Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
N. VENUGOPAL AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
09/05/1963
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
BENCH:
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
CITATION:
1964 AIR 33 1964 SCR (3) 742
CITATOR INFO :
R 1966 SC1783 (5)
R 1966 SC1786 (3)
R 1968 SC1323 (8)
R 1973 SC 913 (14)
ACT:
Criminal Law-Limitation-Prosecution of Police Officers
Police Officer torturing suspects during investigation-
Whether acts done under the provisions of law-Madras Police
Standing Orders, Or. No. 145-If has the force of law-
Whether mandatory- -Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Mad.
24 of s. 53.
HEADNOTE:
During the course of the investigation of a case of house-
breaking and theft information was received that R had
received the stolen article. The appellants, who were a
Sub-Inspector of Police, a Head Constable and a Constable,
respectively, took R into custody on January 6, 1957. Less
than three days later R was found lying dead with a number
of injuries on the body. The appellants were prosecuted for
having caused injuries to R, acting in concert for the
purpose of extorting from him information which might lead
to the detection of an offence and restoration of stolen
property, and also for having his body thrown at the place
where it was ultimately found with the intention of
screening themselves from punishment. The appellants
pleaded inter alia (1) that the prosecution was barred by
limitation by reason of the provisions of s. 53 of the
Madras District Police Act, 1859, and (2) that the trial of
the appellants was vitiated by the fact that the completion
of the investigation of their case was done by an Inspector
of Police and this contravened the Madras Police Standing
Orders under which investigation in cases against the police
for torture and causing death had to be conducted by a
person of the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of
Police or by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
Hold that the prosecution of the appellants was not barred
by limitation under s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act,
1859..
No provision of law authorised police officers to beat a
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person with a view to induce him to make statement; and
743
though in the present case the act of beating was alleged to
have been done when the appellants were engaged in investi-
gation, there could be no reasonable connection between
those acts and the process of investigation. The acts
complained of could not be said to have been done or
intended to be done under any provision of the Madras
District Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any
other law conferring powers on the police, and,
consequently, s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act had no
application to the present case.
Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v. The State of Mysore, [1963]
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6, followed.
Held further, that the provisions of the Madras Police
Standing Order No. 145 were nothing more than administrative
instructions by the Government of Madras and did not have
the force of law; that, in any case, the requirement of the
Standing Order was merely directory and not mandatory, and
non-compliance did not make the investigation of the case
illegal; and that even assuming that the Standing Order had
the force of law, the trial of the appellants would not be
rendered invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of
justice had been caused on account of the illegal
investigation.
H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi,
[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1150, followed.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 142 of
1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
August 31. 1960, of the Andra Pradesh High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 551 of 1958.
A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Chaudhuri and P. D. Menon, for the
appellant.
N. N. Keswani, for, the respondents.
1963. May 9. The judgment of the court was delivered by
DAs GUPTA J.-The three respondents, Venugopal, Rangaswamy
and Subbaiah were tried along with one Mittala Kamal Sab by
the Session Judge,
744
Anantapur Division, on a number of charges. Kamal Sab was
acquitted of all the charges against him, but these three
respondents were convicted of several offences. All three
of them were convicted under ss. 348, 331, and 201 read with
s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Venugopal was further
convicted under s. 343 of the Indian Penal Code. For the
offence under s. 348 the respondents were sentenced to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years; for the offence
under s. 331 of the Indian Penal Code each of them was
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years; for the
offence under s. 201 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal
Code they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three
years each. Venugopal was sentenced to one year’s rigorous
imprisonment under section 343 of the Indian Penal Code.
All of them were acquitted of the charge under s. 302 read
with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The sentences imposed
on them were directed to run concurrently. These orders of
conviction and sentence were set aside by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in appeal and the three respondents have been
acquitted of all the charges. Against that decision the
State of Andhra Pradesh has filed the present appeal, after
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obtaining special leave from this Court.
Of the three respondents, Venugopal was the Sub-Inspector of
Police, Vempalli police station, in Cuddapah District from
July 20, 1956, to February 22, 1957; Rangaswamy was a Head
Constable attached to the same police station from May 4,
1955 to February 20, 1957; Subbaiah was a Police Constable
at that police station from April 10, 1955 to February 20,
1957. On July 21, 1952 Mittala Kamal Sab, a resident of
Vempalli town lodged at the Vempalli police station an
information of -house-breaking and theft in his house.
After investigation a charge-sheet wag submitted by the
police against one Patra Obanna and three other persons.
Those three were arrested and tried and convicted on October
31, 1962;
745
but Patra Obanna remained absconding and the cut against him
remained pending in the, Magistrate’s Court. After sometime
the Magistrate. wrote to the District Superintendent of
Police of Anantapur, requesting him either to withdraw the
case or to try and arrest Patra Obanna.
Thereafter, Venugopal, who was then the Vempalli Sub-
Inspector of Police, took action in this matter and his
attempt to arrest Patra Obanna met with success. Patra
Obanna was actu lly arrested on January 6, 1957. On the
same date on being informed by him that he had given the g
ld gajjalu which formed part of the stolen property to a
person in Kadiri Taluk, Venugopal proceeded to Kadiri police
station. On the night of January 6, Venugopal, accompanied
by Constables of the Kadiri police station and Rangaswamy
and Subbaiah, who had come with him to Kadiri went to
Dasaravandlapalli in Gandlapenta police station and there on
the identification of Patra Obanna as the person to whom he
had given the gold gajjallu book one Aries Ramanna into
custody. The police party there returned with Arige Ramanna
to Kadiri police station. Less then three days later Arige
Ramanna was found lying dead not far from the house of one
Sugali Baginigadu, in Udumulagutta Thanda, in Kadiri
village. There were a number of injuries on the body. The
prosecution case is that these injuries had been caused by
the three respondents acting in concert for the purpose of
extorting from him information which might lead to the
detection of an offence and restoration of stolen property.
It is also the prosecution case that for this purpose these
three respondents wrongfully confined Arige Ramanna in a
room at the Kadiri police station and it was the when he was
thus confined that the injuries were caused. The
prosecution case further is that when after infliction of
the injuries Arige Ramanna, appeared to be in a bad state
these respondents hid him
746
removed from the police station and his body thrown at the
place where it was ultimately found with the intention of
screening themselves from punishment.
As to the events which led to such acts by the respondents,
the prosecution story is that Arige Ramanna had on being
interrogated at the Kadiri police station given information
that he had sold the gajjalu to Appalla of
Nallasanivandlapplli. Following up this information the
three respondents accompanied by Patra Obanna and Arige
Ramanna went to that village and qeustioned Nallasani
Appalla. One gold gajjlu was seized from his house and to
check on Arige Ramanna’s statement that this had been sold
by him to Apparent in the presence of Fakruddin of
Kataruppalli, the Sub-Inspector tried to contact Fakruddin.
Fakruddin was found at Madanapplli on January 8, 1957; but
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he denied any knowledge about the sale of gold gajjalu by
Arige Ramanna to Appalla. The respondent Venugopal then
returned to Kadiri police station bringing Arige Ramanna and
Apparent with him. It was then the early morning of January
9, 1957. Both Arige Ramanna and Appalla were then taken by
Venugopal into the Sub-Inspector’s room at Kadiri police
station. Subbase and Rangaswamy also went into the room.
There, after some further interrogation, Arige Ramanna was
beaten up by Subbase, Rangaswamy, and Kamal Sab, who was the
complainant in the theft case, under the instructions of
Venugopal.
These three respondents as well as Kamal Sab pleaded not
guilty. We are not concerned with the case of Kamal Sab.
He was acquitted by the Session judge and after the State’s
appeal against the acquittal order was dismissed by the High
Court the State has not sought to appeal against that order
of dismissal.
747
The defence of these three respondents was that they had
nothing to do with the injuries that were found on Arige
Ramanna’s body. The fact that Arige Ramanna was taken into
custody and brought by them to the Kadiri police station was
not disputed, though they dispute the correctness of the
prosecution story that this happened on January 6, 1957.
They do not also deny the visit to Appalla and the seizure
of a gold gajjalu from his house and the visit thereafter to
Madanapplli to meet Fakruddin nor the fact that Fakruddin
denied having witnessed any sale of gold gajjalu. Their
case however is that after the return from Madanappalli both
Arige Ramanna and Appalachia were asked to go away and they
went away and did not come to the police station at all.
After this they say they as well as Obanna came to the
police station and slept there. According to them, the
whole story of Arige Ramanna being taken into the Sub-
Inspector’s room and being beaten up, there and then being
taken away from there is entirely false.
On a consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary,
and the statements of the accused persons the Sessions judge
believed the prosecution case about the confinement and
beating up of Arige Ramanna by these appellants and that
when Arige Ramanna was in a bad state after receiving the
injuries they got him removed from the police station. He
also rejected the defence contention that the investigation
in the present case -had not been made in accordance with
the law. Accordingly, the Session judge convicted these
respondents, as already stated, under sections 348, 331 and
201 read with s. 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned
judge also held that as after the arrest of Arige Ramanna on
the night of January 6, 1957 he was not sent to the
magistrate and kept in restraint for three days, the
respondent Venugopal committed the further offence under a.
343 of the Indian Penal Code. He
748
found that the case against Kamal Sab had not been proved
and acquitted him of all the charges.
When the appeal’ preferred by Venugopal, Rangaswany, and
Subbaiah came up for hearing before the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh a preliminary point was raised on their behalf that
the prosecution was barred by reason of the provisions of s.
53 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (hereinafter
referred to as the "police Act"). Thereupon Basi Reddy J,
before whom this point was raised framed the following
question :
"In the circumstances of this case, is the
prosecution of the appellants barred by
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limitation by reason of the provision of
section 53 of the Madras District Police Act,
1859 ?"
and referred it for determination by a Division Bench of two
judges. The Division Bench to whom the case was referred
this question and a further question framed by them, viz.,
In what circumstances, the bar of limitation prescribed by
s. 53 of the Madras District Police Act would be available
to an accused officer ?, for determination by a Full Bench.
After discussing the relevant legal provisions and
authorities the Full Bench disposed of the matter in these
words :-
"We would therefore answer the first question
referred to us by saying that the bar of limi-
tation prescribed by s. 53 of the Act would be
available to an accused officer only when the
It complained of has been committed in the
discharge of his official duties. We have
already laid down that the question as to
whether a particular act would be regarded as
having been done in the discharge of one’s
official duties would have to be determined on
the facts and particular circumstances
749
of the case. It is unnecessary for us to
answer the second question. This will be
decided by a Single judge."
The appeal then came to be heard by Mr. justice
Anatanarayana Ayyar. The learned judge was of opinion,
after considering the decision of the Full Bench and certain
observations in some other cases, that if the police
officers were alleged to have committed the acts complained
of "when" they were investigating into the cases of house-
breaking and theft, s. 53 of the Police Act would apply.
Observing that there was no doubt or dispute about the fact
that these officers were investigating the case of house-
breaking and theft officially at all material times they
were alleged to have committed the offences which formed the
subject matter of the charges, he concluded, that as the
prosecution was made beyond the period prescribed in s. 53
of the Police Act they were entitled to an acquittal. He
proceeded however to consider the case also on the merits
and came to the conclusion that on facts also there was room
to doubt the guilt of these officers on the charges. In
this view of the law and facts the learned judge set aside
the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial
Court and acquitted these three respondents of the charges
framed against them.
In our opinion, the High Court is clearly wrong in thinking
that the prosecution was barred by s. 53 of the Police Act.
That section provides in the first place for a period of
limitation for certain actions and prosecutions and makes
certain other provisions in respect of civil actions with
which we are not concerned., The actions and prosecutions
for which the limitation is prescribed can be best
understood from the, actual words used by the legislature,
which are these
"All actions and prosecutions against any
person, which may be lawfully brought for
anything
750
done or intended to be done under the
provisions of this Act or under the provisions
of any other law for the time being in force
conferring powers on the police shall be com-
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menced within three months after the act
complained of shall have been committed and
not otherwise."
It is plain that in order that any person against whom a
prosecution has been launched can get the benefit of the
three months period of limitation thus prescribed, it must
appear either, (i) that the act complained of was done under
the provisions of the Police Act or (ii) the act complained
of was done under the provisions of some other law in force
conferring powers on the police or (iii) the act complained
of was intended to be done under the provisions of the
Police Act, i. e., though strictly speaking the act was not
done under the provisions of the Act, the intention of the
accused in doing the act was to act under the provisions of
the Police Act or (iv) the act complained of was intended to
be done under the provisions of some other law in force
conferring powers on the police i.e., though the act was
strictly speaking not done under the provisions of such
other law the intention of the accused in doing the act was
to act under such provisions.
The Police Act contains several provisions under which the
police officers or other persons may act or intend to act.
Section 6 vests in police authorities appointed under the
Act all powers riot inconsistent with the provisions of the
Act which up to the passing of the Act belonged by law to
the existing police authorities. Section 7 confers full
powers of a magistrate on the Inspector-General of Police
and authorises the State Government to vest the District
Superintendents of Police with all or any of these powers.,
Under s. 9 the Inspector-General may from time to time frame
rules and regulations inter alia
751
for collecting and communicating intelligence and
information; section 21 describes the duty of every police
officer to be "to use his best endeavors and ability to
prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances; to
preserve the peace; to apprehend disorderly and suspicious
characters; to detect and bring offenders to justice; to
collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public
peace; and promptly to obey and execute all orders and
warrants lawfully issued to him." Section 42 which is the
next section in the act-the original sections 22 to 43
having been repealed by the Central Act XVII of 1862-em-
powers any police officer above the rank of a constable or
any member of the Madras Fire Service above the rank of a
fireman to do a number of things. These include the closure
of a street or passage in or near which any fire is burning
and the breaking into or through, or pulling down or using
the passage of houses or other appliances, any premises for
the purpose of extinguishing the fire.
The effect of s. 53 of the Police Act is that all
prosecutions whether against a police officer or a person
other than a police officer (e.g., a member of the Madras
Fire Service, above the rank of a fireman acting under s. 42
of the Act) must be commenced within three months after the
act complained of, if this act is one which has been done or
intended to be done "under" any of the provisions detailed
above. The protection of s. 53 is not confined however only
to acts done or intended to be done under the provisions of
the Police Act. It extends to acts done or intended to be
done under the provisions of any other law conferring powers
on the police. One such law is the Code of Criminal
Procedure which confers numerous powers on the police in
respect of arrest, search,and investigation. Among other
laws conferring powers on the police may be mentioned the
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Opium Act, the Excise Act, the Petroleum Act, etc.
752
Any prosecution in respect of any act done or intended to be
done under the provisions of any of these laws has also to
be commenced within three months of the act complained of.
It is clear that if in any of this cases the prosecution is
commenced beyond three months after the act complained of,
it will be the duty of the courts to dismiss the same. But
it is equally clear that unless the act complained of
appears to have been done or intended to be done " under"
the provisions of the police Act or of the other laws
conferring powers on the police the protection of s. 53 will
not be available. Thus, if the prosecution is for an
offence under s. 341 of the Indian Penal Code said to have
been committed by the act of closing a street or passage in
or near which a fire is burning in exercise of powers under
s. 42 (b) of the Police Act, or for an offence under. 426
of the Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by the
pulling down of a house for the purposes of extinguishing a
fire, under s. 42 (e) of the Police Act, the prosecution
must fail unless brought within three months of the act
complained of So also if a police officer is prosecuted for
an offence under s. 323 of the Indian Penal Code said to
have been committed in making an arrest, the prosecution
must fail unless commenced within three months of the act
complained of.
It is easy to see that if the act complained of is wholly
justified by law, it would not amount to an offence at all
in view of the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code.
Many cases may however arise where in acting under the
provisions of the Police Act or other law conferring powers
on the police the police officer or some other person may go
beyond what is strictly justified in law. Though s. 79 of
the Indian Penal Code will have no application to such
cases, s. 53 of the Police Act will apply. But s. 53
applies to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes
the task of the court, whenever
753
any question whether this section applies or not arises to
bestow particular care on its decision. In doing this it
has to ascertain first what act is complained of’ and then
to examine if there is any provision of the Police Act or
other law conferring powers on the police under which it may
be said to have been done or intended to be done. The Court
has to remember in this connection that an act is not
"under" a provision of law merely because the point of time
at which it is done coincides with the point of time when
some act in the exercise of the powers granted by the
provision or in performance of the duty imposed by it. To
be able to say that an act is done "’under" a provision of
law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable
relationship between the provisions and the act. In the
absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to be done
under" the particular provision of law.
This aspect of the matter was emphasized by this Court
recently in Virupappa Veerappa Kadampur v. The State of
Mysore (1) when examining the language of a similar
provision in the Bombay District Police Act.
These principles apply equally to the decision of the
question whether the act complained of was "’intended to be
done" under the provisions of the Police Act or some other
law conferring powers ’on the police. When we apply these
principles to the facts of the present case we look in vain
for any provision of law-whether under the Police Act or
under some other law under which the acts complained of,
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viz., beating a person suspected of a crime or confining him
or sending him away in an injured condition can be said to
have any relation. Mr. Keswani tried to say-it is fair to
him to staterather faintly-that these acts were done under
the provisions of s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
That section empowers any police officer
[1963]Supp.2 S.C.R.6
754
investigating a crime or any other police officer acting on
his requisition to examine orally any person supposed to be
acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
The section further provides that such person shall be
bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to
him by such officer, other than questions answers to
which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal
charge or to a penalty or forefeiture. By no stretch of
imagination can it be said that the provisions of this
section authorise the officer examining a person to beat him
or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a
particular statement. It is worth noticing here s. 163 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The first sub-section of s.
163 prohibits any police officer from making any inducement,
threat or promise for tile purpose of obtaining a statement.
The second sub-section provides that no police officer shall
prevent by caution or otherwise any person from making a
statement which he may be disposed to make on his own free
will. The provisions of s. 163 thus emphasised the fact
that s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
authorise the police officers to beat or to confine a person
with a view to induce him to make a statement.
The act of beating or the act of confining was, it is true
alleged to be done at a time when Venugopal was engaged in
investigation, But it is not possible to see what reasonable
connection these acts had with the process of investigation.
Nor can one see how the act of sending away the injured
person had any relation to the process of investigation.
The High Court fell into the error of thinking that whatever
a police officer does to a person suspected of a crime at a
time when the officer is engaged in investigating that crime
should be held to
755
be done in the discharge of his official duties to inves-
tigate and as such under the provisions of the law that
imposed this duty on him. This view is wholly unwarranted
in law.
In our opinion, it cannot possibly be said that the acts
complained of in the present case were done or intended to
be done under any provision of the Police Act or the Code of
Criminal Procedure or any other law conferring powers on the
police. Section 53 of the Police Act had therefore no
application to this case.
After holding that the prosecution was barred under s. 53 of
the Police Act., the High Court still proceeded to consider
the merits of the case and recorded a conclusion that the
evidence left room for doubt as regards the guilt of the
accused on the different charges. When the High Court held
that the conviction had to be set aside on the preliminary
ground that the prosecution had been commenced in
contravention of s. 53, it might have chosen not to examine
the merits of the case. When it did choose, however, to do
so, it was necessary that this should be done with proper
care. We are constrained to say that the examination of the
evidence was done by the High Court in what can only be
called a cursory or casual manner. It has been necessary
therefore for us to try to assess the evidence for
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ourselves.
But before we proceed to the discussion of the evidence we
must consider a contention raised on behalf of the
respondents that the very trial was vitiated by the fact
that the investigation was not done in accordance with law.
The argument is that under the Madras Police Standing
Orders, the investigation in cases against the police for
torture and causing death has to be conducted by a person of
the rank of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of police
756
or by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. In the present case,
though the initial investigation was conducted by the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Penkondu, it was taken up from him by
an Inspector of the Police, C.I.D., Hyderabad. It was this
Inspector of Police who completed the investigation and
submitted the charge-sheet. It has to be noticed that the
respondents do not say that the investigation was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Their case, as raised before the Session Court,
apparently at the time of argument and again repeated here.
is that the investigation by the Inspector contravened the
Madras Police Standing Orders.
Order No. 145 of the Madras Police Standing Orders
prescribes the procedure, in respect of charges of torture
or of death or grievous hurt against a police officer. This
order it may be mentioned, superseded the previous order No.
157 on the subject and was in force in 1957. The main
features of the procedure when the case occurs in the
Mufassal in the State of Madras are that :-
(1) A Gazetted Police Officer on hearing of such an
occurrence on a complaint made to him or otherwise should
immediately start an informal investigation but when
information is received by a police officer below the rank
of Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police, he should
instead of making an investigation himself report the case
to his Assistance or Deputy Superintendent of Police. In
either case a report should be sent to the Revenue Divi-
sional Officer;
(2) The Revenue Divisional Officer should conduct an
informal enquiry to see whether there are grounds for
launching a criminal prosecution and to fix the
responsibility on individual officers;
(3) Where a complaint has been filed in the Court of a
judicial magistrate as regards the
757
occurrence the Revenue Divisional Officer should after
arriving at his own findings keep them confidential and
decide on the further course of action in the light of the
judicial decision when it is available;
(4) When no complaint has been filed in the court of the
judicial Magistrate the Revenue Divisional Officer should
after completing the investigation submit his report to the
Collector. The Collector shall where necessary issue
instructions for laying a formal complaint by the Revenue
Divisional Officer before the Court of the 1st Class
judicial Magisrate.
It is contended that the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for investigation of crime arc superseded by this
Standing Order and so the investigation by the Inspector,
C.I.D., was illegal. In our opinion, there is no substance
in this argument. It appears to us that this Standing Order
is nothing more than administrative instructions by the
Government of Madras and has not the force of law. It is
worth noticing in this connection that in the Madras Police
Standing Orders as published by the Government of Madras it
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is mentioned in the prefatory note that the orders marked
with asterisk were issued by the Inspector-General of police
under s.9 of the Madras District Police Act. The Standing
Order 145 is not marked with asterisk and it could be safely
held that it was not issued under s. 9 of the Madras
District Police Act. The marginal note against the order as
printed shows that it was issued by a Government Order of
the Home Department dated October 12, 1955. It does not
appear that this was done under any statutory authority.
There can be no doubt that quite apart from the fact that
the Government may and often should issue instructions to
its officers, including police officers, such instructions
have not however the authority of law. We are not satisfied
therefore that the Standing Order No. 145 had the force of
law,
758
We are further of opinion that, in any case, the requirement
of this order was merely directory and not mandatory. Non-
compliance with the provisions of this order therefore does
not make the investigation of the case illegal.
It is also to be mentioned that no objection that the
investigation had been conducted in violation of the
Standing Orders appears to have been taken at any stage
earlier than the trial in the Sessions Court. It will be
proper to hold therefore on the authority of Rishbud’s Case
(1), that even if the provision that the investigation had
to be held and completed by a Magistrate had the force of
law and was mandatory the trial would not be rendered
invalid unless it was shown that miscarriage of justice had
been caused on account of the illegal investigation.
Learned Counsel was not able to show how the accused were in
any way prejudiced by reason of the fact that the investi-
gation was completed by the Inspector of Police. We have
therefore no hesitation in rejecting the contention raised
on behalf of the respondent that the trial was bad in law
because investigation was completed by an Inspector of
Police. (See Munnalal’s Case, Criminal Appeal Nos. 102-104
of 1961, decided on April 17, 1963).
Turning now to the evidence in the case we find it proved by
unimpeachable evidence, and also undisputed fact that Arige
Ramanna was taken away from his house by these respondents
and was with them on January 8, 1957. It is also clearly
proved and is Dot disputed that Arige Ramanna’s dead body
was found on January 9, lying by the side of a hut in Sugali
Tanya. The report of the Asstt. Civil Surgeon who held the
post mortem examination of the body on January 11, 1957
shows that the body bore nine injuries. Seven of these were
contusions on different parts of the body and two abrasions.
One of the contusions on the right parietal scalp had
(1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1150
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the internal injury of the congestion of the brain with
capillary hemorrhage corresponding to it. The doctor’s
report shows that this injury would be necessarily fatal.
The question is: Has the prosecution been able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt its case that these injuries were
caused on the morning of January 9, at Kadiri police station
by these accused persons.
[After discussing the evidence His Lordship proceeded.]
When all these circumstances are considered together they
show one clear connected picture that intent upon getting
some clue about a gold gajjalu which had been stolen from
Kamal Sab’s house in 1952 and exasperated by what he thought
to be Arige Ramanna’s deliberate attempt to conceal the
truth, Venugopal brought Arige Ramanna back to Kadiri police
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station on the morning of January 9, 1957 and there under
his instruction, his subordinates the two police constables,
Rangaswamy and Subbaiah beat up Arige Ramanna and between
them inflicted the injuries which were ultimately discovered
by the doctor.
It is not possible to accept Venugopal’s suggestion that
’after he returned from Madanappalli to Kadiri early in the
morning of January 9, he asked Arige Ramanna and Nallasani
Appalia to go away. It would not be normal human conduct
for him to acknowledge defeat at that stage and the
probabilities of the case strongly support what is proved by
the direct evidence of the witnesses that Arige Ramanna was
taken by him to Kadiri police station on the morning of
January 9, and not allowed to go away.
We are unable to find a single circumstance inconsistent
with the prosecution case that these three respondent beat
up Arige Ramanna at Kadiri police
760
station for the purpose of extorting from him information as
regards the disposal of a gold gajjalu that might lead to
further detection in connection with the case of house-
breaking and theft committed at the house of Kamal Sab in
1952.
The circumstances that have been established are in our
opinion incapable of explanation of any other reasonable
hypothesis than the truth of the prosecution case that these
respondents voluntarily caused hurt to Arige Ramanna for the
purpose of extorting from him information regarding the
disposal of the gold gajjalu which might lead to fuller
detection of the crime. The circumstances speak so clearly
that any other view would, we think, be unreasonable,
arbitrary and indeed perverse.
On a consideration of the injuries that were caused, we do
not find it possible to be certain that the respondents had
the intention of causing grievous hurt to Arige Ramanna.
What is proved beyond doubt however is that they voluntarily
caused hurt to Arige Ramanna for the purpose mentioned
above. Thereby, they committed an offence under s. 330 of
the Indian Penal Code, though not under s. 331 of that Code.
In view of this conclusion from the circumstantial evidence
adduced in the case it is hardly necessary to discuss the
direct testimony given by Nallasani Appalla, the prosecution
witness No. 1. As however the Trial Court on a consideration
of the evidence believed it to be substantially true except
as regards the fourth accused Kamal Sab, who is no longer
before us, and the High Court has expressed a contrary
opinion, we shall briefly refer to his evidence.
We think it proper to point out that the judgment of the
High Court does not contain any discussion worth the name of
what this witness has said or
761
of the reasons which induced the High Court to characterize
it as "unreliable".
[After discussing the evidence His Lordship proceeded.]
On a Consideration of all the circumstances of the case, we
are of opinion that the Session judge was right in his
assessment of this witness’s testimony against these three
respondents and the High Court was wrong in considering his
evidence as wholly unreliable.
Nallasani’s evidence by itself would be sufficient to prove
that the accused had committed an offence under s. 330 of
the Indian Penal Code. But the circumstantial evidence we
have discussed above so clearly establishes their guilt for
this offence that it is unnecessary to seek any further
support for it.
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For the reasons mentioned above, we have come to the
conclusion that the decision of the High Court that there
was any doubt about the truth of the prosecution case that
these respondents beat up Arige Ramanna does not bear
scrutiny and is wholly unjustified. The interests of
justice demand that the High Court’s decision on this
question should not be allowed to stand.
Accordingly, we set aside the order of High Court acquitting
the respondents altogether in respect of injuries caused to
Arige Ramanna, and convict them all of an offence under s.
330 of the Indian Penal Code.
On behalf of the State Mr. Chari does not press the appeal
against the acquittal of the respondents on the other
charge;, viz , ss. 343, 348 and s. 201 read with s. 109 of
the Indian Penal Code.
762
The learned Session judge awarded a sentence of five years’
rigorous imprisonment for the offence under s. 331 of the
Indian Penal Code. Though we have altered the conviction to
one under s. 330 of the Indian Penal Code, we do not think
we shall be justified in reducing the sentence. A serious
view cannot but be taken of such a barbarous method of
dealing with persons suspected of a crime as was committed
by these respondents in this case. It is necessary that
deterrent sentences should be inflicted for such an offence
when established.
Accordingly, we convict the respondents under s. 330 of the
Indian Penal Code and we sentence each of them to five
years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The appeal is thus allowed in part and is dismissed as
regards the acquittal of the respondents on other charges.
The accused to surrender to their bail.
Appeal allowed in part.
763