Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 2729 of 1999
PETITIONER:
City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
Damodar Khemchand Talreja & Anr., Abdul Gafur Naruddin Kazi & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/2003
BENCH:
DORAISWAMY RAJU & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
The appellant in both these appeals is City and
Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra
Limiteda Government Company designated as Special
Planning Authority/New Town Development Authority for
the development of notified area known as New Nasik. The
proceedings for acquisition of vast extent of land were
initiated during the year 1982 in one case and in 1975 in
another case under the provisions of Maharashtra Regional
Town Planning Act, 1966 read with the Land Acquisition
Act. The present appeals, which we are concerned with,
relate to award of compensation for portions of the said
land belonging to the respondents. The compensation was
determined by the Reference Court zone-wise. In Civil
Appeal No. 2729/1999, the appeal filed by the State against
the award of the Reference Court was dismissed upholding
the determination of the market value by the Reference
Court. At the same time, the High Court held that the
claimants shall be entitled to get the benefits envisaged by
Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act
as added/amended by Central Act 68 of 1984. In Civil
Appeal Nos. 2730-2731 of 1999, the appeal filed by the
claimant against the order of the Reference Court was
partly allowed by enhancing the compensation to a certain
extent. The appeal filed by the State was dismissed. There
also, the benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 as
amended were made available to the claimants.
Strangely enough, the judgment of the High Court in
each of these cases in the main appeals against the
awards of the Reference Court have not been questioned at
all before this Court. The orders questioned in this Court
are those dismissing the appellant’s application for
impleadment and review filed after the disposal of the
appeals. The impugned order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2730-
2731 of 1999 reads as follows:
"Heard learned Counsel for the
parties.
These applications were filed in
two groups of First Appeals. One
group was disposed of on 19-20/4/93.
The other was disposed of on 24-
27/1/97. The applicant is praying for
impleadment and for review of those
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orders. It is not possible to implead
the applicant in these First Appeals
which are already disposed of and
consider granting of review.
Civil application disposed of
accordingly."
An identical order was passed on the same date, i.e.,
on 22.12.1998 in the other matter covered by Civil Appeal
No. 2729 of 1999.
The question of law formulated in the S.L.Ps. is
"whether the provisions of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as introduced by Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act No. 68 of 84 are applicable
for determining the compensation payable in respect of
land acquired under the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966?"
The contention of the appellants is that the
acquisition under the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning
Act is unaffected by subsequent amendments to the Land
Acquisition Act and the provisions in vogue at the time of
enactment of M.R.T.P. Act in regard to solatium, interest
and other monetary benefits relatable to compensation
should alone be taken into account. However, this
contention was not raised before the High Court even in
the main appeals. As similar issue was pending
consideration in Civil Appeal No. 4394 of 1997, leave was
granted by this Court. That appeal has been disposed of
today.
Strictly speaking, the question which has been raised
in the S.L.P. does not arise for consideration at all
inasmuch as the main judgment of the High Court in the
concerned appeals has not been questioned. Not even a
ground is raised in the S.L.P. as to how the impugned
order dismissing the impleadment petitions and the prayer
for review is contrary to law or legally unsustainable. Even
a copy of Civil Application and the counter if any filed
therein has not been filed along with the S.L.P. or in the
paper book. The reason given by the High Court in
dismissing the Civil Applications seems to be
unexceptionable.
The question of deciding the point of law raised by
the appellants does not strictly arise for consideration in
view of what is mentioned above. In any case, that issue
stands concluded against the appellants in the judgment
which we have pronounced today in Civil Appeal No. 4394
of 1997.
In the course of arguments, a contention was raised
that the appellant-corporation at whose instance the
application was made, is a necessary party and it should
have been impleaded in the proceedings before the
statutory authorities and the Courts. Relying on the
decision in 1993 (1) SCC, Page 608, it is contended that the
failure to make the requisitioning body as a party vitiates
the acquisition. This point was not specifically raised in the
S.L.P. We are not in a position even to know the averments
made in the I.A. filed in Civil Application and the counter
filed therein. We are saying this because the learned
counsel for the respondents has stated in the course of
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arguments and written submissions that the appellant was
well aware of the Reference proceedings and even oral and
documentary evidence was produced by the appellant. It is
further stated that the appellant deposited the amount
decreed and also instructed the Government Pleader to file
the appeals. The appellant itself did not choose to file the
appeal though it was open to it to do so. It is, therefore,
contended that long after the disposal of the appeal by the
High Court, the bogey of prejudice is sought to be raised
and the S.L.P. has been preferred apparently for the reason
that the issue regarding the statutory benefits under the
amended L.A. Act was pending consideration in another
matter. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been
in a position to rebut what the respondents’ counsel has
stated.
For various reasons noted above, we cannot, at this
stage, allow the appellant to raise the point that it was not
made a party, especially when we are not in a position to
say that any prejudice had occurred to the appellant. In any
case, the only question of law raised in appeals having
been decided against the State, no further consideration
needs to be given to these appeals.
The appeals are therefore dismissed without costs.