Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5025 of 1999
PETITIONER:
Des Raj (Deceased) through L.Rs. & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/10/2004
BENCH:
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & B.N. SRIKRISHNA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5026 OF 1999
Shivaraj V. Patil J.
Certain agricultural lands including lands of these
appellants were acquired pursuant to the Notification dated
23.1.1965 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’). Award was made in March,
1969 fixing the compensation @ Rs. 2,000/- per bigha. The
appellants and other claimants, not satisfied with the
amount of compensation so awarded, sought a reference
under Section 18 of the Act. The Additional District Judge,
i.e., the reference court enhanced the compensation
@2,200/- per bigha from Rs. 2,000/-. The appellants and
four other claimants filed appeals before the High Court
seeking further enhancement of the compensation amount.
The High Court disposed of six appeals including two
appeals of these appellants by common judgment on
11.10.1984 fixing the compensation @ Rs. 4,000/- per
bigha. These appellants did not pursue the matter any
further, if aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of the
High Court. However, Pratap Singh and others, appellants
in one of the six appeals before the High Court, approached
this Court aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment of
the High Court. This Court allowed their Civil Appeal No.
4099/88 by the order dated 22.11.1988 and remanded the
case to the High Court with certain observations to re-
determine the amount of compensation. The appellants
filed review applications long thereafter before the High
Court seeking review of the judgment of the High Court
dated 11.10.1984 on the ground that Pratap Singh and
others whose lands were also acquired under the same
notification and who were similarly placed, got higher rate
of compensation for the lands acquired along with the
statutory benefits, hence the appellants also were entitled
for higher amount of compensation; under Section 28-A of
the Act, the appellants were also entitled for the amount of
compensation at the same rate which was allowed to Pratap
Singh and others. The Division Bench of the High Court, by
impugned judgments dated 22.10.1997, dismissed the
review applications. Hence, these appeals.
Learned counsel for the appellants urged that when
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this Court has set aside one of the cases covered by
common judgment of the High Court, i.e., the case of
Pratap Singh and others and after remand of the case, the
amount of compensation has been considerably enhanced,
the same benefit ought to have been given to the
appellants; having regard to the provisions of Section 28-A
of the Act and keeping in view the legislative intention, the
benefit of enhanced compensation as determined in the
case of Pratap Singh and others ought to have been
extended to these appellants as well and this Court,
exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India to equalize the compensation in respect of similarly
placed people in all respects, could enhance the amount of
compensation @Rs. 40,000/- as fixed in the case of Pratap
Singh and others after remand of the case. In support of
his submissions, he cited few decisions.
Despite service of notice, none represented the
respondents.
We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the appellants. The facts that are not in
dispute are the following:
The first appeals filed by these two appellants and
four others were disposed of by the High Court by the
common judgment dated 11.10.1984. These two
appellants did not challenge the said judgment of the High
Court any further. Pratap Singh and others, who were also
the appellants in the said judgment of the High Court,
approached this Court and at their instance, their appeal
was allowed by this Court and the case was remanded. It is
thereafter the High Court has enhanced the amount of
compensation in the case of Pratap Singh and others. The
judgment dated 11.10.1984 rendered by the High Court in
the case of these appellants had become final. Long
thereafter, the appellants filed review applications seeking
the review of the judgment of the High Court dated
11.10.1984. The High Court dismissed the review
applications by the impugned judgments.
In the impugned judgments, the High Court has taken
note of the fact that the appellants did not challenge the
judgment of the High Court dated 11.10.1984 in appeal, as
was done by Pratap Singh and others. As a result,
judgment and decree dated 11.10.1984 in their cases
became final. In the impugned judgment, the High Court
has stated thus:-
"It is pertinent to note that the applicants herein,
namely the appellants in RFA Nos. 143/75 &
130/75, did not challenge the judgment dated
11.10.1984 in appeal, as was done by Pratap
Singh and others. As a result, judgment and
decree dated 11.10.1984 in their case became
final."
The High Court also has noticed that although in the
review applications reliance was sought to be placed on
Section 28-A of the Act claiming re-determination of the
amount of compensation equal to that awarded to other
interested persons in the same village, however, during the
course of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellants
abandoned that plea in the light of the judgment of this
Court in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese & Anr.
etc. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. [ JT 1996 (10
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SC 573]. In this view, the High Court, by the impugned
judgments, dismissed the review applications filed by the
appellants.
The decision in B.N. Natarajan & Ors. Etc. vs. State
of Mysore and Ors. Etc. [AIR 1966 SC 1942] does not
help the appellants. That was a case dealing with the
power of executive to make rules regulating the recruitment
and conditions of service of persons appointed to public
services \026 whether executive was entitled to frame rules
retrospectively. Further in that case, in paragraph 24,
specific directions were given exercising power under Article
142 of the Constitution of India to cover the cases of those
appellants who had not prosecuted their appeals. Para 24
of the judgment reads:-
"24. In the result, the appeals both of the State
and the other appellants are allowed and
judgment of the High Court set aside. We may
mention that some of the appellants have not
prosecuted their appeals but there is no reason
why they should not have the benefit of this
judgment, and exercising our powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that in
order to do complete justice they should also
have the benefit of the judgment given by us.
There will be no order as to costs."
No such direction was given by this Court in Civil Appeal
No. 4099/88 of Pratap Singh and others and the directions
given there were confined to them only.
In M/s. Shenoy and Co., Bangalore and Ors. vs.
Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore and Ors.
[AIR 1985 SC 621], this Court was concerned with validity
of Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for
Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979. That was a
case where the validity of the provisions of the Act was
challenged by a batch of writ petitions and the Division
Bench of the High Court struck down the Act as invalid.
State Government filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
against only one party and the appeal was allowed. As a
result, there was revival of the Act and it was binding on all
the persons though they were not parties to the appeal.
Hence, this decision also does not advance the case of the
appellants.
The decision of this Court in Ram Chand & Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors. [JT 1993 (5) SC 465] is also of no
avail to the appellants. In that case, the court was
concerned with the long delay of 15 to 21 years in making
the award after declaration was made and certain directions
were given to give benefit of the compensation amount
having regard to the long delay.
The decision of this Court in Union Carbide
Corporation etc. etc. vs. Union of India etc. etc. [ AIR
1992 SC 248] dealt with the power of this Court under
Article 142 in relation to the facts of that case. It cannot be
denied that this Court can exercise power under Article 142
in appropriate cases. We fail to understand how this case
helps the appellants having regard to the fact that in their
cases, the common judgment of the High Court dated
11.10.1984 had become final and that judgment could not
be reviewed as sought to be done by the appellants. This is
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not a case where power under Article 142 may be exercised
having regard to the statutory provisions as applied to the
facts of the case.
The case of Bihar State Housing Board, State of
Bihar and Ors. Vs. Ban Bihari Mahato & Ors. [ AIR 1988
SC 2134] also does not support the contention of the
appellants as is evident from para 2 of the judgment itself.
It was on the peculiar facts and circumstances of those
cases that certain directions were given and no issue of law
was decided.
In our view, the appellants are not entitled to claim
enhanced compensation pressing into service the provisions
of Section 28-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the
appellants before the High Court did not press the claim of
the appellants on this ground as recorded in the impugned
judgments, having not made the applications within the
prescribed time. Moreover, benefit of Section 28-A is
available only to the parties who had not sought reference
under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the
compensation. This provision is not available to persons
who seek for reference under Section 18 of the Act for
enhancement of the compensation and do not challenge
judgment of the reference court or the judgment of the
High Court thereafter. A bench of three learned Judges of
this Court in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land
Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda vs. Union of India &
Ors. [(1991) 1 SCC 174] in this regard, in para 4, has held
thus:-
"4. ................................Any person who
does not accept the award so made may, by
written application to the Collector, required that
the matter be referred for the determination of
the court whereupon the provisions of Sections
18 and 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such
reference as they apply to a reference under
Section 18. It is obvious on a plain reading of
sub-section (1) of Section 28-A that it applies
only to those claimants who had failed to seek a
reference under Section 18 of the Act. The
redetermination has to be done by the Collector
on the basis of the compensation awarded by the
court in the reference under Section 18 of the
Act and an application in that behalf has to be
made to the Collector within 30 days from the
date of the award. Thus only those claimants
who had failed to apply for a reference under
Section 18 of the Act are conferred this right to
apply to the Collector for redetermination and
not all those like the petitioners who had not
only sought a reference under Section 18 but
had also filed an appeal in the High Court against
the award made by the reference court. The
newly added Section 28-A, therefore, clearly
does not apply to a case where the claimant has
sought and secured a reference under Section 18
and has even preferred an appeal in the High
Court. This view, which we take on a plain
reading of Section 28-A finds support from the
judgment of this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of
Haryana. ((1986) 4 SCC 151 : (1986) 3 SCR
660)."
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This Court again in the case of Babua Ram & Ors.
vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [(1995) 2 SCC 689] following the
decision in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning
Society Ltd., Bhatinda (supra), in para 36, has stated thus:-
"36. The next question is whether an interested
person who sought and secured reference under
Section 18 but was either unsuccessful and filed
no appeal or had carried in appeal but
unsuccessful, would be entitled to
redetermination when the compensation was
enhanced by the appellate court either under
Section 54 or on further appeal under Articles
132, 133 and 136 of the Constitution. In Mewa
Ram case this Court held in paragraph 5 that
Section 28-A provides for the determination of
amount of compensation subject to the
conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. For
such redetermination, the forum is the Collector
and the application has to be made before him
within 30 days from the date of the award under
Section 26 and the right is restricted to persons
who had not applied for reference under Section
18 of the Act. If these conditions are satisfied,
the petitioner could have availed of the remedy
provided under Section 28-A of the Act."
Admittedly, the appellants in these cases did seek for
reference under Section 18 of the Act; filed appeals before
the High Court and after the High Court delivered the
judgment on 11.10.1984, did not challenge the same. The
applications were not made under Section 28-A of the Act
within the prescribed period of limitation also in these
cases. At any rate, the grounds raised in the review
applications were not the grounds which could be accepted
to review or modify the judgment of the High Court dated
11.10.1984. In our view, the High Court was right in
dismissing their review applications for the reasons stated
in the impugned judgments.
Thus, having regard to all aspects of the matter, it is
not possible to find fault with the impugned judgments.
Further, in our view, these are not the fit cases to exercise
power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India having
regard to what is stated above and in view of the clear legal
position as stated in Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land
Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda (supra). Hence, finding no
merit in these appeals, they are dismissed but with no
order as to costs.