2023 INSC 669
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1598 OF 2023
STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE .....APPELLANT
VERSUS
S. SUBBEGOWDA ....RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The appellant – State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police by way of
instant appeal has assailed the judgment and order dated
16.08.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in
Criminal Petition No. 4463 of 2018 whereby the High Court has
allowed the said petition by discharging the respondent (original
petitioner-accused) from the offences charged under Section 13(1)
(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as the said Act), on the ground that the
sanction accorded to prosecute the respondent-accused by the
Signature Not Verified
Government was illegal and without jurisdiction.
2. The respondent was working as an Executive Engineer in the
Digitally signed by
SNEHA DAS
Date: 2023.08.03
17:13:39 IST
Reason:
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board, Mandya
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Division, Mandya during the period 1983 to 2007. On the basis of
the Source Report dated 17.12.2007 submitted by the then Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Bengaluru Rural Division, Karnataka
Lokayukta, Bengaluru, a case being Crime No. 22 of 2007 (later
numbered as Crime No. 62 of 2008) came to be registered against
the respondent for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with
Section 13(2) of the said Act. It was alleged, inter alia, that the
respondent-accused during his tenure in the office as an Executive
Engineer had amassed the wealth disproportionate to his known
sources of income. On the completion of the investigation, the
Investigating Officer had sent the papers to the State Government
seeking sanction to prosecute the respondent as required in Section
19(1) of the said Act. The Government of Karnataka on the basis of
the material placed before it, had accorded the requisite sanction by
issuing the Government order dated 13.09.2010. Thereafter the
chargesheet came to be filed in the Court of Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District at Bengaluru wherein it
was alleged that respondent had abused his position as a public
servant, had indulged into corrupt practices and had amassed
wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income. The said
2
case was registered as Special Case No. 488 of 2011 before the
said Court.
3. The respondent-accused filed an application under Section 227 read
with 239 of CrPC on 12.10.2011, seeking his discharge from the
case contending, inter alia, that neither the contents of the Source
Report nor the other documents constituted any offence as alleged,
and that the sanction under Section 19(1) of the said Act was issued
by the Government without any application of mind. The said
application came to be dismissed by the trial court by passing a
detailed order on 01.02.2013. Being aggrieved by the said order, the
respondent preferred a Criminal Revision Petition being no. 287 of
2013 before the High Court. The said petition came to be disposed
of by the High Court vide the order dated 05.07.2013 directing the
trial court to consider the documents made available by the
respondent during the investigation and produced by the
prosecution with the chargesheet, while framing the charge without
being influenced by the order dated 01.12.2013.
4. It appears that in view of the said order passed by the High Court,
the respondent-accused again filed an application under Sections
227 and 239 of CrPC before the trial court seeking his discharge
3
from the case by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order
passed by the Government lacked application of mind and was
given mechanically and that the Investigating Officer had
suppressed the material produced by the respondent offering
satisfactory explanations to the assets acquired, income derived and
expenditure incurred by the respondent during period in question.
Pertinently, the respondent did not press for the said application by
submitting a memo on 02.12.2014 and stating therein that the Court
may proceed to frame charge against him. The said memo reads as
under-
“IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND
SESSIONS JUDGE BANGALORE RURAL AT BANGALORE
Spl.C.C. No.488 of 11
BETWEEN:
State by Lokayktha Police,
Bangalore Rural. ... Complainant
AND:
Subbegowda. … Accused
MEMO FILED ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
The above named Accused humbly submits that he will not
press the application filed under Sections 227 and 239 of
Cr.P.C., 1973 seeking discharge in the case. It is further
submitted that the Hon'ble Court may proceed to frame charges
against the Accused.
02.12.2014
Bangalore. Sd/-
Advocate for Accused.”
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5. The trial court thereafter framed the charge against the respondent-
accused on 23.12.2014 for the offence of criminal misconduct under
Section 13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of the said Act in
Special Case No. 488 of 2011. The prosecution thereafter examined
as many as 17 witnesses in support of its case, and in the midst of
the trial the respondent-accused again filed third application under
Section 227 of CrPC seeking his discharge from the case on the
ground that the respondent was an employee of the Karnataka
Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board and could be removed
only by the said Board in view of Rule 10 of Karnataka Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. The State
Government therefore had no jurisdiction to accord the sanction to
prosecute the respondent under Section 19(1) of the said Act. The
trial court vide the order dated 05.06.2018 dismissed the said
application by passing a detailed order holding, inter alia, that the
third successive application filed by the respondent-accused for the
discharge from the case, when the evidence of 17 witnesses had
been recorded and when the contention based on the sanction was
already rejected by the Court earlier, was liable to be dismissed. The
aggrieved respondent filed the Criminal Petition being no. 4463 of
5
2018 under Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court, which came
to be allowed by the High Court vide the impugned order.
6. In view of the afore-stated undisputed facts the following questions
arise for consideration before this Court:
(i) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 of CrPC could have discharged the respondent-
accused from the charges levelled against him for the offences
under Section 13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of the
said Act, despite the fact that the accused had not pressed for
his second application for discharge by submitting the Memo
dated 02.12.2014 and despite the fact that after framing of the
charge by the Special Court on 23.12.2014, the trial had
proceeded further and the prosecution had examined 17
witnesses in support of its case?
(ii) Whether the High Court in the criminal petition filed under
Section 482 of the CrPC could reverse the findings recorded
by the Special Court with regard to the validity of sanction,
ignoring the bar contained in sub-section (3) read with sub-
section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act?
7. As stated earlier, after having not succeeded in the first application
seeking discharge under Section 227 of CrPC, in which the
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petitioner had raised the issue of sanction by contending that the
sanction was accorded by the Government under Section 19(1) of
the said Act without any application of mind, the respondent-
accused had filed the second application again seeking his
discharge under Section 227 of CrPC by raising the issue of
sanction by contending, inter alia, that the sanction order was
passed mechanically by the Government and that the Investigating
Officer had suppressed the material produced by the respondent
offering satisfactory explanations to the assets acquired by him.
Admittedly, the second application was not pressed for by the
respondent by submitting the Memo on 02.12.2014, wherein it was
stated that the Court may proceed to frame charge against him.
Thus, by submitting the said Memo, the respondent-accused had
specifically not pressed for his contention with regard to the validity
of sanction or error in granting the sanction by the Government, and
he specifically requested the Court to proceed further with the
framing of charge. Considering the said memo, the trial court framed
the charge, and the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses
in support of its case. At that stage, the respondent submitted the
third application which was in the nature of interlocutory application
7
again seeking the discharge under Section 227 of CrPC on the
ground that there was an error in the sanction order, the
Government being not competent to grant the sanction under
Section 19(1) of the said Act. The said application having been
dismissed by the trial court, the High Court could not and should not
have entertained the petition under Section 482 of CrPC, which was
in the nature of revision application, and reversed the findings
recorded by the trial court, in view of sub-section (3) read with sub-
section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.
8. For the ready reference, the relevant part of sub-section (1), (3) and
(4) of Section 19 are reproduced herein below:
“19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution . —
(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable
under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been
committed by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and
Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014)—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed in connection with the
affairs of the Union and is not removable from his
office save by or with the sanction of the Central
Government, of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed in connection with the
affairs of a State and is not removable from his office
save by or with the sanction of the State Government,
of that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office.
(2) ----------
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(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), —
(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special
Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in
appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the
absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in,
the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in
the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact
been occasioned thereby;
(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on
the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the
sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied
that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in
a failure of justice;
(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on
any other ground and no court shall exercise the
powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order
passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other
proceedings.
(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence
of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has
occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall
have regard to the fact whether the objection could and
should have been raised at any earlier stage in the
proceedings.
Explanation. — For the purposes of this section,—
(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant
sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference
to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the
instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of
a specified person or any requirement of a similar
nature.”
9. Similar provision is contained in Section 465 of CrPC on whether
finding or sentence is reversible by reason of error, omission or
irregularity. It reads as under: -
“ 465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of
error, omission or irregularity. -
1. Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no
finding sentence or order passed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal,
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confirmation of revision on account of any error, omission or
irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant,
proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before
or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under
this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the
prosecution unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of
justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
2. In determining whether any error, omission or
irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error,
or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has
occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to
the fact whether the objection could and should have been
raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”
10. Having regard to the afore-stated provisions contained in Section 19
of the said Act, there remains no shadow of doubt that the statute
forbids taking of cognizance by the Court against a public servant
except with the previous sanction of the Government/authority
competent to grant such sanction in terms of clauses (a), (b) and (c)
to Section 19(1). It is also well settled proposition of law that the
question with regard to the validity of such sanction should be raised
at the earliest stage of the proceedings, however could be raised at
the subsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the stages of
proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard
to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court
takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be
framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at
the stage of final arguments in the trial. Such issue of course, could
be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation,
10
however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section
(3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. It is also
significant to note that the competence of the court trying the
accused also would be dependent upon the existence of the validity
of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of
validity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot be gainsaid
that in case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can
discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the
competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution
in accordance with the law.
11. The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19
makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,
no finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall be
reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on
the ground of, the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in
the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of
the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
sub-section (4) further postulates that in determining under sub-
section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or
irregularity in the sanction has occasioned, or resulted in failure of
11
justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection
could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the
proceedings. The explanation to sub-section (4) further provides that
for the purpose of Section 19, error includes “competency of the
authority to grant sanction”. Thus, it is clear from the language
employed in sub-section (3) of Section 19 that the said sub-section
has application to the proceedings before the Court in appeal,
confirmation or revision, and not to the proceedings before the
Special Judge. The said sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in
appeal, confirmation or revision, the interference with the order
passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was
bad, save and except in cases where the appellate or revisional
court finds that the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity.
1
12. This Court in case of Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka has very
aptly dealt with the intricacies of Section 19(1) as also Section 19(3)
and 19(4) of the said Act as to at what stage the question of validity
of sanction accorded under Section 19(1) of the said Act could be
raised, and what are the powers of the court in appeal, confirmation
| “22. | The legal position regarding the importance of sanction |
|---|
| under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is thus | |
| much too clear to admit equivocation. The statute forbids | |
1 (2015) 14 SCC 186
12
| taking of cognizance by the court against a public servant | | | | | | | |
|---|
| except with the previous sanction of an authority competent | | | | | | | |
| to grant such sanction in terms of clauses ( | a | ), ( | b | ) and ( | | c | ) to |
| Section 19(1). The question regarding validity of such | | | | | | | |
| sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The | | | | | | | |
| competence of the court trying the accused so much | | | | | | | |
| depends upon the existence of a valid sanction. In case the | | | | | | | |
| sanction is found to be invalid the court can discharge the | | | | | | | |
| accused relegating the parties to a stage where the | | | | | | | |
| competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the | | | | | | | |
| prosecution in accordance with law. If the trial court | | | | | | | |
| proceeds, despite the invalidity attached to the sanction | | | | | | | |
| order, the same shall be deemed to be non est in the eyes of | | | | | | | |
| law and shall not forbid a second trial for the same offences, | | | | | | | |
| upon grant of a valid sanction for such prosecution. | | | | | | | |
| 23. | Having said that there are two aspects which we must | |
|---|
| immediately advert to. The first relates to the effect of sub- | | |
| section (3) to Section 19, which starts with a non obstante | | |
| clause. Also relevant to the same aspect would be Section | | |
| 465 CrPC which we have extracted earlier. | | |
| 23.1. | It was argued on behalf of the State with considerable | |
|---|
| tenacity worthy of a better cause, that in terms of Section | | |
| 19(3), any error, omission or irregularity in the order | | |
| sanctioning prosecution of an accused was of no | | |
| consequence so long as there was no failure of justice | | |
| resulting from such error, omission or irregularity. It was | | |
| contended that in terms of Explanation to Section 4, “error | | |
| includes competence of the authority to grant sanction”. The | | |
| argument is on the face of it attractive but does not, in our | | |
| opinion, stand closer scrutiny. | | |
| 23.2. | A careful reading of sub-section (3) to Section 19 | |
|---|
| would show that the same interdicts reversal or alteration of | | |
| any finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge, | | |
| on the ground that the sanction order suffers from an error, | | |
| omission or irregularity, unless of course the court before | | |
| whom such finding, sentence or order is challenged in | | |
| appeal or revision is of the opinion that a failure of justice | | |
| has occurred by reason of such error, omission or | | |
| irregularity. Sub-section (3), in other words, simply forbids | | |
| interference with an order passed by the Special Judge in | | |
| appeal, confirmation or revisional proceedings on the ground | | |
| that the sanction is bad save and except, in cases where the | | |
| appellate or revisional court finds that failure of justice has | | |
| occurred by such invalidity. What is noteworthy is that sub- | | |
| section (3) has no application to proceedings before the | | |
| Special Judge, who is free to pass an order discharging the | | |
| accused, if he is of the opinion that a valid order sanctioning | | |
| prosecution of the accused had not been produced as | | |
| required under Section 19(1). | | |
| 23.3. | Sub-section (3), in our opinion, postulates a prohibition |
|---|
| against a higher court reversing an order passed by the | |
| Special Judge on the ground of any defect, omission or | |
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| irregularity in the order of sanction. It does not forbid a | |
|---|
| Special Judge from passing an order at whatever stage of | |
| the proceedings holding that the prosecution is not | |
| maintainable for want of a valid order sanctioning the same. | |
| 23.4. | The language employed in sub-section (3) is, in our | |
|---|
| opinion, clear and unambiguous. This is, in our opinion, | | |
| sufficiently evident even from the language employed in sub- | | |
| section (4) according to which the appellate or the revisional | | |
| court shall, while examining whether the error, omission or | | |
| irregularity in the sanction had occasioned in any failure of | | |
| justice, have regard to the fact whether the objection could | | |
| and should have been raised at an early stage. Suffice it to | | |
| say, that a conjoint reading of sub-sections 19(3) and (4) | | |
| leaves no manner of doubt that the said provisions envisage | | |
| a challenge to the validity of the order of sanction or the | | |
| validity of the proceedings including finding, sentence or | | |
| order passed by the Special Judge in appeal or revision | | |
| before a higher court and not before the Special Judge trying | | |
| the accused. | | |
| 23.5. | The rationale underlying the provision obviously is that | |
|---|
| if the trial has proceeded to conclusion and resulted in a | | |
| finding or sentence, the same should not be lightly interfered | | |
| with by the appellate or the revisional court simply because | | |
| there was some omission, error or irregularity in the order | | |
| sanctioning the prosecution under Section 19(1). Failure of | | |
| justice is, what the appellate or revisional court would in | | |
| such cases look for. And while examining whether any such | | |
| failure had indeed taken place, the Court concerned would | | |
| also keep in mind whether the objection touching the error, | | |
| omission or irregularity in the sanction could or should have | | |
| been raised at an earlier stage of the proceedings meaning | | |
| thereby whether the same could and should have been | | |
| raised at the trial stage instead of being urged in appeal or | | |
| revision.” | | |
2
13. In State of M.P. vs. Bhooraji and Others , this Court had an
occasion to deal with the various aspects contained in Section 465
of CrPC more particularly to deal with the expression “A failure of
justice has in fact been occasioned” as contained therein. Since, the
provisions contained in Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption
2 (2001) 7 SCC 679
14
Act and in Section 465(1) of CrPC are pari materia , the observations
made in the said decision would be relevant.
| “14. We have to examine Section 465(1) of the Code in the<br>above context. It is extracted below: | | |
|---|
| “465. (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore<br>contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a<br>court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or<br>altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision<br>on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the<br>complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order,<br>judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or<br>in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code,<br>or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the<br>prosecution, unless in the opinion of that court, a<br>failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” | |
| 15. A reading of the section makes it clear that the error,<br>omission or irregularity in the proceedings held before or<br>during the trial or in any enquiry were reckoned by the<br>legislature as possible occurrences in criminal courts. Yet<br>the legislature disfavoured axing down the proceedings or to<br>direct repetition of the whole proceedings afresh. Hence, the<br>legislature imposed a prohibition that unless such error,<br>omission or irregularity has occasioned “a failure of justice”<br>the superior court shall not quash the proceedings merely on<br>the ground of such error, omission or irregularity. | | |
|---|
| | |
| 16. What is meant by “a failure of justice” occasioned on<br>account of such error, omission or irregularity? This Court<br>has observed in Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of<br>Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577: 2001 SCC (Cri) 358] thus:<br>(SCC p. 585, para 23) | | |
| “23. We often hear about ‘failure of justice’ and quite<br>often the submission in a criminal court is accentuated<br>with the said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable or<br>facile an expression which could be fitted in any<br>situation of a case. The expression ‘failure of justice’<br>would appear, sometimes, as an etymological<br>chameleon (the simile is borrowed from Lord Diplock<br>in Town Investments Ltd. v. Deptt. of the<br>Environment [(1977) 1 All ER 813 : 1978 AC 359 :<br>(1977) 2 WLR 450 (HL)] ). The criminal court,<br>particularly the superior court should make a close<br>examination to ascertain whether there was really a<br>failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage.” | |
the second application for discharge filed by the respondent having
15
not been pressed for by him. The Special Judge, while dismissing
the third application filed by the respondent seeking discharge after
examination of 17 witnesses by the prosecution, specifically held
that the sanction accorded by the government which was a superior
authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which the
respondent was an employee, was proper and valid. Such findings
recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not
have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed
by the respondent challenging the said order of the Special Judge,
in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19,
and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of
justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as
contemplated in the said sub-section (3). As a matter of fact, neither
the respondent had pleaded nor the High Court opined whether any
failure of justice had occasioned to the respondent, on account of
error if any, occurred in granting the sanction by the authority.
15. As a matter of fact, such an interlocutory application seeking
discharge in the midst of trial would also not be maintainable. Once
the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was
framed against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed
16
nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act.
In the instant case, though the issue of validity of sanction was
raised at the earlier point of time, the same was not pressed for. The
only stage open to the respondent-accused in that situation was to
raise the said issue at the final arguments in the trial in accordance
with law.
16. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the High
Court is set aside. It will be open for the respondent to raise the
issue of validity of sanction if he desires to do so, in accordance with
law at the final stage of arguments in the trial. Special Judge is
directed to proceed with the trial from the stage it had stopped, in
accordance with the law and as expeditiously as possible.
17. Appeal stands allowed accordingly.
…..................................J.
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE]
…..................................J.
[BELA M. TRIVEDI]
NEW DELHI;
03.08.2023
17