State vs. Sabu

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 22.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on:20.02.2026
+ CRL.L.P. 286/2018
STATE .....Petitioner
versus
SABU ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:

For the Petitioner : Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP for the State
with Ms. Divya Yadav, Adv. with SI Pavan
Kumar Yadav, PS Sunlight Colony.

For the Respondent : Ms. Vrinda Bhandari, Adv. (DHCLSC)
with Ms. Nitya Jain, Adv.
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. By the present petition, the petitioner seeks leave to appeal
against the judgment dated 12.02.2018 (hereafter ‘ impugned
judgment ’), passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (‘ MM ’) in
the case arising out of FIR no. 497/2016 dated 21.11.2016, registered
at Police Station Sunlight Colony.
2. Briefly stated, it is alleged that on 20.11.2016, the respondent
was driving a truck on a public road in a rash and negligent manner. It
is alleged that while driving the said truck, the respondent struck
against a motorcycle from behind and caused the death of the victim,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 1 of 10






who was driving the motorcycle.
3. The learned MM vide judgment dated 12.02.2018 acquitted the
respondent for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC and convicted
the respondent for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC. The
relevant portion of the impugned judgment in regard to the
respondents reads as under:
“20 As far as the offence made punishable u/s. 279 IPC is
concerned, before the accident, it is not clear as to how or in what
manner did the accused act in a rash and negligent manner by
driving the truck in question. As per PW1, the accused herein was
driving his vehicle at a speed of about 40 kms per hour. The same
cannot be said to be too excessive a speed. PW2 claims that the
speed of the truck was 60 kms per hour. That to cannot be said to
be too high. Thus before the accident how and in what manner did
the accused drive the truck, to call such driving as rash and
negligent to endanger human life is not clear from the evidence
before this court. Accordingly, accused is acquitted of the said
charge made punishable u/s. 279 IPC.”
4. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State
submitted that the learned MM has committed a grave error in
acquitting the respondent for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC.
He submitted that the findings of the learned MM are perverse and are
not based on correct appreciation of the evidence. He submitted that
the learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate that PW1 and PW2
have explicitly stated that the truck was being driven rashly in a zig
zag manner.

5. He submitted that the learned Magistrate has overlooked the
admission by the respondent that the truck was loaded with 8000
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 2 of 10






bricks weighing 32000Kg and the weight of the truck was about
7000Kg, which establishes his negligence as the heavy load was 2.5
times over the permissible allowed weight. He submitted that despite
the heavy truck load, the respondent drove negligently and hit the
victim.
6. He submitted that the respondent has been convicted for the
offence under Section 304A of the IPC for causing death by rash and
negligent driving, whereby, the acquittal for the offence under Section
279 of the IPC on account of rash and negligent act not being proved
is manifestly erroneous.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is
no infirmity in the respondent’s acquittal for the offence under Section
279 of the IPC and the respondent has already challenged his
conviction under Section 304A of the IPC, which is pending
consideration before the learned Court of Sessions.
ANALYSIS
8. It is trite law that this Court must exercise caution and should
only interfere in an appeal against acquittal where there are substantial
and compelling reasons to do so. At the stage of grant of leave to
appeal, the High Court has to see whether a prima facie case is made
out in favour of the appellant or if such arguable points have been
raised which would merit interference. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 3 of 10






case of State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar : (2008) 9
SCC 475 held as under:
“ 19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of appeal by
the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that no
appeal “shall be entertained except with the leave of the High
Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where it is
aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court of Session
to file an application for leave to appeal as required by sub-section
(3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be
registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after the
High Court grants leave by allowing the application filed under
sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question whether
requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court
must apply its mind, consider whether a prima facie case has
been made out or arguable points have been raised and not
whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of
universal application that each and every petition seeking leave to
prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial
court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal
must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be
overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute
details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that
the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be
said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. In the present case, the prosecution examined three witnesses to
establish its case, that is, two eye witnesses and the Investigating
Officer, while the defence only examined the respondent as a witness.
10. The prosecution has essentially assailed the respondent’s
acquittal on two grounds– that the learned Magistrate has failed to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 4 of 10






appreciate the material on record in determining the rashness and
negligence, and that having found the respondent to be guilty of the
offence under Section 304A of the IPC, the respondent shouldn’t have
been acquitted of the offence under Section 279 of the IPC.
11. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment reflects that although
the learned Magistrate found that the respondent had caused the death
of the victim by hitting the rear side of his vehicle in a rash and
negligent manner so as to warrant his conviction for the offence under
Section 304A of the IPC, however, the respondent was acquitted for
the offence under Section 279 of the IPC as it was unclear as to how
or in what manner the accused acted by driving the truck prior to the
incident. It appears that the only factor which weighed the learned
Magistrate was that the speed of the vehicle as per both PW1 and PW2
was not too high or excessive.
12. Before proceeding further, this Court considers it apposite to
take note of the offences under Section 279 of the IPC and Section
304A of the IPC, which read as under:
“ 279. Rash driving or riding on a public way.— Whoever drives
any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or
negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or
injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
304A. Causing death by negligence.— Whoever causes the death
of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 5 of 10






description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both.”
13. In the case of The State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Ramchandra
Rabidas @ Ratan Rabidas &Anr. :Criminal Appeal No.
905 of 2010 , the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed the penal
provisions under IPC in relation to road traffic accidents. The relevant
portion of the judgment is as under:
“5.9 Section 279 IPC falls under Chapter XIV –
“Offences affecting Public Health, Safety, Convenience, Decency
And Morals”, and provides for offences relating to rash
and negligent driving which endanger human life.
Section 279 IPC makes rash driving, or riding on a public
road, punishable if such rash driving or riding endangers
human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person. It is
the rash or negligent manner of driving or riding which
endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any
person, which constitutes an offence under Section 279 IPC.

5.10 Sections 304 Part II, 304A, 337 and 338 IPC fall under
Chapter XVI – “Offences Affecting the Human Body” which makes
provision for offences relating to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder, causing death by negligence by doing any rash or
negligent act, and causing hurt or grievous hurt, by
endangering the life or personal safety of others.
xxx
5.12 Where the rash or negligent driving, results in the death of a
person, without the knowledge that the said act will cause death,
Section 304A IPC would be applicable. In other words,
Section 304A appliesto cases where there is no intention to
cause death, and no knowledge that the act done in all
probability will cause death. Negligence and rashness are
essential elements of Section 304A.
The three ingredients of Section 304¬A, which are
required to be proved are: (1) the death of a human being; (2) the
accused caused the death; and (3) the death was caused by the
doing of a rash or negligent act, though it did not amount to
culpable homicide of either description [Alister Anthony Pareira
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 6 of 10






v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)
848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953]
xxx
5.14 Sections 279, 304A, 337 and 338 IPC may be invoked only
if the act of the accused is a negligent or rash act. ”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case of Braham Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh :
(2009) 7 SCC 353 , the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed as under:
“ 8. Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a public way.
A bare reading of the provision makes it clear that it must be
established that the accused was driving any vehicle on a public
way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person. Obviously the foundation
in accusations under Section 279 IPC is not (sic) negligence.
Similarly, in Section 304-A the stress is on causing death by
negligence or rashness. Therefore, for bringing in application of
either Section 279 or 304-A it must be established that there was
an element of rashness or negligence…”
15. The statutory provisions as well as the said judgment makes it
clear that both the offences share the common aspect of commission
of a rash or negligent act, and the offence under Section 279 of the
IPC is fulcrumed on endangerment of human life or likelihood of
causing hurt or injury to another.
16. The learned Magistrate has laid much emphasis on the absence
of material prior to the incident. Pertinently, in the facts of the present
case, it does not appear that the prosecution sought to distinguish
between the rashness and negligence prior to the accident and during
the accident. Even otherwise, once it is found that the accused rashly
and negligently caused death of the victim while driving on a public
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 7 of 10






way, the requisite ingredients to constitute the offence under Section
279 of the IPC are met as it is the act of endangerment which is
criminalized in the aforesaid provision.
17. It is the prosecution’s case that the respondent was driving in a
rash and negligent manner on a public way when he struck the
motorcycle of the victim. Although the learned Magistrate appears to
have discerned the aspect of rashness and negligence from the sheer
fact of collision on the rear end of the victim’s motorcycle, no
deference has been paid to the other material on record, including
evidence of PW1 and PW2, who have stated that the truck was driven
by the respondent in a zig zag manner. The said aspects require
consideration.
18. The only specific observation made by the learned Magistrate is
in reference to the speed of the vehicle as per the witnesses.
Undisputably, high speed is not a sine qua non to constitute the
offence under Section 279 of the IPC.
19. Prima facie , possibility of rashness and negligence by a driver
cannot be negated on mere account of low speed, especially when it is
alleged that the respondent was driving a heavy vehicle, carrying
material over the permissible weight limit, in a zig zag manner prior to
the accident.
20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 8 of 10






that the State has been able to make out a case for grant of leave.
21. The present leave petition is thus allowed and leave to appeal is
granted.
Crl. A. _____________________(to be numbered)
22. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the respondent’s
petition against his conviction for the offence under Section 304A of
the IPC is still pending before the Court of Sessions. Considering the
intertwined allegations of rashness and negligence in the present case,
it would not be appropriate for this Court to delve into the said aspect
on merits when the appeal is pending before the Court of Sessions.
23. In the opinion of this Court, it would be expedient for the ends
of justice to transfer the appeal filed by the respondent against the
impugned judgment, pending before the Sessions Court, to this Court,
in order to ascertain that both the appeals can be heard and decided
together.
24. In view of the above, this Court considers it apposite to exercise
its power under Section 447 of the BNSS (erstwhile Section 407 of the
CrPC) and transfer CA No. 130/2018, titled Sabu Vs State , pending
before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, South-East, Saket
Courts, New Delhi to this Court forthwith.
25. The learned District and Sessions Judge is directed to transmit
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 9 of 10






the papers and proceedings of the aforementioned appeal to this Court.
26. A copy of the order be communicated to the learned District and
Sessions Judge for necessary information.
27. List on 20.03.2026.

AMIT MAHAJAN, J
FEBRUARY 20, 2026
‘KDK’
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:SHIKHA SEHGAL
Signing Date:21.02.2026
17:48:13
CRL.L.P. 286/2018 Page 10 of 10