Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAM BAHADUR RAI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1974
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
CITATION:
1975 AIR 223 1975 SCR (2) 732
1975 SCC (3) 710
ACT:
Preventive Detention-Effective representation against order
of detention,--Grounds of detention, when to be read as
inter-related-Petitioner, whether entitled to have notice of
inter-play of one ground on another.
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, Section 3(1) (a)
(ii)-"Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar"-Expression, if
vague.
HEADNOTE:
On April 9, 1974, in the exercise of powers conferred by
section 3 (1) (a) (ii). of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, the District Magistrate, Patna, made an order
directing that the petitioner, who is a student leader, be
detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The
order of detention served on him on April 13, 1974,
contained seven grounds. The order was confirmed by the
Governor of Bihar on May 28, 1974. The petitioner filed a
writ Petition in the High Court at Patna under Article 226
of the Constitution challenging the validity of the
detention order on various grounds. The petition was
dismissed by the High Court. This Court granted special
leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court. Rule
was also issued in the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner
under Article 32 of the Constitution.
It was contended for the petitioner that the grounds of
detention furnished to him are vague, that some of the
allegations contained in the grounds are ,false and that the
grounds bear no relevance to the object of detention,
namely, the maintenance of public order.
Setting aside the order of detention and making the Rule
absolute.
HELD. (i) The grounds of detention do not furnish intrinsic
aid to justify ,the conclusion that all of them are inter-
related. Nor is there any material to ,come to the
conclusion that the petitioner can be said to have had
notice of such interplay of one ground on another. [737B]
(ii) The first ground contains these particulars : (1) The
petitioner. in his capacity as Secretary of All India
Vidyarthi Parishad, attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya
Chatra Neta Sammelan held on 17th and 18th February, 1974,
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in the Patna University campus; (2) A decision was taken in
those meetings :at the instance of the petitioner that a
Gujarat type agitation should be started in Bihar; and (3)
It was also decided in those meetings to resort to hunger
strike and to gherao the office of the Bihar Chief Minister,
the Patna District Magistrate and other officials. By the
second ground the following particulars were furnished to
the petitioner (1) A meeting of the Students Steering Com-
mittee was held on March 1, 1974 under President-ship of
Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav; (2) it was decided in that meeting
to form a Sanchahalan Samiti for conducting the students
agitation and (3) the petitioner readily agreed in that
meeting to become a member of the Sanchalan Samiti. It is
impossible by merely reading these particulars to decipher
the connection between grounds 1 and 2. Grounds 1 and 2 must
be read disjunctively, each one referring to a distinct
episode. One is not a sequel to the other and the validity
of the two grounds has to be determined independently on the
merits of each. [737C-D]
(iii)One of the allegations in ground no. 1 is that, in the
meeting of tile Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta, Sammelan, it was
decided at the instance of tile petitioner "to start a
Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar." The reference obviously
is to the recent happenings in Gujarat which culminated in
the dissolution of the State Legislature and the
introduction of the Presidents Rule. The Court may and
ought to take judicial notice of well-known facts of con-
temporary life. But it is very difficult to comprehend the
true connotation of
733
the so-called Gujarat type of agitation. It may mean
differently to different people and is, therefore, vague.
The court will be treading on a dangerous ground if it
attempted to interpret judicially the genesis of recent
political events. The court cannot assume that the decision
to start a ’Gujarat type of agitation’ meant a clarion call
to violence. If the charge be that the petitioner had
preached violence, the grounds of detention must say so. If
the petitioner was not apprised of what was truly alleged
against him and if the accusation, when reasonably read. was
unintelligible, he was deprived of an opportunity to make an
effective representation against the detention order. [738E-
G]
(iv)The second ground is irrelevant. An order of detention
passer under any law providing for preventive detention has
to answer the test that there has to be a nexus between the
acts of the detenu founding the order of detention and the
purpose of detention. The purpose here is to prevent the
petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. The mere fact that the
petitioner was instrumental in forming the Sanchalan Samiti
for conducting the students agitation or that he readily
agreed to become a member of that Samiti cannot justify the
conclusion that these acts are calculated to disturb public
order. Peaceful protests and the voicing of a contrary
opinion are powerful wholesome weapons in the democratic re-
pertoire. It is therefore unconstitutional to pick up a
peaceful Protestant and to put him behind the prison bars.
[740F-G]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 347 of 1974.
Petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
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N. M. Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for the petitioner.
Babadra Prasad Advocate General for the State of Bihar.
Birendra Prasad and U. P. Singh, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court were delivered by
CHANDRACHUD, J.-These proceedings for the writ of habeas
corpus are directed against an, order passed by the District
Magistrate, Patna, on April 9, 1974 in the exercise of
powers conferred by section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 26 of 1971. The
District Magistrate directed by the aforesaid order that the
petitioner, who is a student leader, be detained with a view
to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order.
The ’Grounds’ of detention were served on the petitioner on
April 13, 1974. They read thus :
"1. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai, in
his capacity as Secretary of All India
Vidyarthi Parishad, attended a meeting of the
Bihar Rajya Shatra Neta Sammelan held on the
17th and 18th February, 1974, in Patna
University campus, in which from amongst other
things, it was decided, at his instance, to
start a Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar,
and whereas in the same meeting it was also
decided to resort to hunger strike and gherao
of the office of the Chief Minister, Bihar,
District Magistrate, Patna and other
officials.
2. Whereas a meeting of the Students
Steering Committee was held on the 1st March,
1974 under the President-ship of Shri Laloo
Prasad Yadav where it was decided
734
to form a Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the
students agitation, and whereas in the same
meeting you readily accepted to become one of
the members of the Sanchalan Samiti;
3. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
attended a meeting of the, Sanchalan Samiti on
4-3-74 at the Legislature Club where he was
instrumental in forcing a decision to Gherao
the Assembly on the 18th March, 1974 and to
prevent the Governor from addressing the
Assembly on the same date,
4. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
further attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya
Chatra Sangharas Samiti on the 12th March,
1974 in the office of the Students Union,
Patna University in which it was decided, at
his instance, to commence the gherao of the
Assembly on the 18th March. 1974 from 8.30
A.M.
5. Whereas there are reports to indicate
that the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai was
actually leading and actively participating in
the gherao of the Assembly on the 18th Match,
1974; and
6. Whereas even after the 18th March 74,
the said shri Ram Bahadur Rai has been
actively guiding the students agitation and
with this end in view he convened a meeting of
the students in the National Hall, Kadamkuan,
Patna on the 8th April, 1974 wherein he
exhorted them to paralyse the functioning of
the Government offices with effect from the
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9th April, 1974 by resorting to gherao dharna,
etc.
7. Whereas the said Shri Ram Bahadur Rai
actually led a demonstration of the students
on the 9th April, 1974 in defiance of the
prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C.
with a clear intention and known objective to
gherao the Government officials particularly
the Secretariat buildings;
8. I am, therefore, satisfied that in the
circumstances mentioned above if you are
allowed to remain at large, you will indulge
in further activities prejudicial to the main-
tenance of public order. I. V. S. Dubey,
District Magistrate, Patna therefore, consider
it necessary to detain you in custody with a
view to preventing you from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the
public order."
The order of detention was confirmed by the Governor of
Bihar on May 29, 1974. By the order of confirmation the
petitioner is to remain In detention till April 8, 1975.
735
The petitioner filed a writ petition (No. 47 of 1974) in the
High Court at Patna under Article 226 of the Constitution
challenging the validity of the detention order on various
grounds. That petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of
the High Court on May 8, 1974. This Court, on September 3,
1974 granted to the petitioner leave to appeal from the
judgment of the High Court.
On July 22, 1974 the petitioner filed in this Court a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging
the validity of the detention order. Rule was issued on
this petition on the same date on which special leave was
granted to the petitioner to appeal from the judgment of the
High Court.
The appeal and the writ petition involve common questions
and can be disposed of together.
In his writ petition here and in the High Court the
petitioner has made these averments; The petitioner is a
Secretary of the All India Vidyarthi Parishad whose aim is
to inculcate amongst the student a sense of discipline,
patriotism, character and devotion to studies. The
Vidyarthi Parishad has branches in various Indian colleges
and Universities, more than a lakh of students and teachers
being members of the Parishad. The Vidyarthi Parishad has
been striving to bring about cordiality between the teachers
and the taught. The offices of the President and the Vice-
President of the Parishad are held by teachers while those
of the Secretary and the Joint Secretary are held by
students. The Executive Committee consists of both the
teachers and fine students. The students of the Patna
University placed certain demands before the Chief Minister
and the Education Minister of Bihar as also before the
District Magistrate of Patna impressing upon them that due
to high prices, articles of food were not available in the
various hostels of Patna and therefore it was necessary to
issue ration cards for supply of food grains to the
students. A similar demand was made in regard to the non-
availability of text-books and writing material. Verbal
assurances were given to the students that their demands
would be considered but the situation remained as before.
On February 17 and 18 a meeting of the student leaders was
held in the Patna University campus to consider the problems
facing the student community.
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The petitioner says that the particulars furnished to him in
regard ,to what transpired in those meetings do not set out
as to what was said by him in those meetings The main
grievance of the petitioner as reflected in his writ
petitions is that the grounds of detention furnished to him
are vague, that some of the allegations contained in the
grounds are false and that the grounds bear no relevance to
the object of the detention, namely the maintenance of
public order.
The District Magistrate of Patna has filed an affidavit in
this Court in answer to the contentions of the petitioner.
The says that there were reliable reports that the
petitioner had attended meetings in the University campus on
February 17 and 18, 1974, where at his instance, it was
decided to start a "Gujarat type agitation" in Bihar. The
petitioner bad readily agreed to become a member of the
16-L319 SupCI/75
736
Sanchalan Samiti which was formed for conducting the
students’ agitation. The petitioner had attended a meeting
of the Sanchalan Samiti on March 4, 1974 at Legislature Club
and he was instrumental in enforcing the decision to gherao
the Assembly on March 18 and to prevent the Governor of
Bihar from addressing the Assembly on that day. On March,
18 the petitioner, according to reliable reports, had
actually led the gherao of the Assembly. Similar reports
were received that the petitioner had convened a meeting of
the students in the National Hall, Kadamkuan, Patna on April
8, 1974 where he had exhorted the students to paralyse the
Functioning of the Government offices with effect from April
9 by resorting to gharao and dharna. On April 9 the
petitioner, according to authentic reports, had led a
demonstration of students defying the prohibitory order
issued by the District Magistrate under section 144,
Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner was arrested on
that date, was taken to the Police Station at about 1 p.m.,
was released from police custody at about 2 p.m. and was
served with a detention order at 4 p.m.
The learned Judges of the High Court constituting the
Division Bench delivered separate but concurring judgments.
Nagendra Prasad Singh J. held in the main judgment that the
grounds of detention supplied to the petitioner "are not
absolutely independent and unconnected"; that none of the
grounds is vague so as to affect the petitioner’s right to
make, a representation against the order of detention; that
gherao’ per se involves an element of compulsion and
therefore any resistance on the part of the person gheraoed
is bound to affect public peace; that to agitate means ’to
stir violently’ and therefore students’ agitation would
affect public order; and that the grounds of detention are
relevant and germane to the purpose of detention. A. N.
Mukherji J. by his concurring judgment held that it was
"well-known that large scale violence and arson were
indulged in Gujarat’ and since the petitioner was the
Secretary of All India Vidyarthi Parishad, he would know
what was meant by "Gujarat type of agitation"; that a gherao
may be accompanied with violence; that it is not necessary
for the detaining authority to incorporate in grounds of
detention the details. of what the petitioner said and did
in meetings referred to in the grounds; and that the grounds
of detention were neither vague nor irrelevant.
Various contentions were raised before us by learned counsel
for the petitioner but we Propose to confine our attention
to certain basic considerations which are vital in habeas
corpus petitions filed to challenge detention orders passed
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under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act.
The primary question in these proceedings arising, no doubt,
on their own facts is whether, as contended by the learned
Advocate-General appearing for the State of Bihar, the
grounds of detention ought to be read as one composite
document or whether as con.tended by the petitioner’s
counsel, each one of the grounds forms
737
a distinct and separate reason for detention and ought to be
examined separately on its own merits. Considering the
facts stated in the various grounds, both parties have over-
pitched their respective ,cases. The grounds of detention
do not furnish intrinsic aid to justify ,the conclusion that
all of them are inter-related. Nor is any material placed
before us from which we could conclude that the petitioner
can be said to have had notice of such inter-play of one
ground on, another.
The first ground contains, these particulars : (1) The
petitioner, in his capacity as Secretary of All India
Vidyarthi Parishad, attended a meeting of the Bihar Rajya
Chatra Neta Sammelan held on 17th and 18th February, 1974,
in the Patna University campus; (2) A decision was taken in
those meetings at the instance of the petitioner that a
Gujarat type agitation should be started in Bihar; and (3)
it was also decided in those meetings to resort to hunger
strike and to gherao the office of the Bihar Chief Minister,
the Patna District Magistrate and other officials. By the
second grounds the following particulars were furnished to
the petitioner : (1) A meeting of the Students Steering
Committee was held on March 1, 1974 under the Presidentship
of Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav; (2) it was decided in that
meeting to form a Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the
students agitation; and (3) the petitioner readily agreed in
that meeting to become a member of the Sanchalan Samiti.
We find it impossible, by merely reading these particulars,
to decipher the connection between grounds 1 and 2.
Calendar-wise the 1st of March incontrovertibly falls after
the 17th and 18th February but no one can for that reason
contend that the events of March are an aftermath of the
events of February. They may conceivably bear a causal
connection but such a connection must either be reflected in
the recitals of particulars or else the detaining authority
must disclose in its affidavit the basis of its belief that
the events followed upon one another as cause and effect or
as a part of the same plan or movement. The petitioner has
made an express averment in paragraph 22 of his writ
petition here that the mere fact of his acceptance of the
membership of the Sanchalan Samiti referred to in ground No.
2 cannot justify the passing of a detention order under
section 3(1) (a) (ii) of the Act. The affidavit of the
District Magistrate does not deal with paragraph 22 of the
petition at all. It deals only with paragraphs 1 to 18 of
the writ petition.
What is the tangible connection between the meetings of the
Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta Sammelan held in the University
campus on February 17 ’and 18 and the meeting of the
Students Steering Committee held on March 1, 1974, under the
Presidentship of Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav ? None is alleged
or shown to exist and we cannot fathom it. The Neta
Sammelan of February and the Students Steering Committee
which met in March may perhaps have been animated by a
similar object and the two, without a common bond, may have
been striving to achieve a similar purpose. But the diffe-
738
rence between similar and same purpose is well-known to
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trained minds and what we are asked to accept by the
Advocate-General is that the particulars stated in grounds 1
and 2 refer to a series of continuous events woven together
by a common intention. That contention is impossible to
accept. Grounds 1 and 2 must, in our opinion, be, read
disjunctively, each one referring to a distinct episode.
One is not a sequel to the other and the validity of the two
grounds has to be determined independently on the merits of
each.
But such a motivation can be seen in the incidents referred
to in the other grounds. Those grounds show that the
petitioner attended a meeting of the Sanchalan Samiti on
March 4, 1974; that he was instrumental in forcing a
decision to gherao the Assembly on March 18 and to prevent
the Governor from addressing the Assembly on that date; that
he attended a meeting of the, Bihar Rajya Chatra Neta
Sammelan on March 12 in which it was decided at his instance
to commence the gherao of the Assembly from 8-30 a.m. on
March 18; that he led the gherao on March 18; that on April
8 he, convened a meeting of the students and exhorted them
to paralyse the functioning of the Government offices by
resorting to gherao, dharna etc. with effect from April 9;
and that he led a demonstration of students on April 9 in
defiance of the prohibitory orders issued under section 144
Cr. P.C. with the intention of gheraoing the Government
offices, particularly the secretariat buildings. Grounds 3
to 7 may therefore be read legitimately as constituting a
composite, inter-connected indictment comprising events
which followed in quick succession as a part of the same
preplanned objective.
Counsel for the petitioner concentrated his attack on the
first ground by which it is alleged that on February 17 and
18 it was decided at the instance of the petitioner to start
a "Gujarat type of agitation in Bihar". The reference
obviously is to the recent happenings in Gujarat which
culminated in the dissolution of the State Legislature and
the introduction of the President’s Rule. We may and ought
to take judicial notice of the well-known facts of
contemporary life like ’the dissolution of the Assembly or
the introduction of President’s Rule. But, frankly, we are
unaware of the true connotation of the so-called ’Gujarat
type of agitation’. That is not to feign ignorance of what
the newspapers and journals reported but outside the
layman’s way of thinking there is a distinction between what
happened in fact and what was intended to happen. The court
will be treading on a dangerous ground if it attempted to
interpret judicially the genesis of recent political events.
Often, the tint of glasses furnishes a preconceived answer
to such problems and the glasses of the court have no tint.
Some one claimed that the Gujarat agitation was essentially
an anti price-rise stir which went out of hand because of
supervening circumstances. Some one else claimed that the
movement in its inception was and was intended to be a
violent means of creating chaos and public disorder. The
fence-sitters saw sense in both points of view while the
independent politician, not committed to this or that
ideology, discovered yet new dimensions
739
of the problem rejected alike by those who launched the
movement and those who opposed it. So conflicting are the
popular verdicts. It would be wholly improper for a court
to pronounce on the prognosis of such political events. We
shall therefore not assume that the decision to start a
’Gujarat type of agitation’ meant a clarion ’call to
violence.
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If the charge be that the petitioner had breached violence,
the grounds of detention must say so. Such a serious
accusation ought not to be left to mere speculation. And if
there is not a whisper of violence in the grounds of
detention or in the affidavit of the District Magistrate,
how can the court conclude that the petitioner exhorted the
student community to take to the path of violence in the
pursuit of its demands ? The judgment of the High Court
shows that in March 1974 Bihar was in the grip of violence.
But we cannot argue back and hold that since the Chatra Neta
Sammelan took a certain decision in February and the
violence erupted in March therefore one was the cause and
the other the consequence. Such an inference may perhaps be
permissible in respect of historical events which have been
subjected to an expert and dispassionate examination by
historians. But green facts of contemporary life are an un-
sure foundation for raising such an inference.
’Gujarat type of agitation being thus a phrase of vague and
uncertain import, the petitioner could have had no
opportunity to make an effective representation against the
order of detention. Article 22(5) of the Constitution
requires that the detenu shall be afforded the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order of
detention. By a long series of decisions, this right has to
be real and effective, not illusive or empty. If the
petitioner was not apprised of what was truly alleged
against him and if the accusation, reasonably, was
unintelligible, he was deprived of an opportunity to make an
effective representation against the detention order.
Anything said by him to clear his conduct would then, at
best, be a fishing answer to meet a roving charge. Such a
representation involves the risk of being rejected out of
hand as being beside- the point.
The District Magistrate says in his affidavit that ’Gujarat
type of agitation is a matter of common knowledge and the
petitioner being Secretary of All India Vidyarthi Parishad
and a good student throughout his career, as stated by the
petitioner himself, it is preposterous to-imagine that the
words ’Gujarat type of agitation’ would be unintelligible to
him". In the first place, common knowledge like commonsense
is not so common and, at any rate, what may be said to be
common knowledge is the fact of happenings in Gujarat and
not what is meant by ’,Gujarat type of agitation’. Saying
that any one and every one knows what is meant by ’Gujarat
type of agitation’ is not a legal answer to the contention
that the petitioner did not and could not know what is meant
by the particular phrase. The Secretaryship of the
Vidyarthi Parishad or the petitioner’s claim to scholarship
has no- bearing on the question whether the phrase has
740
a fixed connotation. The point of the matter is that it
would mean differently to different people and is therefore
vague., Inability to comprehend the meaning of vague
expression cannot surely be dubbed as ’preposterous’.
The learned Advocate-General urged that the petitioner had
taken a leading part in the two meetings of February and has
stated in ground No. 1, "it was decided at his instance" to
start a ’Gujarat type of agitation’ in Bihar. The
petitioner had therefore adopted the expression "Gujarat
type of agitation’ and, it is urged, that he cannot be heard
to say that his own words carry no meaning for him. We
cannot accept this new slant on what the petitioner did in
the meeting. The ground does not allege that the petitioner
himself used the particular expression. The counter-
affidavit of the District Magistrate also does not say that
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the petitioner himself used the particular words. It seeks
to justify the use of the expression it the ground by saying
that to a clever student leader like the petitioner, the
expression must have been intelligible.
Ground No. 2 has a different facet : whereas the first
ground vague, the second is irrelevant. It is alleged in
this latter ground than in the meeting of the Steering
Committee held on March 1, 1974, (i) it was decided to form
a Sanchalan Samiti for conducting the students agitation;
and (ii) that the petitioner readily agreed in that meeting
to become a member of the Samiti. The formation of an
Association for the ventilation of grievances in a lawful
manner is a part of the Constitutional right of free speech
and expression, the right to assemble peaceably and without
areas and the right to form association guaranteed by
Article 19(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The
State, under clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 19 has the
right to make laws for imposing reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of those rights in the interests, inter alia,
of public order. That power lends illegality to preventive
detentions under the authority of a law. But an order of
detention passed under any such law has again to answer the
test that there has to be a nexus between the acts of the
detenu founding the order of detention and the purpose of
detention. The purpose here is to prevent the petitioner
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. The mere fact that the petitioner was
instrumental in forming the Sanchalan Samiti for conducting
the students agitation or that he readily agreed to become a
member of that Samiti cannot justify the conclusion that
these acts are calculated to disturb public order. Peaceful
protests and the voicing of a contrary opinion are powerful
wholesome weapons in the democratic repertoire. It is
therefore unconstitutional to pick up a peaceful Protestant
and to put him behind the prison bars. The right to repine
can be taken away only for a Constitutionally recognised
purpose, as for example in the interests of public order.
That nexus is lacking in this case.
The District Magistrate says in his affidavit that the
"Sanchalan Samiti was formed for conducting the students
agitation and, therefore, the contention of the petitioner
that this ground has nothing
741
to do with any breach or contravention of any law is
erroneous, as _the word agitation itself implies violence
and threat to public order". The High Court relied on the
authority of Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary in
support of its conclusion that to ,agitate’ is to stir
violently’. it is, in our opinion, wrong to treat every
agitation as implying violence on a priori considerations.
The glorious history of our freedom movement exemplifies
that agitations may be primarily be intended to be and can
be peaceful. In this regard Gandhiji’s life work has
perhaps no parallel. Nor indeed in the West, of Dr. Martin
Luther King. But agitations can also be meant to be violent
under an apparently lawful cloak and there is ample rower to
equal these. As for dictionaries, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1961 Ed., p. 42) says that to
’agitate’ is ’to stir up’; to arouse public feeling or
influence public opinion (as by constant discussion)’.
’Agitation’ is defined to mean ’the persistent and sustained
attempt to arouse public feeling or influence public opinion
(as by appeals, discussions, or demonstrations)’. The
Random House Dictionary (.1970 Ed., p. 28) says that to
’agitate’ is ’to call attention to by speech or writing;
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discuss; debate.’; to arouse or attempt to arouse public
interest, as in some political or social question’.
’Agitation’ accordingly moans ’persistent urging of a
political or social question before the public’. The
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1964 Ed., Vol. I, p. 36)
says that to ’agitate’ means ’To perturb, excite or stir up
by appeals’; ’To discuss or push forward’. Dictionaries
give various shades of meanings and the effort has to be to
choose the meaning which is appropriate in the context.
When "the wind agitates the sea", the meaning of the word
agitate is ’to move or force into violent, irregular
action’. When a crowd is " agitated to a frenzy by
impassioned oratory", the meaning of the word is ’to disturb
or excite emotionally’. But in regard to social or
political questions, the normal meaning of the word is ’to
arouse or attempt to arouse public interest’ (See The Random
House Dictionary, 1970 Ed., p. 28). When "the ladies sigh
and agitate Their fans" the meaning of the word ’agitate’ is
simply ’to move to and fro’. But when one is "agitating for
the schools and the vote" the meaning is- ’to arouse public
feeling or influence public opinion (as by constant
discussion)’ (See the Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, 1961 Ed., p. 42).
The second ground therefore has no bearing on the
maintenance of public order and is irrelevant for attaining
that purpose.
The first ground being vague and the second irrelevant, the
order of detention is liable to be set aside. It is too
late in the day to
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contend, as the learned Advocate-General, did, that the
detaining authority assesses the cumulative effect of the
activities of the detenu while passing the order of
detention. Where the order of detention is founded on
distinct and separate grounds if any one of the grounds is
vague or irrelevant the entire order must fall. The
satisfaction of the detaining authority being subjective, it
is impossible to predicate whether the order would have been
passed in the absence of vague or irrelevant data.
For these reasons, we set aside the order of detention, make
the Rule absolute and direct that the petitioner shall be
set at liberty forthwith.
V.M.K. Petition allowed.
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