UNION OF INDIA vs. CHAMAN RANA

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).2763 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.1118 of 2018) UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS CHAMAN RANA ….RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).2764 OF 2018 (arising out of SLP(C) No.1123 of 2018) UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ….APPELLANT(S) VERSUS GULSHAN KUMAR SHARMA ….RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by BALA PARVATHI Date: 2018.03.13 16:01:15 IST Reason: 2. These   two   appeals   arise   from   a   common   order   dated 05.05.2017,   directing   retrospective   consideration   for 1 promotion   of   the   respondents   to   the   post   of   Second­in­ Command   and   Commandant   respectively,   in   the   Border Security Force (BSF), from the date that their juniors had been promoted, along with all consequential benefits.  3. The   respondents   in   the   two   writ   petitions   were superseded in the years 1996 and 2000, respectively.  Both of them   were   subsequently   promoted   on   28.11.1997   and 16.06.2003   as   Second­in­Command   and   Commandant respectively.   Subsequently, both of them submitted several representations for promotion from the date of supersession. Orders rejecting the representations, along with reasons, were duly   communicated   to   them   more   than   once.     After   the pronouncement   in   Sukhdev   Singh   vs.   Union   of   India   & , (2013) 9 SCC 566 affirming  ors. Dev Dutt vs. Union of India & ors. , (2008) 8 SCC 725,  separate writ petitions were filed by them on 25.09.2016.  The common plea taken was that the entry  ‘good’  in their annual confidential reports (ACRs) for the relevant   years   was   an   adverse   remark   in   view   of   the 2 benchmark of ‘very good’.   Since the adverse entry had not been   communicated   to   them,   it   could   not   be   taken   into consideration,   requiring   reconsideration   for   promotion   from the date of supersession.  4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the claims of the respondents were highly belated and stale.  The writ petitions ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.   Specific objection had been taken in the counter affidavit, including the cascading effect that it would have had upon those promoted earlier to the respondents, and which   would   lead   to   administrative   chaos.     Mere   filing   of representations   or   a   subsequent   judgement,   could   not   be sufficient justification to entertain such belated claims, dehors the facts of a case.  The High Court ought not to have given directions   to   consider   their   candidature   with   retrospective effect.   3 5. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   submitted   that enunciation of law by this Court will always have to be given retrospective effect, unless it is made prospective specifically. The grading ‘good’ in the facts of the case was adverse as the benchmark for promotion was ‘very good’.   In view of the law laid down in  Dev Dutt  (supra) as affirmed in  Sukhdev Singh (supra),   it   was   mandatory   for   the   appellants   to   have communicated such adverse remarks to the respondents.  In absence   of   such   communication,   these   remarks   could   not have been considered to deny promotions.   The respondents were genuinely and bonafide pursuing their grievances before the authorities themselves, hoping that they would see reason, and   only   when   they   realised   that   relief   would   not   be forthcoming   otherwise,   they   approached   the   High   Court ultimately. 6. We  have considered the  submissions  on behalf  of the parties.     The   only   question   for   consideration   is   the applicability of the law as declared in   Dev Dutt   (supra)   and 4 affirmed in  Sukhdev Singh  (supra) to the respondents in the facts and circumstances of the present case.  7. The benchmark for promotion to the posts in question under the BSF (Seniority, Promotion and Superannuation of Officers)   Rules   of   1978,   as   prescribed   in   paramilitary Promotion   DO   letter   dated   25.11.1988   was   modified   on 08.05.1990   from   ‘Good’   to   ‘Very   Good’.     The   respondent Chaman   Rana,   a   Deputy   Commandant   was   considered   for promotion   to   the   rank   of   Second­in­Command   at   the departmental   promotion   committee   (DPC)   meeting   held   on 13.09.1996   but   could   not   make   the   grade   in   view   of   the criteria   prescribed   in   DO   letter   dated   08.05.1990.     The respondent   represented   on   20.02.1997   against   his supersession.     An   order   of   rejection   with   reasons   was communicated to him on 25.03.1997.     The cause of action had, therefore, accrued to seek relief before a court of law. Nonetheless a repeat representation was made on 31.07.1997, and   a   reasoned   rejection   was   again   communicated   on 5 07.05.1998.  In the meantime, the respondent was empanelled to   be   considered   for   promotion   to   the   rank   of   Second­in­ Command by the DPC held in the year 1997, and he was promoted as such on 28.11.1997.   A cause of action again accrued to the respondent for approaching the Court for relief but he again represented on 30.06.1998, followed by further representations on 14.09.1998, 22.08.2000, 22.08.2006.   A fresh reasoned order of rejection was again communicated on 16.05.2007.   Repeat representations followed on 28.08.2012, 07.11.2015 and 20.11.2015 after which the writ petition came to be instituted. 8. Likewise, the respondent Gulshan Kumar Sharma was considered for promotion as Commandant in the years 2000­ 2001 and 2001­2002 by the DPC but was superseded as he failed   to   secure   the   benchmark.     He   represented   on 25.10.2001   and   was   informed   on   09.01.2002   that   he   had failed   to   secure   the   benchmark.     The   cause   of   action   to approach   the   Court   for   grant   of   relief   had   accrued   to   the 6 respondent  but  he  again   represented   on   18.03.2002.      An order of rejection along with reasons was again communicated to   him   on   01.09.2004.     After   he   was   promoted   as Commandant   on   16.06.2003,   instead   of   approaching   the Court,   he   again   represented   on   04.05.2005,   followed   by another representation on 08.01.2007.   A reasoned order of rejection   was   again   communicated   to   him   on   17.04.2008. This   was   followed   by   further   representation   on   11.08.2009 which   was   again   rejected   on   02.09.2009   allegedly communicated on 01.01.2016.  A further representation dated 03.08.2015   was   also   rejected   on   27.11.2015.       The   writ petition then came to be instituted. 9. Manifestly,   the   cause   of   action   first   arose   to   the respondents on the date of initial supersession and again on the   date   when   rejection   of   their   representation   was communicated to them, or within reasonable time thereafter. Even if the plea based on  (supra)  be considered, the Dev Dutt  cause of action based thereon accrued on 12.05.2008.  There 7 has to be a difference between a cause of action and what is perceived as materials in support of the cause of action.   In service matters, especially with regard to promotion, there is always an urgency.   The aggrieved must approach the Court at   the   earliest   opportunity,   or   within   a   reasonable   time thereafter   as   third   party   rights   accrue   in  the   meantime to those   who   are   subsequently   promoted.     Such   persons continue to work on the promotional post, ensconced in their belief of the protection available to them in service with regard to seniority.  Any belated interference with the same is bound to   have   adverse   effect   on   those   already   promoted   affecting their morale in service also.  Additionally, any directions at a belated   stage   to   consider   others   for   promotion   with retrospective effect, after considerable time is bound to have serious administrative implications  apart from  the  financial burden on the government that would follow by such orders of promotion. 8 10.    As far back as in   P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. The State

promotion belated by 14 years,  this Court had observed that a period   of   six   months   or   at   the   utmost   a   year   would   be reasonable   time   to   approach   a   court   against   denial   of promotion and that it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion not to entertain such claims by persons who tried to unsettle the settled matters, which only clog the work of the court   impeding   it   in   considering   genuine   grievances   within time in the following words :­ “2…..   A   person   aggrieved   by   an   order   of promoting   a   junior   over   his   head   should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle   settled   matters.   The   petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed 9 in   limine.   Entertaining   such   petitions   is   a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.”

sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for

202, by Chief Justice Chagla,  observing as follows :­

Court, had specifically taken the objection that the claim was highly   belated,   and   that   any   direction   for   a   retrospective 10 consideration would have a destabilising effect in unsettling the settled position which would lead to complete chaos apart from   other   administrative   consequences.     The   High   Court failed to consider the objection.  In  Union of India vs. M.K. , Sarkar (2010) 2 SCC 59, this Court observed as follows:­ “16.   A   court   or   tribunal,   before   directing ‘consideration’   of   a   claim   or   representation should   examine   whether   the   claim   or representation is with reference to a ‘live’ issue or whether it is with reference to a ‘dead’ or ‘stale’ issue. If it is with reference to a ‘dead’ or ‘stale’   issue   or   dispute,   the   court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration….”

The appellant therein, aggrieved by his supersession moved the   High   Court   with   utmost   expedition   leading   to   the pronouncement by the Single Judge on 21.08.2001 and by the Division   Bench  on  26.11.2001.     The   appeal  was   instituted before this Court in the year 2002.  If that were not sufficient to distinguish the case of the respondents, reference may also be made to the observations in paragraph 36 as follows: 11 “36. In the present case, we are developing the principles   of   natural   justice   by   holding   that fairness   and   transparency   in   public administration   requires   that   all   entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation.” 

another vs.   Major Bahadur Singh,   (2006) (1) SCC 368, it was observed:­ “9.  The   courts  should   not   place   reliance   on decisions   without   discussing   as   to   how   the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of   the   decision   on   which   reliance   is   placed. Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the   statute   and   that   too   taken   out   of   their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed   as   statutes.   To   interpret   words, phrases   and   provisions   of   a   statute,   it   may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy   discussions   but   the   discussion   is 12 meant   to   explain   and   not   to   define.   Judges interpret   statutes,   they   do   not   interpret judgments….” 15. A subsequent pronouncement by this Court could not enthuse a fresh lease of life, or furnish a fresh cause of action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim.     In , State of  Uttaranchal vs.  Shiv  Charan Singh  Bhandari (2013) 12 SCC 179, it was observed that :­ “29…. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for we are all slaves of time. There may not be any provision   providing   for   limitation   but   a grievance   relating   to   promotion   cannot   be given a new lease of life at any point of time.”   16.  The observations with regard to the  modus operandi of the representation syndrome to revive what are clearly dead and stale claims as discussed in   C. Jacob vs. Director of

be exercised by the Court are also considered apposite in the facts of the present case.  13

direction   to   consider   retrospective   promotion   of   the respondents at such a belated passage of time of over 17 to 20 years, would virtually bring a tsunami in the service resulting in   administrative   chaos   quite   apart   from   the   financial implications for the government.  The order of the High Court is therefore held to be unsustainable and is set aside. 

………………………………….J.    (Arun Mishra)  .……….………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   New Delhi, March 12, 2018. 14 ITEM NO.1502 COURT NO.10 SECTION IV-B S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS C.A.No.2763/2018 @ SLP(C)No..1118/2018 (Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 05-05- 2017 in CWP No.20322/2016 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh) UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Petitioner(s) VERSUS CHAMAN RANA Respondent(s) WITH C.A.No.2764/2018 @ SLP(C)No.1123/2018 (IV-B) Date : 12-03-2018 These petitions were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For Petitioner(s) Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Deepak Goel,AOR Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha pronounced the Reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and His Lordship. Leave granted. The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed Reportable judgment. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. (Sarita Purohit) (Suman Jain) Court Master Branch Officer (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file) 15