ASHISH SHELAR vs. THE MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.797 OF 2021 ASHISH SHELAR & ORS.  ...PETITIONERS VERSUS THE MAHARASHTRA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY & ANR.     …RESPONDENTS WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.807 OF 2021 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.800 OF 2021 AND WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.808 OF 2021 JUDGMENT A.M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The petitioners have been duly elected as members of the current Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (2019­2024).  They got   elected   from   different   constituencies   in   the   State   of Signature Not Verified 1 Maharashtra.   They belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party , Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2022.01.28 12:00:07 IST Reason: the principal Opposition Party in the Maharashtra Legislative 1  for short, “BJP” 2 Assembly.   The Ruling Party is a coalition between the Shiv Sena, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and the Indian National Congress (INC) christened as “Maha Vikas Aghadi”. 2. This   lis   emanates from the  events as  unfolded during the Monsoon Session of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on 5.7.2021.   The proceedings of the House witnessed heated exchanges between the members of the Opposition Party and the Ruling Party due to an impression formed by the former that   the   business   of   the   House   was   being   conducted   in unilateral manner, with conscious and engineered effort to suppress voice of the Opposition Party.   In that, even the Leader of Opposition was denied an opportunity to speak on a crucial motion under consideration.  At the relevant time, the House was presided over by the Chairman nominated under 2 Rule 8 of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules , who according   to   the   petitioners,   denied   opportunity   to   the Opposition   Party   to   speak   including   to   the   Leader   of Opposition. 2  for short, “Rules”  3 3. It is  alleged  that in  the  meeting  of  the  Business  Advisory Committee,   which   preceded   the   actual   Assembly   Session, there was a concerted effort on behalf of the members of the Ruling Party to cut short the Assembly Session for a period of two days especially when the State was facing unprecedented situation   owing   to   pandemic,   which   needed   elaborate deliberation in the House.  The concerted effort was to strip of all legislative tools available to the Opposition Party so as to make sure that voice of opposition is muffled and suppressed. 4. The Chair of the Speaker of the House was vacant at the relevant time due to stepping down by the incumbent.   The election for appointing a new Speaker of the Assembly was yet to  be  conducted.     As  per  Rule  8  of   the   Rules,  in  such a situation   other   nominated   member   of   the   House   had   to preside   on   5.7.2021.     As   aforesaid,   a   general   feeling   had developed amongst the members of the Opposition Party that the   business   of   the   House   was   not   being   transacted   in congenial   manner   and   they   were   prevented   from   raising important questions and express their views on matters of public importance.  To wit, when the Minister was moving a 4 resolution in relation to the empirical data pertaining to OBC, the   Leader   of   Opposition   wanted   to   object   to   the   same. However, he was denied that opportunity.  That eventually led to heated exchanges between the members of both sides and consequently, the House was adjourned.   5. Thereafter, some of the members of the Opposition went to meet the Deputy   Speaker in his chamber to vent out their grievance   regarding   the   unfair   manner   of   conducting proceedings by the nominated Chairman.  At that time, some members of the Ruling Party (Shiv Sena) arrived and engaged in   heated   exchanges.     When   the   House   resumed,   the nominated Chairman referred to the fact that some members of the Shiv Sena were present in the chamber and involved in heated   exchanges,   but   no   action   was   being   taken   against them   as   both   the   sections   had   apologised   to   each   other. According to the petitioners, when the House resumed, by way of courtesy a sincere apology was graciously tendered by the   Leader   of   Opposition   to   the   Chairman   for   the   earlier incident while adverting to the fact that none of the MLAs belonging   to   the   Opposition   Party   (BJP)   including   the 5 petitioners   herein   had   abused   the   Chairman.     Soon thereafter, to the utter surprise of the petitioners (and other members   of   the   Opposition   Parties),   the   Minister   for Parliamentary Affairs moved a resolution for initiating action against 12 MLAs of the BJP for having committed contempt of the House.   That motion was tabled in the House and the Chairman was called upon to do the needful.  The Chairman then called upon the House to pass the said resolution.  The House in turn passed that resolution by majority votes after it was put to vote at 14:40 hours on 5.7.2021.  The same reads thus: “P.H.: Contempt of the House by objectionable behavior M.H.:   Resolution   of   Minister   for   Parliamentary   Affairs regarding suspension of M.L.A.s for Contempt of the House due to objectionable behavior. 1) Dr. Sanjay Kute, 2) Adv. Ashish Shelar, 3) Shri Abhimanyu Pawar 4) Shri Girish Mahajan 5) Shri Atul Bhatkhalkar 6) Adv. Parag Alavani, 7) Shri Harish Pimple 8) Shri Ram Satpute, 9) Shri Jaikumar Rawal, 10) Shri Yogesh Sagar, 11) Shri Narayan Kuche, 12) Shri Kritikumar @ Bunty Bhangdiya, M.L.A. 6 Adv.   Anil   Parab   (Minister   for   Parliamentary   Affairs): Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   wish   to   move   the   following resolution with your kind permission. th “On 5  July 2021 when the business of the House was being conducted, Hon’ble M.L.As Dr. Sanjay Kute, Adv. Ashish Shelar, Sarvashree Abhimanyu Pawar, Girish Mahajan,   Atul   Bhatkhalkar,   Adv.   Parag   Alvani, Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute,   Jaikumar Rawal, Yogesh Sagar, Narayan Kuche, Kirtikumar @ Bunty Bhangdia misbehaved in the House, addressed the Chairman in the Speaker’s Chair unparliamentary language, tried to take the mike and Rajdand, despite repeated warnings, all these members misbehaved in the   chamber   of   the   Hon’ble   Speaker   even   after   the House was adjourned and abused and manhandled the Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair.     Due   to   the indisciplined   and   unbecoming   behavior   resulting   in maligning the dignity of the House, this House resolves to suspend the membership of Sarvashree Dr. Sanjay Kute,   Adv.   Ashish   Shelar,   Sarvashree   Abhimanyu Pawar, Girish Mahajan, Atul Bhatkhalkar, Adv. Parag Alvani,   Sarvashree   Harish   Pimple,   Ram   Satpute, Jaikumar   Rawal,   Yogesh   Sagar,   Narayan   Kuche, Kirtikumar @ Bunty Bhangdia for a period of one year. Similarly, during the period of suspension they may be restrained from entering into the premises of Vidhan Bhawan at Mumbai and Nagpur.” Hon’ble   Speaker,   I   request   the   House   to   pass   this resolution. Resolution has been tabled. Chairman   in   the   Speaker’s   Chair:   Now   I   put   this resolution to vote. Resolution has been passed after putting it to vote.” 6. According   to   the   petitioners,   the   Leader   of   Opposition thereafter   wrote   four   letters   to   the   Deputy   Speaker   on 7.7.2021 for furnishing relevant information including CCTV 7 footage, video recording of the entire proceedings and a copy of the verbatim proceedings of the record of the Legislative Assembly   dated   5.7.2021   and   6.7.2021.     Thereafter,   the petitioners also sent letters to the Deputy Speaker requesting him to furnish relevant material of the proceedings including recording of the proceedings in the House dated 5.7.2021 and 6.7.2021. 7. Eventually,   on   22.7.2021,   the   petitioners   approached   this Court by way of these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, for issuing appropriate writ, order or direction   so   as   to   quash   and   set   aside   the   impugned resolution   dated   5.7.2021   passed   by   the   Maharashtra Legislative Assembly being unconstitutional and grossly illegal and   for   enforcement   of   their   fundamental   rights   as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 8. It is urged that the impugned resolution dated 5.7.2021 has been passed in undue haste and is politically motivated.  It is primarily intended to adversely impact the numbers of the Opposition Party in the House.   It has been passed without 8 giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners much less calling upon them to offer written explanation.   To buttress this ground, reliance has been placed on a decision of two­ Judge Bench of this Court in  Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj & 3 Ors. vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly & Anr. . 9. It is urged that the events, as unfolded, on the face of it, would   indicate   the   undue   haste   in   which   the   impugned resolution came to be passed within a matter of hours, that too, without granting opportunity to the petitioners to meet the case against them.  This was grossly and patently violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  For, there was absolutely no material before the Chairman or the Minister to substantiate the need for suspending the petitioners, that too for such a long period. 10. Further, even the impugned resolution dated 5.7.2021 does not refer to any material on the basis of which such extreme   step   of   suspension   had   been   taken   against   these petitioners.  There is no indication in the resolution as to how 3  (2016) 6 SCC 82 9 the 12 members (petitioners herein) were identified from a huge crowd of people and singled out for initiating the action of suspension.  As a matter of fact, the impugned resolution itself alludes to unruly behaviour on the floor of the House and outside the chamber of the Speaker.  The video footage of the alleged incident, which is in public domain, shows a large crowd of people and there is absolutely no way of identifying the 12 MLAs (petitioners herein) who have been suspended and   singled   out.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   Minister   who brought the motion was not even present in the chamber of the   Speaker.     In   a   similar   situation,   this   Court   in 4 Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj  had to quash the resolution for lack of evidence to identify the suspended members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. In the present case, the impugned resolution makes no 11. reference to any material much less video footage, etc., which has   been   relied   upon   before   bringing   an   action   for suspension.   Moreover, it is amply clear from the impugned resolution   that   the   action   against   the   petitioners   was   for 4  supra at Footnote No.3 10 alleged unruly behaviour/misconduct and not for breach of privilege that is covered by an independent dispensation.  As regards suspension of a member of the House, as per Rule 53 of   the   Rules   such   action   could   be   initiated   “only”   by   the Speaker after complying with the principles of natural justice and fair play.  The provision, such as Rule 53, is engrafted to put a check on the majoritarian attitude of the Government. The Speaker is expected to act fairly, in particular during the conduct   of   proceedings   in   the   House   towards   both   sides, namely,   members   of   the   Ruling   Party   as   well   as   of   the Opposition Party.   So to speak, he exercises quasi­judicial function. 12. It is urged that a motion for unruly behaviour in the House can never be a subject matter of voting since it would enable the political party in power to virtually wipe out the opposition for some trivial acts committed by their members, by suspending as many members of the Opposition Party. The   decision   of   suspension,   therefore,   must   rest   with   the Speaker and not the House.   Notably, Rule 53 of the Rules prescribes a maximum period of suspension not exceeding 11 remainder   of   the   Sessions.     Thus,   suspension   of   the petitioners for a period of one year is grossly unconstitutional and illegal.  If the impugned resolution was allowed to prevail, nothing   would   prevent   the   political   party   in   power   (in majority) to resort to such mechanism and to suspend a large number of members of Opposition Party upto five years or remainder of the term of the Legislative Assembly by resorting to voting in the House. It is also urged that the erstwhile Speaker had stepped 13. down, as a result of which, he ceased to be the Chairman.  As such, heated exchanges allegedly occurring between him and the petitioners outside the House, would not invite action of suspension, inasmuch as after stepping down as Speaker, he would   continue   only   as   an   ordinary   MLA.     Further,   the Chairman   nominated   under   Rule   8   of   the   Rules   is   not empowered to exercise powers under Rule 53, considering the fact that there was a Deputy Speaker of the House who could have   discharged   the   functions   of   the   Speaker   after   his stepping down or during his absence as per Article 180 of the Constitution.   In that sense, the impugned resolution dated 12 5.7.2021 is nullity and     in the eyes of law, having non est passed without authority of law. 14. These writ petitions came up for preliminary hearing on 14.12.2021.  After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners and   for   the   State   of   Maharashtra,   the   Court   passed   the following order: “We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and for the State of Maharashtra. These   matters   involve   issues   of   moment   for   a Westminster form of Democracy. It   is   urged   by   the   petitioners   that   the   impugned resolution by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly dated 05.07.2021 suffers from the vice of denial of opportunity of   being   heard  and   adherence   to  the   rules   of   natural justice. It is also urged that the resolution neither follows the procedure prescribed under Rule 53 of the Maharashtra Legislative   Assembly   Rules   (for   short   "The   Rules"), namely, for suspension of member of the House by the Speaker nor predicated in Part XVIII including Rule 273 to take action against the member for breach of privilege of the House. It is also urged that the power of Legislative Assembly though absolute in certain respects, the decision reached by the House can always be questioned on the settled principles   amongst   others   being   manifestly   grossly arbitrary or irrational, violating the fundamental rights and   such   other   grounds,   as   may   be   permissible   and delineated in the decision of the Constitution Bench of this   Court   in   Raja   Rampal   Vs.   Hon'ble   Speaker,   Lok Sabha & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 184, including the two Judge decision of this Case in Alagaapuram R. Mohan Raj & Ors. Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly & Anr. reported in (2016) 6 SCC 82. Further, for the nature 13 of impugned resolution, it not only abridges the rights of as   many   as   twelve   members,   as   guaranteed   to   them under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, but also of the constituencies represented by each of them by merely invoking the route of majority opinion of the House, an unprecedented and unconventional move not backed by any   similar   precedent.   In   any   case,   the   period   of suspension of one year is unconscionable and manifestly arbitrary and irrational. On the other hand, it is urged by the learned counsel for the State that Article 212(1) of the Constitution of India makes it amply clear that it is not open to the Court to explore the argument of proper procedure not followed by the House. Further, it is not open to the Court to do judicial   review   of   the   final   decision   on   the   basis   of abstract arguments and grounds urged before this Court; and even if a sui generis procedure has been adopted by the House, it is the absolute prerogative of the House to regulate its business. It is also urged by the learned counsel for the State that the petitioners have not refuted the case made out against   them   about   misbehaviour   in   the   House   and outside the House as well. Indeed, this plea has been countered   by   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the petitioners. All   these   are   debatable   issues   and   would   require deeper consideration. As a result, we deem it appropriate to issue a formal notice to the respondents, returnable on 11.01.2022.  Mr.   Sachin   Patil,   Advocate   waives   notice   for respondent No. 2­State. Additionally, the petitioner is permitted to serve dasti notice on the respondent No.1. Needless to observe that pendency of these petitions will not come in the way of the petitioners to explore the possibility of urging upon the House to show leniency and   reconsider   the   decision   impugned   in   these   writ petitions,   at   least,   to  the   extent   of   reducing   the   term specified therein. That is a matter to be considered by the House appropriately.” 14 By this order, the Court had expressed a sanguine hope that the matter would get resolved in the ensuing Session scheduled in the following week.  Presumably, no effective headway had been made in that regard. It appears that notice sent to respondent No.1, as per 15. office report, has been duly served.  We have been informed by the learned counsel appearing for the State as well as the petitioners that respondent No.1 would not be appearing in the present proceedings.   The respondent­State, however, is defending the impugned resolution by filing counter affidavit dated 7.1.2022 sworn by         Mr. Satish Baban Waghole, In Charge   Secretary,   Parliamentary   Affairs   Department.     The reply   affidavit   amongst   others   points   out   that   the   issues raised   by   the   petitioners   are   essentially   the   matters concerning   procedure   in   the   House   of   the   Legislative Assembly and at best regarding some procedural irregularities committed during the proceedings.  That cannot be the basis to invoke jurisdiction of this Court which is constricted by the mandate of Article 212 of the Constitution, as it concerns the 15 powers and privileges of the House.  Thus, the petitioners are not entitled for any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution. It is urged that the suspension for unruly conduct in the 16. House   is   not   solely   referrable   to   Rule   53   of   the   Rules. Whereas, it is open to the Legislature to depart from the Rules and take a decision which could exceed the period prescribed in the Rules.   The period of one year suspension cannot be said to be arbitrary or disproportionate as such when the Legislature has the prerogative to reprimand or admonish its members, independent of the power of the Speaker of the House to order withdrawal of members under the Rules.  The House   has   the   power   to   take   suitable   action   against   its members who transgress the limits laid down in Article 194(1) of the Constitution, being its inherent power and it is not open to the Judicature to have a second­guess approach in that regard. 17. It is urged that from the averments in the writ petitions itself, it is conceded that the Leader of Opposition had to apologise   for   the   unruly   behaviour   of   the   members   of  the 16 Opposition including that of the petitioners.  The petitioners had   committed   acts   which   resulted   in   undermining   and maligning the dignity of the House in the face of the House and   for   which   reason,   the   House   decided   to   suspend   the petitioners.     In   such   a   situation,   there   is   no   question   of granting any opportunity of hearing or for furnishing written explanation, being a case of contempt of the House on the face   of   it   while   it   was   in   Session.     The   reply   affidavit essentially rebuts the legal arguments of the petitioners and reiterates the factual position emanating from the impugned resolution   itself   and   urges   this   Court   to   dismiss   the   writ petitions being devoid of merits. Submissions ­ Petitioners: The   petitioners   are   represented   by   Mr.   Mahesh 18. Jethmalani,  Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul and Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior counsel.   The sum and substance of their submission is as follows.   First, the impugned   resolution   passed   by   the   House   is   without jurisdiction.   For, the  power to suspend as per applicable 17 Rules is bestowed “only” upon the Speaker of the House and as the Office of the Speaker was vacant at the relevant time, upon   the   Deputy   Speaker   as   per   Article   180   of   the Constitution.  Further, the exercise of power by the Speaker is a quasi­judicial decision which must, therefore, precede with a   formal   inquiry,   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   member concerned and recording of satisfaction about the nature of misdeeds committed by the member concerned amounting to grossly   disorderly   conduct.     In   short,   the   House   had   no jurisdiction to pass the impugned resolution much less the manner   in   which   it   has   been   passed,   in   undue   haste. Second, no known or prescribed procedure has been followed to   order   withdrawal   of   the   members   from   the   Assembly. Thus, a gross illegality has been committed by the House. The House is bound to adhere to the Rules framed by it for that   purpose   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     The applicable Rules provide for different dispensation.  The power to order withdrawal of its member, is provided in Rule 53 and regarding breach of its Privileges is governed by Part XVIII of the Rules (vide Rules 273 to 289).  A 15 days’ notice regarding 18 the motion introduced in the House is required to be given under Part XII of the Rules being Rule 106 of the Rules.  None of these have been followed in tabling of the subject motion and in passing the impugned resolution.   Thus, it is not a case   of   mere   procedural   irregularity,   but   of   being unconstitutional,   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution adopted   by   the   House   including   the   direction   to   the petitioners   to   withdraw   from   the   House   for   one   year   vide impugned resolution.  Thirdly, there has been gross violation of   principles   of   natural   justice.     In   that,   no   opportunity whatsoever was afforded to the petitioners much less a formal notice calling upon them to offer their explanation.  Had such an opportunity been given, it would have been possible for the petitioners   to   demonstrate   that   they   were   not   part   of   the unruly mob which had indulged in activities amounting to grossly disorderly conduct. It   is   also   urged   that   at   any   rate   the   impugned 18.(a) resolution suspending the petitioners for a period of one year cannot   be   countenanced   in   law   being   unconstitutional, grossly illegal and irrational.  Inasmuch as, Rule 53 provides 19 for   a   graded   approach   to   be   adopted   by   the   Speaker   for ensuring   orderly   conduct   of   business   in   the   House   by directing withdrawal of a member, who in his opinion, had or was creating obstruction in that regard.  Inasmuch as, if it is his first instance of such type, the Speaker could order his withdrawal for the remainder of the day’s meeting.  In case of repeat   misconduct   during   the   same   Session,   the   Speaker could order withdrawal of such member for the remainder of the Session.   Had it been a case of exercise of power under Rule 53, the member so directed to be absent shall, during the period of such absence, is deemed to be absent with the permission of the Assembly within the meaning of clause (4) of Article 190 of the Constitution.   However, the impugned resolution makes no reference to this aspect at all. 18.(b) On the stated position taken by the respondents that the power has been exercised by the House and is not ascribable to Rule 53, but the inherent power of the House, even in that case, the suspension of the member of the House cannot go beyond   the   ongoing   Session.     Inasmuch   as,   excess   and unnecessary period of suspension of the member from the 20 House is not only undesirable in the matter of democratic values enunciated in the Constitution, but substantively or grossly illegal and irrational, if not bordering on perversity. For, longer period of suspension beyond the ongoing Session would not only be unnecessary, but nearer to being arbitrary, irrational and perverse.  Taking any other view would entail in validating   grossly   illegal   and   irrational   resolution   of   the House.     To   buttress   this   argument,   support   is   drawn additionally   from   the   dispensation   predicated   in   the concerned Standing Order of the United Kingdom regarding the   Parliamentary   Procedure   as   well   as   extracts   from   Sir Thomas   Erskine   May’s   Treatise   on   The   Law,   Privileges Proceedings and Usage of Parliament.   It is urged that the consequence of absence of suspended member of the House beyond   sixty   days   would   entail   in   vacation   of   the   seat occupied by him/her, as predicated in Article 190(4); and in which case, in law, the concerned constitutional Authority would be obliged to initiate process to fill in the vacant seat(s) not later than six months from the date of such vacancy in 21 5 terms of Section 151A   of the Representation of the People 6 Act,   1951 .     This   is   essential   also   to   ensure   that   the concerned constituency does not remain unrepresented in the Legislative Assembly for more than six months owing to the action against its duly elected representative by the House. Had it been a case of expulsion, it would not have resulted in punishment   either   to   the   concerned   member   or   the constituency represented by him.  For, the member concerned in that case could get re­elected to occupy the vacant seat not later   than   six   months.     Thus   understood,   the   timeline   of suspension   of   the   petitioners   prescribed   in   the   impugned resolution is worst and operates as inflicting penalty upon the petitioners as well as the constituency represented by them. In other words, it is worse than expulsion of a member of the House.  5   151A. Time limit for filling vacancies referred to in sections 147, 149, 150 and 151 .— Notwithstanding anything contained in section 147, section 149, section 150 and section 151, a bye­election for filling any vacancy referred to in any of the said sections shall be held within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy:        Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply if— (a) the remainder of the term of a member in relation to a vacancy is less than one year; or  (b)   the   Election   Commission   in   consultation   with   the   Central   Government certifies that it is difficult to hold the bye­election within the said period. 6  for short, “1951 Act” 22 18.(c) In the present case, learned counsel contends that the House   had   to   assemble   for   only   two   days   of   the   ongoing Session.   The suspension, therefore, ideally could not have been for a period more than the remainder of the Session in terms of Rule 53 of the Rules.  Moreover, as the motion was introduced in the House for initiating contempt, it ought to have proceeded only under Part XVIII of the Rules by following procedure   prescribed   therein   which   includes   giving opportunity of hearing to the member before the Committee of Privileges.   If it was to be regarded as an ordinary motion, then the procedure under Rule 106 of the Rules would have 7 required 15 clear days’ notice.  Further, Rule 110  postulates that the resolution if moved by the Minister, it should precede with seven days’ notice.   Even this requirement  had been violated.  In either case, the impugned resolution suffers from the vice of denial of principles of natural justice, besides being arbitrary,   perfunctory   and   founded   on   unsubstantiated allegations   against   the   petitioners.     To   buttress   this 7     (1)   The   provisions   of   rule   106   shall   not   apply   to 110. Government   Resolutions.—   resolutions of which notice is given by a Minister or the Advocate General. (2)  Seven days’ notice shall be necessary  in respect of such resolutions (emphasis supplied) 23 submission,   reliance   has   been   placed   on   the   dictum   in 8 .   Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj 18.(d) It   is   then   urged   that   at   any   rate   the   time   period   of suspension as specified in the impugned resolution is manifestly arbitrary and grossly disproportionate and excessive, besides being grossly illegal and unconstitutional being hit by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.  For, the impugned resolution entails in denial of representation even to the concerned constituency for such a long time, much less   beyond   the   period   specified   in   the Constitution [Article 190(4)]   and   the   mandate   of   conducting elections   not   later   than   six   months     from     the     date     of vacancy     vide     Sections   150   and   151A   of   the   1951   Act. 9 Reliance  is  placed  on   Barton  vs.  Taylor ,  Sushanta  Kumar Chand     &     Ors.     vs.     The     Speaker,     Orissa   Legislative 10 ,    Assembly   and   Anr. M.S.M.   Sharma   vs.   Sri Krishna 11 12 Sinha  &  Ors. , Special  Reference  No.1  of  1964 , Jagjit 13 Singh  vs.  State  of  Haryana  &                  Ors. , Raja Ram 8  supra at Footnote No.3 (paras 38 to 42) 9  (1886) 11 AC 197 10  AIR 1973 Ori 111 (Division Bench) 11  AIR 1959 SC 395 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 25,26,28 and 29) 12  AIR 1965 SC 745 (7­Judge Bench) (paras 31,32,35,36,39 to 41,56,60,61,124 and 125) 13  (2006) 11 SCC 1 (3­Judge Bench) (para 44) 24 14 Pal vs. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.    and  Amarinder 15 Singh vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha & Ors. . 18.(e) It was also argued that suspension of members beyond the period specified in Rule 53 tantamounts to deviation from the logic   stated   therein.     And   being   a   case   of   deviation   from   the applicable Rules, it was essential to first suspend Rule 53.  That 16 could be done by way of a motion under Rule 57 .  Moreover, the general powers of the Speaker have been constricted in terms of 17 Rule 58 , namely, limited to matters not specifically provided for in the rules. Submissions – Respondent (State of Maharashtra): 19. Mr.   C.   Aryama   Sundaram,   learned   senior   counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra, however, would urge that   much   argument   of   the   petitioners   is   founded   on untenable assumption that the Rules were binding on the 14  (2007) 3 SCC 184 (5­Judge Bench) 15  (2010) 6 SCC 113 (5­Judge Bench) (paras 47,62,64 and 65) 16   57. Suspension of rules.—  Any member may, with the consent of the Speaker, move that any rule may be suspended in its application to a particular motion before the House; and if the motion is carried, the rule in question shall be suspended for the time being. 17   58. General Powers of Speaker.—   All matters not specifically provided for in these rules  and all questions relating to the detailed working of these rules shall be regulated in such manner as the Speaker may, from time to time direct. (emphasis supplied) 25 House; and it was not open to the House to proceed  dehors the   rules formulated under Article 208 of the Constitution. He submits that it is open to the Legislature to deviate from the Rules, even if framed under Article 208.  Such rules are only   akin   to   the   byelaws   of   the   society   which   are   not enforceable   nor   can   it   be   regarded   as   statutory   rules. Further, grounds of challenge set forth by the petitioners are essentially questioning the procedure adopted by the House in   adopting   the   impugned   resolution.     Such   a   challenge cannot be maintained nor could be entertained by the Court in light of bar under Article 212(1) in particular.   It is not open to the Court to question the decision of the House on the ground of irregularities in the procedure.  For, the House has the prerogative to adopt its own procedure even   dehors   the rules framed under Article 208.  In a given situation, the rules being procedural rules can be deviated by the House, if the need so arises.  The Court can only enquire into the question as to whether the House had jurisdiction to adopt such a resolution and no further. 26 19.(a) He further submits that it is cardinal that the powers and privileges of the House of Legislatures as delineated in Article 194 of the Constitution are non­justiciable, forming part of Chapter III (the State Legislature) in Part VI of the Constitution.     It   is   so   mandated   by   Article   212(1)   of   the Constitution.   That gives enough room to the Legislature to adopt its own procedure for upholding the privileges of the House   of   Legislature   and   its   members   which   includes proceeding   against   even   non­member   in   case   of   breach. Thus,   it   is   not   open   to   even   remotely   suggest   that   the Legislature lacks jurisdiction. 19.(b) He   submits   that   the   fact   that   Rule   53   of   the   Rules provides   for   exercise   of   power   by   the   Speaker   to   order withdrawal of member in graded manner, that does not and cannot prevent the House from passing a resolution to even expel   the   erring   member.     Thus,   the   House   can   certainly direct   suspension   of   its   member   for   a   period   beyond   the remainder   term   of   the   Session.     The   Legislature   while adopting such resolution is not required to give any reason. For, no judicial review of reasons which had weighed with the 27 Legislature to pass the resolution is permissible, unless it is further shown that the resolution adopted by the House is unconstitutional.  In the present case, the House had adopted resolution which is self­eloquent.   In that, it mentions the necessity for passing such a resolution of suspension of the petitioners   for   a   term   of   one   year.     The   power   has   been exercised by the Legislature, which is inherent in it especially regarding   the   conduct   of   its   business.     The   impugned resolution,   therefore,   is   not   unconstitutional.     He   would submit   that   in   the   guise   of   asserting   that   the   impugned resolution   is   irrational,   the   petitioners   in   effect   are questioning the proportionality of the period of suspension. This enquiry by the Court is impermissible.  For, the decision of the House regarding quantum or the period of suspension is non­justiciable He   vehemently   urged   that   this   Court   ought   not   to 19.(c) venture   into   the   factual   matrix   and   have   a   second­guess approach regarding the opinion expressed by the House in the impugned resolution.   To buttress his submissions, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in 28 Jagdishbhai   Thakore   &   Anr.   vs.   Chandrikaben 18 ,   which   follows   the   exposition   of   the Chudasma   &   Ors. Division   Bench   of   the   same   High   Court   in   Chhabildas Mehta,   M.L.A. vs. The   Legislative   Assembly,   Gujarat 19 State .   He has also placed reliance on   K.A. Mathialagan 20 , vs. P. Srinivasan & Ors.  A.M. Paulraj vs. The Speaker, 21 Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Madras & Anr. ,   K. Anbazhagan & Ors. vs. The Secretary, The Tamil Nadu 22 Legislative Assembly, Madras & Ors. , V.C. Chandhira Kumar, Member of Legislative Assembly & Ors. vs. Tamil 23 Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat & Anr. , Special 24 Reference No.1 of 1964 ,    Kihota Hollohon vs. Zachilhu 25 25A ,   , & Ors. M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India & Ors.   Raja 26 27 Ram Pal   and   Amarinder Singh . 18  2007 SCC OnLine Guj 402 (para 8): 2007 (48) 4 GLR 2998 (Single Judge Bench) 19  (1970) 11 GLR 729 (Division Bench) (paras 14 to 16) 20  AIR 1973 Madras 371 (Full Bench) 21  AIR 1986 Madras 248 (Full Bench) 22  1987 SCC OnLine Mad 89 (Division Bench) (paras 87 to 92, 101, 108 to 110 and 160) 23  2013 (6) CTC 506 (Division Bench) (paras 4.19 to 4.30) 24  supra at Footnote No.12 (paras 31,34,35 and 39 to 41) 25  AIR 1993 SC 412:1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (5­Judge Bench)  25A    (1999) 6 SCC 237 (paras 18 to 21) 26  supra at Footnote No.14 (paras 125, 160 to 162, 163, 271 to 300, 451 to 453, 530, 531, 534, 536, 598 and 696 to 705) 27  supra at Footnote No.15 (paras 54 and 66) 29 20. He   would   further   submit   that   the   Maharashtra Legislative   Assembly   even   in   the   past   on   more   than   one occasion   had   passed   similar   resolution   to   suspend   its member for one year period.  That is the legitimate inherent power of the House in the matter of upholding its privilege. Article 190(3) prescribes no limitation in this regard.  Further, the invocation of Article 190(4) and Section 151A of the 1951 Act by the petitioners, is completely misplaced.   For, Article 190(4) has no application unless the absence of the member concerned is voluntary and without permission of the House. Article 190(4) cannot override the powers and privileges of the Legislature endowed in Article 190(3).   Article 190(4) is an enabling provision envisaging occurrence of vacancy only if the Legislature so resolves/decides, unlike  vacancy ipso facto  occurring in situations referred to in Article 190(1) to 190(3). For issuing declaration under Article 190(4) that vacancy has arisen,   it   ought   to   be   done   by   the   Legislature   if   such recommendation is made by the Committee constituted under Rule 229 of the Rules known as Committee on Absence of Members from the Sittings of the House.  The functions of the 30 stated Committee are spelt out in Rule 230.   The procedure noted in Rules 231 and 232 is clearly indicative of the fact that   the   absence   of   the   member   must   be   voluntary   and without   permission   of   the   House.     In   fact,   the   period   of 28 absence noted in Article 190(4) is sixty days  of meetings and not English calendar days.   In this case, only seven days of meetings had been conducted so far.   Thus, invocation of Article   190(4)   in   the   fact   situation   of   the   present   case   is unavailable.  Further, in the case of absence of member from the   House   owing   to   his/her   suspension   by   the   House presupposes that the House itself has restricted the entry of the concerned member during the meetings and it can be safely   regarded   as   deemed   permission   of   the   House   for absence for the relevant period.   Similarly, the constituency cannot complain about its non­representation in the House having   elected   someone   who   conducts   himself/herself 29 inappropriately in the meetings.  In  , similar Raja Ram Pal plea   had   been   negatived.     Concededly,   suspended   elected representative continues to represent the constituency from 28  Out of total 98­100 days in a year in three Sessions, namely, Budget, Monsoon and Winter altogether. 29  supra at Footnote No.14 31 where he/she has been elected for all other purposes except attending the meetings owing to suspension.  The argument of   the   petitioners   is   more   fixed   on   the   basis   of   morality approach.  That cannot be countenanced.  As a matter of law, the House has inherent powers to direct suspension of its member for one year period and there is no express bar or restriction provided for by the Constitution or by virtue of any statutory provision.  In substance, it is urged that the Court cannot enquire into the grievances as made, essentially being about the irregularity of procedure in adopting the impugned resolution by the House. 21. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the   respondent­State.     As   aforesaid,   respondent   No.1   has chosen not to appear despite service. Consideration: 22. The moot question is about the maintainability of the challenge in respect of the stated resolution adopted by the Legislative Assembly.  The scope of interference by the Court has   been   well­delineated   in   successive   decisions   of   the 32 Constitution Bench of this Court.  This Court has consistently expounded   that   the   judicial   scrutiny   regarding   exercise   of legislative privileges (including power to punish for contempt of the House) is constricted and cannot be  stricto sensu  on the touchstone of judicial review as generally understood in other situations.   In that, there is complete immunity from judicial review   in   matters   of   irregularity   of   procedure.     The 30 Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Raja   Ram   Pal delineated the principles on the basis of catena of decisions noted in the said decision as follows:

30  supra at Footnote No.14 33

34

35

These principles have been restated by the subsequent 23. 31 Constitution Bench in  Amarinder Singh , in paragraphs 53 and   54.     Further,   it   would   be   useful   to   advert   to   the observations in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the same decision in 31  supra at Footnote No.15 36 the   context   of   the   concerns   about   the   intrusion   into   the powers of the Legislature.  The same reads thus: “ Concerns   about   intrusion   into   the   executive   and judicial domain 87.   The   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers   is   an inseparable   part   of   the   evolution   of   parliamentary democracy   itself .   Renowned   French   philosopher Montesquieu   had   drawn   the   attention   of   political theorists to the dangers inherent in the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial powers in one authority and stressed on the necessity of checks and balances in constitutional   governance.   Our   institutions   of governance have been intentionally founded on the principle   of   separation   of   powers   and   the Constitution does not give unfettered power to any organ. All the three principal organs are expected to work in harmony and in consonance with the spirit and essence of the Constitution. It is clear that a legislative body is not entrusted with the power of adjudicating a case once an appropriate forum is in existence under the constitutional scheme . 88.  It   would   be   pertinent   to   cite   the   following observations made by M.H. Beg, J. (as His Lordship then 32 was) in  Indira Nehru Gandhi  v.  Raj Narain : (SCC p. 149, para 392)     “ 392 . …  One of these basic principles seems to me to be that, just as courts are not constitutionally competent   to   legislate   under   the   guise   of interpretation, so also neither our Parliament nor any State Legislature, in the purported exercise of any   kind   of   law­making   power,   perform   an essentially   judicial   function   by   virtually withdrawing   a   particular   case,   pending   in   any court, and taking upon itself the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own standards to . This power must at least be the facts of that case first   constitutionally   taken   away   from   the   court concerned and vested in another authority before it 32  1975 Supp SCC 1 37 can be lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is not   a   necessary   or   even   a   natural   incident   of   a ‘constituent power’. As Hans Kelsen points out, in his ‘ General Theory of Law and the State ’ (see p. 143), while creation and annulment of all general norms, whether   basic   or   not   so   basic,   is   essentially   a legislative   function,   their   interpretation   and application   to   findings   reached,   after   a   correct ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case, by   employing   the   judicial   technique,   is   really   a judicial   function.   Neither   of   the   three constitutionally   separate   organs   of   State   can, according to the basic scheme of our Constitution today,   leap   outside   the   boundaries   of   its   own constitutionally   assigned   sphere   or   orbit   of authority into that of the other. This is the logical meaning   of   the   principle   of   supremacy   of   the Constitution .”” (emphasis supplied) To the same end, dictum of the Constitution Bench in 24. Sub­Committee on Judicial Accountability vs. Union of 33 may be apposite.   In paragraph 61 of the India & Ors.   reported decision, the Court observed thus: “ 61.  But   where,   as   in   this   country   and   unlike   in England,   there   is   a   written   Constitution   which constitutes the fundamental and in that sense a “higher law” and acts as a limitation upon the legislature and other   organs   of   the   State   as   grantees   under   the Constitution,   the   usual   incidents   of   parliamentary sovereignty do not obtain and the concept is one of ‘limited government’. Judicial review is, indeed, an incident   of   and   flows   from   this   concept   of   the fundamental and the higher law being the touchstone of the limits of the powers of the various organs of the State which derive power and authority under the Constitution   and   that   the   judicial   wing   is   the 33  (1991) 4 SCC 699 (5­Judge Bench) 38 interpreter of the Constitution and, therefore, of the limits   of   authority   of   the   different   organs   of   the State . It is to be noted that the British Parliament with the Crown is supreme and its powers are unlimited and courts have no power of judicial review of legislation.” (emphasis supplied) The Court then noted that this doctrine is in one sense the doctrine of  ultra vires  in the constitutional law and in a federal set up, the judiciary becomes the guardian of the Constitution.  It enunciated 34 that   the   rule   in     was   inapplicable   to Bradlaugh   vs.   Gossett proceedings   of   colonial   legislature   governed   by   the   written Constitution.  In paragraph 66, the Court expounded as follows: 35 “  The   principles   in Bradlaugh  is   that   even   a 66. statutory   right   if   it   related   to   the   sphere   where Parliament and not the courts had exclusive jurisdiction would be a matter of the Parliament's own concern.  But the principle cannot be extended where the matter is not merely one of procedure but of substantive law concerning   matters   beyond   the   parliamentary procedure.   Even   in   matters   of   procedure   the constitutional   provisions   are   binding   as   the legislations are enforceable . Of the interpretation of the Constitution  and as to what law is the courts have the constitutional   duty   to   say   what   the   law   is .   The question whether the motion has lapsed is a matter to be pronounced   upon   the   basis   of   the   provisions   of   the Constitution and the relevant laws. Indeed, the learned Attorney General submitted that the question whether as an   interpretation   of   the   constitutional   processes   and laws, such a motion lapses or not is exclusively for the courts to decide.” (emphasis supplied) 34  (1884) 12 QBD 271: 50 LT 620 35  supra at Footnote No.34 39 25. In the Indian context, the power of the Legislature is not absolute, as noted by the Constitution Bench in   Raja Ram 36 Pal   in paragraph 398.  The same reads thus:

After having said as above, the Court proceeded to examine the extent of circumspection to be observed by the courts.  That had been exposited in following words: 37 “ 414.  In  State   of   Rajasthan v. Union   of   India  while dealing with the issues arising out of communication by the then Union Home Minister to the nine States asking them to advise their respective Governors to observe the 36  supra at Footnote No.14 37  (1977) 3 SCC 592 : AIR 1977 SC 1361 40 Legislative Assemblies and therefore seek mandate from the people, this Court  observed in para  40 as under: (SCC p. 616) “40.   This   Court   has   never   abandoned   its constitutional   function   as   the   final   judge   of constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done under the authority of the Constitution . It has not refused to determine questions either of fact or of law so long as it has found itself possessed of power to do it and the cause of justice to be capable of being   vindicated   by   its   actions.   But,  it   cannot assume   unto   itself   powers   the   Constitution   lodges elsewhere   or   undertake   tasks   entrusted   by   the Constitution to other departments of State which may be better equipped to perform them . The scrupulously discharged   duties   of   all   guardians   of   the Constitution  include the duty not to transgress the limitations of their own constitutionally circumscribed powers   by   trespassing   into   what   is   properly   the . Questions of domain of other constitutional organs political wisdom or executive policy only could not be subjected to judicial control. No doubt executive policy must also be subordinated to constitutionally sanctioned   purposes.   It   has   its   sphere   and limitations. But, so long as it operates within that sphere,   its   operations   are   immune   from   judicial interference. This is also a part of the doctrine of a rough separation of powers under the supremacy of the   Constitution   repeatedly   propounded   by   this Court and to which the Court unswervingly adheres even when its views differ or change on the correct interpretation   of   a   particular   constitutional provision.” (emphasis supplied) 415.   We reaffirm the said resolve and find no reason why   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   at   hand   this Court should take a different view so as to abandon its   constitutional   functions   as   the   final   judge   of constitutionality   of   all   acts   purported   to   be   done under the authority of the Constitution, though at the same time refraining from transgressing into the sphere that is properly the domain of Parliament. 41  Learned Additional Solicitor General submits that 416. in  U.P.   Assembly   case   (Special   Reference   No.   1   of 38 1964)  the Court had placed reliance on Articles 208 and 212 which contemplate that  rules can be framed by the legislature   subject   to   the   provisions   of   the Constitution which in turn implies that such rules are   compliant   with   the   fundamental   rights guaranteed by Part III. He submits that if the rules framed   under   Article   118   (which   corresponds   to Article   208)   are   consistent   with   Part   III   of   the Constitution then the exercise of powers, privileges and immunities is bound to be a fair exercise and Parliament can be safely attributed such an intention . 417.  While it is true that there is no challenge to the Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of   Business   in   Lok Sabha   and   the   Rules   of   Procedure   and   Conduct   of Business in the Council of States, as made by the two Houses   of   Parliament   in   exercise   of   enabling   powers under Article 118(1),  we are of the opinion that mere availability of rules is never a guarantee that they . What we are concerned with, have been duly followed given   the   limits   prescribed   in   Article   122(1),   is   not “irregularity   of   procedure”   but   illegalities   or unconstitutionalities.” (emphasis supplied in bolds) 26. From   the   exposition   in   these   successive   Constitution Bench   decisions   referred   to   above,   it   is   not   possible   to countenance the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent­State that the enquiry must be limited to one of 39 the parameters specified in  Raja Ram Pal   and, in this case, only clause (s) – “The proceedings which may be tainted on 38  supra at Footnote No.12 39  supra at Footnote No.14 42 account   of   substantive   or   gross   illegality   or unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny”. On the other hand, we lean in favour of taking the view that each of the parameters is significant and permissible area of judicial   review   in   relation   to   exercise   of   parliamentary privileges including clauses (f), (g), (s) and (u).  In one sense, clause (u) is a comprehensive parameter articulated by the 40 Constitution Bench in  , as it predicates that Raja Ram Pal “an  ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the court to review the decision but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non­compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity”.  The   Constitution,   by   itself,   does   not   specify   the 27. limitation   on   the   privileges   of   the   Legislature,   but, indubitably, those privileges are subject to the provisions of the   Constitution   (as   is   predicated   in   the   opening   part   of Article 194(1) as also in Article 208(1) requiring the House of 40  supra at Footnote No.14 43 the Legislature to make rules for regulating its procedure), which ought to include the rights guaranteed to the citizens under   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.     The   moment   it   is demonstrated that it is a case of infraction of any of the rights under   Para   III   of   the   Constitution   including   ascribable   to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, the exercise of power by the Legislature would be rendered unconstitutional.   For attracting Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, it is open to the   petitioner   to   demonstrate   that   the   action   of   the Legislature is manifestly arbitrary.  The arbitrariness can be attributed to different aspects.  Applying that test, it could be a case of irrationality of the resolution/decision of the House. Indeed, in this case, the Court is not called upon to enquire into the proportionality of such a resolution/decision. 28. There   is   marked   distinction   between   the   expression “rational” and “proportional”.  The expression “proportion” is derived from a latin word “ proportio”   or “ proportionalis” .   It means corresponding in size or amount to something else.  To wit, the punishment should be proportional to the crime — whereas, expression “rational” is derived from a latin word 44 “ or   .     It   means   action   is   based   on   or  in ratio”   “rationalis” accordance with the reason or logic or so to say sensible or logical.   The rationality of action can be tested, both on the ground of power inhering in the Legislature and the exercise of that power.   Keeping the stated principles in mind, we must proceed 29. to analyse the grounds of challenge in these petitions.   The foremost   ground   is   that   it   is   imperative   for   the   House   to adhere to the procedure prescribed in the Rules framed by the House under Article 208 of the Constitution. The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   30. M.S.M. 41 Sharma  had occasion to deal with the efficacy of the rules so   framed   under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution.     In 42 paragraph 29 , the Court noted that Article 194(3) read with 41  supra at Footnote No.11

45 rules framed under Article 208 had laid down the procedure for enforcing its powers, privileges and immunities.  Further, the   Legislative   Assembly   has   the   powers,   privileges   and immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is deprived of his personal liberty as a result of the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges, such deprivation will be in accordance   with   procedure   established   by   law   and   the petitioner   cannot   complain   of   the   breach,   actual   or threatened, of his fundamental right under Article 21.   This dictum presupposes that action taken under the rules framed under   Article   208   of   the   Constitution   and   in   conformity therewith is compliance of the procedure established by law for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution.  

46 31. In   Ratilal   Bhanji   Mithani   vs.   Asstt.   Collector   of 43 ,  the Constitution Bench restated Customs, Bombay & Anr. the aforenoted position in the following words: 44 “…..   As   explained   in  Pandit   Sharma’s   case ,   these powers and the procedure prescribed by the rules has the sanction of enacted law and an order of committal for   contempt   of   the   Assembly   is   according   to procedure established by law . Das, C.J., speaking for four learned Judges said at page 861: “Art. 194(3) confers on the Legislative Assembly those powers, privileges and immunities and Art. 208 confers power on it to frame rules. The Bihar Legislative Assembly has framed rules in exercise   of   its   powers   under   that   Article.   It   follows, therefore, that Art. 194(3) read with the rules so framed has   laid   down   the   procedure   for   enforcing   its   powers, privileges   and   immunities.   If,   therefore,   the   Legislative Assembly has the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons and if the petitioner is eventually deprived   of   his   personal   liberty   as   a   result   of   the proceedings   before   the   Committee   of   Privileges,   such deprivation   will   be   in   accordance   with   procedure established by law and the petitioner cannot complain of the breach, actual or threatened, of his fundamental right under Art. 21.” Subba Rao, J. in his minority judgment in that   case   and  the  Court   in  Special  Reference   No.  1 of 45 1964  did not say anything to the contrary on this point.” (emphasis supplied) It is settled law that even rules made to exercise the 32. powers   and   privileges   of   State   Legislature   constitute   law within the meaning of Article 13.  This is exposited in  Special 43  (1967) 3 SCR 926 (at p. 929) 44  supra at Footnote No.11 45  supra at Footnote No.12 47 46 Reference No.1 of 1964 .     It is held that   when the State Legislatures   purport   to   exercise   this   power,   they   will undoubtedly be acting under Article 246 read with Entry 39 of List II.  The enactment of such a law will, therefore, have to be treated as a law within the meaning of                 Article 13. 33. In the backdrop of these observations, the plea taken by the   State   that   the   rules   are   neither   statutory   rules   nor binding   on   the   House   will   be   of   no   avail.     Indeed,   the Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Sub­Committee   on 47 Judicial Accountability   in paragraph 94 noted as follows:

(emphasis supplied) 46  supra at Footnote No.12 47  supra at Footnote No.33 48 These observations have been noted while deliberating over the legal question as to whether the law made by the Parliament in the matter of removal of a judge of the High Court ought to prevail over the Rules framed by the House under Article 118 (corresponding to Article 208, applicable to State Legislative Assembly).  This Court held that the parliamentary law is of higher quality and efficacy than the Rules under Article 118.  This, however, had not whittled down the legal exposition that the Rules framed by the Legislative Assembly under Article 208 of the Constitution is the procedure established by law for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution. 34. Be that as it may, it is well­settled that the rules so framed can be altered by the House at any time.   Until the rules are altered, however, the House is ordinarily guided by the procedure prescribed in the rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution.  At the same time, proceedings inside the Legislature cannot be called into question on the ground that the same have not been carried on in accordance with 48 the rules of business as restated in  Kihota Hollohon .   It is, however, enough for the present to observe that the rules 48  supra at Footnote No.25 (para 42) 49 framed   under   Article   208   acquire   the   status   of   procedure established   by   law   for   the   purpose   of   Article   21   of   the 49 Constitution   as   noticed   in   .     This M.S.M.   Sharma observation   has   been   quoted   with   approval   by   another 50 Constitution Bench again in   Raja Ram Pal ,   inter alia,   in paragraphs 53, 167, 338, 416 and 417. 35. Viewed   thus,   even   though   the   Legislature   has   the prerogative to deviate from the rules including to alter the rules; until then, and even otherwise, it is expected to adhere to the “express substantive stipulation” (which is not mere procedure)   in   the   rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the Constitution   and   the   principle   underlying   therein,   being procedure established by law.   36. As   aforesaid,   the   dispensation   prescribed   under   the Rules   to   exercise   power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member (suspension) is ascribable to Rule 53 of the Rules which reads thus: “ 53.   Power   to   order   withdrawal   of   member. —   The Speaker may direct any member who refuses to obey his 49  supra at Footnote No.11 50  supra at Footnote No.14 50 decision, or whose     is, in his opinion,   conduct grossly disorderly , to withdraw immediately from the Assembly and   any   member   so   ordered   to   withdraw   shall   do   so forthwith and shall absent himself during the  remainder of   the   day’s   meeting .   If   any   member   is   ordered   to withdraw   a   second   time   in   the   same   Session ,   the Speaker may direct the member to absent himself from the meetings of the Assembly  for any period not longer than the remainder of the Session , and the member so directed shall absent himself accordingly. The member so directed to be absent shall, during the period of such absence, be deemed to be absent with the permission of the Assembly within the meaning of clause (4) of Article 190 of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) This Rule not only speaks about the procedure to be adopted for passing   the   drastic   order   of   withdrawal   of   a  member   from  the House but also about the substantive disciplinary or the rationality of  the  self­security   measure   to  be   taken  in   a  graded   (objective standard) manner.   The non­compliance of or deviation from the former (procedure) may be non­justiciable.  However, in regard to the substantive disciplinary or the rationality of the self­security measure   inflicted   upon   the   erring   member,   is   open   to   judicial review on the touchstone of being unconstitutional, grossly illegal and irrational or arbitrary. 37. In terms of above Rule, the power is exercised by the Speaker being a quasi­judicial order directing the member to 51 withdraw from the meetings of the Assembly.  The Speaker is expected to exercise this power only in case of conduct of the member being “grossly disorderly” and in a graded objective manner.  The  raison d’etre  is to ensure that the business of the House on the given day or the ongoing Session, as the case may be, can be carried on in an orderly manner and without any disruption owing to misconduct of one or more members.  The expression used in the stated Rule is “grossly disorderly”. 38. The expression “grossly disorderly” has not been defined in the Rules.  The meaning of expression “gross” as given in 51 the Black’s Law Dictionary  reads thus: “ gross,   adj.   (14c)   1.   Conspicuous by reason of size or other attention­getting qualities; esp., obvious by reason of   magnitude   <a   gross   Corinthian   column>.   2. Undiminished by deduction; entire <gross profits>.  3.  Not specific or detailed; general <a gross estimate>.  4.  Coarse in   meaning   or   sense   <gross   slang>.   5.   Repulsive   in behavior or appearance; sickening <a gross fellow with gross habits>.  6.  Beyond all reasonable measure; flagrant <a gross injustice>.” “Grossly”, is an adverb and indicative of relatively higher degree of misconduct or so to say extremely wrong and deviant.   th 51  11  Edition 52 39. The   expression   “disorder”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law 52 Dictionary  is as follows: (1877)   A   lack   of   proper   arrangement “ disorder.   1.   <disorder of the files>.   2.   An irregularity <a disorder in the proceedings>.   3.   A public disturbance; a riot.   See CIVIL DISORDER.  4.  A disturbance in mental or physical health <an emotional disorder> <a liver disorder>.”   53 The expression “disorderly” as defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is as follows: “ Disorderly .   Contrary to the rules of good order and behavior;   violative   of   the   public   peace   or   good   order; turbulent, riotous, or indecent.” 54 In the Concise Oxford Dictionary , the expression “disorderly” has been defined thus: “ disorderly  adj. 1 untidy; confused. 2 irregular; unruly; riotous. 3 Law contrary to public order or morality.” The   expression   “disorderly   conduct”   as   defined   in   Black’s   Law 55 Dictionary  is as follows: “ disorderly conduct.  See CONDUCT Conduct,   n.   (15c) Personal behavior, whether by action or inaction, verbal or nonverbal; the manner in which a person behaves; collectively, a person’s deeds.    Conduct does not include the actor’s natural death or a death that th 52  11  Edition th 53  6  Edition th 54  8  Edition th 55  11  Edition 53 results   from   behavior   consciously   engaged   in   but   not reasonably expected to have this result. —  conduct,  vb. ” 40. Taking   the   totality   of   the   meaning   of   expressions “grossly” and “disorderly”, it must follow that the conduct of the   member   is   such   that   it   was   impeding   the   smooth   or orderly functioning of the House, and may also be of such a nature that it is likely to bring disrepute to the House.  It may involve varied situations and, therefore, implied exercise of rational corrective mechanism is quintessential.  The action of suspension   or   directing   withdrawal   of   a   member   from   the meetings of the Assembly is in the nature of self­security and is   essentially   directed   to   ensure   that   the   House   can   then protect   itself   against   obstruction,   or   disturbance   of   its ongoing proceedings owing to the misconduct of any of its members.  That power is different from the privilege to inflict punishment on a member, which may require higher degree of deprivation of the member over and above participating in the proceedings of the House during the Session.  In a given case, it can be in the form of expulsion being the highest degree   of   exclusion   of   the   member   from   the   House.     Yet 54 another would be penal, in case of ordering imprisonment owing to act of contempt of the House.  We shall elaborate on this aspect a little later while dealing with the challenge on the ground of impugned resolution being grossly irrational. 41. Suffice it to observe that Rule 53 of the Rules provides for a graded (rational and objective standard) approach to be adopted by the Speaker for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the House.   In the present case, however, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs introduced a motion in the House for initiating action for contempt of the House, which the Chairman allowed it to be put to vote instantly at 14:40 hours on the same day and it was passed by the House by majority in no time.  Indeed, if it is a case of grossly disorderly behaviour   in  the  House,   the   Speaker/Chairman  himself is free to take instantaneous decision to order withdrawal of the member   from   the   meetings   of   the   Assembly   during   the remainder of the day’s meeting and if it is a case of repeat misconduct in the same Session — for the remainder of the Session.   55 42. Concededly,   there   is   nothing   in   the   constitutional scheme or the rules framed under Article 208 to prevent a member   of   the   House   to   move   a   motion   for   directing withdrawal   of   a   member   on   the   ground   of   his   grossly disorderly conduct.   Further, if the Speaker can   suo motu direct the  member to withdraw from  the Assembly on the same   day   instantly   to   secure   smooth   functioning   of   the proceedings, for the same logic, even the House could pass a resolution itself on a motion being moved by a member of the House instantly with the concurrence of the Speaker on such a motion. In   the   present   case,   the   Chairman   entertained   the 43. subject motion and called upon the House to vote thereon, which had  the   effect  of  giving  tacit  consent  if  not explicit concurrence to the same.   In that sense, it is not a case of resolution passed by the House (to suspend its members) as being without jurisdiction.  It is a different matter that if the Speaker/Chairman was to do so, it could be only under Rule 53 in a graded manner for the remainder of the day and for repeat misconduct in the same Session — for the remainder 56 of the Session.  That would be a logical and rational approach consistent with the constitutional tenets. If the House takes upon itself to discipline its members, 44. it is expected to adopt the same graded (rational and objective standard) approach on the lines predicated in Rule 53.  That would be a case of rational action taken by the House as per the procedure established by law.  The expression “rational” is 56 defined in Black’s Law Dictionary  as follows: “ rational ,   adj.   (14c)   1.   Endowed   with   the   faculties   of cognition   traditionally   thought   to   distinguish   humans from the brutes <man as a rational being>.  2.  Based on logic   rather   than   emotion;   attained   through   clear thinking; not absurd, preposterous, foolish, or fanciful <a rational conclusion>.  (Of a person) able to think clearly 3.  and sensibly; clear­headed and right­minded <Jones was rational at the time of the woman’s death>.”   As opposed to a rational decision, it would be a case of irrational or preposterous approach.   The expression “irrational” as defined in 57 Black’s Law Dictionary  is as follows: “ irrational ,   adj.  (16c) Not guided by reason or by a fair consideration   of   the   facts  <an   irrational   ruling>.    See ARBITRARY. (15c)   Depending   on   individual arbitrary,   adj.   1.   discretion; of, relating to, or involving a determination made   without   consideration   of   or   regard   for   facts, circumstances,   fixed   rules,   or   procedures.   2.   (Of   a th 56  11  Edition th 57  11  Edition 57 judicial   decision)   founded   on   prejudice   or   preference rather than on reason or fact.    This   type   of   decision   is   often   termed   arbitrary   and capricious.  Cf. CAPRICIOUS. —  arbitrariness,  n.” 45. A   priori,   if the resolution passed by the House was to provide for suspension beyond the period prescribed under the stated Rule, it would be substantively illegal, irrational and   unconstitutional.     In   that,   the   graded   (rational   and objective   standard)   approach   predicated   in   Rule   53   is   the benchmark to be observed by the Speaker to enable him to ensure smooth working of the House, without any obstruction or impediment and for keeping the recalcitrant member away from the House for a period maximum upto the remainder of the entire Session. 46. Inflicting   suspension   for   a   period   “beyond   the   period necessary” than to ensure smooth working/functioning of the House during the Session “by itself”; and also, as per the underlying   objective   standard   specified   in   Rule   53, indubitably, suffer from the vice of being grossly irrational measure   adopted   against   the   erring   member   and   also substantively illegal and unconstitutional. 58 47. It is a different matter if the House had ended up with resolution of expulsion of the member, which power in a given situation it could legitimately exercise, as held in  Raja Ram 58 That   action   would   not   visit   the   member   with Pal .     disqualification and also allow him to get re­elected from the same constituency within the statutory period of six months from the date of vacation of his seat.  However, if it is a case of   suspension   for   a   period   beyond   the   remainder   of   the Session,   it   would   entail   in   unnecessary   (unessential) deprivation.  And longer or excessive deprival would not only be   regarded   as   irrational,   but   closer   to   or   bordering   on perversity.  Resultantly, such an action would be violative of procedure established by law and also manifestly arbitrary, grossly irrational and illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 48. Be   it   noted   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder period   of   the   ongoing   Session   would   not   only   be   grossly irrational   measure,   but   also   violative   of   basic   democratic values   owing   to   unessential   deprivation   of   the   member 58  supra at Footnote No.14 59 concerned   and   more   importantly,   the   constituency   would remain unrepresented in the Assembly.  It would also impact the   democratic   setup   as   a   whole   by   permitting   the   thin majority   Government   (coalition   Government)   of   the   day   to manipulate the numbers of the Opposition Party in the House in an undemocratic manner.   Not only that, the Opposition will   not   be   able   to   effectively   participate   in   the discussion/debate in the House owing to the constant fear of its members being suspended for longer period.  There would be no purposeful or meaningful debates but one in   terrorem and as per the whims of the majority.   That would not be healthy for the democracy as a whole.   It   is   well­established   that   fundamental   rights   are 49. guaranteed   by   Part   III   of   the   Constitution,   out   of   which Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the most frequently invoked to test the validity of the executive as well as legislative actions when these   actions   are   subjected   to   judicial  scrutiny.     Different Articles   in   the   Constitution   under   chapter   Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles in Part IV ought to be read as   an   integral   and   incorporeal   whole   with   possible 60 overlapping with the subject matter of what is to be protected by its various provisions particularly the fundamental rights. The sweep of Article 21 is expansive enough to govern the action   of   dismembering   a   member   from   the   House   of   the Legislative Assembly in the form of expulsion or be it a case of suspension by directing withdrawal from the meeting of the Assembly for the remainder of the Session. 50. Be   that   as   it   may,   it   is   evident   from   the   impugned resolution that it has been passed by the majority votes in the House immediately after it was put to vote by the Chairman. It was in fact introduced as a motion for initiating action for having   committed   contempt  of   the   House   which  ordinarily ought to have proceeded under Part XVIII of the Rules dealing with Privileges.   That would have required constitution of a Committee of Privileges to enquire into the entire matter by giving   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   persons   concerned. Instead of adopting that procedure, the House itself chose to direct withdrawal of the petitioners from the meetings of the Assembly for a period of one year — which direction is neither 61 ascribable to the dispensation prescribed in Part XVIII of the Rules or Rule 53 enabling the Speaker to do so. As   aforementioned,   it   is   not   a   case   of   procedural 51. irregularity   as   such.     Whereas,   the   decision   taken   by  the House in this case, is one of substantive illegality in directing suspension beyond the period of remainder of the Session in which the motion was presented.   We say so because, the period of suspension in excess of the period essential to do so much   less   in   a   graded   manner   including   on   principle underlying   Rule   53,   would   be   antithesis   to   rational   or objective standard approach for ensuring orderly functioning of the House during the ongoing Session. 52. Reverting to the challenge to the impugned resolution being grossly irrational.  As noticed earlier, Rule 53 provides for a graded (rational and objective standard) approach.  The timeline as specified in Rule 53 is with a view to address the immediate concern of the House for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the House in the given Session.  This action is implied on the doctrine of necessity.  The Speaker and for 62 that matter, even the House as a whole or by majority, would be   within   its   power   to   resort  to  such  a  mechanism   being rational   measure.     Exceeding   the   stated   timeline   is   a substantive   matter   and   not   a   procedural   irregularity.     It would raise a basic question as to what purpose would be served   by   withdrawing   the   member   from   the   House   for successive   Sessions  falling   within  that  period   of  one   year. Indeed, if the conduct of the member is gross warranting his removal from the Assembly even beyond the period of sixty days [Article 190(4)] or six months (Section 151A of the 1951 Act), the House is capable of invoking its inherent power of expulsion of such a member, which is a greater power. 53. Indubitably, suspension for a day or for the remainder of the Session, would be of a lesser degree of exercise of that power.   However, it is not open to contend that the higher degree of power would include power to suspend the member beyond the period essential to keep him/her away from the Assembly for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the 59 House.  As expounded in  Amarinder Singh , the important 59  supra at Footnote No.15 (paras 47 and 66) 63 consideration   for   scrutinising   the   exercise   of   legislative privileges is whether the same is necessary to safeguard the integrity   of   the   legislative   functions.     This   Court   had recognised   that   the   Legislature’s   power   to   punish   for   its contempt was not untrammelled.   That power of legislative chamber to punish for its own contempt must coincide with the   Legislature’s   interest   in   protecting   the   integrity   of   its function. In other words, the suspension of a member must be   preferred   as   a   short­term   or   a   temporary   measure   for restoring order in the functioning of the concerned Assembly Session   for   completing   its   scheduled   business   within   time and by way of disciplinary measure against the incorrigible member(s). 54. The   word   “suspension”   is   necessarily   linked   to attendance   of   the   member   in   the   House.     Thus,   the suspension may be resorted to merely for ensuring orderly conduct of the business of the House during the concerned Session.     Anything   in   excess   of   that   would   be   irrational suspension.   This is so because the member represents the constituency from where he has been duly elected and longer 64 suspension would entail in deprivation of the constituency to be represented in the House.  It is true that right to vote and be represented is integral to our democratic process and it is not an absolute right.  Indeed, the constituency cannot have any   right   to   be   represented   by   a   disqualified   or   expelled member.  However, their representative cannot be kept away from   the   House   in   the   guise   of   suspension   beyond   the necessary  (rational)  period  linked to  the  ongoing  Assembly Session, including the timeline referred to in Article 190(4) of the Constitution and Section 151A of the 1951 Act. 55. Be   that   as   it   may,   suspension   is   essentially   a disciplinary measure.   It must follow that suspension for a period of one year would assume the character of punitive and punishment worse than expulsion.   For, suspension for long period and beyond the Session has the effect of creating a   de   facto   vacancy   though   not   a   de   jure   vacancy.     The argument   of   the   State   that   despite   suspension   from   the House, the members would continue to discharge all other functions   outside   the   House   as   an   elected   representative. This plea, in our view, is tenuous.   For, the effect of such 65 suspension is visited not only on the constituency that goes unrepresented for potentially long and unessential time, but also on the functioning of the Assembly itself.  Apart from a role in bringing to light the special needs or difficulties of the constituency, a member also plays a role in various motions, 60 debates, votes, etc. .   In any case, this plea cannot whittle down the logic requiring limited action essential for orderly functioning of the House on the given day or at best, the Session   for   completion   of   its   scheduled   business   for   the relevant Session.   56. Suffice it to observe that one­year suspension is worse than “expulsion”, “disqualification” or “resignation” — insofar as the right of the constituency to be represented before the House/Assembly is concerned.   In that, long suspension is 60  Some of the functions of the elected representative in the House/Assembly (taken from the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Rules) would indicate that the member would not be able to take part in following matters, if suspended: (a) Moving of a motion which requires decision by the Assembly, including by Division ( Rules 23, 40, 41 ); (b) Taking part in a debate on a motion including speeches ( Rules 33,34 ); (c) Asking Questions on Statements made by Ministers ( Rule 47 ); (d) Making of personal explanations ( Rule 48 ); (e) Questions on matters of public concern from Ministers ( Rule 68 ); (f) Short Notice questions for immediate reply on questions of urgent nature ( Rule 86 ); (g) Private member bills ( Rule 111 ); (h) Discussions on matters of sufficient public importance ( Rule 94 );                                  (i) No confidence motions ( Rule 95 ); (j) Adjournment motions ( Rule   97 );   (k)   Participation   as   members   of   Committees,   including   the   Committee   for consideration of matters of public importance, Business Advisory Committee, Public Accounts Committee, Committee on Estimates, etc ( Part XV of the Rules ). 66 bound to affect the rights harsher than expulsion wherein a mid­term election is held within the specified time in terms of Section 151A of the 1951 Act, not later than six months. Thus,   the  impugned   resolution  is   unreasonable,   irrational, and arbitrary and liable to be set aside.   57. Having said this, we may now turn to two decisions of the   Privy   Council   referred   to   and   discussed   by   the 61 Constitution Bench in  , in paragraphs 284 to Raja Ram Pal   293.  The same reads thus:

61  supra at Footnote No.14 62  supra at Footnote No.9 63  Edward Kielley vs. William Carson, (1842) 4 Moore PC 63 : 13 ER 225 64  Thomas William Doyle vs. George Charles Falconer, (1865­67) LR 1 PC 328 : 36 LJPC 33 : 15 WR 366 67

65  supra at Footnote No.9 66  Lawrence Joseph Harnett vs. William Patrick Crick, 1908 AC 470 : 78 LJPC 38 : 99 LT 601 (PC) 68

69

68 ) were pressed into service in that case to answer Joseph Harnett   the plea that the Legislature has inherent limited remedial power to punish   for   contempt   by   way   of   suspension   of   its   member   and cannot resort to expulsion of the member.  The Constitution Bench noticed   that   even   these   two   decisions   of   the   Privy   Council, recognised inherent power of the Legislature to expel its member and, thus, negatived the plea of the petitioner in that regard.  This Court   after   analysing   the   said   decisions   concluded   that   the Legislatures   established   in   India   by   the   Constitution,   including 67  supra at Footnote No.9 68  supra at Footnote No.66 70 Parliament under Article 105(3), need not be denied the claim to the power of expulsion arising out of remedial power of contempt. What emerges  from the  stated  conclusion  is that the 58. Constitution Bench declared that the inherent power of the Legislature   is   not   absolute,   but   limited   remedial   power   to punish   for   contempt   and   to   take   such   measures   as   are necessary for orderly functioning of the proceedings of the House. 69 59. The   case   of   has   been   noticed   in   paragraph Barton   284, which in turn had dealt with suspension of the member from the Legislative Assembly of the New South Wales.   In that case, the resolution passed by the House did not mention about the time frame of suspension of the member.  That was challenged   by   the   aggrieved   member   being   irrational   and unnecessary.  That plea was considered by the Privy Council 70 keeping in mind its earlier decisions in  Edward   Kielley   and 71 .     (These   decisions   have   been Thomas   William   Doyle adverted to in paragraph 283 by the Constitution Bench as 69  supra at Footnote No.9 70  supra at Footnote No.63 71  supra at Footnote No.64  71 well).     After   noticing   these   decisions,   the   Privy   Council  in 72 noted that those authorities had dealt with situation Barton   that no powers of that kind are incident to or inherent in a Colonial Legislative Assembly (without express grant), except such as are necessary to the existence of such a body, and the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to execute. It must follow that in absence of any express provision 60. bestowing power in the Legislature to suspend its member(s) beyond the term of the ongoing Session, the inherent power of the Legislature can be invoked only to the extent necessary and for proper exercise of the functions of the House at the relevant point of time.  No more.  For that purpose, it could resort to protective and self­defensive powers alone and not punitive at all.   This logic is reinforced from the dictum in 73 Barton   wherein the Privy Council noted as follows: “…“If a member of a Colonial House of Assembly is guilty of disorderly conduct in the House while sitting, he may be removed or excluded for a time, or even expelled …. The right to remove for self­security is one thing, the right to inflict punishment is another …. If the good sense and 72  supra at Footnote No.9 73  supra at Footnote No.9 72

61. The Privy Council in the same decision   then proceeded to observe as follows:

(emphasis supplied) These observations are significant and apposite in the context of the issue under consideration.   And we must lean in favour of adopting the same.   Inasmuch as this exposition recognises the fact that  implied  or   inherent  power   of  the   Legislature   must be reckoned to the extent only to what is required to be done by the House for effective and orderly functioning of its business during 74  1 L.R, P.C. 340 73 the ongoing Session and not beyond.   This is more emphatically expounded by the Privy Council in the following words:

Again, it went on to observe as follows:

75 62. The essence of the analysis done in   is about Barton   the   logic   and   rationality   behind   the   need   to   suspend   a member.   It unambiguously held that the same be regarded as   temporary   by   way   of   self­protective   mechanism   of   the Legislature to ensure orderly conduct of its business in the House   during   the   sitting.     For   that   very   reason,   Rule   53 75  supra at Footnote No.9 74 provides for a graded corrective action, namely, on the first occasion,   the   Speaker   may   suspend   the   member   for   the remainder of the day and if the misbehaviour is repeated in the same Session — for the remainder of the Session.   The 76 observations in  Barton   would reinforce this logic of need to adhere to a graded approach, which reads thus:

(emphasis supplied) 63. In light of this decision, it must follow that only a graded approach is the essence of a rational and logical approach; and only such action of the Legislature which is necessary for orderly   conduct   of   its   scheduled   business   of   the   ongoing Session can be regarded as rational approach.   Suspension beyond the Session would be bordering on punishing not only the   member   concerned,   but   also   inevitably   impact   the legitimate rights of the constituency from where the member had been elected. 76  supra at Footnote No.9 75 77 64. In the case of  Lawrence Joseph Harnett ,  the question was   about   the   challenge   to   the   Standing   Order   which provided as follows:

This   Standing   Order   was   approved   by   the   Governor.     In   that context, the Privy Council observed that it seems impossible for the Court to declare that the House was so wrong in its judgment, and the Standing Order and the resolution founded upon it so foreign to   the   purpose   contemplated   by   the   Act,   so   as   to   declare   the proceedings against the member invalid.  In other words, the Privy Council was considering a written Standing Order and its efficacy. In the present case, the House has already adopted the 65. Rules for conduct of its business and Rule 53 of the Rules expressly provides for the mechanism regarding suspension of its member.  Indubitably, the source of powers and privileges 77  supra at Footnote No.66 76 of Legislatures in India is derived from Article 105(3) in case of   Parliament   and   Article   194(3)   concerning   the   State Legislature.   In absence of a law to define such powers and privileges, as of now, it can only exercise those powers as existed in the House of Commons of the Parliament of United Kingdom at the commencement of the Constitution. 78 66. In the celebrated treatise of Sir Thomas Erskine May dealing   with   the   Parliamentary   privileges,   it   is   noted   as follows:   “if for a subsequent occasion, in default of an order by the House that the suspension of the member shall terminate when   the   House   orders   that   it   shall   do   so,   the suspension shall be for the remainder of the Session .” (emphasis supplied) He then noted that the first or subsequent occasion would mean the first or the subsequent occasion in the same session. 67. Further, the position as obtained in United Kingdom at the relevant time to suspend its members was governed by the   House   of   Commons   Standing   Order   Relative   to   Public 78   The Law, Privileges Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, Fifteenth (1950) Edition  (See Chapter VII under the heading “Proceedings upon the naming of a Member” at pages 451­ 452.) 77 Business 1948. The relevant Standing Order is No. 22 (1 to 4) as reproduced hereunder: “22. Order in debate.— (1) Whenever a Member shall have been   named   by   Mr.   Speaker   or   by   the   chairman, immediately   after   the   commission   of   the   offence   of disregarding the authority of the chair, or of persistently and willfully obstructing the business of the House by abusing the rules of the House, or otherwise, then, if the offence   has   been   committed   by   such   Member   in   the House, Mr. Speaker shall forthwith put the question, on a motion   being   made,   no   amendment,   adjournment,   or debate being allowed, “That such Member be suspended from the service of the House”; and if the offence has been committed   in   a   committee   of   the   whole   House,   the chairman shall forthwith suspend the proceedings of the committee and report the circumstances to the House; and Mr. Speaker shall on a motion being made forthwith put the same question, no amendment, adjournment, or debate   being   allowed,   as   if   the   offence   had   been committed in the House itself. (2) If any member be suspended under this order, his suspension on the first occasion shall continue until the fifth day, and on the second occasion until the twentieth day, on which the House shall sit after the day on which he was suspended, but on any subsequent occasion until the   House   shall   resolve   that   the   suspension   of   such Member do terminate. (3)   Not more than one Member shall be named at the same   time,   unless   two   or   more   members,   present together,   have   jointly   disregarded   the   authority   of   the chair. (4) If a Member, or two or more Members acting jointly, who   have   been   suspended   under   this   order   from   the service of the House, shall refuse to obey the direction of Mr.   Speaker,   when   severally   summoned   under   Mr. Speaker’s orders by the Serjeant at Arms to obey such direction,   Mr.   Speaker   shall   call   the   attention   of   the House to the fact that recourse to force is necessary in order   to   compel   obedience   to   his   direction,   and   the Member or Members named by him as having refused to obey   his   direction   shall   thereupon   and   without   any 78 further question being put be suspended from the service of the House during the remainder of the session.” On conjoint reading of sub­clause (2) and (4) of the above­cited Standing Order No. 22, it is seen that suspension of a member on the first occasion can be for a period of five days or the remainder of the session whichever is earlier. Even for the second occasion the period of suspension is only twenty days or remainder of the Session,   whichever   is   earlier.   On   any   subsequent   occasion   the period of suspension shall be until the House shall resolve that the suspension of such member do terminate.     79 The Orissa High Court in   68. Sushanta Kumar Chand had occasion to deal with a case of warrant issued by the Speaker of the Assembly to detain the contemnor for seven days’   simple   imprisonment.     It   was   urged   that   as   the unexpired   period   of   sentence   was   beyond   the   term   of   the Session of the House, the same had lapsed in law.  The High Court answered the challenge in favour of the petitioners after noticing   passage   from   Sir   Thomas   Erskine   May   and Halsbury’s Laws of England.  The Sir Thomas Erskine May’s 79  supra at Footnote No.10 79 Parliamentary Practice relied upon in that decision, expounds thus:

And Halsbury’s Law of England relied upon in the same decision observes thus: “The Lords claim to have power to commit an offender for a specified period even beyond the period of a session. This course was also formerly pursued by the Commons but was later abandoned;  and it would now seem that they no longer have power to keep offenders in prison beyond the period of session ……………” (emphasis supplied) The rationale for limiting all remedies for breach of privilege, as a rule, to a Session in which the House takes action for such breach 80 is the effect of prorogation. According to Erskine May’s Treatise , it is stated as under:

(emphasis supplied) 80 1950 Edition at page 32 under the heading “Effect of a Prorogation” 80 69. A   priori,   if   the   Legislature   intended   to   depart   from mechanism predicated in Rule 53, it ought to have expressly provided for that dispensation.  If it had done that by a law or in   the   form   of   Rules   framed   under   Article   208   of   the Constitution, the legality and constitutionality thereof could have been tested.   Suffice it to note, in absence thereof, it would   inevitably   be   exercise   of   power   without   an   express grant in that regard.   In such a case, the exercise of power can only be implied or inherent and limited to the logic of general necessity by way of self­protective or self­defensive action   reasonably   necessary   for   proper   exercise   of   the functions of the House during the ongoing Session.  Anything in excess then for a  day  or the  remainder of  the ongoing Session, would not be necessary much less rational exercise of inherent power of the Assembly.   Even, Rule 53 bestows authority in the Speaker to take action against the member only for ensuring orderly functioning of the House.   Same logic must apply to the exercise of inherent limited power by the House, even if it may not be  de facto  under Rule 53. 81 70. Be   it   noted,   had   it   been   a   case   of   expulsion   of   the member by the House in terms of Section 151A of the 1951 Act, the Election Commission would move into action and rather be obliged to take steps not later than six months to fill in the vacancy so caused subject to the situation referred to in the proviso therein — so that the constituency could be duly represented in the  House at the  earliest opportunity. Concededly, the Legislative Assembly is a conglomeration of members   chosen   by   direct   election   from   the   territorial constituencies   in   the   State   (as   per   Article   170).     That presupposes that all territorial constituencies must be duly represented in the Assembly in  continuum .  In any case, their representation   cannot   be   deprived   for   longer   period   than necessary for the orderly functioning of the House during the Session.   For that reason, the statutory mandate postulated 81 vide Parliamentary law   (which must be regarded as higher law and acts as a limitation upon the Legislature as well, as expounded   in   Sub­Committee   on   Judicial 81 Section 151A of the 1951 Act 82 82 Accountability ),   the   constituency   cannot   be   denied representation in the House beyond a limited period due to fortuitous situation.  Moreover, the expelled member would be free to contest the mid­term election and get re­elected from the same constituency.  In that, the member does not incur any disqualification due to expulsion or even removal by the House.  In case of suspension beyond the period of remainder of the Session or sixty days or six months, as the case may be, even though is not a case of disqualification incurred by the   member,   it   would   entail   in   undue   deprivation   of   the constituency to be represented in the House by their duly elected   representative.     It   is,   therefore,   a   drastic   measure trenching upon imposing penalty more than disciplinary or corrective measure, beyond the limited inherent powers of the House. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   had   invited   our 71. attention to the judgments of the Gujarat High Court wherein it had been held that the rules framed under Article 208 of the   Constitution   are   neither   statutory   nor   binding   on   the 82  supra at Footnote No.33 (para 61) 83 Legislative Assembly.  Those decisions have not taken note of the   efficacy   of   the   observations   made   by   the   Constitution 83 Bench of this Court in   as back as in 1959 M.S.M. Sharma — that the rules framed under Article 208 of the Constitution would have the effect of procedure established by law for the purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution and which dictum has   been   consistently   followed   in   subsequent   decisions including   by   the   Constitution   Bench   which   dealt   with  the 84 case of  Raja Ram Pal .    Accordingly, the decisions pressed into service by the respondents cannot take the matter any further.   The respondents have relied upon other decisions including of this Court which, however, has had no occasion to  deal with the  legality  and   efficacy  of  direction  or  order issued by the House such as vide impugned resolution of suspending duly elected members for a period of one year instead of maximum period of remainder of the same Session. Indeed, the decision of Madras High Court in  V.C. Chandhira 85 Kumar,   Member   of   Legislative   Assembly   held   the 83  supra at Footnote No.11 84  supra at Footnote No.14 85  supra at Footnote No.23 84 resolution of the Assembly reducing the original period of one year to six months as valid, however, for the view that we have taken, the said decision will be of no avail. 72. Resultantly, we have no hesitation in concluding that the   impugned   resolution   suffers   from   the   vice   of   being unconstitutional, grossly illegal and irrational to the extent of period of suspension beyond the remainder of the concerned (ongoing) Session.  Further, it is not a case of mere procedural irregularity committed by the Legislature within the meaning of Article 212(1) of the     Constitution. 73. Although learned counsel appearing for the parties had raised diverse contentions, we need not dilate further having opined that in exercise of inherent power of the House, the suspension   of   the   members   could   not   have,   in   any   case, exceeded the remainder period of the ongoing Session.   The concerned Session having concluded long back in July 2021, the petitions ought to succeed and could be disposed of with a declaration   that   suspension   beyond   the   remainder   of   the ongoing   Session   in   which   the   resolution   was   passed,   is 85 nullity,   unconstitutional   and   grossly   illegal   and   irrational. The  same cannot be given effect to  beyond  the  remainder period of the concerned Session and must be regarded as  non est  in the eyes of law beyond that period.  For that reason, it is unnecessary for us to dilate on other aspects of the matter. Thus, we do not wish to examine the same. Epilogue: 74. It is unnecessary to underscore that Parliament as well as   the   State   Legislative   Assembly   are   regarded   as   sacred places, just as  the  Judicature  as temple  of justice.   As a matter of fact, the first place where justice is dispensed to the common man is Parliament/Legislative Assembly   albeit   by a democratic process.  It is a place where policies and laws are propounded for governing the citizenry.   It is here that the entire range of activities concerning the masses until the last mile, are discussed and their destinies are shaped.  That, in itself, is the process of dispensing justice to the citizens of this   country.     These   are   places   where   robust   and dispassionate debates and discussion inspired by the highest 86 traditions of truth and righteousness ought to take place for resolving the burning issues confronting the nation/State and for dispensing justice — political, social and economic.  The happenings in the House is reflection of the contemporary societal   fabric.     The   behavioural   pattern   of   the   society   is manifested or mirrored in the thought process and actions of the members of the House during the debates.  It is in public domain (through print, electronic and social media) that the members of the Parliament or Assembly/Council of the State, spend   much   of   the   time   in   a   hostile   atmosphere.     The Parliament/Legislative   Assembly   are   becoming   more   and more intransigent place.   The philosophical tenet, one must agree   to   disagree   is   becoming   a   seldom   scene   or   a   rarity during the debates. It has become common to hear that the House could not complete its usual scheduled business and most   of   the   time   had   been   spent   in   jeering   and   personal attacks against each other instead of erudite constructive and educative debates consistent with the highest tradition of the august body.   This is the popular sentiment gaining ground amongst   the   common   man.     It   is   disheartening   for   the 87 observers.     They   earnestly   feel   that   it   is   high   time   that corrective steps are taken by all concerned and the elected representatives would do enough to restore the glory and the standard of intellectual debates of the highest order, as have been chronicled of their predecessors.   That legacy should become more prominent than the rumpus caused very often. Aggression during the debates has no place in the setting of country governed by the Rule of Law.  Even a complex issue needs to be resolved in a congenial atmosphere by observing collegiality and showing full respect and deference towards each   other.     They   ought   to   ensure   optimum   utilisation   of quality time of the House, which is very precious, and is the need of the hour especially when we the people of India that is Bharat,   take   credit   of   being   the   oldest   civilisation   on   the planet   and   also   being   the   world’s   largest   democracy (demographically).     For   becoming   world   leaders   and   self­ dependant/reliant, quality of debates in the House ought to be   of   the   highest   order   and   directed   towards   intrinsic constitutional and native issues confronting the common man of   the   nation/States,   who   are   at   the   crossroad   of   semi­ 88 sesquicentennial or may we say platinum or diamond jubilee year on completion of  75 years post­independence.   Being House   of   respected   and   honourable   members,   who   are emulated   by   their   ardent   followers   and   elected   from   their respective   constituency,   they   are   expected   to   show statesmanship and not brinkmanship.   In the House, their goal is and must be one — so as to ensure the welfare and happiness of we the people of this nation.  In any case, there can be no place for disorderly conduct in the House much less “grossly disorderly”.   Such conduct must be dealt with sternly for ensuring orderly functioning of the House.   But, that action must be constitutional, legal, rational and as per the procedure established by law.  This case has thrown up an   occasion   for   all  concerned   to   ponder   over   the   need   to evolve and adhere to good practices befitting the august body; and   appropriately   denounce   and   discourage   proponents   of undemocratic   activities   in   the   House,   by   democratically elected representatives.  We say no more. Conclusion: 89 75. In conclusion, we have no hesitation in allowing these writ petitions and to declare that the impugned resolution directing suspension of the petitioners beyond the period of the remainder of the concerned Monsoon Session held in July 2021 is  non est  in the eyes  of  law ,  nullity,  unconstitutional, substantively     illegal     and   irrational.         The       impugned resolution       is,   thus,       declared     to     be ineffective in law, insofar as the period beyond the remainder of   the   stated   Session   in   which   the   resolution   came   to   be passed. Order: 76. As a result of the stated declaration, the petitioners are entitled for all consequential benefits of being members of the Legislative Assembly, on and after the expiry of the period of the remainder of the concerned Session in July 2021.   The writ petitions are allowed in the above terms.  No order as to costs. Postscript: 77. While parting, we need to express a word of appreciation for the able assistance given by the learned counsel appearing 90 for the concerned parties enabling us to deal with the complex issues on hand.   That they did despite the handicaps and uncertainty of online interaction in virtual Court hearing. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. ..……………………………J.           (A.M. Khanwilkar) ………………………………J.           (Dinesh Maheshwari) ………………………………J.           (C.T. Ravikumar) New Delhi; January 28, 2022.