Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MESSRS. P.M. PATEL & SONS AND OTHERS, ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT25/09/1985
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
BENCH:
PATHAK, R.S.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 447 1985 SCR Supl. (3) 55
1986 SCC (1) 32 1985 SCALE (2)860
CITATOR INFO :
F 1992 SC 573 (12,14,39)
ACT:
Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions
Act 1952 Section 2(f) - Workers employed- at their homes in
manufacture of beedis - Whether entitled to benefit of the
Act.
Relationship of Master and servant - Element of
personal service - Of little significance when test of
control and supervision enables a right of rejection.
HEADNOTE:
The labour employed in the manufacture of beedis
consists of different categories. At the factory, which
constitutes the formal establishment, there are
administrative and clerical staff, accountants, packers,
checkers and bhattimen. The work of rolling the beedis
itself is done by one or the other of different categories
of workers. The first category is where the work may be
entrusted by the manufacturers directly to workers who
prepare the beedis at home after obtaining a supply of the
raw material consisting of tobacco, beedi leaves and thread
from the manufacturers. The second category consists of
workers employed by the manufacturers through contractors
and the manufacturers pass on the raw material to such
workers for rolling the beedis in their dwelling houses and
then supplying beedis. There is thus a direct relationship
between the manufacturers and workers. The third category of
home workers are those to whom the work is entrusted by
independent contractors who treat the workers as their own
employees and get the work done by them either at their own
premises or in the dwelling homes of the workers in order to
fulfil and complete contracts entered into with the
manufacturers for the supply of the finished product from
the raw material supplied by the manufacturers to the
contractors.
The home workers attend the factories within specified
hours everyday ant collect the raw material for taking to
their homes for rolling beedis. In the case of home workers
who hold a direct relationship with the manufacturers, the
rolled beedis are brought by the home workers to the factory
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and the beedis which H
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conform to the standards envisaged by the manufacturers are
accepted while those which do not are rejected. The staff at
the factory maintains registers in which regular entries are
made of the raw material supplied to home workers, and of
the rolled beedis which are delivered by them at the
factory. The payment of wages to such home workers may be
mate directly or distributed through the contractors engaged
by the manufacturers. In the case of contracts between the
manufacturers ant independent contractors, the manufactured
product is collected by the contractors from their home
workers ant delivered to the manufacturer. The manufacturer
is concerned only with the payment under the contract to the
contractors, and the payment of wages to the home workers is
a matter between the contractors ant the home workers.
The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 provides for the institution of
provident Funds for employees in factories ant other
establishments. Originally, it did not extent to the beedi
industry. For the first time, by a Notification dated May
17, 1977 mate by Government of India the beedi Industry was
added to Schedule I of the Act with effect from May 31,
1977. This was followed by another Notification dated May
23, 1977 issued by the Central Government amending clause
(b) of sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph I of the Employees’
Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 in order to bring the beedi
industry within the province of that scheme with effect from
May 31, 1977. The Central Government Provident Funds
Commissioner thereupon wrote to all the Regional Provident
Funds Commissioners for the enforcement of the scheme in the
beedi industry.
The petitioners in the Writ Petitions who were engaged
in the manufacture and sale of beedis, challenged the
constitutional validity of the Notifications dated May 17,
1977 ant May 23, 1977, ant the enforcement of the Scheme in
so far as it related to home workers ant sought a
declaration that the Employees’ Deposit-Linked Insurance
Scheme ant the Employees’ Family Pension Scheme framed under
the Employees’ Provident Funds Act are unenforceable in
respect of the beedi industry, contenting that: (i) while
the Employees’ Provident Funds Act ant the Scheme may be
applicable to the workers employed in the factory itself,
they cannot be extended to home workers because there is no-
relationship of employer ant employee between the
manufacturers ant the home workers, (ii) the Employees’
Provident Funds Act ant the Scheme cannot be applied to home
workers in the beedi industry inasmuch as they are subject
to no retirement age and there is no
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power in the manufacturer to retire such home workers on the
ground of superannuation, ant (iii) the extension of the
Scheme to the beedi industry constitutes an unreasonable
restriction on the Fundamental rights of the petitioners
guaranteed by sub-cl. (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the
Constitution and also violates Articles 14 and 31 of the
Constitution in as much as the financial burden occasioned
thereby is so excessive that it is obvious that the Central
Government did not apply its mind to the paying capacity of
the industry.
On the question whether the workers employed at their
homes in the manufacture of beedis are entitled to the
benefit of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme ant
Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 ant the Schemes framed
thereunder.
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Dismissing the Writ Petitions,
^
HELD: 1. The home workers are ’employees’ within the
definition of ’employee’ contained in clause (f) of s. 2 of
the Employees’ Provident Funds Act 1952, and the Schemes
framed thereunder. The terms of the definition of ’employee’
in section 2(f) of the Act are wide. They include not only
persons employed directly by the employer but also persons
employed through a contractor. Moreover, they include mot
only persons employed in the factory but also persons
employed in connection with the work of the factory. A home
worker, by virtue of the fact that he rolls beedis, is
involved in an activity connected with the work of the
factory. It is therefore mot possible to accept the narrow
construction sought by the ’petitioners that the words ’in
connection with’ in the definition of ’employee’ in section
2(f) must be confined to work performed in the factory
itself as a part of the total process of the manufacture.
[67 G, 63 C-E]
2. The conditions and the circumstances in which the
home workers of a single manufacturer go about their work,
including the receiving of raw material, rolling the beedis
at home and delivering them to the manufacturer subject to
the right Of rejection indicates sufficient evidence of the
requisite degree of control and supervision for establishing
the relationship of master and servant between the
manufacturer and the home worker. The work of rolling beedis
is mot of a sophisticated nature, requiring control and
supervision at the time when the work is done. It is a
simple operation which has been performed satisfactorily by
thousands of illiterate workers. It is a task which can be
performed by young and old, men and women, with
58
equal facility. It does not require a high order of skill.
The right of rejection can constitute in itself an effective
degree of supervision and control, and there is evidence to
show that the rejection takes place in the presence of the
home worker. This factor however plays a merely supportive
role in determining the existence of the relationship of
master and servant. The element of personal service is of
little significance when the test of control and supervision
lies in the right of rejection. [67 C-F]
Shri Chintaman Rao and Another v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, [1958] S.C.R.. 1340, Shri Birdhichand Sharma v.
First Civil Judge, Nagpur and Others, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 161.
Shanker Balaji Waje v. State of Maharashtra [1962] Suppl. 1
S.C.R. 249, M/s. Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Union of India,
[1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 837, D.C. Dewan Mohindeen Sahib and
Sons v. The Industrial Tribunal, Madras, [1964] 7 S.C.R.
646, Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of
Shops & Establishments, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 747, Mangalore
Ganesh Beedi Works etc. v. Union of India etc. [1974] 3
S.C.R. 221, referred to.
3. Clause (a) of sub-para. (1) of Para 69 of the
Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme provided that "a member
may withdraw the full amount standing to his credit in the
fund on retiring from service after attaining the age of 55
years". The law does not envisage the fixation of a
retirement age before that provision can apply. A worker is
entitled to withdraw the amount in the Fund if he retires at
any time after attaining the age of 55 years. There 18 no
reference to any predetermined age of superannuation. [68 A-
B]
4. The expression ’retirement’ does mot, in the absence
of anything more, necessarily imply a fixed age for leaving
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service. It has a wide connotation. In a context where no
age of superannuation has been fixed, the expression must
take on its ordinary meaning of the normal cessation of
service by an act of the employer or of the worker. That a
person may retire even before reaching any specified age 18
exemplified by cl. (b) of sub-para (1) of para 69 which
speaks of "retirement on account of permanent and total
incapacity for work due to bodily or mental infirmity." [68
C]
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen and
other etc. [1969] 2 S.C.R. 307, referred to.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh v.
Shri T.S. Hariharan, [1971] Suppl. S.C.R. 305,
distinguished.
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5. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of
Employment) Act, 1966 and the Rules made thereunder by the
Maharashtra Government have been framed specifically on the
basis that in certain matters home workers enjoy a status
akin to the general category of workers. In the Maharashtra
Beedi ant Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules
1968, there is specific provision in respect of the payment
of wages to home workers. The contention that the provisions
of the Employees Provident Funds Act and the Schemes cannot
be implemented at all in respect of the beedi industry has
therefore to be rejected. [69 C, E, F]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 3605 to
3609 of 1978 etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
M.N. Phadke, B. Kanta Rao, M.Q. Qazi, V.N. Ganpule and
Mrs. Veena Khanna for the Petitioners.
Abdul Khader, Girish Chander and Miss A. Subhashini for
the Respondents.
Mr. Rameshwar Nath for the Interveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PATHAK, J. This and the connected cases raise the
important question whether the workers employed at their
homes in the manufacture of beedis are y entitled to the
benefit of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 and the & heme framed thereunder.
The question for consideration is surrounded‘by a
welter of facts, many of which are disputed through
affidavits filed on the record, and it has not been an easy
task to pick our way through them to arrive at an
intelligent and coherent picture for the purpose of deciding
these cases. We propose to take Writ Petitions Nos. 3605 to
3609 of 1978 filed by Messrs. P.M. Patel & Sons and others
as the leading group of cases, because the principal
arguments on the several points arising in these cases were
argued by learned counsel in those writ petitions.
The petitioners are engaged in the manufacture and sale
of beedis. The labour employed in the manufacture of beedis
consists of different categories. At the factory, which
constitutes the formal establishment. there is an
administrative ant clerical
60
staff, accountants, packers, checkers and bhattimen. The
work of rolling the beedis itself is done by one or the
other of different categories of workers. The work may be
entrusted by the manufacturers directly to workers who
prepare the beedis at home after obtaining a supply of the
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raw material consisting of tobacco, beedi leaves and thread
from the manufacturers. Another category consists of workers
employed by the manufacturers through contractors, and the
manufacturers pass on the raw material to such workers for
rolling the beedis in their dwelling houses, and there is,
in a sense, a direct relationship between the manufacturers
and those workers. m e third category of home workers are
those to whom the work is entrusted by independent
contractors who treat the workers as their own employees and
get the work done by them either at their own premises or in
the dwelling homes of the workers in order to fulfil and
complete contracts entered into with the manufacturers for
the supply of the finished product from the raw material
supplied by the manufacturers to the contractors. A cording
to the manufacturers the home workers attend at the
factories within specified hours every day and collect the
raw material for taking to their homes for rolling beedis.
While that is true of home workers employed directly by the
manufacturers or who have been placed in employment through
contractors with the manufacturer, in the case of home
workers employed by independent contractors that may not be
so. In the case of home workers who hold a direct
relationship with the manufacturers, the rolled beedis are
brought by the home workers to the factory and the beedis
which conform to the standards envisaged by the
manufacturers are accepted while those which do not are
rejected. m e acceptance or rejection is effected in the
presence of the home worker to whom the work was entrusted.
The staff at the factory maintains registers in which
regular entries are made of the raw material supplied to
home workers, and of the rolled beedis which are delivered
by them at the factory. m e payment of wages to such home
workers may be made directly or distributed through the
contractors engaged by the manufacturers for engaging them.
In the case of contracts between the manufacturers and
independent contractors, the manufactured product is
collected by the contractors from their home worker and
delivered to the manufacturer. It is evident that the
manufacturer is concerned only with payment under the
contract to the contractors, and the payment of wages to the
home workers is a matter between the contractor and the home
workers.
The employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the
Employees’ Provident Funds Act ) provides for the
institution of provident funds for
61
employees in factories and other establishments. Originally,
it did not extend to the beedi industry. For the first
time, by Notification No. GSR. 660 dated May 17, 1977 made
by the Government of India under sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of that
Act, the beedi industry was added to Schedule I of the Act
with effect from May 31, 1977. This was followed by
Notification No. GSR. 677 dated May 23, 1977 issued by the
Central Government amending clause (b) of sub-paragraph 3 of
paragraph 1 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as the "Scheme") so as to bring the
beedi industry within the province of that Scheme with
effect from May 31, 1977. Closely thereafter, the Central
Government Provident Funds Commissioner wrote to all the
Regional Provident Funds Commissioners about the extension
of the Scheme to the beedi industry with effect from June 1,
1977. By these writ petitions the petitioners challenge the
constitutional validity of the Notifications dated May 17,
1977 and May 23, 1977 and the proceedings taken by the
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respondents against the petitioners for the purpose of
enforcing the employees’ Provident Funds Act and the Scheme
so far as they relate to home workers. The petitioners also
seek a corresponding declaration that the Employees’
Deposit-Linked Insurance Scheme and the Employees’ Family
Pension Scheme framed under the Employees’ Provident Funds
Act are unenforceable in respect of the beedi industry.
The principal grounds on which the petitioners
challenge the impugned Notifications may be shortly
enumerated:-
(1) While the Employees’ Provident Funds Act and
the Scheme may be applicable to the workers
employed in the factory itself, they cannot be
extended to home workers because there is no
relationship of employer and employee between the
manufacturers and the home workers. It is
submitted that a home worker cannot be described
as an "employee" within the definition set forth
in clause (f) of 8. 2 of the Employees’ Provident
Funds Act.
(2) The Employees’ Provident Funds Act and the
Scheme cannot be applied to home workers in the
beedi industry inasmuch as they are subject to no
retirement age and there is no power in the
manufacturer to retire such home workers on the
ground of superannuation. Having regard to the
peculiar features of the arrangements under which
home workers
62
manufacture beedis, it is not reasonably possible
to apply and implement the provisions of the
Employees Provident Funds Act and the Scheme in
relation to them.
(3) The extension of the Employees’ Provident
Funds Act and the Scheme to the beedi industry
constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the
Fundamental Rights of the petitioners guaranteed
by sub-cl. (g) of clause 1 of Article 19 of the
Constitution and also violates Articles 14 and 31
of the Constitution inasmuch as the financial
burden occasioned thereby is so excessive that it
is obvious that the Central Government did not
apply its mind to the paying capacity of the
industry. Moreover, the burden imposed on the
industry-bears no nexus to the object of the
statute, namely, to provide post retirement
benefits.
Having considered the material on the record before us
in this leading group of writ petitions it appears that some
of the home workers have been working regularly for several
years exclusively for a single manufacturer, and depend for
their livelihood on this work, that they attend the factory
during specified hours to secure raw material for making
beedis at home and for delivering the manufactured beedis to
the staff at the factory, that the quantity of leaves and
tobacco supplied is fixed by the manufacturer, and that
registers of the raw material and of payment of wages are
maintained at the factory, that a record is maintained of
the manufactured beedis received from the home workers and
the quantity rejected, and that a log book or a wage card is
issued to the home workers.
In order to organise the conditions in which the beedi
workers worked and to give them greater security of
employment Parliament enacted the Beedi and Cigar Workers
(Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and the State
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Governments framed rules under that statute. The said Act
applied to home workers, as is clear from the definition of
"employee" in clause (f) of 8. 2 of
that Act and provides for the application of certain labour
laws.
There is no dispute that pursuant to the impugned
Notification dated May 17, 1977 the beedi industry has been
brought within the scope of the Employees’ Provident Funds
Act and that the impugned Notification dated May 23, 1977
has made the Scheme applicable to the beedi industry. Clause
(a) of sub-s.
63
(3) of 8. 1 of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act applies
that Act to every establishment which is a factory engaged
in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty
or more persons are employed. Admittedly, the factory
belonging to the manufacturer is, therefore, drawn within
the compass of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act and the
Scheme. It is also admitted by the petitioners that the
workers employed within the factory premises would be
covered by the Act and the Scheme. The real question is
whether the home workers are entitled to that benefit.
Clause (f) of s. 2 of that Act defines an "employee" to mean
"any person who is employed for wages in any kind of work,
manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an
establishment, and who gets his wages directly or indirectly
from the employer, and includes any person employed by or
through a contractor in or in connection with the work of
the establishment." It will be noticed that the terms of the
definition are wide. They include not only persons employed
directly by the employer but also persons employed through a
contractor, Moreover, they include not only persons employed
in the factory but also persons employed in connection with
the work of the factory. It seems to us that a home worker,
by virtue of the fact that he rolls beedis, is involved in
an activity connected with the work of the factory. We are
unable to accept the narrow construction sought by the
petitioners that the words "in connection with" in the
definition of "employee" must be confined to work performed
in the factory itself as a part of the total process of the
manufacture.
Now to be an employee it is necessary that the
relationship of master and servant should exist with the
employer. The principal question is whether such a
relationship exists between the manufacturer and a home
worker. Several cases were placed before us by the parties
in this connection, and reference may be made to them. In
Shri Chintaman Rao and Another v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh, [1958] S.C.R. 1340, this Court held that
independent contractors, known as Sattedars, with whom a
manufacturer contracted for the supply of beedis could not
be described as workers within the definition of sub-8- (1)
of 8- 2 of the Factories Act, nor could their collies,
because the Sattedars undertook to supply the beedis by
manufacturing them in their own factories or by entrusting
the work to third parties. The Sattedars were not subject to
a right of control by the manufacturer in respect of the
manner in which the work was to be done. The Court applied
the principle that the test for determining the relationship
of master and servant lay in the
64
existence of the right in the master to supervise and
control the A work done by the servant not only in the
matter of directing what work the servant was to do but also
the manner in which he should do it. In passing, the Court
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referred to home workers employed by the Sattedars for
making beedis in their respective homes, and the Court
observed that they could not be regarded as persons employed
by the manufacturer directly or through any agency.
Thereafter, in Shri Birdhichand Sharma v. First Civil Judge,
Nagpur and Others, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 161, this Court
considered a case where the manufacturer had employed
workmen in his beedi factory and who were at liberty to work
at their homes, and the Court held that the conditions in
which they worked made them "workers" within the meaning of
clause (1) of s. 2 of the Factories Act. The significant
feature of the judgement lies in the observation of the
Court that in the case of the beedi industry the right of
rejection of the beedis if they did not come up to the
proper standard was evidence of the supervision and control
exercised by the manufacturer. Noting that the nature and
extent of supervision and control varied in different
industries. the Court said :-
"Taking the nature of the work in the present case
it can hardly be said that there must be
supervision all time when biris are being prepared
and unless there is such supervision there can be
no direction as to the manner of work. In the
present case the operation being a simple one, the
control of the manner in which the work is done is
exercised at the end of the day, when biris are
ready, by the method of rejecting those which do
not come up to the proper standard. In such a case
it is the right to supervise and not so much the
mode in which it is exercised which is important."
Reference may be made next to Shankar Balaji Waje v. State
of Maharashtra, [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 249. The majority
view taken on the particular facts of that case was that the
workers were not subject to the control and supervision of
the manufacturer. The learned Judges constituting the
majority appear to have overlooked the observations in
Birdhichand Sharma (supra) that the right of rejection of
the beedis prepared by the workers in itself constituted a
sufficient element of supervision and control. Our attention
was also invited by the petitioners to . Orissa Cement Ltd.
v. Union of India [1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 837, but this is a
case where the question was whether a notification was
valid which made the employer liable to pay into
65
the provident fund, constituted under the provident Funds
Act, 1952, the share of workers who were in fact the
employees of A independent contractors. The Court drew a
careful distinction between labour employed by the
manufacturer and that employed by an independent contractor.
Most of these cases were considered thereafter by this Court
in D.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib and Sons v. The Industrial
Tribunal, Madras, [1964] 7 S.C.R. 646, and while reviewing
the law the Court rejected the plea of the manufacturers
against the application of the Industrial Disputes Act on
the ground that the workers ostensibly employed by the "so-
called contractors" were in fact the workmen of the
appellants who had employed them through their agents or
servants. It may be pointed out, however, that the Court
reiterated the view expressed in Birdhichand Sharma’s case
(supra) that the rolling of beedis was work of such a simple
nature that supervision was not required all the time and it
was sufficient if supervision was exercised at the end of
the day through the system of rejecting defective beedis.
The law took a major shift in Silver Jubilee Tailoring House
and others v. Chief Inspector of Shops and establishments
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and another [1974] 1 S.C.R. 747, as to the criteria which
determined the relationship of master and servant. Mathew,
J., who spoke for the Court, reviewed the earlier decisions
of this Court as well as some of the decisions rendered in
England, and pointed out that the test of control as
traditionally formulated was no longer treated as an
exclusive test. He observed -
"It is exceedingly doubtful today whether the
search for a formula in the nature of a single
test to tell a contract of service from contract
for service will serve any useful purpose. The
most that profitably can be done is to examine all
the factors that have been referred to in the
cases on the topic. Clearly, not all of these
factors would be relevant in all these cases or
have the same weight in all cases. It is equally
clear that no magic formula can be propounded
which factors should in any case be treated as
determining ones. The plain fact is that in a
large number of cases, the court can only perform
a balancing operation weighing up the factors
which point in one direction and balancing them
against those pointing in the opposite direction.
During the last two decades the emphasis in the
field has shifted and no longer rests so strongly
upon the question of control. Control is obviously
an
66
important factor and in many cases it may still be
the decisive factor. But it is wrong to say that
in every case it is decisive. It is now no more
than a factor, although an important one
He was dealing with a case where the workers who were
tailors went to tailoring shops and were given work as and
when work was available, and when cloth was given for
stitching to a worker he was told how he should stitch it,
and if the instructions were not carried out the work was
rejected and he was asked to restitch it. Some of the
workers were allowed to take the clothes home for stitching.
The Court held that there was a relationship of master and
servant because of the right in the employer to reject the
work done, and it reiterated that "the degree of control and
supervision would be different in different types of work".
In the present cases, the right of rejection can similarly
be said to represent the control and supervision exercised
by the manufacturer over the beedis prepared by the home
workers. Quite obviously, while in the Silver Jubilee
Tailoring House case (supra) it was possible for, the
employer to direct re-stitching of the garment, no such
direction can be reasonably envisaged in the case of sub-
standard beedis. A Constitution Bench of this Court had
occasion to consider the law in Bangalore Ganesh Beedi Works
etc. v. Union of India etc. [1974] 3 S.C.R. 221, which
questioned the validity of the Beedi and Cigar Workers
(Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. The Court adopted the
test of rejection of defective beedis for determining
whether the beedi workers were the employees of the
manufacturer or the independent contractors. The Court
observed:-
"...the manufacturers or trade mark holders have
liability in respect of workers who are directly
employed by them or who are employed by them
through contractors. Workers at the industrial
premises do not present any problem. The
manufacturer or trade mark holder will observe all
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the provisions of the Act by reason of employing
such labour in the industrial premises. When the
manufacturer engages labour through the contractor
the labour is engaged on behalf of the
manufacturer, and the latter has therefore
liability to such contract labour. It is only when
the contractor engages labour for or on his own
behalf and supplies the finished product to the
manufacturer that he will be the principal
employer in relation to such labour and the
manufacturer will not be responsible
67
for implementing the provisions of the Act with
regard A to such labour employed by the
contractor. If the right of rejection rests with
the manufacturer or trade mark holder, in such a
case the contractor who will prepare beedis
through the contract labour will find it difficult
to establish that he is the independent
contractor-
In the context of the conditions and the circumstances
set out earlier in which the home workers of a single
manufacturer go about their work, including the receiving of
raw material, rolling the beedis at home and delivering them
to the manufacturer subject to the right of rejection there
is sufficient evidence of the requisite degree of control
and supervision for establishing the relationship of master
and servant between the manufacturer and the home worker. It
must be remembered that the work of rolling beedis is not
of a sophisticated nature, requiring control and supervision
at the time when the work is done. It is a simple operation
which, as practice has shown, has been performed
satisfactorily by thousands of illiterate workers. It is a
task which can be performed by young and old, men and women,
with equal facility and it does not require a high order of
skill. In the circumstances, the right of rejection can
constitute in itself an effective degree of supervision and
control. We may point out that there is evidence to show
that the rejection takes place in the presence of the home
worker. That factor, however, plays a merely supportive role
in determining the existence of the relationship of the
master and servant. The petitioners point out that there is
no element of personnel service in beedi rolling and that it
is open to a home worker to get the work done by one or the
other member of his family at home. The element of personal
service, it seems to us, is of little significance when the
test of control and supervision lies in the right of
rejection.
In our opinion, the home workers are "employees" within
the definition contained in cl. (f) of s. 2 of the
Employees’ Provident Funds Act.
The next question is whether having regard to the
peculiar features of the home workers’ system of employment
the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds Act and
Scheme can be applied on their terms to home workers. The
principal contention in this connection is that no
retirement age is fixed in the case of home
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workers and, therefore, the Scheme cannot be implemented in
respect of them. Cl. (a) of sub-para (1) of Para. 69 of the
Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme provides that "a member
may withdraw the full amount standing to his credit in the
Fund on retirement from service after attaining the age of
55 years". It seems to us that the law does not envisage the
fixation of a retirement age before that provision can
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apply. A worker is entitled to withdraw the amount standing
to his credit in the fund if he retires at any time after
attaining the age of 55 years. There is no reference to any
pre-determined age of superannuation. The expression
"retirement" does not, in the absence of anything more
necessarily imply a fixed age for leaving service. It has a
wide connotation. In a context where no age of
superannuation has been fixed, the expression must take on
its ordinary meaning of the normal cessation of service by
an act of the employer or of the worker. That a person may
"retire" even before reaching any specified age is
exemplified by cl. (b) of sub-para. (1) of Para. 69 which
speaks of "retirement on account of permanent and total
incapacity for work due to bodily or mental infirmity". We
may point out that in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.,
V. Workmen and others etc. [1969] 2 S-C-R. 307, this Court
has held that a gratuity scheme could be effective even if
no age of superannuation was fixed. Learned counsel for the
petitioners had referred us to Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh v. Shri T.S. Hariharan [1971]
Suppl. S.C.R. 305, where this Court observed in respect of
the Employees’ Provident Funds Act:-
"The Act was brought on the statute book for
providing for the institution of a provident fund
for the employees in factories and other
establishments. The basic purpose of providing for
provident funds appears to be to make provision
for the future of the industrial worker after his
retirement or for his dependants in case of his
early death. To achieve this ultimate object the
Act is designed to cultivate among the workers a
spirit of saving something regularly, and also to
encourage stabilisation of a steady labour force
in the industrial centres,"
and it is pointed out that the Court rejected the plea that
the Act could apply to short term employees also. The case,
in our opinion, is distinguishable because the workers there
were taken in employment on account of an emergency and for
a very short period necessitated by an abnormal contingency.
That is not the
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position here. In the present cases, the employment was
entered A into in the regular course of business. We hold
that there is no substance in the contention of the
petitioners that the provisions of the Employees’ Provident
Funds Act and the Scheme cannot be applied at all to home
workers. There is no reason why the provisions of the Act
and Scheme should not apply where their terms permit such
application-
We may also point out that the Beedi and Cigar Workers
(Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and the rules made
thereunder by the Maharashtra Government have been framed
specifically on the basis that in certain matters home
workers enjoy a status akin to the general category of
workers. Not only do these provisions apply to "industrial
premises" as defined under clause (i) of s.2 of that Act but
also to an "establishment" as defined in clause (i) of s. 2
of the Act. There are several provisions which apply to
employees in establishments and are not confined to
industrial premises. An "establishment", by the terms of its
definition is wide enough to include the dwelling house of a
home worker. A home worker would be entitled, therefore, to
annual leave with wages and wages during leave period among
other things. In the Maharashtra Beedi and Cigar Workers
(Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968 there is specific
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provision in respect of the payment of wages to home
workers. The Rules relating to the issue of raw material by
the employer would extend to home workers also.
Accordingly, we reject the contention that the
provisions of the Employees Provident Funds Act and the
Schemes cannot be implemented at all in respect of the beedi
industry.
The last contention of learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the financial burden which will be
suffered by the beedi industry in consequence of the
Employees’ Provident Funds Act and the Schemes envisaged by
it being extended to the industry will be beyond the
financial capacity of the beedi industry and will severely
handicap it in competing with the cigarette manufacturing
industry. There is no nexus, it is said, between the burden
imposed on the industry and the object of the statute of
providing postretirement benefits. It is urged that this
aspect did not engage the attention of the Central
Government when the impugned Notifications were promulgated.
On the basis of this submission the petitioners contend that
their Fundamental Rights under Article 14, sub-cl. (g) of
cl. (1) of Article 19 and Article 31 of the Constitution
have been violated. We have
70
carefully examined the record before us and we are unable to
find adequate material in support of this submission. We
need say nothing more. The contention is rejected.
In the result, we see no force in these writ petitions,
the connected writ petitions and the connected special leave
petitions, and they are all accordingly dismissed. There is
no order as to costs.
N.V.K. Petitions dismissed
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