Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAM GOPAL CHATURVEDI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
29/04/1969
BENCH:
BACHAWAT, R.S.
BENCH:
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SIKRI, S.M.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 158 1970 SCR (1) 472
1969 SCC (2) 240
CITATOR INFO :
R 1974 SC 175 (21)
R 1974 SC 423 (15)
RF 1976 SC1766 (12)
RF 1976 SC2547 (21)
D 1978 SC 363 (6)
D 1978 SC 851 (65,67)
D 1991 SC 101 (18,42,43,226)
ACT:
Constitution of India, Art, 311 and Art. 320-Services of
temporary government servant-Terminated without consulting
Public Service Commission-No notice, no opportunity to show
cause--On advice of High Court-Validity.
Madhya Pradesh Government Servants (Temporary and Quasi-
permanent Service) Rules, 1960-Whether hit by Arts. 14 & 16
of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was appointed temporarily, to the judicial
service in the respondent-State. On complaints, that the
appellant was associating with a girl, and was taking
bribes, the Chief Justice of the High Court enquired into,
them and the High Court recommended to the State Government
to terminate the appellant’s service. The Government passed
an order under r. 12 of the M. P. Government Servants
(Temporary and Quasi-permanent Service) Rules, 1960 stating
only that the services of the appellant are terminated from
a specified day. The appellant filed a writ petition in the
High Court against this order. The High Court dismissed the
petition. in appeal, to this Court, the appellant contended
that (i) r. 12 was violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the
Constitution as it conferred arbitrary and unguided
discretion to the Government; (ii) the impugned order was as
invalid as it was passed without consulting the State Public
Service Commission under Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution;
(iii) the order -was passed by way of punishment without
giving the appellant an opportunity to show cause against
the proposed action and was therefore violative of Art. 311
of the Constitution; (iv) the order was in violation of the
principles of natural justice, as no charge-sheet was served
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nor any departmental inquiry held; and (v) the State
Government erred in blindly following the recommendations of
the High Court. Repelling the contentions. this Court,
HELD : The appellant was a temporary government servant and
was in not quasi-permanent service. His services could be
terminated on one month’s notice under r. 12. There was no
provision in the order of appointment or in any agreement
that his service could not be ’so terminated.
(i) Rule 12 applies to all temporary government servants
who are not in quasi-permanent service. All such government
servants are treated alike. The agrument that r. 12
conferred an arbitrary and unguided discretion was devoid of
any merit. The services of a temporary government servant
may be terminated on one month’s notice whenever the
government thinks it necessary or expedient to do so for
administrative reasons. It was impossible to define before
hand all the circumstances in which the discretion could be
exercised. The discretion was necessarily left to the
government. [475B]
(ii) The provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) were not mandatory and
did not confer any rights on the public servant and that the
absence of consultation with the State Public Service
Commission did not afford him a cause of action. [475G]
473
State of U.P. v. M. L. Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533,
followed.
(iii) On the face of it, the order did not cast any
stigma on the appellant’s character or integrity nor did it
visit him with any evil consequences It was not passed by
way of punishment and the provisions of Art. 311 were not
attracted. [476H]
It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal
inquiry into the appellant’s conduct with a view to
ascertain whether he would be retained in service. [477A]
State of Punjab v. Sukh Rai Bahadur, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 234,
followed.
(iv) In the present case, the impugned order did not involve
any element of punishment nor did it deprive the appellant
of any vested right to any office. The appellant was a
temporary Government servant and had no Tight to hold the
office. The state government had the right to, terminate
his servicess under r. 12 without issuing any notice to the
appellant to, show cause against the proposed action. [477H]
(v) The government rightly terminated the services,
following the advice tendered by the High Court. The High
Court is vested with the control over the subordinate
judiciary. If the High Court found that the appellant wits
not a fit person to be retained in service, it could
properly ask the government to terminate his services.
[478B]
State of West Bengal v. N. N. Bagchi, [1966] 1 S.C.R.
771, followed.
State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. [1967] 2
S.C.R. 625 and Ridge v. Baldwsin, [1964] A.C. 40, referred
to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 712 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated July 27, 1964
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 272
of 1964.
S. C . Chaturvedi, K. Mehta and M. V. Goswami, for the
appellant.
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I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bachawat, J. The appellant was a temporary Civil Judge in
Madhya Pradesh. On March 14, 1961 an order was issued in
the name of the Governor of Madhya Pradesh State that the
appellant "is appointed temporarily, until further orders,
as Civil Judge", Rule 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Government
Servants (Temporary and Quasi-permanent Service) Rules, 1960
provided:
12(a) Subject to any provision contained in
the order of appointment or in any agreement
between the gov-
474
ernment and the temporary government servant,
the service of a temporary government servant
who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be
liable to termination at any time by notice in
writing given either by the government servant
to the appointing authority or by the ap-
pointing authority to the Government servant;
Provided that the services of any such
government servant may be terminated forthwith
by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the
amount of his pay plus allowances for the
period of the notice, or as the case may be,
for the period by which such notice falls
short of one month or any agreed longer period
Provided further that the payment of
allowances shall be subject to the conditions
under which such allowances are admissible.
(b) The periods of such notice shall be one
month unless otherwise agreed between the
Government and the Government servant."
On March 25, 1964 an order was issued by and
in the name of the Governor terminating the
appellant’s services. The order stated :-
"The service of Shri Ram Gopal Chaturvedi,
temporary Civil Judge, Waidhan, are terminated
with effect from the 1st June 1964, forenoon."
The appellant filed a writ petition in the Madhya Pradesh
High Court for quashing the order dated March 25, 1964. The
High Court summarily dismissed the petition. It held that
the impugned order was not by way of punishment and that the
appellant’s services were liable to be terminated under the
aforesaid rule 12 on one month’s notice.The appellant has
filed the present appeal after obtaining special leave.
The appellant was a temporary government servant and was not
in quasi-permanent service. His services could be
terminated on one month’s notice under r. 12. There was no
provision in the order of appointment or in any agreement
that his services could not be so terminated.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that rule 12 was uncon-
stitutional as it was framed without consulting the State
Public Service Commission and the High Court. The
contention raises -mixed questions of law and fact. It was
not raised in the High
475
Court, and we indicated in the course of arguments that
the appellant could not be allowed to raise it in this Court
for the first time.
Counsel next submitted that rule 12 was violative of arts.
14 and 16 of the Constitution. There is no merit in this
contention. Rule 12 applies to all temporary government
servants who are not in quasi-permanent service. ’All such
government servants are treated alike. The argument that
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rule 12 confers an arbitrary and unguided discretion is
devoid of any merit. The services of a temporary government
servant may be terminated on one month’s notice whenever the
government thinks it necessary or expedient to do so for
administrative reasons. It is impossible to define before-
hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be
exercised. The discretion was necessarily left to the gov-
ernment.
It was argued that the appellant’s services could not be
terminated on one month’s notice as (a) his confirmation was
recommended by the High Court after the expiry of the
probationary period and (b) the advertisement dated
September 9, 1960 inviting applications for the temporary
posts (if civil judges did not specifically mentioned that
their services could be so terminated. The point that the
High Court had recommended the appellant’s confirmation was
not raised in the High Court and cannot be allowed to be,
raised in this Court for the first time. The appellant’s
services were subject to the relevant rules and could be
terminated on one month’s notice under rule 12. It is
immaterial that the advertisement did not specifically
mentioned that his services could be so terminated. It was
argued that the impugned order was invalid as it was passed
without consulting the State Public Service Commission under
Art. 320(2)(c) of the Constitution. There is no merit in
this contention. The case of State of U.P. v. M. L.
Srivastava(1) decided that the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c)
were not mandatory and did not confer any rights on the
public servant and that the absence of consultation with the
State Public Service Commission did not afford him a cause
of action.
It was next argued that the impugned order was
passed by way of punishment without giving the appellant an
opportunity to show cause against the proposed action and
was therefore violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution. In
this connection, counsel It for the appellant drew our
attention to the statement of case filed on behalf of the
respondent. It appears that there were complaints
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 533.
476
that the appellant was associating with a young girl named
Miss Laxmi Surve against the wishes of her father and other
members of her family. The Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh
made inquiries into the matter and on February 19, 1954 he
admonished the appellant for this disreputable conduct. On
his return to Jabalpur on February 28, 1964 the Chief
Justice dictated the following note:
"During my recent visit to Gwalior, I probed
into the matter of Shri R. G. Chaturvedi,
Special Magistrate (Motor Venicles), Gwalior,
giving shelter to a girl named Kumari Laxmi
Surve, the daughter of a Chowkidar employed in
the J. C. Mills Gwalior. The enquiry made by
me revealed that Shri Chaturvedi has been
associating with this girl for over a year and
his relations with her are not at all
innocent. He is sheltering and supporting
Miss Surve against the wishes of her father
and other members of her family. This is evi-
dent from the fact that on 14th December 1963,
when the girl was at the residence of Shri
Chaturvedi and when her younger brother
came to take her back, his house was stormed
by a mob of 300 to 400 persons. A report of
this incident was also recorded in the Roz-
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namcha-Am of Lashkar Kotwali. The statement
published by Miss Surve in some newspapers
published from Gwalior explaining his action
and her relation with her parents is
significant. In that statement Miss Surve
gave her address as ’C/o. Shri Chaturvedi.
That the statement is one inspired by Shri
Chaturvedi is obvious enough. Shri Chaturvedi
is still maintaining the girl. Shri
Chaturvedi did not enjoy good reputation at
Morena and Kolaras where he was posted before
his posting at Gwalior. Shri Bajpai, District
Judge, Gwalior, also informed me that Shri
Chaturvedi was not honest and that in
collaboration with the Traffic Inspector he
has taken money from accused persons in many
cases under the Motor Vehicles Act."
No charge-sheet was served on the appellant nor was any
departmental inquiry held against him. On March 1O, 1964
the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed a resolution that the
State Government should terminate the appellant’s services.
Having regard to this resolution the State Government passed
the impugned order dated March 25, 1964. On the face of it,
the order did not cast any stigma on the appellant’s
character or integrity nor did it visit him with any evil
consequences. It was not passed by way of punishment and
the provisions of Art. 311 were not attracted.
477
It was immaterial that the order was preceded by an informal
inquiry into the appellant’s conduct with a view to
ascertain whether he should be retained in service. As was
pointed out in The State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur(1) :-
"An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form
preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities
only to ascertain whether the public servant should be
retained in service, does not attract the operation of
Article 311 of the Constitution."
It was next argued that the impugned order was in violation
of the principles of natural justice and in this connection
reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in State
of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors.(2) and Ridge v.
Baldwin(3). In Binapani’s Case the appellant was an
assistant surgeon in the Orissa medical service. The State
government accepted the date of birth given by her on
joining the service. Later the government refixed the date
of her birth on ex parte inquiry and passed an order
compulsorily retiring her. The Court held that its order
was invalid and was liable to be quashed. The appellant as
the holder of an office in the medical service had the right
to continue in service. According to the rules made under
Art. 309 she could not be removed from the office before
superannuation except for good and sufficient reasons. The
ex parte order was in derogation of her vested rights and
could not be passed without giving her an opportunity of
being heard. In the present case, the impugned order did
not deprive the appellant of any vested right. The
appellant was a temporary government servant and had no
right to hold the office. The State government had the
right to terminate his services under rule 12 without
issuing any notice to the appellant to show cause against
the proposed action. In
Ridge v. Baldwin(3) the House of Lords by majority held that
the order of dismissal of a chief constable on the ground of
neglect of duty without informing him of the charge made
against him and giving him an opportunity of being heard was
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in contravention of the principles of natural justice and
was liable to be quashed. Section 191 of the Municipal
Corporations Act, 1882 provided that the watch committee
might at any time suspend and dismiss any borough constable
whom they thought negligent in the discharge of his duty or
otherwise unfit for the same. The chief constable had the
right to hold his office and before depriving him of this
right the watch committee was required to conform to the
principles of natural justice. The order of dismissal
visited him with the loss of office and involved an element
of punishment for the offences committed. In the present
case, the impugned order
(1) [1968] 3 S.C.R 234.
(2) [1967] 2 S.C.R 625.
(3) [1964] A.C. 40.
478
did not involve any element of punishment nor did it deprive
the appellant of any vested right to any office.
It was next argued that the State Government blindly
followed the recommendations of the High Court. We find no
merit in this argument. The State government properly
followed those recommendations. The High Court is vested
with the control over the subordinate judiciary, see The
State of West Bengal v. N. N. Bagchi (1).If the High Court
found that the appellant was not a fit person to be retained
in service, it could properly ask the government to
terminate his services. Following the advice tendered by
the High Court, the government rightly terminated his
services under rule 12.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no
order as to costs.
Y.P. Appeal dismissed.
(1)[1966] 1 S.C.R. 771.
LI 3Sup.CI(NP)69-2,500-2-5-70-GIPF.
479