Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.336 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013)
The State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant
Versus
Dhruv Gurjar and another ..Respondents
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.337 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013)
State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant
Versus
Tinku Sharma and others ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.
2. As common question of law and facts arise in both
these appeals, they are being disposed of by this common
judgment and order.
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Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal
Petition No. 2572/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the
said application preferred by the respondents herein/original
accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for
the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the
IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present
appeal.
4. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was
lodged against the accused at police station, Kotwali, District
Datia for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and
34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No. 552/2012. It
was alleged that at about 8:00 p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012
when after distributing the milk, Cheeni @ Devasik Yadav came
in front of his house situated at Rajghat Viram, at the same
time, Dhruv Gurjar (accused) being armed with 12 bore gun,
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Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 other
persons came there and asked him to take out his nephew, and
they will kill him as on account of enmity of scuffle took place
between his nephew Anand and the accused persons. When
complainant told them that my nephew is not here at the same
time all of them started to abuse the complainant with filthy
language and when he asked them not to do so, at the same
time, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 34
other persons spoken that “kill this bastard”, at the same time,
Dhruv Gurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets
struck on three places of his body, i.e., on his forehead, left
shoulder and left ear, due to which, he sustained injuries and
blood started oozing from it. According to the complainant,
Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Singh were present on the spot,
who had witnessed the incident. On hearing the noise of fire,
when other people of vicinity reached there, then, all of these
persons fled away from the spot of the incident.
4.1 On the basis of a report, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No.
0/12 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC.
As the complainant sustained injuries, his MLC was performed.
On the basis of the contents of the said report, a Crime bearing
3
No. 552/2012 was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of
the IPC and the criminal investigation was triggered. Thereafter,
the investigation team reached the spot and prepared the spot
map and articles were seized.
4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses
were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. That on
21.03.2013, the police arrested the accused.
4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No.
2572 of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal
proceedings against the accused arising out of the FIR, on the
basis of a compromise arrived at between the accused and the
complainant.
5. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High
Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has
quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on the
ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the
disputes amicably. While quashing the criminal proceedings
against the accused, the High Court has considered and relied
upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu and
others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.
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6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned
judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against
the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294
and 34 of the IPC, the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the
present appeal.
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013
7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal
Petition No. 1936/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the
said application preferred by the respondents herein/original
accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for
the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya
Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
8. The facts leading to this appeal are, that on
21.12.2012 one truck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed
the complainant – Malkhan Singh Yadav, who is also a truck
driver that his truck was having some problem and he is near
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Sitapur village. The complainant reached there and found that
his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck. It is
alleged that when they were busy in repairing the truck, four
persons at around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and
they had beaten all of them with legs and fists and snatched cash
of Rs.7,300/ and two Nokia mobiles having Sim Nos.
9411955930 & 7599256400 from the complainant – Malkhan
Singh Yadav, Rs.19,000/ from Mangal and Rs.16,500/ from
Janki Kushwah and a Spice mobile having Sim No. 8756194727.
That the complainant is driving on that route since last 7 to 8
years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village. According to
the complainant, all the four persons were known to him and one
of them, namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having ‘Addhi’ in
his hand, the second one was Ravi Sharma, who was having gun
in his hand, and the other two were Babloo Sharma and
Bhurerai. All the accused persons after robbing the complainant,
Mangal and Janki Kushwah, went towards Sitapur village.
8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat Police
Station, District Datia and lodged the first information report,
which was registered as Crime No. 159 of 2012 against the
accused under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act
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and 25/27 of the Arms Act. Thereafter, the investigation was
started and the police reached the spot of the incident and
prepared spot map and also recorded the statement of witnesses.
Thereafter, they sent the complainant and two other persons to
the District Hospital, Datia for medical examination, where the
Medical Officer found simple injuries on various body parts of
them.
8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the
accused persons and in the village but could not found them and
ultimately prepared the ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013,
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia issued proclamation
under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to
appear before him on 16.04.2013. Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013,
the accused persons approached the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing of FIR No. 159/2012,
registered against them at Police Station Goraghat, District Datia
for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13
of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.
9. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court,
in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has
quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on the
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ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the
disputes amicably. While quashing the criminal proceedings
against the accused, the High Court has considered and relied
upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Shiji (supra).
10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned
judgment and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against
the accused for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the
IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the
State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
11. So far as the criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the
accused were facing the criminal proceedings for the offences
punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. It was
alleged against the accused that at the time of commission of the
offence, the accused Dhruv Gurjar fired from his fire arm on the
original complainant with an intention to kill him, and the
original complainant sustained serious injuries and the pellets
struck on three places of his body, i.e., on the forehead, left
shoulder and left ear. That incident took place on 17.12.2012
and the investigating officer commenced the investigation,
recorded the statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the
8
Cr.P.C. on 18.12.2012. The investigating officer also seized the
articles. The Investigating officer also collected the medical
evidence. It appears that one of the coaccused, namely, Rohit
Gurjar was arrested on 21.03.2013. Nothing in on record to
show, whether in fact the respondent no.1 herein, the main
accused – original accused no.1 was arrested or not. It appears
that during the investigation, immediately, the original accused
no.1 – Dhruv Gurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by
filing an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for
quashing the FIR. Immediately on the fourth day of filing of the
application, by the impugned judgment and order dated
8.4.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the
ground that there is a settlement arrived at between the
complainant and the accused. While quashing the FIR, the High
Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of
Shjji (supra) , specially the observations recorded by this Court
“that where there is no chance of recording conviction against the
accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial destined to be
exercise of futility, the criminal case registered against the
accused persons, though it may not be compoundable, can be
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quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C”.
12. Now so far as the criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No.
9860/2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the
criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 394 of the
IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms
Act. The incident was alleged to happen on 21.12.2012.
Immediately, the investigating officer started the investigation.
All the accused were absconding. That when the investigation
was in progress, the original accused approached the High Court
by way of an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on
12.03.2013 and prayed for quashing of the FIR. That on
14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued
proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused
persons to appear before him on 16.04.2013. That, by the
impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2013, the High Court
has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that the original
complainant and the accused has entered into a compromise.
Hence, the present appeals.
13. Shri Varun K. Chopra, learned advocate appearing on behalf
of the State of Madhya Pradesh has vehemently submitted that in
10
both these cases, the High Court has committed a grave error in
quashing the respective FIRs which were for the offences under
Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act
respectively.
13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellantState that in the present
cases the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs
mechanically and solely on the basis of the
settlement/compromise between the complainant and the
accused, without even considering the gravity and seriousness of
the offences alleged against the accused persons.
13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellantState that while exercising
the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the
respective FIRs, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were against the society at large and not
restricted to the personal disputes between the two individuals.
13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellantState that the High Court
has misread the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra) ,
11
while quashing the respective FIRs. It is vehemently submitted
by the learned counsel that the High Court ought to have
appreciated that in all the cases where the complainant has
compromised/entered into a settlement with the accused, that
need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording
conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be
exercise of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantState that in a given
case despite the complainant may not support in future and in
the trial in view of the settlement and compromise with the
accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the
accused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any,
and/or on the basis of the medical evidence and/or other
evidence/material. It is submitted that in the present cases the
investigation was in progress and even the statement of the
witnesses was recorded and the medical evidence was also
collected. It is submitted that therefore in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred in
considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Shiji (supra) .
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13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellantState that as such in the
appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the
accused were absconding from the day of the commission of the
offence and, in fact, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia
issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the
accused persons to appear before him. It is submitted that in
between the day of the alleged commission of the offence and
filing of the application before the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C., and while they were absconding, the accused managed
to get the affidavits of the complainant and other witnesses,
which were dated 9.2.2013. It is submitted that all these
aforesaid circumstances and the conduct on the part of the
accused were required to be considered by the High Court while
quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C., and more particularly when the offences
alleged were against the society at large, namely, robbery and
under the Arms Act, and in fact noncompoundable. In support
of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellantState has
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian
Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Madhya
13
Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh
vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana
Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer
Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat
(2017) 9 SCC 641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal
No. 14/2019.
13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
aforesaid decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellantState has prayed to allow the present
appeals and quash and set aside the impugned judgments and
orders passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the
respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused has supported the impugned judgments and orders
passed by the High Court.
14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate
appearing on behalf of the accused that in the facts and
circumstances of the case and when the complainant and the
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accused entered into a compromise and settled the disputes
amicably among themselves, and therefore when the High Court
found that there is no chance of recording conviction against the
accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be an
exercise of futility, the High Court has rightly exercised the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly quashed the
respective FIRs. In support of his submissions, learned counsel
for the accused has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court
in the cases of Jitendra Raghuvanshi vs. Babita Raghuvanshi
(2013) 4 SCC 58; Anita Maria Dias vs. State of Maharashtra
(2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar vs.
Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443 .
14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals.
15. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at
length.
16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the
present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the offences
under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC,
15
11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act
respectively, solely on the basis of a compromise between the
complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise
and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision
of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra) , the High Court has
observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against
the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be
exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the respective
FIRs.
16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the
fact that the offences alleged were noncompoundable offences as
per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments
and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all
considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case,
more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social
impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the
High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically
quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social
wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the
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case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15
SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings,
should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the
allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the
experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said
experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection
and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court
has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of
facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal
proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the respective
FIRs by the High Court in the present cases for the offences
under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC,
11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act
respectively, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court
in a catena of decisions.
16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this
Court has observed and held as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus: the power of
the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
17
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: ( i ) to
secure the ends of justice, or ( ii ) to prevent abuse of
the process of any court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such
power, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even
though the victim or victim’s family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the offences
under special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly
civil flavour stand on a different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or
the family disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the parties have
resolved their entire dispute. In this category of
cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility
of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
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the criminal case would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. In other words, the High
Court must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue with
the criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether
to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer
to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the
High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding.”
16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014)
after considering the decision in the case of
6 SCC 466, Gian
Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up
and lay down the following principles by which the
High Court would be guided in giving adequate
treatment to the settlement between the parties and
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code
while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under Section
320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to
quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases
which are not compoundable, where the parties have
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settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement
and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
( i ) ends of justice, or
( ii ) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form
an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.
29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is
.
to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
cases would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in
the category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be generally treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC
20
in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC.
For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can
generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this
prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as
to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction
or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In
the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement
and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the
latter case it would be permissible for the High Court
to accept the plea compounding the offence based on
complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that
the settlement between the parties is going to result
in harmony between them which may improve their
future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in
accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the
reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
and even the chargesheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still
at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is
21
almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code,
as in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.
Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is
already recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of
the offender who has already been convicted by the
trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous
crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
16.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra) , again this
Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court
can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise
of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this
Court summarised the following propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers
of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision
does not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a first information report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been
arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the
22
same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash
under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non
compoundable.
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of
its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must
evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to
secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of
the process of any court.
(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that
the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be
formulate.
(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482
and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been
settled, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious
offences involving mental depravity or offences such as
murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of the victim
have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact
upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in
such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may
be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or
predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a
distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent
power to quash is concerned.
(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise
from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or
similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may
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in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties
have settled the dispute.
(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between
the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote
and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out
in Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic wellbeing of the
State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a
mere dispute between private disputants. The High
Court would be justified in declining to quash where the
offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of
the act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance.”
16.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has
specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question
of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC
(as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections
25 and 27 of the Arms Act (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No.
9860/2013), by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an
offence as between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed
that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at
large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing
trial under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well as
Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, as the offences are definitely
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against the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and
come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.
16.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has
specifically observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is
noncompoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a
private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime
against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a
compromise is not permissible. Similar is the view taken by this
Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case of Kalyan
Singh (supra) .
17. Now so far as the decisions of this Court upon which
the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has
placed reliance, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, none of
the decisions shall be of any assistance to the accused in the
present case. In all the aforesaid cases, the dispute was a
matrimonial dispute, and/or the dispute predominantly of a civil
dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrong is basically
private or personal.
18. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Shiji (supra) , while quashing the
respective FIRs by observing that as the complainant has
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compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of
recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an
exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the
High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the
aforesaid ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or
misapplied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand.
The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every
case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with
the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations
are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given
case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt
by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses
and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the
dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature
and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra) , this
Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute
between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and
therefore this Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of
the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support
the allegations…will be a futile exercise that will serve no
purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed ‘that
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even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the
complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and
to that this Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the
proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482
Cr.P.C. can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the
High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby
preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in the
said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by
itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to
exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The
width and the nature of the power itself demands
that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where
the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the
clear view that continuance of the prosecution would
be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is
neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the
situations in which the exercise of power under
Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say
is that the exercise of power must be for securing the
ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to
exercise that power may result in the abuse of the
process of law. The High Court may be justified in
declining interference if it is called upon to
appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of
an appellate court while dealing with a petition
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Subject to the above, the High Court will have to
consider the facts and circumstances of each case to
determine whether it is a fit case in which the
inherent powers may be invoked.”
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18.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a
case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties;
the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not
against the society at large and/or the same may not have social
impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The
aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the
offences alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a
social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 of
the Arms Act etc. Therefore, without proper application of mind
to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High
Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the
respective FIRs, by observing that in view of the compromise,
there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further
trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has
mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in
the case of S hiji (supra) , without considering the relevant facts
and circumstances of the case.
18.2 Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the
case of the appeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the
High Court has erred in quashing the FIR. It is required to be
noted that the FIR was lodged on 21.12.2012 for the offence
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alleged to happen on 21.12.2012. All the accused were
absconding. After a period of approximately three months, they
approached the High Court by way of filing a petition under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on 12.03.2013. The learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate issued a proclamation under Section 82 of
the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on 14.03.2013. In the
meantime, the accused managed to get the affidavits of the
complainant and the two witnesses dated 09.02.2013, and the
High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, i.e., within a period
of three days from the date of filing the petition. The High Court
has also not considered the antecedents of the accused. It has
come on record that the accused persons were facing number of
trials for the serious offences. The aforesaid would be relevant
factors, while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C and while considering the application for quashing the
FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact, in such a situation,
the High Court ought to have been more vigilant and ought to
have considered relevant facts and circumstances under which
the accused got the settlement entered into. The High Court has
not at all considered the aforesaid relevant circumstances, while
exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
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19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, both
these appeals succeed, and are hereby allowed. The impugned
judgments and orders passed by the High Court are hereby set
aside, and the respective FIRs/investigation/criminal
proceedings be proceeded against the respective accused, and
they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
……………………………….J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………….J.
FEBRUARY 22, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
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