Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11
PETITIONER:
MUNSHI SINGH & OTHERS ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1972
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
HEGDE, K.S.
PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 1150 1973 SCR (1) 973
1973 SCC (2) 337
ACT:
Land Acquisition Act, 1894-s. 5A-No opportunity was
available to the appellant to file objection u/s. 5-A in
absence of definite scheme and the public purpose for which
the land was required was vague and indefinite-Whether the
acquisition proceedings bad in law.
HEADNOTE:
Under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act,
1958, a notification was issued by the U.P. Government,
declaring Ghaziabad a regulated area under S. 3 of the said
Act. On July 16, 1960 a notification under S. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, was issued by the State Government
declaring its intention to acquire land measuring about
34,000 acres for planned development of the area. On
December 23, 1961, a notification was issued under Sections
6 and 17 of the Acquisition Act in respect of an area of
19.75 acres. This was followed by other notifications and
on February 9, 1962, by another notification under S. 4 was
issued by modifying the earlier notification dated July 16,
1960, By this notification, the said 34000 acres was reduced
to 6158 acres.
On July 4, 1962, the appellant made an application to the
Land Acquisition Officer, for supplying a copy of the scheme
in order to file objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition
Act. The Land Acquisition Officer however, ordered that no
such schemes of the planned development was available in his
office. On September 4, 1962, the State Government
sanctioned the Master Plan of Ghaziabad under the Regulation
Act. Thereafter, the appellants filed a writ petition in
the High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid
notification. A batch of 39 writ petitions, including the
appellants were allowed by the High Court and the
notifications under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act were quashed
by the High Court on the ground of invalidity of piecemeal
notifications. On February 9, 1966, this Court decided in
State of Madhya Pradesh and others v., Bishnu Prashad & Ors.
[1966] 3 S.C.R. 557, that piecemeal and successive
notifications was not permissible.
On February 20, 1967, the President of India promulgated the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11
this Ordinance was challenged in the High Court by the
appellant. Thereafter, an Act was passed on the same lines
as, the Ordinance. The provision of the Act were also
challenged before the High Court by necessary amendments in
the writ petitions. This Court in Udairam Sharma & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 41, upheld the
validity of the. Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1967.
Thereafter, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions of
the appellants.
The counsel for the appellants confined his arguments mainly
to one, question. namely that no proper, reasonable, or
effective opportunity was available to the appellant to file
by objection under S. 5-A of the Acquisition Act, inasmuch
as the notification gave no indication that different pieces
of land would be acquired for different authorities in
different circumstances and for different purposes.
Further, the appellant did not get a reasonable opportunity
of objecting under s. 5-A since the purpose shown was
extremely vague and there was no definite
974
scheme before the State Government at the material time to
show bow the land would be developed and to what use it will
be put. It was pointed out that different notifications
published under S. 6 of the Acquisition Act from time to
time clearly indicated that the State Government did not
have any specific scheme of development at the time the
notification under S. 4 was published. It was pointed out
that the whole object of s. 5-A would be defeated if the
public purpose was stated vaguely and without any indication
of the nature or the purpose for which the land is being or
is intended to be acquired.
Allowing the appeal,
HELD : (i) The Acquisition Act was enacted to amend the law
for the acquisition of land for public purpose and for
Companies. The expression "Public Purpose" was defined by
S. 3-F. The expression "Public Purpose" includes provision
for or in connection with the laying out of village sites,
townships or the extension of planned development or im-
provement of existing village sites or townships. S. 5-A
provides that any person interested in any land which has
been notified under S, 4. Sub-Section (1) as being needed
for a public purpose, may object to the acquisition within
30 days after the issue of the notification. Every ob-
jection under Sub-Section (1) shall be made to the Collector
in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an
opportunity of being heard. The Collector after hearing all
such objections, may make a report to the appropriate
Government. The decision of the appropriate government on
the objection shall be final.- [981F]
It is apparent from Sub-Section (2) of S. 4 that the public
purpose which has to be stated in Sub-Section (1) of S. 4
has to be particularised because, unless that is done, the
various matters which were mentioned in Sub-Section (2)
cannot be carried out. If the public purpose stated in S.
4(1) is planned development, without anything more, it is
extremely difficult to comprehend how all the matters set
out in Sub-Section (2) can be carried out by the officer
concerned. [981C]
(ii) S. 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle
that a person who is deprived of his property, is given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. The right to file
objection under S. 5-A is a substantial right when a
person’s property is being threatened with acquisition, and
that right cannot be taken away as if by sidewind. [981D]
Nandeshwar Prasad & Anr. v. The State of U.P. & Ors., [1964]
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11
3 S.C.R. 440.
In the present case, the notification under S. 4 all that
was stated was that the land was required for planned
development ’of the area. There was no indication
whatsoever, whether the development was to be of residential
and building sites, or commercial and industrial class, nor
was it possible for any one to find out that kind of planned
development was under contemplation. If the Master Plan
which came to be sanctioned in September 4, 1962, was
available for inspection, the position may have been
different. The words that were found in the notification,
"planned development of the area" were wholly insufficient
and conveyed no idea as to the specific purpose for which
the lands were to be utilised. [982B]
(iii) The Acquisition Act did not originally provide for
filing or hearing of objections to the proposed
acquisition., It was only by the Amending Act of 1923 that
S. 5-A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Upto that time,
the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were
wholly irrelevant. But after the insertion of S. 5-A the
position has completely changed, and it cannot be said that
the owner’s wishes are
975
not relevant and he does not need an opportunity to file his
objections. A person whose land is likely to be acquired
must have an opportunity to submit his objections and that
he can do only if the notification tinder S. 4(1), while
mentioning the public purpose, gives some definite indica-
tion or particulars of the said purpose which would enable
the persons concerned to object effectively, if so desired.
In the absence of such specific or particular purpose, the
objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under
S. 5-A which he has a right to do under that provision. In
the present case, owing to the vaguness and indefiniteness
of the public purpose stated in the notifications under S.
4(1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants
were either aware of or were shown this scheme or Master
Plan in respect of the, planned development of the area in
question, the appellants were wholly unable to object
effectively and exercise their right under S. 5-A of the
Acquisition Act. [983E]
Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Ars. [1961] 1
S.C.R. 128, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 2356 of
1968.
Appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution
of India from the judgment and order dated March 26, 1968 of
the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ No. 662 of 1971 and
Civil Appeals Nos. 1139, 1475 and 1476 of 1971.
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated
April 2, 1968 of the High-Court at Allahabad in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 3671, 3670 and 3669 of 1967 respectively andCivil
Appeals Nos. 1140,and 1785 of 1971
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated
April 2, 1968 of the High Court of Allahabad in
Civil Misc.Writ Nos. 3667 and 3668 of 1967 respectively and
Civil Appeal No. 1888 of 1970
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated
March 26, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 465 of 1967.
K.R. Chowdhry, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 2356 of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11
1968).
G.L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1 (in
C.A. No. 2356/68) and G. N. Dikshit, M. V. Goswami and O. P.
Rana, for the State of U.P., Collector of Meerut & Special
Land Acquisition Officer, Meerut (in all the appeals).
0.P. Rana, for the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad (in all
the appeals).
U.P. Singh and Shiv Pujan Singh, for the appellant in
C.A. Nos. 1139, 1140 and 1785 of 1971).
976
L.M. Singhvi, P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants (in C.
A. Nos. 1475 and 1476 of 1971).
L.M. Singhvi, U. P. Singh and S. C. Dingra, for the
appellant (in C.A. No. 1888 of 1970).
A.K. Sen, G. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for respondent
No. 4 (in C.A. No. 1888/70).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. These appeals from the decision of the Allahabad
High Court involve a common point and shall stand disposed
of by this judgment.
It is necessary to state the facts only in C.A.1888 of 1970.
The U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act 1958
received the assent of the President on October 8, 1958. On
December 10, 1958 a notification was issued by the U.P.
Government declaring Ghaziabad a regulated area under S. 3
of the aforesaid Act. In February 1959 the Controlling
Authority under S. 4 of the Regulation Act was constituted.
On July 16, 1960 a notification was issued under S. 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act by the State Government declaring its
intention to acquire land measuring about 34,000 acres in
fifty villages of Ghaziabad for planned development of the
area. On December 23, 1961 a notification was issued under
ss. 6 and 17 of the Acquisition Act in respect of an area of
19.75 acres. This was followed by successive piecemeal
notifications on various dates in 1962 and 1963. On Feb-
ruary 9, 1962 another notification was issued under S. 4 of
the Acquisition Act modifying the earlier notification dated
July 16, 1960. By this notification the proposed area from
34,000 acres was reduced to 6158 acres. On July 4, 1962 the
appellants made an application to the Special Land
Acquisition Officer Ghaziabad for supplying a copy of the
scheme of the planned development for which notification
under S. 4 had been issued to enable them to make
representations at the hearing of the objections filed under
S. 5A of the Acquisition Act. It was mentioned inter alia
in that application that the Government had not published
the scheme of the planned development and without a copy of
the scheme for which the notification had been published "no
forceful arguments could be submitted". The Special Land
Acquisition Officer made the following order on that
application :
"The scheme of the planned development is not
necessary for a notification under S. 4 of the
Act, as such, no such scheme of the planned
development is available in this office."
On September, 4, 1962 the State Government sanctioned the
Master Plan of Ghaziabad under the Regulation Act. On Sept-
ember 27, 1962 a writ petition was filed by the appellants
in the
977
High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid
notifications. Several other writ petitions were also filed
by other petitioners. On December 10, 1965 a batch of 39
writ petitions including the appellants’ petition were
allowed by the, High Court and the notifications under s. 6
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11
of the Acquisitions Act were quashed on the ground of
invalidity of piecemeal notifications. Another batch of
writ petitions Was similarly allowed quashing the
notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisition Act on the same
ground. On February 9, 1966 this court decided in State of
Madhya Pradesh & Others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Others(1)
that piecemeal and Successive notifications under s. 6 of
the Acquisition Act was not permissible. On February 20,
1967 the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition
(Amendment & Validation) Ordinance No. 1 of 1967. The
validity of this Ordinance apart from the legality of the
notifications issued was challenged in the High, Court by
the appellants in February 1967. In April 1967 an Act was
passed on the same lines as the Ordinance. The provisions
of the Act were also challenged before the High Court by
necessary amendment in the writ petitions filed by the
appellants. This Court in Udai Ram Sharma A Othrs etc. v.
Union of India & Others(2) upheld the validity of the
Acquisition Amending Act of 1967. On March 26, 1968 the
High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellants.
In view of the judgment of this Court the High Court
repelled the contentions of the appellants impugning the
validity of the Acquisition Amendment Act 1967. Another
point which was agitated before the High Court was that the
notification under s. 4 was too vague and afforded no
adequate basis for the lodging of objection under s. 5A of
the Acquisition Act. Certain other points were also raised
which need not be mentioned. The High Court observed that
all these points had been urged in the writ petition No. 55
of 1963 which had been heard along with any other writ
-petitions by the Division Bench which, by its judgment
dated December 24, 1965, had negatived them. For the
reasons mentioned in that judgment these contention were
also repelled.
Dr. L. M. Singhvi sought to raise a number of points before
us but ultimately he confined his arguments mainly to one
question. Reference has been made to the notification dated
July 14 1960 issued under s. 4 as also to subsequent
notification dated February 9, 1962 amending the earlier
notification. The earlier notification to the extent it is
material is as follows :-
"In pursuance of the provisions of under (?)
sub-s. (1) of section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894), the
Governor of U.P. is pleased
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.
L172Sup CI/73
(2) [1968] 3 S.C. R. 41.
978
to notify for general information that the
land mentioned in the schedule is likely to he
needed for a public purpose.
2.Under Section 5-A of the said Act, any
person interested in the land may, within
thirty days after the issue of this
notification, make an objection to the acqui-
sition of the land for any land in the
locality in writing to the Collector, Meerut.
For what purpose : For planned development of
the area.
Note :-A plan of the land may be inspected in
the office of Collector, Meerut."
In the writ petition a specific plea was taken in paras 3 5
(b) and 36 that no proper, reasonable or effective
opportunity was available to the appellants to file any
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11
objections under s. 5A of the Acquisition Act inasmuch as
the notification gave no indication that different pieces of
land would be acquired for different authorities in
different circumstances and for different purposes. Accord-
ing to para 36 the appellants did not get any effective or
reasonable opportunity of objecting under s. 5A of the
Acquisition Act inasmuch as the purpose shown was extremely
vague and there was no definite scheme before the State
Government at the material time to show how the land would
be developed and to what use it would be put. Para 33 of
the petition may also be noticed. It is stated therein that
different notifications published under S. 6 of the
Acquisition Act from time to time clearly indicated that the
State Government did not have any specific scheme of deve-
lopment at the time the notification under s. 4 was
published, nor had it any idea as to whether the land would
be utilized by it or would be utilized for the purposes of
U.P. State Industrial Corporation or the Improvement Trust,
Ghaziabad. In the return which was filed Para 9
contained the reply to Para 33 and this is what was stated:
" That the allegations made in paragraph 33 of
the petition are denied. The scheme for the
planned development of the area was there when
the notification under section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act was issued although the scheme
at that stage had not been finalised in the
details".
No reply is to be found in the return to paragraphs 35(b)
and 36 of the writ petition. We may also refer to paragraph
14 of the petition in which the order of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer was reproduced in respect of the
applications filed by the
979
appellants for supplying the copy of the scheme of the
planned development. It is noteworthy that in the return
nothing was said about this order.
Dr. Singhvi has based his argument on the above significant
facts. According to him the words in the notification,
namely, "for planned development of the area" gave no
indication whatsoever as to the precise purposes for which
the land was required Planned development could be of
various kinds. It could be for residential, industrial or
some similar purpose. Moreover for development of a
particular area the Government may acquire the land itself
and develop it or it may control the development of that
area by making a scheme or a Master Plan. It is urged that
the scheme of the Acquisition Act shows that public purpose
for which the land is needed or is likely to be needed
should be stated with sufficient particularity and in such a
manner that a land owner should be able to file an objection
under s. 5A. The whole object of s., 5A would be defeated
if the public purpose is stated vaguely and without any
indication of the nature of the purpose for which the land
is being or is intended to be acquired.
It is necessary to examine the scheme of the Acquisition
Act. This Act was enacted to amend the law for the
acquisition of land for public purpose and for companies.
The expression "public purpose" is defined by s. 3(f). By
the Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment) Act 1954 s. 3 was
amended and for clause (f) in the Central Act the following
clause was substituted
"(f) the expression "public purpose" includes
provision for or in connection with--
(i)..............................
(ii)the laying out of village sites,
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11
townships or the extension, planned
development or improvement of existing village
sites or townships;
(iii)..............................
Section 4(1) provides for a notification to be issued and
public notice of the same to be Riven whenever it appears to
the appropriate Government that land in any locality is
needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose.
Sub-s. (2) is in these terms :
"4 (2) "Thereupon it shall be lawful for any
officer, either generally or specially
authorised by such Government in this behalf,
and for his servants and workmen,-
to enter upon and survey and take levels of
any land in such locality;
980
to dig or bore into the sub-soil; to do all
other acts necessary to ascertain whether the
land is adopted for such purpose; to set out
the boundaries of the land proposed to
be taken and the intended line of the work (if
any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by
placing marks and cutting trenches; and, where
otherwise the survey cannot be completed and
the levels taken and the boundaries and line
marked, to cut down and clear away any part of
any standing crop, fence or jungle
Provided that............................
Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 5A being material for
purposes of the present appeal may be set out in extenso :
(1) "Any person interested in any land which
has been
notified under section 4, sub-s. (1), as being
needed or likely to be needed for a public
purpose or for a Company may, within thirty
days after the issue of the notification,
object to the acquisition of the land or of
any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under subsection (1)
shall be made to the Collector in writing, and
the Collector shall give the objector an
opportunity of being heard either in person or
by pleader and shall, after hearing all such
objections and after making such further
enquiry, if any, as he‘ thinks necessary
either make a report in respect of the land
which has been notified under section 4, sub-
section (1) or make different reports in
respect of different parcels of such land to
the appropriate, Government containing his
recommendations on the objections, together
with the record of the proceedings held by
him, for the decision of that Government. The
decision of the appropriate Government on the
objection shall be final".
Section 6(1) says, inter alia, that when the appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report made
under s. 5A(2) that any particular land is needed for a
public purpose or for company a declaration shall be made to
that effect by the authority mentioned therein. According
to sub-s. (3) such a declaration shall be conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for
a company as the case may be. After the
981
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11
declaration under s. 6 the Collector has to take orders for
acquisition under s. 7 Section 8 provides for land to be
marked out, measured and planned and s. 9 for notices to
persons interested. Section II deals with inquiry into
measurements, value and claims and the award by the
Collector. It is not necessary to refer to any other
provision.
It is apparent from sub-s.(2) that the public purpose which
has to be stated in sub-s. (1) of s. 4 has to be
particularised because unless that is done the various
matters which are mentioned in sub-s.(2) cannot be carried
out; for instance, the officer concerned or his servants and
workmen cannot de any act necessary to certain whether it is
suitable for the purpose for, which it is being acquired.
If the public purpose stated in s. 4(1) is planned
development of the area without anything more it is
extremely difficult to comprehend how all the matters set
out in sub-s. (2) can be carried out by the officer
specially authorised in this behalf and by his servants and
workmen.
Section 5A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that
a person whose property is being or is intended to be
acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of
persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the
property belonging to that person should not be made. We
may refer to the observation of this Court in Nandeshwar
Prasad & Anr. v. The State of U.P. & Others(1) that the
right to file objections under s. 5A is a substantial right
when a person’s property is being threatened with
acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a
side wind. Sub-section (2) of s. 5A makes it obligatory on
the Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being
heard. After hearing all objections and making further
inquiry he is to make a report to the appropriate Government
containing his recommendation on the objections. The
decision of the appropriate Government on the objections is
then final. The declaration under s. 6 has to be made after
the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration
of the report, if any, made by the Collector under s. 5A(2).
The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for
the persons interested to file objections against the
proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their
objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special
powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to
dispense with the provisions of s. 5A: (See s. 17 (4) of the
Acquisition Act).
As already noticed in the notifications under s. 4 all that
was stated was that the land was required for "planned
development of the area". There was no indication
whatsoever whether the
(1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 440.
982
development was to be of residential and building sites or
of commercial and industrial plots nor was it possible for
any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find
out what kind of planned development was under contemplation
i.e. whether the land would be acquired and the development
made by the Government or whether the owners of properties
would be required to develop a particular area in a
specified way. If the Master Plan which came to be
sanctioned on September 4, 1962 had been available for
inspection by the persons interested in filing objections or
even if the knowledge of its existence on the part of the
appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position may
have been different. In that situation the appellants could
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11
not claim that they were unable to file objections owing to
the lack of any indication in the notification under s. 4 of
the nature of development for which the area was being
requisitioned. On behalf of the State it has been pointed
out that the appellants had themselves filed a copy of the
Master Plan which was sanctioned on September 4, 1962 and
that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Master
Plan was under preparation. The details relating to the
Master Plan and the Plan itself had been published in the
local newspapers and the appellants could have easily dis-
covered what the proposed scheme was with regard to the
development of the area in which they were interested. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an
opportunity to the State to apply for amendment of its
return since nothing had been said about these matters
therein and to produce additional evidence in support of its
allegations. Such a petition was filed and certain
documents were sought to be placed on the record. After a
careful consideration of the petition for amendment and the
evidence sought to be adduced we dismissed the prayer for
amendment as well as for production of additional evidence
as we were not satisfied that the documents sought to be
produced were either relevant or were required to enable
this Court to pronounce judgment.
Learned counsel for the State next contended that the
proposed acquisition was in pursuance of the activity under
the Regulation Act. Moreover planned development is one of
the public purposes as defined in s. 3 (f) as amended by the
U.P. Amending Act 1954. Mere-mention of such a public
purpose was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of law.
Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in
Arnold Rodricks & Another v. State of Maharashtra(1) in
which in the notification under s. 4 it was stated that the
land was needed "for a public purpose, viz, for development
and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and
residential area". It was said that the purpose specified
was a public purpose within the Acquisition Act, The points
which arose for
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885.
983
determination in that case were entirely different. At any
rate, the public purpose was stated with sufficient
particularity, namely, for development and utilisation of
the land as an industrial and residential area. Once it was
stated that the land will be utilised for the aforesaid
purpose the persons interested could certainly object
effectively. But tile mere words, as are to be found in the
notifications here "planned development of the area" were
wholly insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the specific
purpose for which the lands were to be utilised. It must be
remembered that the Acquisition Act is silent as to the
nature of objections that could be raised. In some of the,
States executing instructions have been issued or rules have
been framed which indicate the classes of objections which
are contemplated. In Madras the classes of objections that
the Collectors inquiry should specifically deal with are the
following:
(a) that the purpose for which the land is
acquired is not a public purpose;
(b) that the land notified is not the best
adapted to the purpose intended or that its
area is greater than is actually required for
the purpose, and
(c) that the acquisition of the land or any
land in the locality is not desirable or
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11
expedient.
In Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Others(1) it
was stated in the notification under S. 4(1) that the land
was likely to be needed for purposes of a. company which was
named. A challenge was made against the validity of that
notification on the ground that it was not stated that the
land was-required for a public purpose. It was laid down
that where the land was required for a company the
requirement of the law would be sufficiently met if the
appropriate Government was satisfied on a report under s.
5A(2) or by an inquiry under s. 40 that the purpose of the
acquisition was the same as contemplated by s. 40 of the
Act. This Court said that the purpose of the notification
under s. 4 was to carry out a preliminary investigation with
a view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of
levels and, if necessary, digging or boring into sub-soil
whether the land was adapted for the purposes for which it
was sought to be acquired. It was only under s. 6 that a
firm declaration had to be made by the Government that land
with proper description and area was needed for a public
purpose or a company. Hence it was not correct to say that
any defect in the notification under, s. 4 was fatal to the
validity of the proceedings particularly when the
acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to
the suggestion on behalf of the State that the observations
made
(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128.
984
in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present
cases. The question which we are called upon to decide is
of an entirely different nature. It relates to the
notification under s. 4 in the light of s. 5A with a view to
giving full effect to that section and not simply wiping it
out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did
not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections
to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending
Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that
s. 5A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time
the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were
wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of s. 5A the
position has completely change and it cannot be said that
the owner’s wishes are not relevant and that he does not
need an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a
view would render s. 5A otios. If it has any purpose and if
it has to be given its full effect the person interested in
the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to
submit his objections and that he can do only if the
notification under s. 4(1) while mentioning the public pur-
pose gives some definite indication or particulars of the
said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to
object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such
specific or particular purpose being stated the objector
cannot file any proper or cogent objections under s. 5A
which he has a right to do under that provision. We would
accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and
indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the
notifications under s. 4(1) and in the absence of any proof
that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the
scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned
development of the area in question the appellants were
wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right
under s. 5A of the Acquisition Act.
For the reasons given above these appeals must succeed and
are hereby allowed. The entire acquisition proceedings in
respect of the lands of the appellants in all the appeals
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11
are, hereby quashed. In matters of this nature we would
have taken due notice of laches on the part of the
appellants while granting the above relief but we are
satisfied that so far as the present appellants are
concerned they have not been guilty of laches, delay or
acquiescence at any stage. The appellants shall be entitled
to costs in this Court. C.M. Petition No. 6852 of 1971 is
disposed of by observing that it will be open to the partly
to file a suit for damages, if any, if so desired.
S.C. Appeals allowed.
985