Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
JAGDISH PANDEY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF BIHAR & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
17/08/1967
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ)
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N. (CJ)
BACHAWAT, R.S.
RAMASWAMI, V.
MITTER, G.K.
HEGDE, K.S.
CITATION:
1968 AIR 353 1968 SCR (1) 231
CITATOR INFO :
R 1989 SC 665 (4,6)
E 1991 SC 101 (30,70,212,227,278)
ACT:
Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and
Ranchi) (Amendment) Act 13 of 1962, s. 4--Whether
discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution--Lecturer’s qualification of third class
masters degree deemed to be minimum qualification as a
second class degree by University Statute--Whether such
deeming continued to entitle him to be appointed to
principal’s post also requiring second class degree.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was appointed as a lecturer in 1952 of a non-
Government College affiliated to the Bihar University and
later as Principal of another college. Both these
appointments were approved by the University.
The Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur
and Ranchi) (Amendment) Act 13 of 1962 came into force in
April 1962, s. 4 of which provided that every appointment,
dismissal, etc., of any teacher of a college not belonging
to the State Government affiliated to the University made
after the 27th November, 1961 and before 1st March, 1962
shall be subject to such order as the Chancellor of the
University, on the recommendation of the University Service
Commission, may pass. Thereafter, the appellant received an
order dated August 8, 1962, from the Chancellor to the
effect that he had been pleased to approve under s. 4 of the
Act, on the recommendation of the Commission, the
appointment of the appellant as Principal till November 30,
1962 or till the candidate recommended by the Commission
joined, whichever was earlier.
Subsequently, as’ it was realised that the order of August
18. 1962 Might be successfully challenged on the ground that
the appellant had not been given an opportunity for a
hearing, the Commission gave the appellant a show-cause
notice on November 8, 1962 and after he was given a hearing
the Chancellor passed another order on February 18, 1963
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which purported to modify the order of August 18, 1962; the
modification was to the effect that the appellant would be
given a year or two to sit for an examination and obtain a
second class Master’s degree which was the minimum
qualification for the post of Principal, failing which his
services would be terminated.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court
challenging both the orders of August 18, 1962 and February
18, 1963 on the grounds, inter alia; (i) that under sub-rule
(6) of Rule (1) of Chapter 16 of the Statutes of the
University, which provided that notwithstanding any other
requirements the qualifications of a teacher already in
service and confirmed before the 1st July, 1962, shall be
considered to be equivalent to the minimum qualifications
for the post he holds, the appellant must be deemed to have
the minimum qualifications for a lecturer i.e. a Second
Class MaSter’s degree. and that this deeming would continue
when he was appointed Pricipal for which also the minimum
qualification was a Second Class Master’s degree with
certain experience; (ii) that s. 4 of the Act was violative
of Art. 14 of the Constitution. and (iii) that the order of
August 18, 1962 violated the principles of natural justice
and it could not be modified after November 30, 1962 as it
had worked itself out 231
232
and there was no power of review given to the Chancellor
under S. 4. The High Court dismissed the petition.
On appeal to this Court,
HELD: allowing the appeal,
(i) The Chancellor’s order of February 18, 1963 giving the
appellant time to appear at an examination to enable him to
obtain a second class Master’s degree failing which his
services would be terminated was invalid.
The appellant must be deemed to have the minimum qualifica-
tion of a second class Master’s degree by virtue of sub-rule
(6) of the Statutes and as such he was qualified for
appointment as Principal. Sub-r. (6) must be read as a
protection to the teachers who were appointed and confirmed
before July 1, 1952 and by fiction it gave them the minimum
qualification even though they may not actually have it.
That minimum qualification must therefore remain with them
always for the future. for there was nothing to show that it
was taken away. [241G-242A].
(ii) Section 4 was not discriminatory and violative of Art.
14 of the Constitution on the ground that it fixed two
arbitrary dates and had visited teachers appointed,
dismissed etc. between these two dates with a differential
treatment as compared to teachers appointed before November
27, 1961. The report of the Joint Select Committee
recommending the establishment of the University Service
Commission which would have the effect of curtailing the
powers of the governing bodies of affiliated colleges was
published on November 27, 1961 and after the passing of Act
II of 1962, S. 48-A with respect to the Commission was
actually put into force from March 1, 17962. Many
irregularities as to appointments, dismissals etc., during
this period were brought to the notice of the government and
this led to the enactment of S. 4 of the Act. It cannot
therefore be said that teachers appointed etc. between these
two dates did not form a class that would have a nexus with
the object to be achieved. [236B-F].
Furthermore, S. 4 only authorises the Chancellor to
scrutinise appointments. dismissals etc. made between these
two dates for the purpose of satisfying himself that these
were in accordance with the University Act and the Statutes,
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etc. Read this way, s. 4 cannot be said to confer
uncanalised power on the Chancellor. [237A-C].
Although S. 4 makes no provision for giving the teacher a
hearing before passing an order thereunder, it must be read
as requiring that the Commission must act according to
principles of natural justice and must hear the teacher
concerned before making its recommendation. [237 D-E].
(iii) The order of August 18, 1962 must be taken to have
fallen when action was taken to give notice to the appellant
on November 8, 1962 and a fresh order passed on February 18.
1963. The latter order must be treated as a fresh order
which was passed after giving the appellant a hearing and
which was not therefore defective on the round that
principles of natural justice had been violated. [238G].
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 30, 1964 of
the Patna High Court in M.J.C. No. 498 of 1963.
B. C. Ghosh and K. K. Sinha, for the appellant.
S. Mustafi and A. K. Nag, for respondent No. 3
P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 4.
233
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, C. J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the Patna High Court and arises in the following
circumstances. The appellant. Jagdish Pandey, joined as a
lecturer in Ramakrishna College Madhubani in July 1948. His
appointment was approved by the University in June 1949, and
on September 23, 1951 he was confirmed as a lecturer in that
College. In July 1961 the post of the Principal of Pandaul
College, Pandaul fell vacant and was advertised. The
appellant was one of the applicants and was appointed after
interview as the Principal of the college on January 22,
1962. On January 24, 1962, the appellant’s appointment as
Principal of the College was approved by the University. It
appears that the appointment was challenged by a writ
petition before the Patna Court, but that challenge failed
on July 11, 1962, when the petition was dismissed.
In the meantime, the Bihar Legislature passed the Bihar
State Universities (University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and,
Ranchi) (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 1962 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) which came into force on April 21,
1962. Section 4 thereof was in the following terms:-
"Certain appointments, etc., of teachers of
nonGovernment affiliated colleges to be
subject to Chancellor’s orders-Notwithstanding
anything contained in the said Act or the
Magadh University Act, 1961 (Bihar Act IV of
1962) or the statutes made thereunder, or the
Bihar State Universities (University of Bihar,
Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Ordinance, 1962, (Bihar
Ordinance No. 1 of 1962) every appointment,
dismissal, removal, termination of service or
reduction in rank of any teacher of a college,
not belonging to the State Government,
affiliated to the University established under
the said Act or the Magadh University Act,
1961 (Bihar Act IV of 1962) made on or after
the twenty-seventh day of November, 1961 and
before the first day of March, 1962, shall be
subject to such order as the Chancellor of the
University may, on the recommendation of the
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University Service Commission established
under section 48A of the said Act, pass
with respect thereto."
This Act was passed to amend the Bihar State Universities
(University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, No. 14 of
1960, The reason for making the amendment as stated in the
statement of objects and reasons was this. The Bihar State
Universities Act, No. 14 of 1960, was amended by Bihar Act
II of 1962 and s. 48-A was introduced therein. That section
provided for the establishment of a University Service
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) for
affiliated colleges not belonging to the State Government.
Sub-section (6) of s. 48-A provided that "subject to the
approval of the University, appointments, dismis-
234
teachres of an affiliated college not belonging to the State
Government shall be made by the governing body of the
college on the recommendation of the Commission." In effect
thereafter no appointment, dismissal, etc., could be made
after S. 48-A came into force without the recommendation of
the Commission. This section came into force on March 1,
1962, but the report of the Joint Select Committee, which
resulted in the enactment of s. 48-A, was made on November
27, 1961. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act
stated that several reports had been received by Government
that the Governing Bodies of affiliated colleges had made a
very large number of unnecessary appointments and
unwarranted removals from service in order to avoid scrutiny
of such cases by the Commission. It was to meet this
situation that an Ordinance was first promulgated which made
obligatory for the Governing Bodies to submit for the
scrutiny of the Commission, the cases of appointments,
dismissals, removals etc. of teachers which occurred
between November 27, 1961 and March 1, 1962. The Act
replaced that Ordinance.
After the Act came into force, the appellant received an
order dated August 18, 1962 from the Chancellor of the
University to the effect that the Chancellor had been
pleased to approve, under s. 4 of the Act, on the
recommendation of the Commission the appointment of the
appellant as Principal of the Pandaul College till November
30, 1962 or till the candidate recommended by the Commission
joined, whichever was earlier.
It seems that before this, a similar order had been passed
with respect to another teacher of Ramakrishna College
Madhubani on May 31, 1962, and that order was challenged in
the Patna High Court on the ground that the teacher in
question had not been heard before the order was made and
therefore the order was bad as it violated the principles of
natural justice. That case was decided by the High Court on
April 23, 1963 and the order in question was struck down on
the ground that it violated principles of natural justice.
Further in that case the validity of s. 4 of the Act was
also challenged but that question was not decided. (See Ram
Kripalu Mishra v. University of Patna)(1).
It seems that it was realised sometime in October or Novem-
ber, 1962 that the order of August 18, 1962 in the case of
the appellant might be similarly challenged; so on November
8, 1962 the Commission gave notice to the appellant to show
cause why the Commission should not recommend to the
Chancellor that there was no adequate justification or
reason for the Chancellor to modify the order already passed
on August 18, 1962. This was a composite notice to the
appellant and several other teachers with whose cases we are
not concerned. The body of the notice shows various grounds
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on which the notice was issued, but it did not
(1) A.I.R. 1964 Patna, 41.
235
indicate which particular ground applied to the appellant.
e must say that we should have expected a better notice than
this from the Commission. The notice should have been
addressed to each teacher separately indicating the
particular ground on which the notice was given as against
him. However, the appellant replied to the notice and
controverted all the grounds mentioned therein, though it
now appears from the final order which was passed on
February 18, 1963 that the only ground that concerned him
was that he was not academically qualified for appointment
as Principal of the College on the date of the selection by
the governing body. The appellant seems to have been given
a hearing by the Commission and eventually on February 18,
1963 the Chancellor passed another order which purported to
modify the order of August 18, 1962 insofar as it related to
the appellant. The modification was that the appellant
would be given a year or two to appear at the examination to
enable him to obtain a second class Master’s Degree-,
otherwise his services would be terminated. Thereupon the
appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court
challenging both the orders of August 18, 1962 and February
18, 1963.
Three main grounds were urged by the appellant in this con-
nection. It was first urged that s. 4 of the Act was ultra
vires, as it violated Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Secondly, it was urged that the order of August 18, 1962
violated the principles of natural justice and it could not
be modified after November 30, 1962 as it had worked itself
out and there was no power of review given to the Chancellor
under s. 4 and further that proceedings based on the notice
issued on November 8, 1962 by the Commission were a mala
fide device to get over the infirmity in the order of August
18, 1962. Thirdly, it was urged that in view of ch. 16 r.
(1) of the Statutes of the University, the appellant must be
deemed to have the minimum qualification for the post of the
Principal and therefore the order of February 18, 1963
requiring him to appear at an examination to obtain a Second
Class Master’s degree or in the alternative requiring that
his services be terminated was bad. The petition was
resisted on behalf of the Chancellor and the University.
The High Court rejected all the three contentions and
dismissed the petition, but granted a certificate to appeal
to this Court; and. that is how the matter has come before
us.
The three points raised in the High Court have been urged
before us in support of the appellant’s contention that the
two orders dated August 18, 1962 and February 18, 1963 are
liable to be quashed. We shall first consider whether s. 4
is ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. The first
ground in that behalf is that the dates mentioned in s. 4
were completely arbitrary and therefore there was no valid
classification to uphold the validity of the section. There
is no doubt that if the dates are arbitrary,
236
s. 4 would be violative of Art. 14, for then there would
be no justification for singling out a class of teachers who
were appointed or dismissed etc. between these dates and
applying s. 4 to them while the rest would be out of the
purview of that section. But we are of opinion that the
dates in s. 4 cannot be said to be arbitrary. We have
already referred to the statement of objects and reasons
which gives the reasons for the enactment of s. 4. We are
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entitled to look into those reasons to see what was the
state of affairs when s. 4. came to be passed and whether
that state of affairs would justify making a special
provision for teachers appointed, dismissed etc. between the
two dates specified therein. The reason for these two dates
appears to be that a bill for the establishment of the
Commission which would have the effect of curtailing the
powers of the governing bodies of affiliated colleges was on
the anvil of the legislature. The report of the Joint
Select Committee in that connection was made on November 27,
1961. Act II of 1962 was passed after the report of the
Joint Select Committee on January 19, 1962 and s. 48-A with
respect to the Commission was actually put into force from
March 1, 1962. The statement of objects and reasons also
shows that irregularities had been brought to the notice of
the Government as to appointments, dismissals etc. during
this period and that led to the enactment of s. 4 of the Act
by the legislature. In these circumstances it cannot be
said that these dates in s. 4 are arbitrary. Taking the
circumstances as they were when s. 4 came to be enacted and
enforced, it cannot be said that teachers appointed etc.
between these two dates did not form a class that would have
nexus with the object to be achieved. In these circum-
stances we must hold that s. 4. cannot be struck down, on
the ground that it has fixed two arbitrary dates and has
visited teachers appointed, dismissed etc. between these two
dates with a differential treatment as compared to teachers
appointed before November 27, 1961.
The next attack on the validity of s. 4 is that it confers
uncanalised powers on the Chancellor without indicating any
critedon on the basis of which the power under s. 4 can be
exercised. There is no doubt that if one reads s. 4
literally it does appear to give uncanalised powers to the
Chancellor to do what he likes on the recommendation of the
Commission with respect to teachers covered by it . We do
not however think that the Legislature intended to give such
an arbitrary power to the Chancellor. We are of opinion
that s. 4 must be read down and if we read it down there is
no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a
naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor. It seems to us
that the intention of the legislature was that all
appointments, dismissals etc. made between the two dates
should be scrutinised and the scrutiny must be for the
purpose of seeing that the appointments, dismissals etc.,
were in accordance with the University Act and the.
Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules
237
framed thereunder, both in the matter of qualifications, and
in the matter of procedure prescribed for these purposes.
We do not think that the legislature intended more than that
when it gave power to the Chancellor to scrutinise the
appointments, dismissals, etc. made between these two dates.
We have therefore no hesitation in reading down the section
and hold that it only authorises the Chancellor to
scrutinise appointments, dismissals etc. made between these
two dates for the purpose of satisfying himself that these
appointments, dismissals etc., were in accordance with the
University Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations or
Rules made thereunder, both as to the substantive and
procedural aspects thereof. If the appointments etc. were
in accordance with the University Act etc., the Chancellor
would uphold them, and if they were not, the Chancellor
would pass such orders as he deemed fit. Read down this
way, s. 4 does not confer uncanalised power on the
Chancellor; as such it is not liable to be struck down as
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discriminatory under Art. 14.
It is then urged that no provision was made in s. 4 for
hearing of the teacher before passing an order thereunder.
Now s. 4 provides that the Chancellor will pass an order on
the recommendation of the Commission. It seems to us
reasonable to hold that the Commission before making the
recommendation would hear the teacher concerned, according
to the rules of natural justice. This to our mind is
implicit in the section when it provides that the Commission
has to make a recommendation, to the Chancellor on which the
Chancellor will pass necessary orders. If an order is
passed under s. 4 even though on the recommendation of the
Commission but without complying with the principles of
natural justice, that order would be bad and liable to be
struck down as was done by the Patna High Court in Ram
Kripalu Mishra v. University of Bihar(1). But we have no
difficulty in reading s. 4 as requiring that the Commission
before it makes its commendation must hear the teacher
concerned according to principles of natural justice.
Reading the section therefore in this way-and that is the
only way in which it can be read-we are of opinion that it
cannot be struck down under Art. 14 of the Constitution as
discriminatory.
Then it is urged that s. 4 does not provide for approval by
the University of the Chancellor’s order while s. 48-A(6)
does, and it is therefore discriminatory. We are of opinion
that s. 4 was enacted, to meet a particular situation as we
have already indicated above, and in that situation the
approval by the University of the Chancellor’s order would
be quite out of place. Section 4 cannot be struck down as
discriminatory on this ground.
We therefore read s. 4 in the manner indicated above both as
to the limit of the Chancellor’s power while passing an
order thereunder and as to the necessity of the Commission
giving a hearing
(1) A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 41.
238
to the teacher concerned before making the recommendation,
and so read we are of opinion that s. 4 cannot be held to be
discriminatory and as such liable to be struck down under
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
This brings us to the next point, namely, that the order of
August 18, 1962, violated the principles of natural justice
and was therefore bad. It is not the case of the
respondents that the appellant was heard before the said
order was passed, and if that order stood by itself it would
be bad as the appellant was not given a hearing before it
was. passed and the decision of the Patna High Court in Rain
Kripalu Mishra(1) would apply. What happened in this case
was that at some stage it was realised that the appellant
should be given a hearing before an order was passed against
him under S. 4. Therefore the appellant was given a hearing
by the Commission on a notice issued on November 8, 1962 to
show cause. It is true that the subsequent proceedings were
in form as if they were for the review or modification of
the order of August 18, 1962 and it is doubtful whether S.
4 provides for review of an order once passed. It seems to
us that in substance what happened was that the order of
August 18, 1962 was not given effect to when it was realised
that it might be illegal and thereafter action was taken to
give notice to the appellant and a hearing before passing an
order under S. 4. Here again the order of February 18, 1963
is in form an order modifying the order of August 18, 1962,
but in substance it should be taken as a fresh, order under
S. 4 after giving opportunity to the appellant to represent
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his case before the Commission. The order made on February
18, 1963 therefore cannot be said to suffer from the defect
that it was passed without observing the principles of na-
tural justice. As for the order of August 18, 1962, it must
be taken to have fallen when action was taken to give notice
to the appellant on November 8, 1962 and pass a fresh order
on February 18, 1963 after giving a proper hearing. In the
circumstances it is not necessary to quash the order of
August 18, 1962, for it fell when further proceedings were
taken after notice to the appellant. Further as to the
order of February 18, 1963 it must be treated to be a fresh
order and as it is not defective on the ground that the
principles of natural justice had been violated, it cannot
be struck down on that ground.
This brings us to the last contention raised on behalf of
the appellant. The order of February 18, 1963 shows that
the only defect that was found in the appointment of the
appellant as Principal of the Pandaul College was that he
was not a second class M.A. It appears that according to
chapter 16, r. (1) of the Statutes, the minimum
qualification for the appointment of Principal is a second
class Master’s degree and at least ten years,,
(1) A.I.R. 1964 Pat. 41.
239
teaching experience in a college of which at least seven
years must be in a degree college or five years’ experience
as Principal of an Intermediate College. It is not
disputed, that the appellant had ten years’ teaching
experience in a college of which sever,, years were in a
degree college. But it appears that the appellant had a
third class Master’s degree and therefore did not satisfy
the qualification that a Principal should have a second
class Master’s degree. The appellant relies on sub-r. (6)
of r. (1) which is in these terms:
"Notwithstanding anything in the Article, the
qualifications of a teacher already in service
and confirmed before the 1st July 1952 shall
be considered to be equivalent to the minimum
qualifications for the post he holds."
The appellant was confirmed before July 1, 1952. It is
therefore contended on his behalf that in view of sub-r.
(6), he must be deemed to have the minimum qualification for
a lecturer, which, according to sub-r. (1) is a second class
Master’s degree. Once therefore it is deemed under sub-r.
(6) that he had a second class Master’s degree, it follows
that that deeming must continue when he is appointed
Principal for which also the minimum qualification is second
class Master’s degree with certain experience. The High
Court has however held that sub-r. (6) would only mean this
that the appellant had a second class Master’s degree for
the purpose of the post of a lecturer in Ramakrishna College
and that sub-rule could not mean that for the purpose of
appointment as a Principal of the Pandaul College, the
appellant would be deemed to have a second class Master’s
degree. The High Court therefore held that as the appellant
did not fulfil the minimum qualification for the post of a
Principal, his appointment was irregular under the Statutes
and the Chancellor would have the power to pass such order
as he thought fit under s. 4.
We are unable to accept this construction of sub-r. (6).
Rule (1) of chapter 16 of the Statutes provides for the
grades, pay scales and qualifications of teachers. This
sub-rule is prospective in operation meaning thereby that
the minimum qualifications thereunder would be required for
future appointments. Further nothing has been brought to
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our notice in the Statutes to show that teachers appointed
before July 1, 1952 would be liable to removal on the ground
that they did not possess the minimum qualifications. This
means that sub-r. (6) was not necessary in order that
teachers appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 who did
not fulfil the minimum qualifications then being prescribed
should continue in service. Obviously those teachers would
have continued in service even without sub-r. (6).
Therefore, the view of the High Court that sub-r. (6) was
made for the purpose of allowing teachers with less than the
minimum qualifications to continue in the post which they
actually held at the time the
240
Statutes were passed cannot be accepted. If that was the
intention of sub-r. (6), we would have found its language
very different It would then have provided that teachers
already in service and confirmed before July 1, 1952 would
continue in their present posts even though they did not
fulfil the minimum qualifications. But the language of sub-
r. (6) is very different. It begins with a non obstante
clause and says in effect that whatever may be the actual
qualification of the teacher appointed and confirmed before
July 1, 1952 that qualification will be considered to be
equal to the minimum qualification for the post he holds.
The words "for the post he holds" are only descriptive and
mean that if a person holds the post of a lecturer, his
actual qualification will be considered to be equal to the
minimum qualification of the lecturer; if he happens to hold
the post of a Principal, his actual qualification will be
considered to be equal to the minimum qualification required
for the post of the Principal, even though in either of
these cases the actual qualification is less than the
minimum qualification. The obvious intention behind sub-r.
(6) was to safeguard the interest of teachers already
appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952, and that is why
we find language which lays down that even though the actual
qualification may be less than the minimum, that will be
considered equivalent to the minimum. Once that equivalence
is established by sub-r. (6), and it is held that even
though the actual qualification was less, it was equal to
the minimum qualification as provided by sub-r. (1), we fall
to see how that deemed qualification can be given a go-by in
the case of further promotion or appointment. The appellant
was a lecturer in Ramakrishna College, and though he had
only a third class Master’s degree, sub-r. (6) provided that
that third class Master’s degree must be treated as
equivalent to the minimum qualification necessary for the
lecturer’s post i.e., a second class Master’s degree.
Therefore, it must be held that from the date the sub-rule
came into force, the appellant, though he actually had a
third class Master’s degree, must be deemed to have a second
class Master’s degree, which was the minimum qualification
for the lecturer’s grade. Nothing has been pointed out to
us in the Statutes which would take away this deemed
qualification thereafter. We cannot therefore agree with
the High Court that when sub-r. (6) says that a teacher
appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 would be deemed
to have the minimum qualification-though in fact he does not
have it-it only provides for this deeming so long as he held
the particular post he was holding on the date the Statutes
came into force. That in our opinion is not the effect of
the words "the post he holds", for these words are only
descriptive and have to be there because the provision in r.
(1) (1) referred to three categories, namely, lecturers,
professors and principals. ’We may in this connection refer
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to sub-r. (5) which shows that even if in future candidates
with minimum qualification are not available, the
241
A Syndicate can relax the minimum qualification, thus
indicating that the minimum qualifications are not
absolutely rigid. But apart from this it appears to us that
sub-r. (6) was made for the protection of teachers who were
appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 and by this
deeming provision gave them the minimum qualifications and
if that was so that must be for all pur poses in future.
If this were not the interpretation of sub-r. (6) another
curious result would follow inasmuch as a lecturer could be
appointed a college professor for which a second class Mas-
ter’s degree was not made the minimum qualification under
sub-r. (1) but he could not be appointed a Principal on the
interpretation pressed before us on behalf of the
respondents. We should have thought that a good degree
would be more necessary in the case of a professor whose
main work is teaching than in the case of a principal whose
main work is administrative. However that may be, we are of
opinion that sub-r. (6) is meant for the protection of
teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July 1,
1952 and it confers on them a qualification by its deeming
provision and that must enure to their benefit for all time
in future for the purpose of promotion or appointment to a
higher grade in another college.
Another curious result would follow if the interpretation
accepted by the High Court is correct. The High Court as we
have pointed out above has held that sub-r. (6) give
equivalence only for the particular post held by a teacher
appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952. Suppose that a
lecturer in one college who holds a third class Master’s
degree and is entitled to remain as lecturer in that
college, for some reason is appointed to another college
after the Statutes came into force. This would be a new
appointment and such a lecturer could not be appointed in a
new college because he would not have a second class Mas-
ter’s degree for the new appointment. It seems to us
therefore that the intention of sub-r. (6) was not that for
the purpose of the particular post actually held the
equivalence would prevail but no more. We are of opinion
that sub-r. (6) must be read as a protection to the teachers
who were appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 and by
fiction it gave the minimum qualification even though they
may not actually have. it. That minimum qualification must
therefore remain with them always for the future, for
nothing has been brought to our notice which takes away that
minimum qualification deemed to be conferred on the teachers
by sub-rule (6). We are therefore of opinion that the order
dated February 18, 1963 passed by the Chancellor requiring
the governing body of the Pandaul College to give the
appellant a year or two to appear at an examination to
enable him to obtain a second class Master’s degree,
otherwise his services might be terminated, is not valid,
for the appellant must be deemed to have the minimum
qualification of a second class Master’s degree by
412
virtue of sub-rule (6) of the Statutes and as such he was
qualified A for appointment as Principal of Pandaul College.
We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of the
High Court and allowing the writ petition quash the order of
the Chancellor dated February 18, 1963 in respect of the
appellant. The appellant will get his costs from the
respondent University.
R.K.P.S Appeal allowed.
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