Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
KUNDULA BALA SUBRAHMANYAM AND ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT26/03/1993
BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
SINGH N.P. (J)
CITATION:
1993 SCR (2) 666 1993 SCC (2) 684
JT 1993 (2) 559 1993 SCALE (2)214
ACT:
Evidence Act 1872: Section 3--Appreciation of
evidence--Criminal trial--Case based on circumstantial
evidence--Proof--Court’s duty to scrutinize
evidence--Motive, oral dying declarations, medical evidence,
conduct of accused immediately and after the evidence,
absconding of accused--Whether prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Evidence Act, 1872: Section 32--Dying declaration--proof
of--Acceptance by Court when--More than two dying
declarations--Trustworthy test--Court’s duty.
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Object and purpose
of--Cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides
and dowry deaths of young brides--Causes--Solutions to such
situations--Court’s role what to be.
HEADNOTE:
The prosecution case was that on 23.8.1981 between 12-30
1.00 p.m., on hearing screams and cry of the deceased, aged
about 18 years, P.W.2 alongwith her father PW3, and PW4
rushed to the house of the appellant They saw the father of
appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased) alongwith
the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased hurriedly com-
ing out of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on the
floor engulfed in flames.
As the appellant No. 1, did not respond to the request of
PW2 to give her something to extinguish the fire, PW2
requested the father of the appellant No. 1 to give a bed-
sheet or blanket while the father of the appellant No. 1 was
passing on a bed sheet to PW2, the appellant No. 2 (mother-
in-law of the deceased) objected. In the meanwhile PW2 took
the bed sheet from the father of the appellant No. 1 and
tried to extinguish the fire. The deceased asked PW2 for
some water. PW3 removed the burning petticoat from the body
of the deceased to save her from further burning. While
doing so he also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured
water into the deceased’s mouth and enquired from her as to
what had happened.
667
The deceased told PW2 that her mother-in- law had poured
kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to her. The
deceased asked for more water, which was again given to her
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by PW2. The deceased’s statement made to PW2 was overheard
by PW3 PW5 and some others who also reached the spot on
hearing her cries.
PW5 went away to inform the matenal uncle of the deceased
with one Ramakrishna on his motor cycle. There PW5 found
PW1, the brother of the deceased and informed about the
burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the
deceased telling PW2.
PW1 reached the house of the appellant with Ramakrishna on
his motor cycle. He saw a number of persons including PWs 2
and 3 gathered there. The deceased was lying on the floor
and she had no clothes on her. PWl noticed that she had
received burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her
legs. On seeing her plight, PWl started crying and hitting
his head against a piller. When the deceased noticed PW1
had come, she asked PW2 to bring her brother inside. PW2
went out and brought PWI to the kitchen. The deceased took
the palm of her brother, PWl into her own palms and told him
to tell mother and father that her mother-in-law poured
kerosene on her and her husband set her or fire. She
requested him that he should not fight, "anyhow she was
dying." She also told PWl to take back the cash given to her
and to divide it amongst her sisters in equal share and to
get them married to nice persons. The appellant No. 1, the
husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen with folded
hands and begged her for forgiveness saying that he would
not repeat what he had done. PWI got wild and caught hold
of the neck of the appellant No. 1. FIW2 and PW3 rushed
towards them and released the appellant No. 1 from the hold
of PW1. They sent PWI to another uncle’s house and told the
uncle to take care of PW1. When PWI returned to the house
of the deceased after one hour he saw that PW6, a local
Doctor, was giving first-aid to the deceased and she was
lying on a cot in the verandah. PW6 advised at about 3.30
p.m. to remove the deceased to the Government Hospital. The
deceased was brought to the hospital at about 5 p.m. At
about 5.30 p.m., PW9, a doctor examined the deceased and
declared her dead.
PWl along with his uncle went to the Police Station,
adjacent to the hospital and lodged the FIR. A case under
section 302 IPC was registered
668
and police investigation was started.
Both the appellants were not found in the village when
search for them was made by the investigating officer. The
appellant No. 1 surrendered in the Court on 10.11.1981 while
the appellant No. 2 surrendered in the Court on 7.12.1981.
The Trial Court held that there was no motive for the
appellant to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to
4 could not be relied upon; that PW1 had made improvements
in his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore the
oral dying- declaration made to him could not be relied
upon. The Trial Court also held that there was unexplained
delay in lodging report with the policy. It acquitted the
appellants, holding that the case was one of suicide and not
of murder.
The State filed appeal in the High Court. The High Court
held that the chain of the established circumstances was
complete and the circumstances were sufficient to establish
that the appellants alone had committed the crime of murder
of the deceased. The High Court convicted both the
appellants for the offence under section 302/34 IPC and
sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life.
Hence this appeal before this Court under section 2(a) of
the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate
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Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.
The appellants contended that since the Trial Court had
acquitted the appellants, the High Court was not justified
in recording an order or conviction, as the findings
recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be
perverse; that the dying declarations were not worthy of
reliance and the motive was feeble and not established; that
the surrendering of the appellants themselves in the court
on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that
they had no guilty-conscious and the prosecution was not
justified in relying upon this conduct as an adverse conduct
against the appellants; and that since all neighbors had
become hostile, out of fear the appellants did not act
either to put off the fire or remove the deceased to the
hospital.
The respondent-State submitted that the findings of the
Trial Court were not only conjectural but also perverse and
the evidence of the wit-
669
nesses was disbelieved on mere surmises; that the Trial
Court did,not properly discuss the two dying declarations
made by the deceased and since the dying declarations have
been proved by reliable evidence, these by themselves could
form the basis of conviction of the appellants; that the
High Court after a careful appraisal of the evidence had
rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court which
suffered from illegality as well as manifest error and
perversity,, and that the prosecution had established the
case against the appellants beyond every reasonable doubt
and their appeal deserved to be dismissed.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
HELD:1.01. In a case based on circumstantial evidence,
the settled law is that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and
these circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover,
all the established circumstances should be complete and
there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. The proved
circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent with
his innocence. The courts have, therefore, the duty to
carefully scrutinize the evidence and deal with each
circumstance carefully and thereafter find whether the chain
of the established circumstances is complete or not before
passing an order of conviction. [679 E-F]
1.02.In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive
assumes great significance as its existence is an
enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning.
The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry.
[679 H]
1.03.The evidence led by the prosecution to establish, the
existence of motive is wholly reliable and is also
consistent. The prosecution has successfully established
that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to
commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to get
the land registered in the name of the first appellant and
their insistence to have the land registered in the name of
their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been
conclusively established by the prosecution. [682 D]
1.04.Both the dying declarations are oral. They have
been made to friends and to the brother of the deceased
respectively. In view of the close relationship of the
witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were
670
made, it becomes necessary for the court to carefully
scruitinize and appreciate the evidence of the witnesses to
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the dying declarations- [683. B]
1.05.PW1 is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very
close relation, but mere relationship cannot be a ground to
discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to be
reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of events,
the deceased who was on the verge of her death would have
conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances leading
to her receiving the burn injuries. PW1 has given a very
consistent statement and has reproduced the words of the
deceased clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been brought
out in the cross examination to discredit his testimony at
all. [683 C-D]
1.6.Despite searching cross-examination of both PW2 and
PW3, nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination
to discredit them or doubt their veracity at all. After
carefully analysing their evidence, it is found that PWs 2
and 3 as witnesses worthy of credence and trustworthy.[684
F]
1.07.From the evidence of PWs 1,2 and 3, both the dying
declarations are provedto have been made by the deceased.
They are the statements made by thedeceased and relate
to the circumstances leading to her death. Both the dying
declarations are consistent with each other and appear to
have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the
natural course of events. They have a ring of truth about
them. [684 G]
1.08The medical evidence, fully corroborates the
prosecution case and lendssupport to the dying
declaration and more particularly the manner inwhich the
deceased had been set on fire.[686 D]
1.09.The normal human conduct of any person finding someone
engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off
the flames and. save the life of the person. Though, the
appellants were the closest relations of the deceased, they
did not do anything of the kind. They rendered no first-aid
to the deceased. Their conduct at the time of the
occurrence, therefore, clearly points towards their guilt
and is inconsistent with their innocence. The appellants
did not even accompany the deceased to the hospital in the
matador van. Had the husband not been a party to the crime,
one would have expected that he would be the first person to
take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave
no stone unturned
671
to save her life. An innocent mother-in- law would have
also done the same, even if she had no love or emotional
feelings for her daughter-in-law. Neither the husband nor
the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to remove
the deceased to the hospital let alone accompany her to the
hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with their
innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis, as stated
by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the mother-
in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had lit
fire and put her on flames. [686 H, 687 A-D]
1.10.The prosecution has, thus, successfully established
that the conduct ofboth the appellants both at the time of
the occurrence and immediatelythereafter is consistent
only with the hypothesis-of the guilt of the appellants and
inconsistent with their innocence. [688 B]
1.11.Absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance
consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused
because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run
away for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal case
and arrested by the police, but coupled with the other
circumstances, the absconding of the appellants assumes
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Importance and significance. The prosecution has
successfully established this circumstance also to connect
the appellants with the crime. [688 E-F]
1.12.The prosecution has successfully established all the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against the
appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the
chain of the established circumstances is complete and has
no gaps whatsoever and the same conclusively establishes
that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime
of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner
suggested by the prosecution. All the established
circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis that
it was the appellants alone who committed the crime and the
circumstances are inconsistent with any hypothesis other
than their guilt. [688 G-H, 687 A]
2.01.Under Section 32, when a statement Is made by a person,
as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances
which result In his death, in cases in which the cause of
that person’s death comes into question, such a statement,
oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a
relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. The statement
made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in
that category provided it has been made by the deceased
while in a lit mental condition. [684 H, 685 A-B]
672
2.02.A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his
death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a
person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement The
shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of the
truth of the statement made by the deceased regarding the
causes or circumstances leading to his death. A dying
declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status,
as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of
the deceased victim. Once the statement of the dying person
and the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same
passes the test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it
becomes a very important and a reliable piece of evidence
and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is
true and free from any embelishment such a dying
declaration, by itself, can be sufficient for recording
conviction even without looking for any coroboration. If
there are more than one dying declarations, then the court
has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find
out if each one of these passes the test of being
trustworthy. The Court must further find out whether the
different dying declarations are consistent with each other
in material particulars before accepting and relying upon
the same. [685 C-E]
2.03.Both the dying declarations are consistent with each
other in all material facts and particulars. That the
deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the dying
declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been
doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of
the witnesses nor even in the course of arguments both in
the High Court and before this Court. Both the dying
declarations have passed the test of credit worthiness and
they suffer from no infirmity whatsoever.
[685 F-G]
2.04.The prosecution has successfully established a very
crucial piece of circumstantial evidence in the case that
the deceased had voluntarily made the dying declarations
implicating both, the appellants and disclosing the manner
in which she had been put on fire shortly before her death.
This circumstance, therefore, has been established by the
prosecution beyond every reasonable doubt by clear and
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cogent evidence. [685 G-H]
3.01.There has been an alarming increase in cases relating
to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of
young innocent brides. This growing cult of violence and
exploitation of the young brides, though keeps on sending
shock waves to the civilised society whenever it happens,
continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of the
basic
673
human values of tolerance and the spirit of "live and let
live’. Lack of education and economic dependence of women
have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime. It is
the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the
younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either
acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant in
the crime, in utter disregard of his matrimonial
obligations. [689 C-D]
3.02.Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need
of the day. Change of heart and attitude is what is needed.
If man were to regain his harmony with others and replace
hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love, trust
and understanding and if woman were to receive education and
become economically independent, the possibility of this
pernicious social evil dying a natural death may not remain
a dream only. [690-D]
3.03.The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation
has amended the laws and provided for stringent punishments
in such case and even permitted the raising of presumptions
against the accused in cases of unnatural deaths of the
brides within the first seven years of their marriage. [690
H]
3.04.The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has
been amended from time to time, but this piece of social
legislation, keeping in view the growing menance of the
social evil, also does not appear to have served much
purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and
convictions recorded are rather few. [691 A]
3.05.Laws are not enough to combat the evil. A wider social
movement of educating women of their rights, to conquer the
menace, is what is needed more particularly in rural areas
where women are still largely uneducated and less aware of
their rights and fall an easy prey to their exploitation.
[691 B]
3.06.The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes
greater importance and it is expected that the courts would
deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not
allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural
technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence as
otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the
victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime
going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive
in cases involving crime against women. [691 C]
674
State (Delhi Administration) v. Lavnan & Ors., Crl. Appeals
93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 629 of
1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1985 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 1983.
K.Madhava Reddy, A. Subba Rao and A.D.N. Rao for the
Appellants.
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G. Prabhakar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR.ANAND, J. The curse of dowry has claimed yet another
victim. Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam, the husband of the
deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani and his mother Kundula
Annapurna (mother-in-law of the deceased) have filed this
appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement
of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 against the
judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad,
dated 25.6.1985, setting aside the judgment of acquittal
passed by the Sessions Judge, East Godavari Division and
convicting both the appellants for an offence under Section
302/34 IPC and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for life.
On 23rd of August, 1981, between 12.30.1.00 p.m. on hearing
screams and cry of deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani, at that
time aged about 18 years, Pulapa Lakshmi PW2, Vempati
Paparao PW3 and Vempati Radha PW4, rushed to the house of
the appellant and found both the appellants along with the
father of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of the deceased)
hurriedly coming out of the kitchen while the deceased was
lying on the floor engulfed in flames. Since, the
appellants or the father-in-law of the deceased were making
no attempts to put off the flames, PW2 asked appellant No. 1
to give her something so that she could extinguish the fire.
He, however, did not respond. She then requested first
appellant’s father to give something to her so that the fire
could be put off. The father of appellant No. 1 enquired if
he should get a bucket of water. PW2, thereupon, requested
him to give either a bed-sheet or a blanket. The father of
appellant No. 1 then brought out a bed sheet (Bontha) from
the cot and
675
as he was passing it on, to PW2, the mother-in-law of the
deceased, appellant No. 2, told her husband not to give the
bontha to PW2. PW2, in the meanwhile, took the bontha from
the father of the first appellant and tried to extinguish
the fire. The deceased turned her side. She was alive.
The deceased asked PW2 for some water. Since, the petticoat
of the deceased was burning, PW3, the father of PW2, who had
also rushed along with her to the house of the appellant
broke the thread of the petticoat to save her from further
burning and threw away the burning garments In the process,
he also received some burn injuries. PW2 poured water into
the mouth of the deceased and enquired from her as to what
had happened. The deceased told her that "her mother-in-law
had poured kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to
her". The deceased again felt thirsty and asked for more
water which was again given to her by PW2. The above
statement made by the deceased to PW2 was overheard by PW3
and some others, who had also reached on hearing the cries.
Vempati Nagabhushanam PW5, another immediate neighbor of the
appellants living only about 2 yards away also heard the
cries of the deceased and rushed to the house of the
appellant. He noticed PW3 was pulling out the petticoat of
the deceased while PW2 was attempting to extinguish fire.
He saw PW2 pouring water into the mouth of the deceased. He
also heard the statement made by the deceased to PW2 about
the manner in which she had been set on fire. PW5 thereupon
went away to inform the maternal uncle of the deceased at
Malakapalli. On the way, he met one Ramakrishna coming on a
motor-cycle and at his request Ramakrishna gave him a ride
to Malakapalli. On reaching the house of the maternal uncle
of the deceased, they found the brother of the deceased
Vempati Sreerama Krishna Sreeram PWl was also present there.
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He conveyed to them the information regarding the burning of
the deceased and also what he had heard the deceased telling
PW2. Ramarao and PWl then went on the same motorcycle to
Dharmavaram. PWl reached the house of the appellant and saw
a number of persons including PWs 2 and 3 gathered there.
The deceased was lying on the floor and at that time she had
no clothes on her. He noticed that she had received burn
injuries from her breasts downwards to her legs. On seeing
her plight, PW1 started crying and hitting his head against
a pillar. When the deceased noticed that PW1 had come, she
asked PW2 to call her brother PWl inside. PW2 thereupon
went out and brought PW1 to the kitchen where the deceased
took the palm of PWl into her own palms and told him in
Hindi "please tell mother and father as I am
676
telling you. My mother-in- law poured kerosene on me and my
husband set fire. You tell father and mother about this.
Don’t fight. Anyhow I am dying." She also told her brother
PW1 to take back the cash given to her and divide it amongst
the sisters in equal share and get them married off to nice
persons. At this juncture, the first appellant, husband of
the deceased came inside the kitchen and with folded hands
begged the deceased for forgiveness saying that he would not
repeat what he had done and therefore he may be pardoned.
PWl got wild and caught hold of the neck of the first
appellant. PW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and released the
first appellant from the hold of PW1 and sent PWl to another
uncle’s house and told the uncle that since PWl was in an
agitated mood he should take care of him. Within an hour,
however, PWl went back to the house of the deceased and by
that time, a local Doctor PW6, Dr. R. Radha krishnamurthy
had arrived at the house and was giving first-aid to her and
she was lying on a cot in the verandah. PW6 at about 3.30
p.m. advised the removal of the deceased to the Government
Hospital at Kovvur. A matador van was secured and at about
4.30 p.m. PW1, Ramarao, his maternal uncle, the wife of
Ramarao and some other neighbors took the deceased to the
Government Hospital at Kovvur in the matador van reaching
there at about 5 p.m. At about 5.30 p.m., Dr. K.
Parameswaradas PW9 examined the deceased and declared her
dead. PWl thereupon went to the police station which is
adjacent to the hospital alongwith his uncle and lodged the
report Ex.P4 with the Head Constable Md. Navabjani PW12. A
case under section 302 IPC was registered and information
was sent to Inspector of Police G. Scendavce Rao PW14 on
telephone. After collecting a copy of the FIR, PW14
proceeded to the Government Hospital and from there went to
the scene of occurrence. He seized M.0’s 1 to 3, drew the
site plan of the scene of occurrence and examined PWs 1 to 5
and PW9 at Dharmavaram. He also held the inquest
proceedings from 6.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. on August 24 1981
and after getting the postmortem conducted handed over the
dead-body to the family of the deceased. PW9 Dr. K.
Parameswaradas who conducted the postmortem examination in
his report Ex.Pl8 noted extensive burns to the extent of 90%
on the body of the deceased and opined that the deceased had
died due to the extensive burns all over the body and that
the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. During the investigation, the
investigating officer made a request for the preservation of
viscera of the deceased so that it could be sent for
chemical examination, as according to the state-
677
ment of PW6, the deceased had allegedly told him that she
had consumed dettol to commit suicide and since she could
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not bear the pain she had set herself on fire. The report
of the chemical examiner Ex.Pl6, however, revealed that no
poison was detected and that the death had been caused due
to extensive burns. Further investigation into the case
was, carried out by Md. Baduruddin PW15, Inspector of the
Crime Branch. During the investigation, the father of the
deceased Venkataramana handed over letters Exs.Pl-P3 to the
investigating officer. Both the appellants had made
themselves scarce and were not found in the village when
search for them was made by the investigating officer. The
first appellant surrendered in the court on 10.11.1981 while
the second appellant surrendered in the court on 7th of
December, 1981.
After the investigation was over, challan was filed and both
the appellants were sent up for trial in the Court of
Sessions Judge East Godavari Division at Rajahmundry.
At the trial, the prosecution inter alia relied upon the
following circumstances with a view to connect the appellant
with the crime:-
(1) Motive;
(2) Two dying declarations made to PW2 and
to PW1;
(3) Medical Evidence;
(4) Conduct of the appellant immediately and
after the occurrence;
(5) Absconding of the appellants.
The appellants when examined under Section 313 of the
Criminal Procedure Code denied their involvement and stated
the case to be a false one. They, however, produced no
defence.
The learned Trial Court did not accept the prosecution
version and held that there was no motive for the appellant
to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 could
not be relied upon; that PWI had made improvements in his
statements recorded at the trial and, therefore, the oral
dying declaration made to him could not be relied upon. The
Trial court also held that there had been unexplained delay
in lodging report with the police. The Trial Court placed
reliance on the testimony of hostile
678
witness PW6 and held that the case was one of suicide and
not of murder. On those findings, the learned Sessions
Judge acquitted both the appellants.
On an appeal, filed by the State, a Division Bench of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh set aside the judgment of the
learned Sessions Judge and convicted both the appellants for
an offence under Section 302/34 IPC. Speaking for the
Division Bench, K. Ramaswamy J. (as His Lordship then was)
found no hesitation to hold PWl as a witness of truth and a
wholly reliable witness and also opined that the evidence of
’PWs 2 and 3 was trustworthy and reliable. The dying
declarations made by the deceased to PW2 and subsequently to
PWl were believed and relied upon. It was held that report
Ex.P4 had been given by PWl immediately after the deceased
was declared dead by the Doctor and therefore there was no
delay much less unexplained delay in lodging the report.
While dealing with the conduct of the appellant, it was
opined that their conduct was inconsistent with their
innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis that
appellant no. 2 had committed the act of pouring kerosene on
the deceased and appellant No. 1 had lit fire. With regard
to the existence of motive, it was held that the appellants
were actuated with a motive to do away with the life of the
deceased for not getting the land registered in the name of
the first appellant. Finally, the High Court found that the
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chain of the established circumstances was complete and the
circumstances were sufficient to conclusive establish that
the appellants and the appellants alone had committed the
crime of murder of the deceased. The High Court held that
the consideration of evidence on record and the reasoning of
the Trial Court was most unsatisfactory and could not be
sustained and therefore set aside the order of acquittal and
convicted both the appellants for the offence under Section
302/34 IPC and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment
for life.
Appearing for the appellants before us, Mr. Madhav Reddy,
the learned Senior Counsel urged that since the Trial Court
had acquitted the appellants, the High Court was not
justified in recording an order of conviction as the
findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be
perverse. It was argued that the dying declarations were
not worthy of reliance and the motive was feeble and not
established. Learned counsel submitted that the
surrendering of the appellants themselves in the court on
10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they
had no
679
guilty conscious and the prosecution was not justified in
relying upon the conduct as an adverse conduct against the
appellants. While explaining the conduct of the appellants
at the time of and after the occurrence, he submitted that
since all neighbors had become hostile, out of fear the
appellants did not act either to put off the fire or remove
the deceased to the hospital.
In reply, learned counsel for the State argued that the
findings of the Trial Court were not only conjectural but
also perverse and the evidence of the witnesses was
disbelieved on mere surmises. It was submitted that the
Trial Court did not property discuss the two dying
declarations mad by the deceased and since the dying
declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, those by
themselves could form the basis of conviction of the
appellants. It was then submitted that the High Court after
a careful appraisal of the evidence had rightly set aside
the judgment of the Trial Court which suffered from
illegality as well as manifest error and perversity.
Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution had
established the case against the appellants beyond every
reasonable doubt and their appeals deserve to be dismissed.
Admittedly, there is no eye-witness in the case. The case
is sought to be established by the prosecution from
circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial,
evidence, the settled law is that the circumstance from
which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully
proved an these circumstances must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover, all the established circumstances should be
complete and there should be no gap in the chain of
evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only
wit the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and
totally inconsistent wit his innocence. The courts have,
therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the evidence and
deal with each circumstance carefully and thereafter fin
whether the chain of the established circumstances is
complete or no before passing an order of conviction. It is
in the light of the above principles that we shall deal with
various circumstances relied upon by the prosecution.
(1)Motive: In a case based on circumstantial evidence,
motive as sums great significance as its existence is an
enlightening factor in process of presumptive reasoning.
The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry.
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680
On 18.5.1979, marriage between the appellant and the
deceased was solemnised. The deceased aged about 18 years
was prosecuting her Intermediate course of study at that
time. She was the eldest of the five children of one
Vempati Venkataramana, who at the relevant time was working
as an Assistant Engineer with the Railways at Gorakhpur. At
the time of the marriage, the parents of the deceased had
agreed to give Rs. 50,000 in cash, 50 sovereigns of gold and
two acres of land as dowry. The cash was paid at the time
of the marriage itself alongwith 15 sovereigns of gold. The
parents of the deceased had promised to give the remaining
35 gold sovereigns and get the land also registered
subsequently, though the possession of the land measuring
about 3.70 acres was given to the appellant No. 1. The
mother-in-law of the deceased and her husband had been
pressurising the deceased all along to bring the remaining
sovereigns and also to get the land registered in the name
of the first appellant. She conveyed it to her mother PW7.
While the parents of the deceased agreed to get the land
registered in the name of the deceased, the first appellant
and his parents were insisting that the land should be got
registered in his name and not in the name of the deceased.
Since that desire was not fulfilled, the deceased was being
continuously harassed and ill-treated. A strick vigil was
kept on her at the house of her in-laws and she was not even
allowed to meet anybody nor were the neighbors permitted to
come and meet or talk to her. She was being prevented from
writing letters to her family also, but stealthy, she wrote
letters Exs.Pl-3 and got them posted through a neighbor.
The contents of those letters are rather revealing and
expose the extent of the harassment to which the deceased
was being subjected to by her mother-in-law and her husband.
After seeing the contents of the letters and with a view to
find out the cause of her distress, PW1, her brother went to
Dharmavaram on August 22, 1981, to the house of the
deceased. The deceased, however, was so terrorised that she
could not speak to him freely. She was surrounded by her
husband and her mother-in-law, who did not talk to PWl at
all to show their indifference. From the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and particularly that of the mother of
the deceased PW7, the immediate provocation was the
insistence of the appellants that the land be got registered
in the name of the husband and the reluctance’ of the
parents of the deceased to do so and instead their desire to
get it registered in the name of the deceased. The oral
evidence led by the prosecution in this behalf is wholly
consistent. In her letter Ex.P2, the
681
deceased had clearly mentioned that she was getting her
letters posted through PW4. She requested her sisters to
write letters to her in Hindi so that her in-laws, who did
not know Hindi, could not know what was being written. In
one of her letters, a part of which was addressed to her
sister, she wrote:
".......I am not going to anybody’s house.
One day I went to the house of sister-in-law
Radha to deliver the letter secretly. Their
mood was changed on account of going to their
house. That is why I stopped going." Do not
mention even a single word in your letter that
I have been writing to you. Ask mother not to
worry. On hearing about your results write a
letter without fail. If I get an opportunity
I will definitely write a letter..."
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In her letter Ex.P1 to her father, she wrote:
Father I am feeling much bore here because no
one come to our house nor I am allowed to go
their house Please always write letters. So
that I may be satisfied in seeing your
letters. If I may not give reply to your
letter then you please don’t mind it. You
know here’s conditions. Rest is O.K. Father
you also take care of your health."
In the same letter while addressing her
sisters, she wrote:
The lock is opened. I am writing this letter
secretly. In reply do not write that you have
received the letter. If you write like that
these people will become more angry
She also wrote to her sister:
not at house and there is no watch over me. I
am getting the letters posted through sister-
in-law Radha secretly. You write letters
mostly in Hindi only so that even if they
chanced to fall in the hands of any one, they
cannot understand
The tenor of her letters disclose the distressing state of
affairs at the house
682
of her-in-laws. These letters coupled with the evidence of
her mother go to show how the deceased was being tormented
and harassed. It is indeed a shame and pity that within
just two years of her marriage, her dream of a happy married
life was shattered and she found herself almost as a
prisoner and ’a frightened chicken’ who had to write letters
to her parents and sisters ’secretly’ for the fear that if
her in- laws came to know they would "become more angry’.
She had to request her sisters to reply to her letters in
Hindi so that "even if they chanced to fall in the hands of
anyone, they cannot understand". One can only imagine the
plight of this young bride and the sadistic behavior born
out of greed for dowry of her husband and mother-in-law.
Not having been able to get the land registered in the name
of the first appellant appears to have frustrated them to
the extent of murdering the young wife.
The evidence led by the prosecution to establish the
existence of motive is wholly reliable and is also
consistent. The prosecution has successfully established
that the appellants had strong and compelling motive to
commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to get
the land registered in the name of the first appellant and
their insistence to have the land registered in the name of
their own daughter instead. The motive, has, been
conclusively established by the prosecution and we have no
hesitation to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing the existence of the motive for both the
appellants to commit the crime conclusively and positively
and we agree with the finding of the High Court in that
behalf.
2.Dying Declarations: The next piece of circumstantial
evidence relied upon by the prosecution are two dying
declarations made by the deceased. According to the
prosecution case, the deceased made the first dying declara-
tion before PW2 when she after hearing her cries came to the
house and found both the appellants and the father of
appellant No. 1 coming out of the kitchen and the deceased
lying on the floor engulfed in flames. According to PW2,
the deceased told her that her mother- in-law had poured
kerosene on her and her husband had set her on fire. This
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statement was also heard by PW3 & PW5. The second dying
declaration was made by the deceased to her brother PW1,
after he was called by her to the kitchen. The deceased,
according to the prosecution case, on meeting her brother,
took the palm of PWl into her own palms and inter-alia told
to him that "her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and
her husband set fire to her". The statement made by the
deceased to
683
PW1 was in Hindi. Both the statements, as noticed above,
relate to the circumstances leading to the cause of her
death, as according to the medical evidence, the deceased
died of 90% burn injuries. Both the dying declarations are
oral. They have been made to friends and to the brother of
the deceased respectively. In view of the close
relationship of the witnesses to whom the oral dying
declarations were made, it becomes necessary for us to
carefully scrutinize and appreciate the evidence of the
witnesses to the dying declaration.
We have already adverted to the evidence of these witnesses
(PW1, PW2, PW3) while narrating the prosecution case.
Indeed, PWl is the brother of the deceased and therefore a
very close relation, but mere relationship cannot be a
ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to
be reliable and trustworthy. In the natural course of
events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death would
have conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances
leading to her receiving the burn injuries. PW1 has given a
very consistent statement and has reproduced the words of
the deceased clearly and truthfully. Nothing has been
brought out in the cross examination to discredit his
testimony at all. He had at the earliest point of time
disclosed as to what the deceased had told to him. The
discrepancy pointed out by learned counsel for the
appellants as to whether the dying declaration was made to
him by his sister when she was lying on the cot in the
verandah, as stated in FIR Ex.P4, or while she was lying on
the floor of the kitchen, is of an insignificant nature and
could be either out of confusion or the gap of time between
the making of the two statements. Moreover, PW1 was not at
all cross-examined on the alleged discrepancy when he gave
evidence in Court. No explanation whatsoever was sought
from him about the so called discrepancy. PW1, the brother
of the deceased appears to us to be a truthful witness and
his testimony has impressed us. He did not implicate the
father of the appellant and gave evidence only about what he
was actually told by his sister. From our appreciation of
the evidence of PW1, we agree with the view expressed by the
High Court that "considering the case from all perspectives
we have no hesitation to hold that P.W.1 is a witness of
truth worthy of acceptance and so he is wholly a reliable
witness. Ex.P4 is a voluntary statement given by P.W.1 and
it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1."
Coming now to the evidence of PWs2 and 3. The substratum of
their evidence with regard to the dying declaration is that
while that they were
684
in the kitchen of their own house, taking tea, they heard
the cry of a lady and rushed to the house of the deceased,
being her close neighbors. They saw the deceased engulfed
in flames sprawled on the floor of the kitchen. They also
saw both the appellants as well as the father of appellant
No. 1 coming out of the kitchen to the verandah. The
distance between the house of PWs2 and 3 from the house of
appellant is only 2 yards. After PW2 took a bontha from the
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father-in-law of the deceased, to the annoyance of appellant
No. 2, with a view to extinguish the fire, the deceased, on
enquiry by the witness as to what had happened told her that
’my mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and my husband set
me on fire". The deceased had not implicated her father-in-
law, though he was also present there’ PW3, father of PW2,
had assisted PW2 to extinguish the flames and it was he who
broke the string of the petticoat of the deceased and threw
it away. In the process PW3 himself suffered burn injuries.
His injuries were examined by the Doctor and found to be
caused by fire. The Trial Court doubted the testimony of
PW3 on the ground that he had made some improvement in his
evidence in court when he stated that he had heard the
deceased screaming and saying that she was "being killed".
He had not stated so in his statement recorded during the
investigation. This, in our opinion, is hardly an
improvement of any consequence because both in his statement
in court as well as the one recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC
he has deposed that it was on hearing the ’screams’ of the
deceased that he and his daughter rushed to the house of the
decased. In any event the so called improvement was not
sufficient to discard his testimony. Despite searching
cross-examination of both these witnesses, nothing has been
brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them or
doubt their veracity at all. After carefully analysing
their evidence, we find PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy of
credence and trustworthy.
From the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3, both the dying
declarations are proved to have been made by the deceased.
They are the statements made by the deceased and relate to
the circumstances leading to her death. Both the dying
declarations are consistent with each other and appear to
have been made by the deceased voluntarily and in the
natural course of events. They have a ring of truth about
them.
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the
general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible
evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross-examination,
it is not credit-worthy. Under Section 32, when
685
a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or
as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in
cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into
question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by the
deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible
in evidence. The statement made by the deceased, called the
dying declaration, falls in that category provided it has
been made by the deceased while in a fit mental condition.
A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death
has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is
most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The shadow of
impending death is by itself the guarantee of the truth of
the statement made by the deceased regarding the causes or
circumstances leading to his death. A dying declaration,
therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece of
evidence, coming as it does from the mouth of the deceased
victim. Once the statement of the dying person and the
evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes the
test of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes a very
important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the court
is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free
from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by itself,
can be sufficient for recording conviction even without
looking for any corroboration. If there are more than one
dying declarations, then the court has also to scrutinise
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all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these
passes the test of being trustworthy. The Court must
further find out whether the different dying declarations
are consistent with each other in material particulars
before accepting and relying upon the same. Having read the
evidence of PWs 1-3 with great care and attention, we are of
the view that their testimony is based on intrinsic truth.
Both the dying declarations are consistent with each other
in all material facts and particulars. That the deceased
was in a proper mental condition to make the dying
declaration or that they were voluntary has neither been
doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of
the witnesses nor even in the course of arguments both in
the High Court and before us. Both the dying declarations
have passed the test of creditworthiness and they suffer
from no infirmity whatsoever. We have therefore no
hesitation to hold that the prosecution has successfully
established a very crucial piece of circumstantial evidence
in the case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying
declarations implicating both the appellants and disclosing
the manner in which she had been put on fire shortly before
her death. This circumstance, therefore, has been
established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable
686
doubt by clear and cogent evidence.
3.Medical Evidence: The next circumstance relied upon by
the prosecution is the medical evidence which has been
provided by the testimony of Dr. Parameswaradas PW9. He
deposed that the deceased had died of 90% burns and that
kerosene smell was emitting from the deadbody. According to
the report of the chemical examiner, no poison was found in
the viscera. The chemical examiner’s report, coupled with
the other evidence on record belies the suggestion made by
the defence during the cross-examination of some witnesses
that with a view to commit suicide, the deceased had drunk
dettol and when she could not bear the pain on account of
consumption of dettol, she herself poured kerosene oil on
herself and set herself on fire. Rightly, this defence case
was not pursued before us with any amount of seriousness by
the learned counsel for the appellants.. The medical
evidence, therefore fully corroborates the prosecution case
and lends support to the dying declaration and more
particularly the manner in which the deceased had been set
on fire.
4. Conduct of the appellant immediately and after the
evidence:
The conduct of the appellants, son and mother, both at the
time when the deceased lay burning on the floor of the
kitchen and afterwards till she succumbed to the burn
injuries is the next circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution to connect the appellants with the crime.
From the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 4, who are the immediate
neighbors of the appellant and the deceased, they had heard
the cry of the deceased and rushed to her house. PWs 2 and
3 found the deceased lying on the floor of the kitchen
engulfed in flames while both the appellants and father-in-
law of the deceased were coming out of the kitchen in the
verandah. None of the two appellants or the father-in-law
made any attempt whatsoever to extinguish the fire and save
the deceased. The raised no alarm. They stood there as if
waiting for her death, rather than make any effort to save
her. Their conduct, thus, runs consistent with the
hypothesis of their guilt and betrays that of an innocent
persons. In their statements under Section 313 of Cr. PC
they did not deny their presence in the house at the time of
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the occurrence, but denied their involvement in the crime.
The normal human conduct of any person finding someone
engulfed in flames would be to make all efforts to put off
the flames and save the life of the person. Though, the
appellants were the closest relations
687
of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind. Let
alone making any effort to extinguish the fire, according to
PW2 when the father-in-law of the deceased, at her request,
was giving her the bontha to extinguish the flames,
appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, objected
to the same. This conduct speaks volumes about the extent
of hatred which the mother-in-law exhibited towards her
daughter-in-law. They rendered no first-aid to the
deceased. Their conduct at the time of the occurrence,
therefore, clearly points towards their guilt and is
inconsistent with their ingnocence the appellants did not
even accompany the deceased to the hospital in the matador
van. Had the husband not been a party to the crime, one
would have expected that he would be the first person to
take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and leave
no stone unturned to save her life. An innocent mother-in-
law would have also done the same, even if she had no love
or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law. Neither the
husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps
to remove the deceased to the hospital, let alone accompany
her to the hospital. This conduct also is inconsistent with
their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis, as
stated by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the
mother-in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband
had lit fire and put her on flames. Mr. Reddy, the learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
since the neighbors and other relations of the deceased had
almost taken over the house and the person of the daughter-
in-law, the appellants were afraid of being beaten and as
such they rendered no aid to the deceased needs a notice
only to be rejected. No suggestion whatsoever on these
lines was made to any of the witnesses and in any event such
an explanation betrays common sense. Since, the deceased
had admittedly suffered burn injuries in the kitchen of her
house, there was an obligation on the part of the appellants
and the father-in-law of the deceased, who have admitted
their presence in the house at the time of occurrence, to
explain the circumstances leading to the deceased dying of
90% burn injuries. None has been offered. The theory of
suicide was put up only as an argument of despair. While
discussing the motive and the dying declarations, we have
come to the conclusion that the deceased died as a result of
the designed move on the part of both the appellants to put
an end to her life and she did not commit suicide as was
sought to be suggested during cross-examination by the
defence to some witnesses. The theory of suicide has no
legs to stand upon. The conduct of the appellants who did
not try to extinguish the fire or
688
render any first-aid to her, also totally betrays the theory
of suicide and we agree with the High Court that the theory
as set up by the appellants is highly unbelievable or
acceptable. The prosecution has, thus, successfully
established that the conduct of both the appellants both at
the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
appellants and inconsistent with their innoncence.
5) Absconding. Prosecution has also relied upon the
circumstances of the absconding of the appellants to prove
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its case.
A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the
time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter is also
the circumstance relating to their absconding. Md.
Badruddin PW15, the investigating officer, deposed that he
had taken up the investigation of the case and having
examined PWsl-4 had caused search to be made for the accused
but they were not found in the village and despite search,
they could not be traced. Appellant No. 1 surrendered
before the court on 10.11.1981 while appellant No. 2
surrundered in the court on 7.12.1981. No explanation, worth
the name, much less a satisfactory explanation has been
furnished by the appellants about their absence from the
village till they surrendered in the court in the face of
such a gruesome ’tragedy’. Indeed, absconding by itself may
not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the
hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown
that even innocent persons may run away for fear of being
falsely involved in a criminal case and arrested by the
police, but coupled with the other circumstances which we
have discussed above, the absconding of the appellants
assumes importance and significance. The prosecution has
successfully established this circumstance also to connect
the appellants with the crime-
In view of the above discussion and our appraisal and
analysis of-the evidence on record, we have no hesitation to
hold that the.prosecution has successfully established all
the circumstances appearing in the, evidence against the
appellants by clear, cogent and reliable evidence and the
chain of the established circumstances is complete and has
no gaps whatsoever and the same conclusively establishes
that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime
of murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the manner
suggested by the prosecution. All the established
circumstances are consistent only with the hypothesis that
it was the appellants alone
689
who committed.the crime And the circumstances are
inconsistent with any hypothesis other than their guilt. It
is most unfortunate that the husband of the deceased not
only failed to perform his duties and obligations as husband
to protect and take care of his wife as per the marriage
vows and instead joined his mother in the most degrading and
cold blooded murder of the young innocent bride.
Of late there has been an alarming increase in cases
relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry
deaths of young innocent brides. This growing cult of
violence and exploitation of the young brides, though keeps
on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever it
happens, continues unabated. There is a constant erosion of
the basic human values of tolerance and the spirit of "live
and let live’. Lack of education and economic dependence of
women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime.
It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such reported
cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime
against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband
either acting as a mute spectator or even an active
participant in the crime, in utter disregard of his
matrimonial obligations. In many cases, it has been noticed
that the husband, even after marriage, continues to be
’Mamma’s baby and the umbilical cord appears not to have
been cut even at that stage. We are here tempted to recall
the observations of R.N. Mishra, J. (as His Lordship then
was) in State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman & Ors. Cr.
Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, while
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dealing with a bride burning case. It was observed:
"Marriage, according to the community to which
parties belong, is sacramental and is believed
to have been ordained in heaven. The
religious rites performed at the marriage
altar clearly indicate that the man accepts
the woman as his better-half by assuring her
protection as guardian, ensuring food and
necessaries of life as the provider,
guaranteeing companionship as the mate and by
resolving that the pleasures and sorrows in
the pursuit of life shall be shared with her
and Dharma shall be observed. If this be the
concept marriage, there would be no scope to
look for worldly considerations, particularly
dowry. When a girl is transplanted from her
natural setting into
690
an alien family, the care expected is bound to
be more than in the case of a plant. Plant
has fife but the girl has a more developed
one. Human emotions are unknown to the plant
life. In the growing years in the natural
setting the girl- now a bride-has formed her
own habits, gathered her own impressions,
developed her own aptitudes and got used to a
way of life. In the new setting some of these
have to be accepted and some she has to
surrender. This process of adaptation is not
and cannot be one-sided. Give and take, live
and let live, are the ways of life and when
the bride is received in the new family she
must have a feeling of welcome and by the fond
bonds of love and affection, grace and
generosity, attachment and consideration that
she may receive in the family of the husband,
she will get into a new mould; the mould which
would last for her life. She has to get used
to a new set of relationships one type with
the husband, another with the parents-in-law,
a different one with the other superiors and
yet a different one with the younger ones in
the family. For this she would require loving
guidance. The elders in the family, including
the mother-in-law, are expected to show her
the way. The husband has to stand as a
mountain of support ready to protect her and
espouse her cause where she is on the right
and equally ready to cover her either by
pulling her up or protecting her willingly
taking the responsibility on to himself when
she is At fault. The process has to be a
natural one and there has to be exhibition of
cooperation and willingness from every side.
Otherwise how would the transplant succeed?"
Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the
day. Change of heart and, attittide is what is needed. If
man were to regain his harmony with others and replace
hatred, greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love, trust
and understanding and if woman were to receive education and
become economically independent, the possibility of this
pernicious social evit dying a natural death may not remain
a dream only. The legislature, realising the gravity of the
situation has amended the laws and provided for stringent
punishments in such cases and even permitted the raising of
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presumptions against an accused in cases of unnatural deaths
of
691
the brides within the first seven years of their marriage.,
The Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has been
amended from time to time, but this piece of soicial
legislation, keeping in view the growing menance of the
social evil also does not appear to have served much purpose
as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and convictions
recorded are rather few. Laws are not enough to combat the
evil. A wider social movement of educating women of their
rights, to conquer the menance, is what is needed more
particularly in rural areas where women are still largely
uneducated and less aware of their rights and fall an easy
prey to their exploitation. The role of courts, under the
circumstances assumes greater importance and-it is expected
that the courts would deal with such cases in a more
realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on
account of procedural technicalities or insignificant
lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would
receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be
totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The
courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime
against women. The verdict of acquittal made by the Trial
Court in this cast is an apt illustration of the lack of
sensitivity on the part of the Trial Court. It recorded the
verdict of acquittal on mere surmises and conjectures and
disregarded the evidence of the witnesses for wholly
insufficient and insignificant reasons. It ignored the
vital factors of the case without even properly discussing
the same.
The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in
convicting the appellants for the offence of murder
punishable under Section 302 readwith Section 34 IPC and
sentencing each one of them to suffer imprisonment for life.
We uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants for
the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and dismiss their
appeal. The appellants were directed to be released on bail
by this Court on 30.3.1989. Their bail bonds are cancelled
and they are directed to be taken in to custody to suffer
the remaining period of their sentence.
V.P.R.
Appeal dismissed.
692