Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7200 of 2002
PETITIONER:
Bharti Telenet Ltd.
RESPONDENT:
Union of India & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/03/2005
BENCH:
ASHOK BHAN A.K.Mathur
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
With
Civil Appeal No. 1816 of 2003
BHAN, J.
These appeals are statutory appeals under
Section 18 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority
of India Act, 1997 [for short "the Act"] against
the final judgments and orders dated 29.7.2002
and 19.12.2002 passed by the Telecom Disputes
Settlement & Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi [for
short "the Tribunal"] dismissing the appellant’s
applications for condonation of delay and
consequently the statutory appeal No. 1 of 2002
and Appeal No. 9 of 2002 under Section 14 A read
with Section 14A (2) of the Act challenging the
order/determination dated 15.6.2001 and
order/letter dated 29.8.2002 passed by the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India.
At the first instance Appeal No. 7200 of
2002 arising from the Appeal No. 1 of 2002
decided on 29.7.2002 will be taken up for
consideration and thereafter the second appeal
No. 1816 of 2003.
We are stating the facts as found by the
Tribunal, as there is no dispute on them.
Appellant is a licensee to provide basic
telephone services to subscribers in Madhya
Pradesh. As a part of the licence agreement the
appellant is expected to develop its own
telecommunication network within its own service
area, viz., Madhya Pradesh and also interconnect
with the network of Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited, respondent No. 2, [for short "the
BSNL"] so as to provide national and inter-
circle links which is currently available with
only BSNL. This link is also required to connect
the subscribers of the appellant with the
subscribers of BSNL within the same service
area, viz., Madhya Pradesh. The issue under
dispute is the location of points of
interconnection between the appellant and BSNL.
The appellant claims that as per the terms and
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conditions of its licence it is entitled to
carry the traffic originating from its own
subscribers to the farthest point through its
own network before handing it over to BSNL at
the point of interconnection [ for short "the
POI"]. BSNL, on the other hand, is of the
opinion that the licence agreement clearly
stipulates that the two respective networks and
the points of interconnection of the appellant
and BSNL would have to be at equivalent level.
Thus within the short distance charging area
[for short "the SDCA"], the interconnections
would have to be at the level of local and
tandem exchanges. In so far as long distance
charging area [for short "the LDCA"] are
concerned, the point of interconnection would
have to be located between the trunk automatic
exchanges of the long distance charging area of
both BSNL and the appellant. For this, BSNL
contends that the appellant would have to build
up a parallel network within their long distance
charging area on the same pattern as the
network hierarchy of BSNL starting with the
short distance charging area. In case the
appellant does not have its own trunk automatic
exchange in the long distance charging area it
would have to bring the traffic from its own
short distance charging area tandem with local
exchange to the nearest to the trunk automatic
exchange of BSNL for onward
transmission/carriage to any other trunk
automatic exchanges. Since BSNL has the trunk
automatic exchange in each long distance
charging area this practically means that the
appellant would have to handover all long-
distance traffic in the same long distance
charging area in which it has originated.
The dispute arose in October 2000 when the
Chief Genral Manager, Madhya Pradsh Circle, BSNL
informed the appellant in a meeting about the
manner in which BSNL would provide points of
interconnection in handing long distance
traffic originating from the subscribers of the
appellant. Since mutual discussions held
subsequently did not prove fruitful, the
appellant approached Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India [for short "the TRAI"] for
appropriate orders and directions on 6.12.2001.
After hearing both the parties, TRAI
decided the case as under:
"In the light of the foregoing the
Authority has come to the following
conclusions:-
(i) BSNL’s refusal to accept at
Ujjain and Indore, the STD
inter network traffic for calls
originating in other LDCAs is
in accordance with the
stipulations in the license
agreement as well as
interconnect agreement signed
by both the contending parties.
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(ii) Clause 1.7.6.5. of the licence
agreement gives the licensee
option of carrying a STD call
entirely on his own network
within the circle/service area.
(iii) This clause (1.7.6.5.) also
gives the licensee the option
of far end hand over of calls
to BSNL for termination only.
The licensee may, therefore,
also use his network to carry
inter-Network calls to the Far
End and hand over in the
terminating LDCA/SDCA to the
DOT (now BSNL) in the same
manner as is permitted to the
DOT (now BSNL) in the license
agreement. The BSNL should not
refuse such Far End hand over
from licenses received by them
for termination within the
LDCA.
(iv) Intermediate hand over of calls
for terminating is not in
conformity with the license
agreement as well as
interconnect Agreement and,
therefore, neither the licensee
nor the BSNL is obliged to
accept any such hand over of
calls.
Though this Order has been made
in relation to the specific
complaint relating to Madhya
Pradesh Circle, it will have
general applicability in
similar interconnect
scenarios."
[Emphasis
supplied]
Since the Tribunal did not decide the
dispute on merits and dismissed the appeals as
barred by limitation we would also confine
ourselves to the question as to whether "in the
facts and circumstances of the case the
appellant had shown sufficient cause to condone
the delay in filing the appeal and the Tribunal
has erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction in
holding that sufficient cause for condoning the
delay had not been shown and consequently
dismissing the appeal barred by time.
Section 14A (2) and (3) of the Act which is
relevant for this case are reproduced below:
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"14A. Application for settlement of
disputes and appeals to Appellate
Tribunal.-(1) The Central Government
or a State Government or a local
authority or any person may make an
application to the Appellate Tribunal
for adjudication of any dispute
refereed to in clause (a) of section
14.
(2) The Central Government or a State
Government or a local authority or
any person aggrieved by any
direction, decision or order made by
the Authority may prefer an appeal to
the Appellate Tribunal.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section
(2) shell be preferred within a
period of thirty days from the date
on which a copy of the direction or
order or decision made by the
Authority is received by the Central
Government or the State Government or
the local authority or the aggrieved
person and it shall be in such form,
verified in such manner and be
accompanied by such fee as may be
prescribed:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal
may entertain any appeal after the
expiry of the said period of thirty
days if it is satisfied that there
was sufficient cause for not filing
it within that period."
TRAI passed the order on 15.6.2001 and
communicated the same to the appellant on that
very day under a covering letter dated
15.6.2001. On 17.8.2001 a review application
was filed which was dismissed by the TRAI on
27.11.2001. A copy of the said order was
received by the appellant on 5.12.2001. The
appeal was filed on 2.1.2002, i.e., within the
period of 30 days from the communication of the
order dismissing the review application and
after a delay of 172 days from the passing of
the order dated 15.6.2001 along with an
application seeking condonation of delay in
filing the appeal.
TRAI made its order under Section 11
(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Though the order
was made in relation to specific complaint
relating to Madhya Pradesh Circle but was same
was ordered that "it will have general
applicability in similar interconnect
scenarios." Since that order was made
applicable generally to all the telecom
operators, appellant forwarded a copy of the
said order under cover of letter dated
17.06.2001 to its Association (Association of
Basic Telecom Operators \026 ’ABTO’ for short), for
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seeking review of the order in collective
interest. ABTO circulated the said order among
its members vide its circular dated 19.06.2001.
Executive council of ABTO met on 20.6.2001 and
26.6.2001 in which the order/determination of
the TRAI was discussed and deliberated. At the
subsequent meeting held on 27.6.2001, Executive
Council of ABTO observed that members had agreed
for the need to file a petition challenging the
order of the TRAI before the Tribunal. On
17.7.2001 appellant reminded the Secretary
General of ABTO about the said decision of the
executive council and requested to convey the
action taken, if any.
On 26.7.2001 ABTO informed the appellant
that some of the members of ABTO had reservation
about filing the appeal before the Tribunal
challenging the said order. It was contended by
them that since the order was passed affecting
all the members/basic service operators without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the
members (except the Appellant herein), it would
be appropriate to file a review application
before the TRAI. Appellant again represented
to the ABTO that the said order dated 15.6.2001
was causing huge loss and financial hardship to
the appellant and requested for collective
action under the aegis of ABTO at the earliest.
On 17.8.2001 ABTO filed a review application
before the TRAI for review of the order dated
15.6.2001.
TRAI dismissed the review application on
27.11.2001. The order passed in review was
again discussed amongst the members of the ABTO
but no consensus was forthcoming till 2.1.2001.
By way of abundant caution and since the
appellant was the most affected by the order of
the TRAI the appellant filed the appeal before
the Tribunal on 2.1.2002 challenging the order
of the Tribunal dated 15.6.2001 along with
application seeking condonation of delay in
filing the appeal. To the application filed by
the appellant reply was filed by the respondent
and on the direction issued by the tribunal the
appellant filed a supplementary affidavit
explaining the delay.
The Tribunal dismissed the application for
condonation of delay and held that the
application for condonation of delay was
speculative and was not bona fide. That
the appellant had failed to make out a case for
condoning the delay for 172 days in filing the
appeal. The tribunal recorded the following
three findings for coming to the aforesaid
decision:
"It will be clear from this letter
that BTNL abandoned its earlier
decision to prefer an appeal and
decided to extend full support to
ABTO if a review petition was filed
instead of an appeal. This review
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petition was filed on 17.8.2001 well
after expiry of the period of
limitation for preferring an appeal
i.e. 14.7.2001."
"In the review petition filed by ABTO
before TRAI, the appellant did not
separately join as a party even
though TRAI had passed the
determination order on the
application made by the appellant. It
is also significant that ABTO has
kept itself away from the present
appeal filed by the appellant. We
are, therefore, of the opinion that
the appellant has failed to furnish
sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal within the statutory time
limit."
"There is another aspect of this
case. The review petition made by
ABTO was dismissed by TRAI on
5.12.2001. The determination made by
TRAI has been accepted by the other
members of ABTO. A number of
interconnect agreements with BSNL
have been signed by the members of
ABTO on the basis of the
determination made by TRAI on
15.6.2001. The petitioner who has
preferred this appeal before us also
signed an interconnect agreement with
BSNL on 6.12.2001 in respect of
Haryana Circle. After filing this
appeal in this tribunal, the
petitioner on 15.2.2002 has entered
into two more agreements with BSNL in
which the determination made by TRAI
has been accepted and made part of
the agreements."
With respect we do not agree with either of
these reasons recorded by the Tribunal for
dismissing the application filed by the
appellant in condonation of delay.
In the instant case before passing of the
order dated 15.6.2001 the issue of BSNL’s
refusal to accept intermediate hand over of
transit calls of long distance charging area in
Madhya Pradesh Circle (licensed to the
appellant), was specific and confined to the
appellant and therefore the appellant directly
approached TRAI for appropriate direction to
BSNL. Since the order dated 15.6.2001
expressly stated that the order would have
general applicability in similar interconnect
scenarios, the appellant being a member of the
Association not only had an option but was also
bound by the spirit of unity to approach the
Association and consult other members. In any
event being a member of the Association the
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appellant had the option to either challenge the
order individually or through the aegis of its
Association and neither course of action could
be said to be inexplicable. The Tribunal has
erred in holding that the appellant had
abandoned its decision to prefer an appeal or
its right of appeal merely because it conveyed
to the Association that it will extend its
support to the Association if a review is filed
instead of an appeal against the said order.
The appellant’s support to the Association in
filing review petition is not indicative of its
abandonment of its right to file appeal. Mere
acquiescence of the appellant at one stage to
file the review petition instead of the appeal
would not amount to the abandonment of its right
to file the statutory appeal or to an estoppel
disentitling it from claiming the relief in
appeal.
This Court in Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. vs.
Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem, AIR 1953 SC 98 held:
" Further, whatever be the effect of
mere waiver, acquiescence or laches
on the part of a person on his claim
to equitable remedy to enforce his
rights under an executory contract,
it is quite clear, on the
authorities, that mere waiver,
acquiescence or laches which does not
amount to an abandonment of his right
or to an estoppel against him cannot
disentitle that person from claiming
relief in equity in respect of his
executed and not merely executory
interest. [See per Lord Chelmsford in
Clarke’s case (supra) at p. 657.]
Indeed, it has been held in \026 ’Garden
Gully United Quartz Mining Co. v.
McLister’, (1876) 1 A C 39 that mere
laches does not disentitle the holder
of shares to equitable relief against
an invalid declaration of forfeiture.
..."
In the instant case, the mere letter of
appellant stating that it would extend support
to the Association if review petition is filed
instead of appeal cannot amount to abandonment
of its right to challenge the invasion of and
interference with its legal/contractual right.
The Tribunal failed to appreciate that filing of
an appeal or review petition by the appellant or
through its Association or joining itself or the
Association as a party to the proceeding
initiated by either of them to avail of either
of the alternate procedures available to the
aggrieved party in the given circumstances could
not be said to be inexplicable or fatal for not
choosing the other procedures.
Tribunal has misconstrued the fact that the
ABTO kept itself away from the present appeal
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filed by the appellant. Firstly, action of an
Association was guided by the majority opinion
of its members. Secondly, in the given
circumstances of stiff competition amongst
members it was the lack of consensus amongst the
members and the failure/delay on the part of the
Association which drove the appellant to file
the appeal itself before the Tribunal. Hence
whether or not the Association joined the appeal
filed by the appellant is irrelevant for
considering the merits of the appellant’s case
much less for deciding whether or not to condone
the delay in filing the appeal. Acceptance of
TRAI’s determination dated 15.6.2001 by other
members of ABTO signing of interconnect
agreements with BSNL by other members on the
basis of the said determination or signing of
such agreement by the appellant in respect of
Haryana Circle or any other service area except
the Madhya Pradesh circle, have no relevance to
the case at hand. Merely because the
interconnect scenarios in other service
area/circles permit or enable the licensees
there to sign the interconnect agreement even
though such agreement is contrary to the express
provisions in the licence agreement for the M.P.
Telecom Circle the appellant cannot be denied
its legal/contractual right flowing from the
subsisting licence agreement. Therefore, the
Tribunal erred in holding that having accepted
and acted upon the determination made by TRAI in
Haryana, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu Circles, the
appellant cannot contend to the contrary in
respect of Madhya Pradesh circle alone. The
licensees have varying levels of network in the
various licensed areas and if the network in one
service area permits the licensee to accept the
said determination, it does not follow that the
licensee in another service area could be denied
his contractual rights regardless of the nature
and extent of its network there.
In our view, the Tribunal erred in holding
that on the facts of the case a ground of
condonation of delay of 172 days in preferring
the appeal was not made out. The point in issue
was of general importance and since there was no
authoritative pronouncement of the Tribunal or
of this Court on the point in our view the
Tribunal should have condoned the delay and
decided the appeal on the merits.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1816 OF 2003
The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed
by the appellant relating to Haryana Circle by
holding that there was an enormous delay of more
than 450 days in preferring the appeal from the
earlier order of the TRAI dated 15.6.2001
although the licence for Haryana Circle was
granted to the appellant on 8.10.2001, the
interconnect agreement which gave rise to the
issues in dispute was signed on 6.12.2001 and
the appellant’s representation was rejected by
the TRAI on 29.8.2002. Appellant filed the
appeal on 27.9.2002 within the period of
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limitation, i.e., 30 days. In our considered
view the Tribunal has erred in dismissing the
appellant’s appeal on the ground of bar of
limitation.
The licence agreement was signed on
6.12.2001. The appellant’s representation was
put on hold by the TRAI by its order dated
24.7.2002 awaiting the decision of the Tribunal
in appellant’s appeal No. 1 of 2002relating to
the Madhya Pradesh Telecom Circle. Thereafter,
by letter dated 29.8.2002 TRAI rejected the
appellant’s representation upon dismissal of
Appeal No. 1 of 2002 by the Tribunal on
29.8.2002. The appeal was filed on 27.9.2002.
In this case there was no delay in filing the
appeal. The appeal has been filed within 30
days of the rejection of the appellant’s
representation finally by the TRAI on 29.8.2002.
The Tribunal has erred in taking the starting
point for limitation from the determination made
by the Tribunal on 15.6.2001 which was in
relation to Madhya Pradesh circle. The order
dated 15.6.2001 and the order dated 29.8.2002
are two separate orders passed by the TRAI
relating to different circles and the starting
point for limitation for the same could not be
taken from the previous order passed by the TRAI
in relation to the Madhya Pradesh circle.
For the reasons stated above, both the
appeals are accepted. The orders passed by the
Tribunal in Appeal No. 1 of 2002 and Appeal No.
9 of 2002 dated 29.7.2002 and 19.12.2002 are set
aside, delay in filing the appeals is condoned
and the case is remitted back to the Tribunal
for a fresh decision on merits of the dispute
and in accordance with law.
Nothing stated herein-above be taken as an
expression of opinion on merits of dispute. The
Tribunal shall be at liberty to decide the
dispute on merits and in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of the
observations made in this judgment touching upon
the merits of the dispute. There will be no
order as to costs.