Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAMNARAIN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT31/01/1973
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 1188 1973 SCR (3) 463
1973 SCC (3) 805
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1991 SC1463 (5)
ACT:
Indian Penal Code-Accused convicted under s. 467 and 120B-
Application under s. 561-A of the Cr. P. C. not considered-
Whether there was grave miscarriage of justice.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant was alleged to have entered into a conspiracy
with others, to persuade members of the public to part with
money for purchasing residential plots in a village, ’Khand
Gawadi’ and in furtherence of this conspiracy, they were
alleged to have forged sale proceedings pattas, and the
signatures of others on such pattas and sale proceedings.
The appellant himself affixed his signatures as Sarpanch and
put the seat of the village panchayat on the forged
documents. The trial court held the appellant guilty of the
offences of conspiracy under s. 120-B and he was also found
guilty of the offences under s. 467 1. P. C. On appeal the
High Court confirmed the appellant’s conviction on both
these counts, but reduced his sentence. The appellant’s
grievance before this Court was that non-consideration of
his application under s. 561-A Cr. P.C. dated April 7,
1970, which was filed on May 1, 1970, but neither listed nor
beard and has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. On
18th May 1970, the Hon’ble High Court made an order as
follows : "Perused application dated 7-4-1970 and 30-4-1970.
1 have decided the case on 17-4-1970 and there is,
therefore, no question of saying anything on the merits
now". The second point strongly presented by the appellant
is that the appellants conviction was based solely on the
testimony of P.W. 1, the approver, whose evidence has not
been corroborated in material parts.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD: (i) The application under s. 561-A Cr. P.C.
should have been disposed of after hearing the appellant’s
counsel and its disposal without such hearing was clearly
wrong and unjust. The appellant has a just grievance
against the manner in which this application was disposed
of. He had a right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity
of being heard in support of his application, and the
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disposal of this case in the chamber of the learned judge
without giving him such opportunity cannot be appreciated
[469H]
(ii) Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, expressly
provides that an accomplice is a competent witness and the
conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But this Section
has to read along with illustration (b) to s. 114. Section
114 empowers the court to presume the existence of certain
facts and the illustrations elucidate what the court may
presume. Illustration (b) in express terms says : ’that an
accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated
in material particulars. The statute thus permits the
conviction of an accused person on the basis of un-
corroborated testimony of army accomplice. But the rule of
prudence embodied in Illustration (b) of s. 114 strikes a
note of warning that the court will not generally believe an
accomplice unless be is corroborated in material parts.
This rule is guided by long experience and has become a rule
of prudence for general application. [470C-G]
464
(iii) So far as the charge under s. 120-B, 1. P.C. is
concerned, in almost every case of conspiracy, it is
generally a matter of inference, direct independent evidence
being seldom. Inferences are normally deduced from acts of
parties in pursuance of apparent criminal purpose in common
between them. In the present case, the only evidence is of
the approver and the trial court expressly observed that
there is no other direct evidence of conspiracy. Therefore
the charge of conspiracy cannot be sustained from the
evidence available. [475G-476B]
In the present case, on the existing evidence, the
appellants conviction under s.467 I.P.C. was wholly
unsustainable. Therefore, the appellants’ conviction must
be set aside. [475F]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 105 of
1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
April 17, 1970 of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in S.
B. Cr. Appeal No. 283 of 1967.
Nuruddin Ahmad F. S. Dave and Subhag Mal Jain, for the
appellant.
K. Baldev Mehta, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DUA, J.-In this appeal by special leave from the judgment of
the Rajasthan High Court Ram Narain, appellant, challenges
his conviction for the offences under ss. 467 and 120B,
I.P.C. He,, along with three others, had been committed for
trial in the court of Sessions Judge, Kota on ten charges
for offences under ss. 467, 468, 420 and 120B, I.P.C. It is
not necessary to reproduce all the charges and it would
suffice if we set out the charges under S. 467 and 120B,
I.P.C., because by the impugned judgment of the High Court
the appellant’s conviction was sustained only on charges
under these two sections. Those charges are :
"I That you between the months of November,
1959 to January, 1960, at your house at
Dadvada entered into a conspiracy with
Sarvashri Madan Mohan, Badriprasad and Bakshi
Gajpatsingh and others, to commit off
ences of
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forgery using forged documents as gen
uine and
of cheating the public, Municipal Board and
the Government in respect of the sale of some
pieces of land belonging earlier to the Gram
Panchayat Khandgawari in favour of Moolsingh,
Mukatbeharilal and Surajsingh and that you did
some act to wit forged the Proceedings of the
Pattas in favour of the above said persons and
the signatures and the thumb impressions, of
the Panchas of the defunct Gram Panchayat and
made false entries in the Cash Book of the
said Panchayat of ;he year 1957-58 at pages 42
and 45 and affixed the
465
seal of that Gram Panchayat and put your
signatures on the Pattas so forged, all in the
capacity of the Surpanch of that Gram
Panchayat besides agreement to commit the
offences under sections 457, 468 and 420, of
the I.P.C. punishable with rigorous
imprisonment for over two years and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section
120B of the I.P.C. and within my cognizance.
(2) That during the same period, you forged
Patta proceedings in antedates in respect of
the sale of land 30’X35’ belonging earlier to
the defunct Gram Panchayat Kandgaonri in
favour of Shri Surajsingh and put your own
signatures on the forged document purporting
to be valuable security to wit, the patta in
favour of Surajsingh and gave it to Shri
Surajsingh and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 467, of the
I.P.C. and within my cognizance.
(5) That during the same period, you forged
patta proceedings in antedates in respect of
the sale of land 50’X 50’ belonging earlier to
the defunct Gram Panchayat Khandgaonri in
favour of Mukat Behari and put your signatures
on the forged document purporting to be a
valuable security to wit the patta in favour
of Mukat Beharilal and gave it to Shri Mukat
Behari and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 467 of the
Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
(8) That during the same period you forged
patta proceedings in antedates in respect of
the sale of land 30’X30’ belonging earlier to
the defunct Gram Panchayat Khandgaonri, in
favour of Shri Moolsingh and put your own
signatures on, the forged document purporting
to be valuable security to with the patta in
favour of Shri Moolsingh and gave it to Shri
Moolsingh and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 467 of the
I.P.C. and within my cognizance."
Village Khand Gawadi had before October, 1958 a panchayat of
which Gangaram (P.W. 3) was the Sarpanch and the appellant
its Up-Sarpanch. In the months of April and May, 19S8 the
appellant officiated for the Sarpanch because the latter
(Gangaram) was busy in connection with his daughter’s
marriage. By means of a gazette notification (No. 1128 8/F.
1 (a) 48L 59/A/55 dated 16-10-58) the Rajasthan Government
extended the limits of the municipal council, Kota, amongst
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other villages, to Khand
466
Gawadi also. The Municipal Council took over charge from
the Gram Panchayat of this village on January 7, 1959.
According to the prosecution version during the months of
November, 1959 to January, 1960, long after the village
panchayat had ceased to exist, the appellant entered into a
conspiracy with the other accused persons (tried along with
him in the sessions court) and Bhanwarlal son of Bapulal
(who became an approver and appeared as P.W. 1 in the case)
to cheat the members of the public, the Municipal Council,
Kota and the Government. The modus operandi for carrying
out the object of this conspiracy was to persuade such
members of the public as were amenable to their persuasion
to part with money for purchasing residential plots in
village Khand Gawadi; and in furtherance of this conspiracy
they forged sale proceedings and pattas by ante-dating them
and forging signatures of the other Panchas on such pattas
and sale proceedings. The appellant himself affixed his
signatures as Sarpanch and put the seal of the village
Panchayat on the forged documents. The trial, as is
obvious, from the charges reproduced above, was confined to
the sale proceedings and pattas in the names of Mool Singh,
Mukat Beharilal and Suraj Singh. Bhanwarlal (P.W. 1), who
was also stated to have been a party to this conspiracy was
granted pardon and having become an approver appeared as a
witness in support of the prosecution. The Sessions Judge,
after considering the prosecution evidence and the evidence
of the defence witnesses, produced by the appellant, upheld
the prosecution case against the appellant holding that he
and the approver, Bhanwarlal, had joined hands in forging
the sale proceedings and pattas mentioned in the charges and
also in forging thereon the signatures of the other Panchas.
In fact, according to the trial court, it was the appellant
who had dragged Bhanwarlal into ’the conspiracy and their
activities were motivated by a desire to cheat the Municipal
Council, Kota, the members of the public and the Government
of Rajasthan by making them part with possession of their
valuable land in village Khand Gawadi for nominal Drice. On
this finding the offence of conspiracy under s. 120B was
held proved against the appellant. He was also held guilty
of the offence under s. 467, I.P.C. Charges under the other
sections were held not proved. The appellant was
accordingly sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three
years and a fine of Rs. 200 under s. 120B and to rigorous
imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 200 under s.
467, I.P.C. In default of payment of fine the appellant was
directed to undergo six months’ further rigorous
imprisonment in each case. Both the substantive sentences
were directed to be concurrent. The other accused persons
Bakshi Gajpat Singh, Madan Mohan and Badri Prasad were
acquitted.
On appeal the High Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction
on both these counts but reduced his sentence to rigorous
imprison-
467
ment for 15 months and a fine of Rs. 200 on each count. The
sentences of imprisonment were directed to be concurrent.
In default of payment of fine the appellant was directed to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months on
each count.
In this Court Shri Nuruddin Ahmad, the learned counsel for
the appellant at the outset pointed out that in the High
Court an application had been made on behalf of the
appellant on April 7, 1970 to recall Gangaram (P.W. 1) for
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cross-examining him and also for examining Mukat Beharilal
and M. L. Parekh Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge,
as court witnesses, but although arguments were addressed on
that application at some length the High Court did not care
to deal with the, matter or even to refer to it in its
judgment. In this connection our attention was drawn to
Annexure D to the petition for special leave in this Court.
Anenexure D is said to be a copy of the application filed in
the High Court by Shri V. S. Dave, Advocate for the
appellant, under s. 540, Cr. P.C. The material part of
Annexure D reads :
"1. That in the above noted appeal prosecution
examined Ganga Ram P.W. 3 as a witness.
2. That Gangaram besides the present
complaint Ex. P-19 also lodged a complaint
against appellant for offence under sections
409, 477, I.P.C. and the accused appellant has
been acquitted in the said case.
3. That the judgment in case under sections
409 and 477, I.P.C. was delivered subsequent
to the examination of Gangararn as P.W. 3 and
as such he could not be cross-examined in
respect of his earlier complaints and fact of
enmity and false concention of cases against
the appellant could not be put to him.
4. That appellant has also been convicted
for forging the, patta alleged to have been
given to Mukat Beharilal.
5. That Mukat Behari Lal has been withheld
by the prosecution.
6. That the appellant has learnt that Mukat
Behari Lal filed a writ petition in this
Hon’ble Court in respect of the said patta
and- same is said to have: been decided in his
favour.
7. That since the subject matter of patta
of Mukat Behari Lal has been adjudicated upon
by this Hon’ble Court his examination in this
Hon’ble Court as a witness is essential to the
just decision of this case and as also the
production of judgment will have important
bearing in the case.
4 68
8. That the Deputy S. P. who conducted the
investigation of this case has also not been
produced and same has caused great prejudice
to the case of the appellant as the appellant
could not bring on record as to from whose
custody the documents Ex. P-5, P-6, P-9 and
P-12
9. That the examination of aforesaid three
Witnesses is essential to the just decision of
the case.
It is, therefore, prayed that your lordships
would be pleased to accept this application
recall Gangaram P.W. 3 for further cross-
examination and also call Mukat Behari Lal
and the Investigating Officer as Court wit-
nesses or grant permission to appellant to
summon them."
Our attention was also invited to Annexures E and F to the
Special Leave Petition. Annexure E is a certified copy of a
slip of the Court Reader in single Bench Cr. A. No. 283 of
67, Ramnarain v. State in the High Court of Judicature for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur. That slip reads :
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"This application was found lying in the
Chamber of Hon’ble Gattani J. How this
application was placed and who placed this
application there.
B. C.
Sd/-
Bansidhar
Reader
27-4-70"
Annexure F a certified copy of the order dated April 29,
1970 of Deputy Registrar of the High Court in the said
Criminal Appeal, which was also brought to our notice, reads
:
"The application has been shown to Hon’ble
Gattani j. and according to the direction of
his Lordship the application be kept on the
file.
Sd/- G. K. Sharma
Dy.Registrar"
On April 30, 1970 an application was presented on behalf of
the appellant in the High Court under s. 561-A. Cr. P.C.
This application, according to the appellant, was filed on
May 1, 1970 but it was neither listed nor heard in court.
The following order dated May 18, 1970 (as translated into
English) was recorded by the learned Judge in Hindi :-
"Perused the applications dated 7-4-70 and 30-
4-70 presented on behalf of the appellant.
46 9
I have, decided the case on 17-4-70 and there
is therefore no question of saying anything on
the merits now. As far as I remember Shri
Chiranjilal Agarwal did mention during the
course of the arguments on 7-4-70 that he
wanted to present an application. Then I had
told him that if the application is presented
it will also be taken into consideration.
Thereafter during the course of the arguments
no application was presented before me.
I never saw the application dated 7-4-70 in my
Chamber, nor anyone said anything to me on 29-
4-70 about this application.
Sd/- H. D. GATTANI J."
The appellant’s grievance before us is that non-
consideration,, of his application dated April 7, 1970 has
resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. Developing this
point it has been contended, that the manner in which this
part of the case was dealt with suggests non-application of
judicial mind by the High Court to the case as a whole.
The second point strongly pressed by Shri Nuruddin Ahmed’ is
that the appellants conviction is based solely on the
testimony of Banwari Lal (P.W. 1), the approver, whose
evidence has not been corroborated in material particulars,
connecting the appellant with the alleged offence in
question. The appellant’s conviction is,therefore,
unsustainable. P.W. 1, according to the appellant’s,
submission, is a wholly unreliable witness add his ’evidence
is so seriously discrepant and unconvincing on vital points
that it is. highly dangerous to place any reliance on it.
The sustenance of the aPPellant’s conviction on the
approver’s evidence in this case Would be a travesty of
justice, said the counsel. We were taken. through the
relevant record of the evidence by the counsel for both. ,-
ides on this part of the case.
Now so far as the first grievance is concerned, the
appellants submission cannot be summarily brushed aside as
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we feel there is prima facie material calling for a further
probe into the matter. But as in our view even if the first
contention were to prevail the question of recording
additional evidence, as requested on behalf of the
appellant, would have to be considered and since, in our
opinion,, the appeal has to be allowed on the second point,
we deem it unnecessary to express any considered opinion on
the first point. We would, however, like to point out that
the application under s. 561-A, Cr. P.C. should have been
disposed of after hearing the appellant’s counsel and its
disposal without such hearing was clearly wrong and unjust.
The appellant has a just grievance against the manner in
which this application was disposed of. He
470
had a right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity of being
heard in support of his application and we are unable to
appreciate the disposal of this application in the chambers
without giving him such opportunity. The counsel for the
State was also unable to explain the divergence between the
order of the Deputy Registrar dated April 29, 1970 and the
learned Judge’s observation in his order dated May 18, 1970
that no one had said anything to him on April 29, 1970 about
the application dated, April 7, 1970. This divergence has
also left on our minds a somewhat unhappy impression with
respect to the whole matter. We need say nothing more on
this point.
Turning to the second point we may first state the legal
position relating to the testimony of an approver. Section
133, Indian Evidence Act, which falls in Ch. IX dealing
generally with witnesses, expressly provides that an
accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds on uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. In other words, this section
renders admissible such uncorroborated testimony. But this
section has to be read along with illustration (b) to s. 114
which falls in Ch. VII, dealing with Burden of Proof.
Section 114 empowers the court to presume the existence of
certain facts mid the illustrations elucidate what the court
may presume, and make clear by means of examples as to what
facts the court shall have regard in considering whether or
not the maxims illustrated apply to a given case before it..
Illustration (b) in express terms says that an accomplice is
unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material
particulars : two examples are also given to further explain
this subject. The statute thus permits the conviction of an
accused person on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice but the rule of prudence embodied in
illustration (b) of s. 114 strikes a note of warning
cautioning the court that an accomplice does not generally
deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material
particulars. This rule of caution is traceable to the fact
that an accomplice witness from the very nature of his
position is a suspect. This rule is guided by long human
experience and has become a rule of prudence of general
application. The ’courts. therefore, consider it prudent to
look for corroboration in material particulars for
sustaining the conviction of an accused person. An approver
who is admittedly guilty of the crime is an accomplice who
has betrayed his associates and has apparently sought pardon
for saving his own skin. In other words he has purchased
complete immunity for his prosecution at the expense of his
associated by agreeing to give evidence against them for the
prosecution. He is. therefore, presumed not to be a man of
high character or a fair witness. His pardon being
conditional, to pleased the prosecution ’he may well weave
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some false detail into the true details of the prosecution
story and may also falsely involve some innocent per-
471
son. There is thus a real danger of his telling a story
true in. general outline but containing some untruth which
he can easily work into the story. It is for this reason
that the courts as a matter of prudence and caution
anxiously look for some corroboration to satisfy their
conscience that the approver’s testimony which is clearly
admissible is also worthy of belief. One can of course
visualise an accomplice who is genuinely repentant for the
commission of his crime and truly desires to make a clean
breast of the whole, affair by way of penetance. But even
in such cases the court has to judicially determine the
extent to which his uncorroborated testimony can be
considered as trustworthy by looking to the other relevant
material and the attending circumstances on the basis of
which the accused can be safely convicted. The rule which
seems to emerge from the foregoing discussion and judicial
decisions is that the necessity of corroboration as a matter
of prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such
corroboration must be clearly present to the mind of the
judge.
It is in this background that the court is required to
determine the nature and extent of corroboration of an
approver’s evidence necessary in a given case for sustaining
the conviction of the accused. The corroborating evidence,
broadly stated, must connect’ or tend to connect the accused
with the crime charged. This is so because of the danger of
the approver introducing some innocent person or persons
into an otherwise true prosecution story. Such evidence,
however, need not by itself be sufficient for sustaining the
conviction of the accused- for in that case the evidence of
the approver would be wholly unnecessary and mere
surplusage.
Before considering the evidence on the record it may be
borne in mind that the court should evaluate the evidence of
an approver de hors the corroborating pieces of evidence for
if his testimony is itself uninspiring and unacceptable
justifying its rejection outright, then, it would be futile
and wholly unnecessary to look for corroborating evidence.
It is only when the approver’s evidence is considered
otherwise acceptable that the court applies its mind to the
rule that his testimony needs corroboration in material
particulars connecting or tending to connect each one of the
accused with the crime charged. The offences for which the
appellant has been convicted, it may be recalled, are of
conspiracy with the approver (P.W. 1) as contemplated by S.
120-B, I.P.C., and forgery of valuable security as
contemplated by s. 467, I.P.C. Before us the counsel for the
State clearly confined his contention to the forgery of
valuable security as the real gravamen of the charge against
the appellant, of course, in addition to the charge of
conspiracy. We have, therefore, to consider the evidence
bearing in mind the ingredients of these two offences.
472
So far as the charge under S. 120-B, I.P.C. is concerned the
,only evidence is of the approver and the trial court
expressly observed that there was no other direct evidence
of conspiracy. After considering the case with respect to
the offence under S. 467, I.P.C. we will turn to the charge
of the substantive offence of conspiracy.
Before dealing with the evidence on the offence under S. 467
it may be recalled that the present case was initiated at
the instance ,of Ganga Ram, ex-Sarpanch, (P.W. 3) and some,
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others when they presented a complaint (Ex. P-19) on March
18, 1961 to the Collector, Kota, long after the charge of
the Panchayat had been taken over by the Municipal Council.
Ganga Ram appears also to have earlier made some, complaints
to the other officers but as nothing had come out of those
complaints the Collector was approached with an allegation
of misappropriation against Ram Narain in March, 1961. The
Municipal Council, it is noteworthy, did not care to
initiate the prosecution.
Bhanwar Lal, the approver, appearing as P.W. 1 has deposed
that in June, 1958 he wanted to buy a plot of land for
building his ,own house at Kota where he had been
transferred from Udaipur as Train Clerk, Kota Junction. He
was introduced to the appellant through one Kanhaiyalal. He
gave to the appellant an application for that purpose and
also paid Rs. 40 towards the price of the land and the
appellant gave him a patta for a piece of land measuring
30’X45’ without showing him its exact location. Inspite of
repeated requests the appellant did not show him the plot on
certain pretexts for about four or five months. And then he
showed him a plot measuring on 30’X35’. On objection being
raised the appellant promised to give to P.W. 1 some more
land elsewhere. It appears that the approver and the
appellant had by then become quite intimate. The approver
gave to the appellant a contract for filling up the
foundation for a house and also paid him about Rs. 8 or 9
hundred for which he took no receipt. The approver also
started teaching the appellant’s children as a private tutor
without ,charging anything. It was due to this intimacy
that the appellant is said to have asked the approver to
help him in completing the proceedings of some incomplete
patta cases of the Gram Panchayat. Bhanwar Lal, approver,
who ultimately agreed to do this work went to the
appellant’s house where he found one Mehta, Secretary of the
Mandi Committee, Madan Mohan Vijay and Badri Prasad. The
appellant introduced the, approver to Mehta and Madan Mohan
and asked them to complete the Panchayat records according
to his directions. According to the approver he had
prepared about 200 pattas and order sheets, in about eight
or ten days’ time. It is unnecessary to go into the
remaining evidence of the approver at this stage. Suffice
it to say that from his evidence it is not at all clear as
to what interest the approver bad in helping the appel-
473
lant in what is described as the forgery of the various
documents. His evidence, therefore, seems, prima facie, to
be unimpressive and hardly trustworthy. The charge under s.
467, as already observed, is confined to four pattas issued
in favour of Suraj Singh, Mool Singh and Mukat Behari. Two
pattas issued in favour of Suraj Singh are Exs. P5 and P6
and one patta each in favour of Mool Singh and Mukat Behari
are Exs. P 9 and P 12 respectively. Before taking up these
instances and scrutinising this evidence, we may point out
that there is no evidence worth the name and no argument was
urged before us to attempt to show that in the case of the
patta in question either the consideration received was less
than the market value or the, amount realised had been
misappropriated and not duly deposited and credited in the
appropriate account. There is thus no question of unlawful
gain or loss by cheating any-body. Now s. 467 provides for
punishment for forging a document which purports to be a
valuable security or a will etc. We ,are concerned with the
offence of forging a valuable security. Forgery is defined
in s. 463, I.P.C. according to which whoever makes a false
document or part of a document with intent to. cause damage
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or injury to the public or to any person or to support any
claim or title or to cause any person to part with property
or to enter into any express or implied contract or with
intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed,
commits forgery. Section 30, I.P.C., defines "valuable
security" to be a document which purports to be a document
whereby any legal fight is created, extended, transferred,
restricted, extinguished or released or whereby any person
acknowledges that he lies under legal liability or has not a
certain legal right. We are, therefore, concerned only with
forgery of valuable security. The fact that the pattas were
granted in favour of the three persons mentioned above
irregularly or contrary to any rules or directions
applicable to such pattas would be wholly immaterial except
to the extent it supports the case of forgery against the
appellant.
In so far as the case of Suraj Singh is concerned there are
two pattas Exs. P 5 and P 6, both dated May 5, 1958. The
two plots measuring about 100 sq. yds. each were allotted to
Suraj Singh for a consideration of Rs. 37.50 each with an
additional sum of Rs. 2 each as plan fee. The consideration
money has been described in these pattas to be "Bhaint". It
is expressly recited in these pattas that the requisite, fee
of Rs. 30.50 has been deposited vide Rokarpanna. These
pattas are signed by the appellant and clearly there can be
no question of forging anybody’s signatures, so far as these
two documents are concerned. Exhibit P-4 is the order
sheet with respect to Suraj Singh. According to the
approver he, the appellant and Badri Prasad, had fabricated
the signatures of Ghasi and Babulal and the thumb impression
of Panch Bhanwarlal (P.W. 8) on Ex. P-4. Except for the
approver’s bald statement there is no
474
other evidence in support of this assertion. Babulal who
was produced as P.W. 5 expressed his inability to say either
way whether Ex. P-4 bore his signatures. He is illiterate
and, according to his own evidence, can only put his
signatures which also he is unable to identify. Ghasi was
not produced by the prosecution. He was, however, produced
in defence as D.W. 2 for admitting his signatures on Ex. P-
11, the order sheet relating to Mukat Behari’s case. But
when he appeared as a defence witness neither the
prosecution nor the defence asked him any questions with
respect to Ex.P-4. The omission on the part of the
prosecution to question him about Ex. P-4 in the absence of
any cogent explanation is, in our opinion, quite
significant. Some evidence has been led with respect to
entries in Ex. P- 1, the cash book of the Gram Panchayat
but since the charges we are concerned with are under s. 467
and 120B, I.P.C. it is unnecessary, as indeed, irrelevant,
to refer to that evidence. Before us the counsel for the
State expressly confined his case to the forgery of the
pattas which, according to him, constitute valuable security
within the contemplation of s. 467. With respect to Suraj
Singh, therefore, we do not have any reliable evidence which
can be said to corroborate the approver, assuming the,
approver’s evidence to be acceptable which we are not
inclined to hold.
We now turn to Mool Singh’s patta Ex. P-9. This patta
relates to an area measuring 100 sq. yds. and the
consideration is stated to be Rs. 30 with an additional sum
of Rs. 2 as plan fee. Here again, the consideration is
described as "Bhaint". Exhibit P-9 also contains an
assertion that the requisite amount of Rs. 32 had been
deposited vide Rokarpana. This patta is also signed by Ram
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Narain and there is no question of forging any one else’s
signatures. The order sheet relating to this patta is Ex.
P-8 which is signed by the appellant and also purports to be
signed by Onkar and Ghasi. The position of this patta is no
better than that of Ex. P-5 which is in favour of Suraj
Singh.
Mukat Behari’s patta is Ex. P-12 and is for an area
measuring 227 sq. yds. and 7 sq. ft. The consideration is
stated to be Rs. too, inclusive of Rs. 2 as plan fee. Here
also the amount is, stated to have been deposited as per
Rokarpana and the receipt is signed by one M. B. Sharma.
The order sheet relating to this patta is Ex. P-11 which
purports to bear the signatures of Ghasi and Madan Lal,
Ghasi (D.W. 2) has deposed about his signatures on Ex. P1
1, as already noticed. Mukat Behari’s case,, if anything,
becomes more doubtful because, of the evidence of Ghasi.
Suraj Singh was produced as P.W. 2 but he did not support
the prosecution and was allowed to be cross-examined by the
public prosecutor. Quite clearly his evidence does not show
that he was in any way cheated by the appellant. Shri Ganga
Ram, the original complainant, has appeared as P.W. 3.
According to him he
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had taken over charge from the appellant on August 31, 1958
and continued to work as Sarpanch till the charge was handed
over to the Municipal Council or the Municipal Board. When
he want to the office of the Municipal Board to hand over
charge, according to his own statement, the appellant had
also gone with him. It was after the abolition of the
Panchayat that he learnt that the appellant was selling land
and issuing pattas and it was then that lie made the
complaint Ex. P-19. Before handing over charge also he had
made certain complaints against the appellant on which Shri
Mehta, the Division Panchayat Officer had made enquiries but
those complaints were not substantiated. From his evidence
it seems clear that the relations between him and the
appellant were far from cordial. Indeed, the appellant had
also complained against this witness of keeping some money
belonging to the Panchayat. Even otherwise his evidence is
wholly unimpressive and is difficult to accept on its face
value.
Again, when we consider the evidence, of Madan Lal (D.W. 1)
and Ghasi son of Ramlal (D.W. 2) both Panchas of the
Panchayat in question upto 1958 and the evidence of Ganesh
Ram (P.W. 4) the evidence of the approver becomes still more
unacceptable. Madan Lal has stated that he was a Panch of
Khand Gawari Panchayat upto 1-959 and a piece of land was
sold to Mukat Behari in 1958 when he was present in the
meeting of the Panchayat. Signatures on Ex. P-11 were
identified by him. The Panchayat also sold pieces of land
to Mool Singh and Suraj Singh. On his evidence Ex. P-1 1
is clearly a genuine document. Ghasi (D.W. 2) also admits
his signatures on Ex. P-11. In face of his evidence it is
not understood how his signatures can be held to be forged.
Ganga Ram (P.W. 4) has deposed that he was not literate and
could only sign his name. After so deposing he expressly
stated that he was unable to identify his own signatures.
His evidence, therefore, also losses its importance. In
face of this material, we find that the appellant’s
conviction under s. 467. I.P.C. is wholly unsustainable on
the existing evidence. The approver’s testimony is most
uninspiring and there is no corroboration worth the name.
We now turn to the charge of criminal conspiracy under s.
120-B, I.P.C. as a separate and distinct offence independent
of the offence under s. 467, I.P.C. No doubt in almost every
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case of conspiracy it is generally a matter of inference,
direct independent evidence being soldom, if ever,
forthcoming. But inferences are normally deduced from acts
of parties in pursuance of apparent criminal purpose in
common between them. Of such criminal acts the evidence in
the case under appeal has not been accepted by us. The
evidence of the approver (P.W. 1) who would of course be
competent to prove the substantive charge of conspiracy,
which has not been believed by us with respect to forgery is
not easy to accept with respect to the charge, of
conspiracy. His version with regard
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476
to it is far from convincing. Though he claims to have
prepared 200 pattas and order sheets, evidence regarding
only four was led and that too not trustworthy. For the
first time he disclosed the story to the police after arrest
in expectation of help from them. On his evidence
uncorroborated as it is, the charge of conspiracy as framed
cannot be sustained. We have, therefore, no option but to
allow this appeal, quash the appellant’s conviction and
acquit him.
G.C. Appeal allowed.
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