REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6561 OF 2004
M/S. ESCORTS LTD. …APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL
EXCISE, FARIDABAD ...RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.457 OF 2006
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9469-9470 OF 2010
JUDGMENT
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
C.A. NO.6561 OF 2004
1. The present case raises an interesting question as to
whether excise duty is payable on an intermediate product,
namely, Transmission Assembly which comes into existence
during the manufacture of tractors made by the appellant. The
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Page 1
period involved is January 1996 to May 1998. The tractors that
are manufactured have engines that are below 1800 CC and
are covered by an exemption notification 162/1986. We are
and even tractors of an engine capacity of less than 1800 CC
now have to bear excise duty.
2. By a show cause notice dated 31.1.2001, the Department
for the period aforesaid relied upon evidence in the form of
statements made by various officers of the appellant and other
documentary evidence to show that Transmission Assemblies
of tractors was a commodity known to the market as such and,
therefore, came into the category of excisable goods. The
respondent by their reply dated 1.10.2001 denied this stating
JUDGMENT
that no separate product known as Transmission Assemblies
came into existence which is known to the commercial
community as such and, therefore, there was neither
manufacture nor marketability of the same. In the reply,
however, various statements were made which, in fact, amount
to admissions, that Transmission Assembly of a tractor is, in
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fact, known to the market as such. These admissions are set
out hereinbelow:
| erchangea<br>e used in | ble. Th<br>both dut |
|---|
47.1. The department has relied upon the
case of M/s International Tractors Ltd., Hoshiarpur
who are supplying transmission assemblies.
(a) The Notice contends that M/s. Mahindra
& Mahindra have not purchased any transmission
assemblies for use in tractors from any other unit.
Further, they have not supplied or transferred any
transmission assemblies to any other person.
However, they have been supplying the
transmission assembly to their own units at Nagpur
and Rudhrapur for manufacturing tractors.
JUDGMENT
(b) It is submitted that this letter can at most
lead to a conclusion that the transmission assembly
made by M & M is marketable.
50. The show cause notice has placed reliance on
certain other web site to contend that the Hoovers
on-line web site and Carraro web site shows that
transmission assemblies are marketed and sold. It
is submitted that while there might be mass
production of transmission assemblies marketed by
Hoovers Carraro, etc., the product specific
transmission assemblies of the noticees never
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3. The Commissioner by an order dated 4.10.2002 held as
follows:-
“41. I find that the issue has been well examined in
the notice. Noticee's plea that the impugned
transmission assemblies are not goods as
transmission assemblies do not have independent
existence is without merit. Noticee in fact itself
clears such goods on payment of duty to ECEL,
Transmission assemblies are well known in the
commercial world and are very much dealt with as a
commercial commodity. The end use as put forth in
the notice amply proves it. To reiterate transmission
assemblies are cleared by the noticee to ECEL;
noticee company's sister concern (Farmtrac
Division) imported transmission assemblies from
Carraro Spa of Italy and also purchased
transmission assemblies from Carraro India Limited,
Pune; M/s TAFE, Chennai, International Tractors
Ltd., Hoshiarpur, Mahindra & Mahindra all deal in
transmission assemblies and further information
regarding transmission assembly availability as
such is also available on internet.
JUDGMENT
42. Noticee's submission that no identifiable
transmission assembly emerges in their production
of Tractors is also incorrect. They are manufacturing
transmission assemblies for their tractors as well as
for ECEL. Of course transmission assemblies
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| semblies<br>nts of Sh | do emerg<br>. K.K. Ka |
|---|
JUDGMENT
43. I also find that the noticee in their reply has laid
great emphasis on their argument that their tractors
are manufactured as a result of integrated
manufacturing process on the assembly line and
therefore there is no removal of intermediate goods,
if any, in terms of Rule 9 or Rule 49. I have to
reiterate that noticee's plea is inadmissible. In terms
of Rule 9 and 49, intermediate goods emerging
during such integrated assembly line production
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| mbly i.e<br>either m | . variou<br>anufactu |
|---|
JUDGMENT
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4. By the impugned judgment dated 27.5.2004, CESTAT
dismissed the appeal holding:
| Central E<br>ured in In | xcise dut<br>dia. "Man |
|---|
The Supreme Court, after referring to various
judgments on the concept of the manufacture, has
laid down a two fold test for deciding whether the
process is that of "manufacture" in Union of India
vs. J. G. Glass, 1998 (97) ELT 5(S.C.) as follows,
"First, whether by the said process a different
commercial commodity comes into existence or
whether the identity of the original commodity
ceases to exist; secondly, whether the commodity
which was already in existence will serve no
purpose but for the said purpose.” We find that this
two fold tests laid down by the Supreme Court is
satisfied in respect of the transmission assembly
coming into existence during the course of
manufacture of tractors by the Appellants. After
assembly of various parts and components a new
and different article known as transmission
assembly emerges having a distinctive name,
character and use and but for the manipulation
undertaken by the Appellants, the parts and
components would not have served the purpose
which a transmission assembly performs. The
impugned product is also marketable as the learned
Senior Departmental Representative has mentioned
the fact of its being imported by the Appellants
themselves (Farmtrac Division); the clearance of the
JUDGMENT
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| that the i<br>g brought | mpugned<br>to the |
|---|
5. Shri Lakshmikumaran, learned advocate for the appellant
argued that the tractors manufactured by the appellant (having
JUDGMENT
engines of a capacity of less than 1800 CC) had no such thing
as a Transmission Assembly. The so-called Transmission
Assembly was only an aggregate of various items which
connected the engine of the tractor with its wheels. Further, the
so-called Transmission Assembly was specifically designed for
the appellant’s tractor and was not saleable in the market. Also,
not a single instance of sale in the market had ever taken place.
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In fact, the so-called Transmission Assembly was not something
which came into existence at all but was part of a continuous
process on the assembly line in the appellant’s factory of
existence. He further submitted that post 1.6.1998 in any case,
the appellant had been paying 8% under Rule 57 CC on the
value of the said Transmission Assembly as required. It is only
for the period upto August 1996 that would be in dispute. Even
for this period, he contends that ultimately the figures would
show that it was revenue neutral in that MODVAT credit
reversed for this period would amount to 1.71 crores, the duty
demand being approximately 2.43 crores out of a total of 9.66
crores for this period of 8 months. He also argued that the duty
JUDGMENT
demand was absurd in that the Transmission Assembly of TAFE
which is said to be the same as that of the petitioner’s was only
13,000 rupees per piece as opposed to the highly inflated figure
of Rs.53,790/-. If the figure of Rs.13,000/- is to be taken, it is
clear that the reversal of MODVAT credit would amount to much
more than the duty demand itself. He further argued that in any
case since there was no fraud or willful suppression of facts,
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invoking the extended period of limitation was not in order and
that in any case the show cause notice being beyond one year
of the stated period would have to be quashed on this ground
alone.
6. Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel for the
revenue contended that the Transmission Assembly was very
much excisable goods known to the market as such from the
statements of the appellants themselves. Further, the revenue
had discharged its burden by oral and documentary evidence
which showed beyond doubt that Transmission Assembly of
tractors were excisable goods in that a new commodity came
into existence known to the market as such. It is completely
irrelevant that no sale actually took place of any such
JUDGMENT
Transmission Assembly. It is enough to show that the said
goods were capable of being sold which, undoubtedly, they
were. He very fairly stated that on valuation, if necessary, the
matter could be remanded. He also stated that the extended
period of limitation was available in the present case as the
appellants on their own showing knew that the intermediate
product of Transmission Assemblies was marketable as such
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and had suppressed this fact while claiming exemption of
excise duty on the finished product, namely, the tractor.
th
List I of the 7 Schedule of the Constitution of India reads as
follows:
“SEVENTH SCHEDULE
[Article 246]
List I — Union List
84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods
manufactured or produced in India except—
(a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs
and narcotics,
but including medicinal and toilet preparations
containing alcohol or any substance included in
sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.”
JUDGMENT
7. It is clear on a reading of this Entry that a duty of excise is
only leviable on “goods” manufactured or produced in India.
“Goods” has been defined under Article 366 (12) as follows:
| “ | 366. | Definitions | .—In this Constitution, unless the |
|---|
| context otherwise requires, the following | | | |
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| expressions have the meanings hereby respectively | |
|---|
| assigned to them, that is to say— | |
| (12) “goods” includes all materials, commodities and | |
| articles;” | |
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as follows:-
“Materials” – the matter of which a thing is or may be made; the
constituent parts of something.
“Commodities” – a thing of use or value; a thing that is an
object of trade; a thing one deals in or makes use of.
“Articles” - a particular item of business.
9. Although the definition of “goods” is an inclusive one, it is
JUDGMENT
clear that materials, commodities and articles spoken of in the
definition take colour from one another. In order to be “goods” it
is clear that they should be known to the market as materials,
commodities and articles that are capable of being sold.
10. In the basic judgment which has been referred to in every
excise case for conceptual clarity, namely, Union of India v.
Delhi Cloth. & General Mills Co. Ltd. , 1963 Suppl. 1 SCR
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586, this Court held that for excise duty to be chargeable under
the constitutional entry read with Section 3 of the Central
Excise and Salt Act, two pre-requisites are necessary. First,
bringing into existence of a new substance. And secondly, the
word “goods” necessarily means that such manufacture must
| a new substance kno<br>the concept of marke<br>ge number of judgm<br>arketability in this co | |
|---|
| Collector | of Central |
| this Court referred t | |
JUDGMENT
and General Mills. It then referred to South Bihar Sugar Mills
Limited V. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 21, in which kiln gas
which was a mixture of gases generated during a process of
burning limestone with coke in a lime kiln was held not to be a
marketable commodity. Since it was a mixture of gases and not
only carbon dioxide, it was clear that it was not known to the
market as such. Carbon dioxide was only a component of kiln
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gas, the content of which ranged from 27 to 36.5%. The Court
also referred to the decision in Union Carbide India Limited v.
the Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 547, in which aluminum cans
capable of sale to a consumer in their crude and unfinished
form. To be made saleable, such cans would have to undergo
various processes such as, trimming, threading and re-drawing.
The Court also referred to Bhor Industries Ltd. v. Collector of
Central Excise, Bombay, (1989) 1 SCC 602. In that case, it
was held that crude PVC films manufactured as an intermediate
product and used in captive consumption of other goods was
not marketable, not being known to the market as such. The
Court also referred to CCE v. Ambalal Sarabhai, (1989) 4 SCC
JUDGMENT
112 in which an intermediate product, namely, starch
hydrolysate was not marketable in that it was highly unstable
and fragmented quickly losing its character in a couple of days.
After referring to all these judgments, the Court held:
“10. It would be evident from the facts and ratio of
the above decisions that the goods in each case
were found to be not marketable. Whether it is
refined oil (non-deodorised) concerned in Delhi
Cloth and General Mills [1963 Supp 1 SCR 586 :
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| 382] or | hydrolys |
|---|
| ) 4 SCC 1 | 12 : 1989 |
JUDGMENT
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11. In Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise,
Calcutta & Ors. , (1994) 6 SCC 610, this Court held:-
| “10. We are of the view that the provisions of the Act<br>mandate that a finding that the goods are<br>marketable is a prerequisite or sine qua non for the<br>levy of duty. Section 3 of the Act is the charging<br>section: | | |
|---|
| “3. Duties, specified in the Schedule to the Central<br>Excise Tariff Act, 1985 to be levied.— There shall be<br>levied and collected in such manner as may be<br>prescribed duties of excise on all excisable<br>goods other than salt which are produced or<br>manufactured in India and a duty on salt<br>manufactured in, or imported by land into, any part<br>of India as, and at the rates, set forth in the<br>Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 ….” | | |
| Section 2(d) defines “exc<br>quoted the definition in<br>‘goods’ is not defined in th | isable goods”. We have<br>para 5 supra. The word<br>e Act. | |
| 11. After adverting to the aforesaid definition of<br>“excisable goods” and the meaning of the word<br>‘goods’, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court<br>JUDGMENT<br>in Union of India v.Delhi Cloth and General<br>Mills [AIR 1963 SC 791 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 586]<br>stated in paragraph 17 thus: | | |
| “These definitions make it clear that to become<br>‘goods’ an article must be something which<br>can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and<br>sold.” (emphasis supplied) | | |
| 12. In a series of decisions, this Court has held that<br>‘marketability’ is an essential ingredient, to hold that<br>an article is dutiable or exigible to duty of excise.<br>The important decisions of this Court which have<br>laid down the law on this aspect are the following: | | |
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| (1) Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills<br>Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 791 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR<br>586] (2) South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of<br>India [AIR 1968 SC 922 : (1968) 3 SCR 21] (3) Bhor<br>Industries Ltd. v. CCE [(1989) 1 SCC 602 : 1989<br>SCC (Tax) 98] (4) Hindustan<br>Polymers v. CCE [(1989) 4 SCC 323 : 1990 SCC<br>(Tax) 118 : (1989) 43 ELT 165] (5) CCE v. Ambalal<br>Sarabhai Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1989) 4 SCC 112 :<br>1989 SCC (Tax) 584 : (1989) 43 ELT 214 : JT<br>(1989) 3 SC 341] (6) Union Carbide India<br>Ltd. v. Union of India [(1986) 2 SCC 547 : 1986<br>SCC (Tax) 443 : (1986) 24 ELT 169 : JT 1986 SC<br>453] (7) A.P. State Electricity Board v. CCE [(1994)<br>2 SCC 428 : JT (1994) 1 SC 545] . | |
|---|
| 13. In the latest decision in A.P. State Electricity<br>Board v. CCE, Hyderabad [(1994) 2 SCC 428 : JT<br>(1994) 1 SC 545] , one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy,<br>J.) speaking for the Bench succinctly stated the law<br>thus at pages 549 and 550: | |
| “Marketability is an essential ingredient in order to<br>be dutiable under the Schedule to the Act …. The<br>‘marketability’ is thus essentially a question of fact to<br>be decided in the facts of each case. There can be<br>no generalisation. The fact that the goods are not in<br>JUDGMENT<br>fact marketed is of no relevance. So long as the<br>goods were marketable, they are goods for the<br>purposes of Section 3. It is not also necessary that<br>the goods in question should be generally available<br>in the market. Even if the goods are available from<br>only one source or from a specified market, it<br>makes no difference so long as they are available<br>for purchasers…. The marketability of articles does<br>not depend upon the number of purchasers nor is<br>the market confined to the territorial limits of this<br>country.” | |
| (emphasis supplied) | |
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| r has it e<br>(granules | ntered a<br>)is a “mar |
|---|
12. In Moti Laminates (P) Ltd. v. Collector Central Excise,
JUDGMENT
Ahmadabad , (1995) 3 SCC page 23, this Court held that an
intermediate product, namely, resols, not being marketable
would not be exigible to duty. After referring to several earlier
judgments, this Court held:
“11. Although the duty of excise is on manufacture
or production of the goods, but the entire concept of
bringing out new commodity etc. is linked with
marketability. An article does not become goods in
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common parlance unless by production or
manufacture something new and different is brought
out which can be bought and sold. In Union of
India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. [AIR
1963 SC 791] , a Constitution Bench of this Court
while construing the word ‘goods’ held as under:
“These definitions make it clear that to become
‘goods’ an article must be something which can
ordinarily come to the market to be bought and
sold.”
Therefore, any goods to attract excise duty must
satisfy the test of marketability. The Tariff Schedule
by placing the goods in specific and general
category does not alter the basic character of
leviability. The duty is attracted not because an
article is covered in any of the items or it falls in
residuary category but it must further have been
produced or manufactured and it is capable of being
bought and sold.”
13. A large part of the arguments ranged around the decision
in Union of India (UOI) & Ors. v. Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd.
JUDGMENT
& Anr., 2002 (145) E.L.T. 274. In this judgment the question
that arose for decision was whether the plastic body of electro
mosquito repellent was excisable goods. This Court held:
| “ | 7…..The germane question is whether it has |
|---|
| marketability. The plastic body is being | |
| manufactured to suit the requirements of the EMR | |
| of the respondents and is not available in the | |
| market for being bought and sold. It is not a | |
| standardised item or goods known and generally | |
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| dealt with in the market. It is being manufactured by | |
|---|
| the respondents for its captive consumption. It is not | |
| a product known in the market with any commercial | |
| name. | |
| oted abov<br>marketab | e, the rea<br>le' are di |
|---|
JUDGMENT
14. From this judgment, Shri Lakshmikumaran wished to
emphasise that, as in the said judgment, Transmission
Assemblies were not available in the market for being bought
and sold, they were not excisable goods not being marketable.
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As has correctly been pointed out by Mr. Gupta, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, what was held in
this judgment is that the product should not be known in the
commercially known in the sense of fulfilling the practical test of
being known to persons in the market who buy and sell, the test
is satisfied. The fact that the product is generally not bought or
sold or has no demand in the market is irrelevant. It was held
in the said judgment that the plastic body is not known as a
commercially distinct product in the market and, therefore, if a
manufacturer is asked to replace such body, it would not be
replaceable not being a commercially known product.
15. The facts in the present case show that Transmission
JUDGMENT
Assemblies of tractors are commercially known products as has
been pointed out above. The fact that not a single sale of such
Assembly has been made by the appellants is irrelevant. This
being the case, we are of the view that the Transmission
Assembly of the tractor on the facts before us is clearly an
intermediate product which is a distinct product commercially
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known to the market as such. On this ground therefore, the
appellants are not liable to succeed.
invoked in the present case. In their reply to the show cause
notice, the appellants stated:
“20.2 It is submitted that the noticees have been
manufacturing tractors right from 1965 onwards till
date. The manufacturing process undertaken by the
noticees has been made known to the Department
innumerable number of times. Consequent1y the
proposal to invoke the extended period of limitation
in the present case is incorrect and the same is
liable to be set aside.
20.3 The Noticee points out that just like the
department raised the issue with regard to the IC
engines in the year 1994-95, similarly the
department is raising the issue in regard to the
transmission assembly by the present Show Cause
Notice. Therefore the dept. cannot allege any
suppression or fraud on the part of Noticee.
JUDGMENT
20.4 However, that is not to say that there has been
any contumacious conduct or an intent to evade
duty on the part of the noticees. In regard to the
transmission assemblies which arise on the
assembly line, if they are used in the dutiable
tractors, they would be exempt under Captive
Consumption Exemption Notification No.67/95-CE
dated 16.3.95.
20.5 In regard to transmission assembly going into
the exempted tractor, the department has now
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raised the issue that they are dutiable and there is
no exemption notification for such transmission
assemblies. Further, that the Noticee had not
claimed NIL rate of duty for transmission assemblies
used within the factory for manufacture of tractors.
| ticee su<br>lief that t | bmits th<br>he transm |
|---|
20.7 The Noticees submit that declarations of the
term "Transmission" appearing under Heading
No.87.08 showing that the rate of duty applicable is
15% and the department knowing fully well that
tractors have been manufactured, should have
raised the issue regarding the transmission
assembly at the earliest and not by invoking the
extended period as done in the present Show
Cause Notice. The number of Transmission cleared
on payment of duty to ECEL over the entire period
from Jan.1996 to May, 1998 is very meagre as
compared to the total number of tractors (both
dutiable and exempted) cleared during the period. It
is clear that only one Transmission Assembly is
used in one tractor. Consequently, the Department
knew that duty was not being paid on captively
consumed Transmission Assemblies. Hence,
extended period is not invocable. Thus, the
department was fully aware that the tractors have
been manufactured and a transmission assembly is
made at the intermediate stage. Nothing prevented
the department from raising demands within the
JUDGMENT
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permissible shorter period of limitation under
Section 11A.
| rtained a<br>n assem | bona fide<br>bly forme |
|---|
22. That in fact, the Show Cause Notice itself terms
the issue of manufacture and captive consumption
of transmission assemblies for tractors is the same
as that for I.C. Engines. However, knowing fully well
that Transmission Assembly comes into existence at
the intermediate stage, the department never raised
the issue. This implies that in the present
proceedings, assuming without admitting duty is
payable on the transmission assembly, the same
was not being paid due to a bona fide error. The
same belief was entertained on the part of the
Noticees as well as the Department during the
relevant period that transmission assemblies going
into the exempted tractor do not attract duty.”
JUDGMENT
17. Added to this, the appellants have also clearly stated that
not a single Transmission Assembly has in fact been sold by
them in the market. On these facts, we are of the opinion that
the appellants would fall within the test laid down in two
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judgments of this Court. In Padmini Products v. Collector of
Central Excise, Bangalore , 1989 (43) E.L.T. 195, this Court
held:
| “ | 8. | Shri V. Lakshmi Kumaran, learned counsel for | | | |
|---|
| the appellant drew our attention to the observations | | | | | |
| of this Court in | | | | CCE v | . Chemphar Drugs and |
| Liniments, Hyderabad [(1 | | | | | 989) 2 SCC 127 : 1989 |
| SCC (Tax) 245] where at p. 131 of the report, this | | | | | |
| Court observed that in order to sustain an order of | | | | | |
| the Tribunal beyond a period of six months and up | | | | | |
| to a period of five years in view of the proviso to | | | | | |
| sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act, it had to | | | | | |
| be established that the duty of excise had not been<br>levied or paid or short-levied or short-paid, or | | | | | |
| erroneously refunded by | | | | | reasons of either fraud or |
| collusion or willful missta | | | | | tement or suppression of |
| facts or contravention of a | | | | | ny provision of the Act or |
| Rules made thereunder | | | | | , with intent to evade |
| payment of duty. It was o | | | | | bserved by this Court that |
| something positive other than mere inaction or | | | | | |
| failure on the part of the manufacturer or producer | | | | | |
| of conscious or deliberate withholding of information | | | | | |
| when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required | | | | | |
| JUDGMENT<br>to be established before it is saddled with any | | | | | |
| liability beyond the period of six months. Whether in | | | | | |
| a particular set of facts and circumstances there | | | | | |
| was any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or | | | | | |
| suppression or contravention of any provision of any | | | | | |
| Act, is a question of fact depending upon the facts | | | | | |
| and circumstances of a particular case. | | | | | |
| …… | .As mentioned hereinbefore, mere failure or |
|---|
| negligence on the part of the producer or | |
| manufacturer either not to take out a licence in case | |
| where there was scope for doubt as to whether | |
| licence was required to be taken out or where there | |
| was scope for doubt whether goods were dutiable | |
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or not, would not attract Section 11-A of the Act. In
the facts and circumstances of this case, there were
materials, as indicated to suggest that there was
scope for confusion and the appellant believing that
the goods came within the purview of the concept of
handicrafts and as such were exempt. If there was
scope for such a belief or opinion, then failure either
to take out a licence or to pay duty on that behalf,
when there was no contrary evidence that the
producer or the manufacturer knew these were
excisable or required to be licensed, would not
attract the penal provisions of Section 11-A of the
Act. If the facts are otherwise, then the position
would be different.”
18. Similarly in Continental Foundation Joint Venture
Holding v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh- I , (2007)
10 SCC 337, this Court held:
“14. As far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it
is evident that the intent to evade duty is built into
these very words. So far as misstatement or
suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly
qualified by the word “wilful”, preceding the words
“misstatement or suppression of facts” which means
with intent to evade duty.The next set of words
“contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or
Rules” are again qualified by the immediately
following words “with intent to evade payment of
duty”. Therefore, there cannot be suppression or
misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet
constitute a permissible ground for the purpose of
the proviso to Section 11-A. Misstatement of fact
must be wilful.
JUDGMENT
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| 13. Factual position goes to show that the Revenue<br>relied on the Circulars dated 23-5-1997 and<br>19-12-1997. The Circular dated 6-1-1998 is the one<br>on which the appellant places reliance.<br>Undisputedly, view expressed<br>by CEGAT in Continental Foundation Joint Venture<br>case [Continental Foundation Joint Venture v. CCE,<br>(2002) 150 ELT 216 (Tri-Del)] was held to be not<br>correct in a subsequent larger Bench judgment. It is,<br>therefore, clear that there was scope for<br>entertaining doubt about the view to be taken. The<br>Tribunal apparently has not considered these<br>aspects correctly. Contrary to the factual<br>position, CEGAT has held that no plea was taken<br>about there being no intention to evade payment of<br>duty as the same was to be reimbursed by the<br>buyer. In fact such a plea was clearly taken. The<br>factual scenario clearly goes to show that there was<br>scope for entertaining doubt, and taking a particular<br>stand which rules out application of Section 11-A of<br>the Act. | |
|---|
| 12. The expression “suppression” has been used in<br>the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act accompanied<br>by very strong words as “fraud” or “collusion” and,<br>therefore, has to be construed strictly. Mere<br>omission to give correct information is not<br>JUDGMENT<br>suppression of facts unless it was deliberate to stop<br>(sic evade) the payment of duty. Suppression<br>means failure to disclose full information with the<br>intent to evade payment of duty. When the facts are<br>known to both the parties, omission by one party to | |
| do what he might have done would not render it | |
| suppression. When the Revenue invokes the<br>extended period of limitation under Section 11-A the<br>burden is cast upon it to prove suppression of fact.<br>An incorrect statement cannot be equated with a<br>wilful misstatement. The latter implies making of an<br>incorrect statement with the knowledge that the<br>statement was not correct.” | |
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19. Judged by this test, it is clear that on facts in the present
case there was no suppression on the part of the appellants nor
1965 onwards. There has never been any change in the
manufacturing process. In the year 1994-95, IC engines were
stated by the department to contain Transmission Assemblies,
which were dutiable. On receiving a reply from the appellant,
the department did not levy any excise duty on such
Transmission Assemblies. The show-cause notice itself stated
that the issue of manufacture and captive consumption of
Transmission Assemblies for tractors is the same as that for IC
engines. These facts, coupled with the fact that not a single
JUDGMENT
Transmission Assembly of tractors manufactured by the
appellant had been sold makes it clear that there was no
suppression or any intent to evade excise duty in the present
case. We feel that the show cause notice needs to be quashed
on this ground alone. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and
the judgment dated 27.5.2004 passed by CESTAT is set aside.
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Civil Appeal Nos.9469-9470 of 2010
| imilar fact<br>.5.1998. | s. We a<br>The sho |
|---|
case was issued on 1.5.2002, in which the extended period of
limitation was invoked as follows:-
“M/s. TAFE have filed the declaration under Rule
173B of Central Excise Rules, 1944, during the year
2000-2001, for the manufacture of product viz.,
Transmission Assembly falling under Chapter
Sub-heading No.8708.00, and cleared the said
product on payment of duty under Invoice
No.1120969 dated 21.6.2000. Never before in the
past M/s. TAFE have declared this product along
with other factory finished products for which duty
was paid by them. Hence, necessary verification
was conducted in order to know whether any such
sub-assemblies were manufactured and cleared by
the assessee for use in the exempted tractors.
JUDGMENT
4. M/s. TAFE have manufactured the
sub-assemblies as listed in the Annexure-I and
Annexure-II for the tractors Model No. TAFE 25 and
TAFE 30 inside the factory for captive use in the
production of tractors. The details of process of
manufacture of such sub-assemblies are explained
in Annexure-III. As per Clause (ii) to Notification
No.67/95 dated 16-3-1995 all inputs specified in
column 1 of the Table in the said Notification which
also includes inputs falling under Chapter Heading
87 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, manufactured
in a factory and used within the factory of production
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| Tractors<br>hich are | of engin<br>exempt |
|---|
5. M/s. TAFE have not brought to the notice of
the manufacture of sub-assemblies to the
Department with the intention to evade payment of
excise duty. They have willfully suppressed the fact
of the manufacture of the sub-assemblies from the
knowledge of the Department and cleared the same
without payment of duty for use in the manufacture
of Tractors, which are exempted. It can be seen
from the process of manufacture that the making of
the independent, sub-assemblies are inevitable in
the Tractor build. But, M/s TAFE chose to declare
only the parts constituting these sub-assemblies as
factory finished items and not sub-assembly.
Whether these factory finished items and bought
out, items, when assembled will form a
sub-assembly has not been declared by them. M/s.
TAFE have chosen not to declare the
sub-assemblies willfully in order to evade payment
of duty.”
JUDGMENT
21. In the reply to the show cause notice, the respondents
stated that they had never sold transmission assemblies in the
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market and that their price list does not carry a list price for this
item. The only removal ever made was during the warranty
period of one tractor and this one removal does not justify the
stated that had the respondents known that transmission
assemblies were excisable, they would have claimed exemption
as the finished product was exempt. Further, Transmission
Assembly is only recognized as an Assembly line intermediate
product and not as a product in itself which is separately
identifiable as in the case of other Assemblies such as axel
shaft, engine, gear parts, instrument panels, etc. The
difference in this case is that vide an order dated 30.4.2004 the
authorities found in favour of the respondents on merits holding
JUDGMENT
that there was neither manufacture nor marketability of the
Transmission Assemblies in question. This was confirmed in
appeal by CESTAT by the impugned judgment dated
12.11.2009.
22. In view of what is stated in Civil Appeal No.6561 of 2004,
the part of the order in original and the CESTAT order on merits
have to be set aside. However, for the self-same reasons as
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are contained in Civil Appeal No.6561 of 2004, we hold that the
extended period of limitation is not available as we are satisfied
that the reply extracted above of the respondent shows that the
were not dutiable. In the circumstances, the appeals of the
revenue shall stand dismissed on this ground.
C.A. No.457 of 2006
23. The facts in this appeal are as follows. The period
involved is April, 1996 to May, 1998 and the show cause notice
is dated 1.5.2001. As the impugned judgment in this case by
CESTAT merely follows the Escorts case i.e. Civil Appeal
No.6561 of 2004, we hold that the finding of the authorities on
merits is correct. However, in this case also the extended
JUDGMENT
period of limitation is not available to the revenue.
24. In the order dated 26.12.2001, the Commissioner stated:-
“In the present inquiry which was undertaken by the
proper officer, it was found that the transmission
assembly or chassis assembly which is classifiable
st
under Sub-heading 87.08 of the 1 Schedule to the
Central Excise Act was not declared by the noticee
in the classification list. Therefore, their plea that
they have declared the chassis thereof does not
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| sembly is<br>e failed to | not the c<br>declare |
|---|
The intention to evade duty is clear from the
statement of Shri P.C. Kale dated 12.04.2001 as the
noticee was knowing that duty is required to be paid
on the goods which go into the assembly of the
tractor of engine capacity less than 1800 CC. As
such tractors were exempt from duty during the
relevant period. Knowing this fact very well and not
declaring the transmission assembly or chassis
assembly in the classification declaration and
clearing such transmission assembly/ chassis
assembly without payment of duty without recording
their production in the statutory records and without
filing the RT-12 returns for the production and
clearance of such transmission assembly/ chassis
assembly clearly established that this was done with
an intention to evade payment of duty.”
JUDGMENT
25. We find that in successive declarations made by the
assessee in this case starting from 16.3.1995 the assessee had
declared not merely the tractor but the chassis therefor. The
assessee bonafide believed that the declaration of the chassis
would suffice as according to them Transmission Assemblies
were not taxable goods. The intention to evade duty is
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Page 33
according to the Commissioner made out from a statement
made by Shri P.C. Kale dated 12.4.2001. It is pointed out by
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that in the
P.C. Kale was never in the employment of the appellant during
the relevant period as he joined the appellant only in July, 2000.
Apart from this, it is also pointed out that the appellant is a
public sector company governed by a Board of Directors
consisting of IAS Officers. Be that as it may, we are satisfied
that there was no attempt to evade excise duty and in this case
also the show cause notice being beyond the period of
limitation of one year would have to be quashed on this ground.
On this ground alone, therefore, the impugned judgment dated
JUDGMENT
3.10.2005 is set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
……………………….J.
(A.K. Sikri)
……………………….J.
(R.F. Nariman)
New Delhi;
April 29, 2015.
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