Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5107 of 2000
PETITIONER:
Kandapazha Nadar & Ors
RESPONDENT:
Chitraganiammal & Ors
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/04/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Challenge in this Appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court allowing the
second appeal filed by the respondents under Section 100 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the ’Code’).
Respondents are the legal representatives of the original
plaintiff.
According to the plaintiff, the suit properties originally
belonged to one Chelliah Nadar, he had purchased the suit
properties under sale deed Ex.A1 dated 26.2.1973, the
defendants 1 to 3 fraudulently created a conveyance deed in
their favour the defendants had earlier instituted O.S. No. 298
of 1973 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Srivaikuntam,
the defendants obtained orders of injunction and managed to
enter into the suit properties; the defendants have no right
whatsoever, the suit 0. S. No. 298 of 1973 was dismissed after
contest, in appeal , the first appellate Court decreed the suit in
favour of the plaintiffs in the said suit , present plaintiff
preferred Second Appeal , No. 8 of 1977, pending the said
Second Appeal, said suit was permitted to be withdrawn i.e.
suit 0.S. No.298 of 1973 but without liberty to file a fresh suit
on the same cause of action, the defendants have no right in
the suit property and the defendants who have no right are in
enjoyment of the suit properties since 11.6:1973.
It was the further case of the plaintiffs that the
defendants have cut and carried away the Odai trees worth
Rs.1500/- the defendants have been tapping toddy from 42
palmyra trees since 1973 standing on the suit properties; the
defendants have also cut and carried away two palmyra trees
worth Rs. 200/-, the defendants have been cultivating ground
nut and derived income of Rs. 1000/- , the palmyra trees
would fetch an income of Rs. 400/- per annum; the
defendants 1 and 3 are liable to pay Rs. 5100/- towards past
mense profits and the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of
possession besides past and future mense profits from the
defendants.
The defendants 1 and 3 filed a written statement inter
alia pleading that the suit properties originally belonged to
Chelliah Naoar and his brother; the defendants have
purchased the properties from Chelliah Nadar on 8.10.1971,
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the plaintiff herein attempted to interfere with the defendants’
possession, the plaintiff had not purchased the suit property
from Chelliah Nadar, on the dismissal of the said suit the
defendants herein preferred A.S.No.51 of 1975 which was
allowed and decreed; the Second Appeal preferred by the
plaintiff herein was pending, pending the Second Appeal , the
defendants herein withdrew the suit itself as they have not
proved execution of the sale deed by Chelliah Nadar, the
plaintiff has no right to institute this suit, the plaintiff is not
entitled to the suit property, the plaintiff is not entitled to any
income or value of the trees or income from palmyra trees and
that the suit is liable to be dismissed.
After contest, the trial Court held that the plaintiff in the
present suit is entitled to the suit property and the plaintiff is
entitled to recover possession, the defendants 1 and 3 are
liable to pay Rs. 2,760/- towards past mense profits and the
plaintiff is entitled to future mense profits to be ascertained
under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code.
The first appellate court held that the defendant Nos. 4 to
5 have not been impleaded as parties to the first appeal.
According to the plaintiff he had purchased the suit property
from Chelliah Nadar under Exhibit A1 on 26.2.1973. The
contesting defendants also purchased the suit property from
brothers of Chelliah Nadan under Exhibit B-7 on 8.10.1971
and claimed to be in possession of the property. In the earlier
suit O.S. No. 298 of 1973 the orders passed have great
relevance and reads as follows :
"After some lengthy arguments, Mr. K.
Sarvabhauman learned counsel for the
respondents prayed for leave to withdraw the
suit. Mr. Ganapathi Subramaniam, learned
counsel for the appellant states that leave
could be granted provided he is not given
liberty to file a fresh suit. Recording the
statement I grant leave to withdraw the suit
making it clear that the plaintiffs-Respondents
will have no liberty to file a fresh suit.
Accordingly the suit will stand dismissed. No
costs."
The High Court observed that in terms of Order XXIII
Rule 1 (4)(b) when a party to the suit withdraws the suit
without permission to institute fresh suit, the parties shall be
precluded from instituting the fresh suit in respect of such
subject matter or such part of the claim. The High Court
observed that the earlier suit was dismissed as the defendant
had withdrawn the earlier suit at the second appellate stage
without securing necessary permission to institute a fresh
suit. The High Court therefore, held that the general
principles of res judicata get attracted and the defendant’s
claim is barred in view of the orders passed in the earlier suit
between the same parties. It is to be noted that the first
appellate court had observed that the withdrawal debarred the
plaintiffs from filing a subsequent suit but it did not affect the
defence of the defendants.
Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to several
decisions to contend that fresh suit is not barred and Order
XXIII Rule 1 (4) has no application to the facts of the cases.
There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent in spite of
notice.
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In order to appreciate contention of learned counsel for
the appellant, it would be appropriate to quote Order XXIII,
Rule 1(4) the same read as follows:
"1 (4)Where the plaintiff \026
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-
rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without
the permission referred to in sub-rule (3).
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award
and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in
respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim."
It would also be relevant to take note of Order IX Rule 9
and Order XXII Rule 10 of the Code which read as follows:
"Order IX, Rule 9 \026 Decree against plaintiff by
default bars fresh suit \026 (1) Where a suit is
wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the
plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a
fresh suit in respect of the same cause of
action. But he may apply for an order to set
the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the
Court that there was sufficient cause for his
non-appearance when the suit was called on
for hearing, the Court shall make an order
setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as
to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall
appoint a day for proceeding with the suit."
Order XXII Rule 10 \026 (1) Procedure in case of
assignment before final order in suit \026 (1) In
other cases of an assignment, creation or
devolution of any interest during the pendency
of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court,
be continued by or against the person to or
upon whom such interest has come or
developed.
(2) The attachment of a decree pending an
appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an
interest entitling the person who procured
such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule(1)."
The original suit was one for declaration of title and
injunction. Undisputedly the withdrawal was permitted but no
liberty to file fresh suit was granted. The purpose of
incorporating of Order XXIII Rule 1 is to avoid multiplicity of
litigation. In the earlier suit the respondent-defendant
claimed to be the owner. The provisions contained in Order IX
Rule 9 Order XXII Rule 10 relate to different concepts. It is
the subject matter which is the relevant aspect. Plaintiff has to
prove his case. Order II Rule 2 also is relevant, the same reads
as follows:
"Order II Rule 2" Suit to include the whole
claim: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of
the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make
in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff
may relinquish any portion of his claim in
order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction
of any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim- where a
plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or
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intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his
claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of
one portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs
\026 A person entitled to more than one relief in
respect of the same cause of action may sue
for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits,
except with the leave of the Court, to sue for
all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for
any relief so omitted."
Order II Rule 2 relates to the "relief which can be
granted" while Order XXIII Rule 1 refers to the "subject
matter". The grant of leave is not a matter of a right. Different
subject matters are relatable to provisions contained in Order
XXIII Rule 1. In both the present and the earlier suit the
subject matter is essentially the same.
By the impugned judgment it has been held that since
the petitioners herein had withdrawn Suit No.298 of 1973 and
since no liberty was given to the petitioners to institute a fresh
suit, the petitioners were precluded from raising the plea in
defence that sale deed executed by Chelliah Nadar in favour of
Thangaraj Nadar dated 26.2.1973 was not true and valid. In
this connection, the Madras High Court placed reliance on
Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of Code.
The question before us is : what is the effect of order
passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No.8 of 1977 filed
by Thangaraj Nadar, in the first round of litigation. That order
is dated 27.7.78. Under that order, the Madras High Court
granted leave to withdraw the suit filed by the petitioners
herein bearing Suit No.298 of 1973, making it clear that the
petitioners herein (plaintiffs in earlier suit) were not given
liberty to file a fresh suit. Does it mean that petitioners-
defendants were estopped from raising the defence regarding
validity of the conveyance in their favour by Chelliah Nadar
dated 8.10.71.
In the case of (Rani) Kulandai Pandichi and another v.
Indran Ramaswami Pandia Thevan (AIR 1928 Madras 416), it
has been held as follows:
"Permission to withdraw a suit decides no
matters in controversy and does not confer any
rights on a party and the fact that the person
withdrawing is precluded from bringing a fresh
suit on the same cause of action cannot be
said to have that effect. It has been held that
an order permitting the withdrawal of a suit or
appeal is not a decree within the meaning of
the Civil Procedure Code. We need only refer
to Patlogi v. Gam \026 [1891] 15 Bom. 370,
Jogodindra Nath v. Sarat Sundari Debi -
[1891] 18 Cal. 322 and Abdul Hussain v. Kasi
Sabu - [1900] 27 Cal. 362"
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of Saraswati Bala Samanta and others v.
Surabala Dassi and others (AIR 1957 Calcutta 57), it has
been held vide para 3 as follows:
"(3) The order recording the withdrawal
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of the suit is not a decree. There was no
question therefore, of drawing the order as a
decree. The order recording the withdrawal
can however be formally drawn up under
R.187 Part I, Chapter 1 of the Civil Rules and
Orders, Vol.1, inasmuch as the order directed
payment of costs by the plaintiff to the
defendant. We, therefore, treat the so called
decree as an order."
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of Devassi v. Anthoni (AIR 1969 Kerala 78), it
has been held vide para 1 as follows:
"(1). None of the conditions in Sub-section (1)
of Section 100 of the Code is here satisfied. Indeed,
the dismissal of the appellant defendant’s appeal
to the court below can be supported on the short
ground that that appeal did not lie. This is a case
where the plaintiff withdrew his suit under Sub-
rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII -- he was
competent to do that and required nobody’s
permission since he was the sole plaintiff, the
defendant, as we shall presently see being in no
sense a plaintiff -- and the so-called dismissal of
the suit as withdrawn by the trial Court was not
really a dismissal but a mere recording of the fact
of withdrawal. It determined none of the matters in
controversy in the suit -- there was no claim by the
defendant to be determined -- and is not a decree
as defined by Section 2 (2) of the Code. It stands
on the same footing as a dismissal under Rule 8 of
Order IX which, because the word, "dismissal"
implying a determination on the merits is used by
the Rule, is expressly excluded from the definition
in Section 2 (2) by Clause (b) of the exclusions
therein. It is the provision in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 1
of Order XXIII (like that in Rule 9 of Order IX) and
not any principle of res judicata that precludes the
plaintiff in such a case from bringing a fresh suit
in respect of the same matter. It follows that there
being no decree no appeal lay under Section 96 of
the Code. Reference may be made in this
connection to Kulandai v. Ramaswami, AIR 1928
Mad 416 at p. 418, Saraswati Bala v. Surabala
Dassi, AIR 1957 Cal 57 and Raisa Sultana Begam
v. Abdul Qadir, AIR 1966 All 318 at p. 320."
(emphasis supplied)
In the case of Nathji and another v. Languria and
another (AIR 1925 Allahabad 272), it has been held that where
in the case of an application to withdraw a suit in terms of
Order 23 Rule 1(2) C.P.C., the Court allows the suit to be
withdrawn but refuses permission to bring a fresh suit, the
court’s order is erroneous. It was held that if the trial court
saw no reason for allowing the withdrawal in terms of Order
23 Rule 1(2), the trial court should have refused the
application seeking liberty to file a new suit and it should have
proceeded with the suit on merits.
In view of the above judgments, the position in law is
clear that when the court allows the suit to be withdrawn
without liberty to file a fresh suit, without any adjudication,
such order allowing withdrawal cannot constitute a decree and
it cannot debar the petitioners herein from taking the defence
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in the second round of litigation as held in the impugned
judgment. The above judgments indicate that if the plaintiff
withdraws the suit, the order of the court allowing such
withdrawal does not constitute a decree under Section 2(2) of
Code. That in any event, it will not preclude the petitioners
herein (defendants in second round) from raising the plea that
the sale deed executed by Chelliah Nadar on 26.2.73 in favour
of Thangaraj Nadar was not true and valid. Thus, the civil
appeal needs to be allowed.