against the
Appellants. Be it noted, the State has argued that sufficient material
warranting cognizance has been unearthed during the course of
investigation.
Page 13 of 16
20. Here, the Court would pause to delve on what is the scope of the
exercise of application of mind on the police papers/case diary for
deciding as to whether to take cognizance or not - it has only to be seen
whether there is material forthcoming to indicate commission of the
offence(s) alleged. The concerned Court is not empowered to go into the
veracity of the material at that time. That is why, the law provides for a
trial where it is open to both the parties i.e., the prosecution as well as
the defence to lead evidence(s) either to prove the materials which have
come against the accused or to disprove such findings. This Court vide
Order dated 13.09.2024 directed the Appellants to file a translated copy
of the chargesheet, as the State filed the chargesheet in Hindi along with
an application seeking exemption from filing official translation (I.A.
No.198073/2024). As this Court [Coram: Sudhanshu Dhulia and
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.] is well-conversant with Hindi, the language
in which the chargesheet is and which has been brought on record, we
have examined the same. However, the Appellants failed to comply with
the specific direction issued on 13.09.2024. Be that as it may, we find
that chargesheet mentions that on the basis of investigation, site
inspection and statements of the complainant, the police has found the
allegations true against all the accused including appellants.
Page 14 of 16
21. For reasons aforesaid and on an overall circumspection of the
facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel
for the parties, we find that the Order taking cognizance dated
13.06.2019, being in accordance with law, was not required to be
interfered with by the High Court.
22. Though no cross-appeal against the Impugned Judgment has
been filed by Respondent No.2, yet to render complete justice as also
set right the error committed by the High Court, on the legal issue of
requirement of recording detailed grounds/reasons for taking
cognizance, the Impugned Judgment is set aside in toto .
23. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. The
Appellants shall appear before the Additional Judicial Commissioner,
where the matter is pending, on the next date fixed in the case,
whereupon the case shall proceed in accordance with law. Registry to
communicate this Judgment to the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi
forthwith through the Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court.
24. We would add that the Appellants shall have full liberty of putting
forth their case before the Court concerned at the appropriate stage viz .
Page 15 of 16
framing of charge(s) and can press for discharge, inter alia , by pointing
out that the investigation has not come up with any material to warrant
trial. We further clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the matter. Our observations are only for the purpose of
deciding the instant appeal. All contentions in law and fact are reserved
to the prosecution and the defence.
25. No order as to costs.
…………………….....................J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
.…………………...................…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 23, 2025
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