Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 328
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2020
UCO BANK & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SK SHRIVASTAVA … RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 376 OF 2020
UCO BANK & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SK SHRIVASTAVA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. The Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2020 is arising out of the
judgment dated 07.01.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 824 of 2018 by the
Signature Not Verified
High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur (hereinafter ‘High Court’ )
Digitally signed by
Gulshan Kumar Arora
Date: 2026.04.07
16:41:59 IST
Reason:
preferred against the judgment dated 28.09.2018 in WP (S) No.
1620 of 2012, wherein the direction for grant of terminal benefits to
1
Respondent No. 1 was issued. Learned Single Judge was of the view
that after completion of the notice period of three months as
specified in the notice for voluntary retirement or from the date of
stopping to attend the service, the Respondent be treated retired
voluntarily. Since he stood retired prior to institution of the
disciplinary proceedings, therefore, he is entitled to all
consequential benefits as per Rules governing the field. The
Division Bench reaffirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge
inter alia observing that since option of refusal of notice for
voluntary retirement was not exercised by the Appellant-Bank
before the expiry of notice period i.e. 04.01.2011 or even prior to
16.05.2011 i.e. the date since when the employee decided to severe
the master servant relationship, therefore, communication made
subsequently to refuse the request of voluntary retirement cannot
be given retrospective effect to undo an act which was deemed to
have been done.
2. In Civil Appeal No. 376 of 2020, the judgment dated
12.07.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 321 of 2019 is under challenge,
whereby, the judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed in WP (S) No. 5109
2
of 2012 was assailed. Learned Single Judge while allowing the writ
petition opined that the employee stood retired with effect from the
date of severance of master servant relationship i.e. 16.05.2011,
therefore, the chargesheet issued on 05.03.2012 after retirement is
liable to be quashed. In view of the judgment dated 28.09.2018
delivered in WP (S) No. 1620 of 2012 which was affirmed by the
Division Bench, the learned Single Judge quashed the chargesheet
and the consequential order of dismissal along with costs of Rs.
25,000/-.
In the present two appeals filed by the Appellant-bank, the
3.
Respondent herein was the petitioner before High Court. The former
writ petition relates to grant of terminal benefits to him and the
latter relates to challenge to chargesheet and his dismissal from
service. Consequent upon the decision in the previous writ petition,
the latter writ petition was allowed. Since both the appeals have
been filed in relation to the same employee, therefore, both the Civil
Appeals are heard analogously and being decided by this common
judgment.
3
4. The issue pertaining to the voluntary retirement is governed
by the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ Pension Regulation ’) as stood on the
date on which notice for voluntary retirement was submitted by the
Respondent. The service conditions of the employee are governed by
(hereinafter
the UCO Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979
referred to as ‘ Service Regulation ’) applicable for termination or
discontinuation from employment of the Bank. The said Regulation
was later amended on 30.04.2011.
FACTUAL MATRIX
5. The facts unveiling the controversy are that the Respondent
was appointed as Clerk-cum-Godown Keeper in UCO Bank on
10.09.1983 and promoted as an Assistant Manager with effect from
01.01.2000. He was further promoted as Manager w.e.f.
26.04.2007. In July 2010, while working as Branch Manager at
Raipur Branch, some suspicious transactions in the account of
M/s. Bhanu Road Carriers and M/s. Progressive Exim Ltd. came to
the knowledge of the Appellant. Internal correspondence was made
from Head Office to Zonal Office regarding the same. In the
4
meantime, Respondent sent a notice of voluntary retirement on
04.10.2010 to the General Manager, Kolkata. In response, Zonal
Office asked for fresh application under the Pension Regulation. The
Head Office also sought information regarding vigilance, non-
vigilance or court case and an undertaking to the effect that he
would not accept any commercial employment for two years from
the date of acceptance of his voluntary retirement.
6. In the interregnum, the Zonal Office issued a show-cause
notice dated 11.11.2010 and asked explanation regarding alleged
transactions and suspicious entries in the accounts as referred
above. An internal communication between the Head Office and the
Zonal Office dated 11.12.2010 indicates that voluntary retirement of
Respondent was not considered because of proposed changes in
Pension Regulation, therefore, the Respondent was advised to
continue in service, and a communication from Zonal Office to the
Chief Manager, UCO Bank, Bilaspur was made on 20.12.2010 to
that effect. The Head Office wrote another letter to Zonal Office on
06.04.2011 stating that since show cause notice has been issued on
11.11.2010 to the Respondent, therefore his request for voluntary
5
retirement cannot be considered, and the same was communicated
to the branch office.
7. On 09.05.2011, reply to the show cause notice was submitted,
and in the meantime, an undertaking was furnished by the
Respondent on 11.04.2011 that he shall not take any commercial
employment. Since the period specified in the notice for voluntary
retirement had elapsed, hence, after writing a letter dated
14.05.2011, Respondent stopped working with the bank w.e.f.
16.05.2011. Later, vide communication dated 29.06.2011 it was
informed to the Respondent by post sent from Bilaspur Branch that
his request for voluntary retirement is not being accepted. As per
information supplied by the Postal Department, the said letter was
never delivered to the Respondent and the High Court has also
taken note of the said fact.
8. After about eight months from the date when he severed his
employment with the Appellant, the Respondent was charge-sheeted
on 05.03.2012 alleging the suspicious transactions as mentioned
hereinabove. Challenging the non-acceptance of voluntary
retirement and consequent initiation of inquiry and dismissal, the
6
Respondent filed the respective writ petitions, which were allowed
by the learned Single Judge and confirmed in writ appeal by the
High Court vide impugned order. Hence, the present two appeals.
9. In the course of hearing, both the parties have placed reliance
on the judgments of this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal
1
Capoor (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - I’ ), UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal
2
Capoor (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - II’ ) and the judgment of Three-
3
Judge Bench in Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam . All the said
judgments deal with Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation,
consequential effect of show cause notice and meaning of deemed
pendency. Considering the peculiar facts of the case and that the
Respondent himself was appearing in person as well as looking to
the questions of law as involved, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior
counsel, was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court, who
agreed to assist us in examining the legal issues involved in these
two appeals.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES
1 (2007) 6 SCC 694
2 (2008) 5 SCC 257
3 (2016) 12 SCC 724
7
10. Learned counsel for the Appellant, the Respondent-in-person
and learned amicus curiae have advanced their arguments and were
heard at length. Learned counsel for the Appellant assailed the
judgment of the High Court placing reliance on Regulation 20(3)(ii)
of the Service Regulation and contended that in case a notice to
show cause for institution of disciplinary action has been issued, it
would amount to pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, and
during such pendency, the request for voluntary retirement cannot
be accepted. It is further argued that the deeming fiction as
contained in Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension Regulation may
not be applicable on elapse of three months’ notice period as
specified therein, in case the disciplinary proceeding is pending as
per Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. In support of his
contentions, reliance has been placed upon the aforementioned
judgments.
11. Per contra , the Respondent-in-person, submitted that while
allowing the writ petition, the High Court recorded the reasons in
detail indicating that the voluntary retirement was deemed to have
been accepted w.e.f. the date of expiry of three months’ notice
8
period or from the date of cessation of employment i.e., 16.05.2011.
It was contended that the show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does
not indicate about initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as required
under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. It is also
contended, in case the disciplinary proceedings is not initiated prior
to retirement, dismissal from service consequent to such
proceedings is arbitrary and without any sanction under the law,
and as such, the findings of the High Court do not warrant
interference. In view of the above submissions, it was prayed that
the Appeals preferred by the Bank may be dismissed with direction
to pay the post retiral and pensionary benefits within time frame
along with interest.
12. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel and amicus , has
placed all the facts in detail in his brief note of submissions and
argued that Regulation 29 of the Pension Regulation would apply for
voluntary retirement on completion of 20 years of service in case
the notice to that effect proposing a date of not less than three
months has been given in writing to the appointing authority. As
per the proviso to Regulation 29(2), such notice shall become
9
effective if not refused during the notice period. He submits that
Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulation
operate in different spheres and the judgments referred hereinabove
only deal with the contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii), therefore,
Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation, particularly in facts of
the present case, requires independent consideration. As per his
contention, show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does not indicate
the institution of disciplinary proceedings and satisfy the
requirement contemplated in Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service
Regulation. It was also stated that nothing has been placed on
record to indicate that the competent authority fulfilling the
requirement of clause 20(3)(ii) of Service Regulation and Clause
29(2) of Pension Regulation has passed any order refusing voluntary
retirement within the notice period. Lastly, it was submitted that
the judgment of the High Court is just, equitable and in accordance
with law, therefore, warrants no interference.
13. It is pointed out, the documents dated 28.07.2010
(communication of Vigilance Department advising to lodge FIR) and
12.08.2010 (a draft show cause notice) placed before this Court
10
along with additional affidavit were not filed with counter affidavit
before the High Court. The communication of these two documents
and internal correspondences of the Head Office to the Zonal Office
dated 11.12.2010, 20.12.2010 and 06.04.2011 to the Respondent
was also not averred in counter affidavit.
14. Learned amicus has drawn a distinction between “notice to
retire” and “request seeking permission to retire” placing reliance on
the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.K.
4
Singhal . It is his contention that any refusal to accept notice
within the period specified in the notice has not been placed before
the Court. Therefore, in terms of proviso of Regulation 29(2) of the
Pension Regulations, the voluntary retirement is deemed to come
into force immediately after expiry of the date as specified in the
notice. In support, reliance was also placed on
Tek Chand v. Dile
5
.
Ram
15. In the facts of both these Appeals, the following four questions
falls for our consideration - Under Regulation 29 of Pension
(a)
Regulation, a notice of voluntary retirement if not refused within the
4 (1999) 4 SCC 293
5 (2001) 3 SCC 290
11
prescribed period of three months or before the date as specified in
the notice, whether such notice would be deemed to be accepted on
expiry of such period? (b) Whether issuance of show cause notice
dated 11.11.2010 by the Appellant may fall within the purview of
institution of the disciplinary proceedings and such proceedings be
treated as pending in terms of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service
Regulation? Whether further action taken by the Appellant in
(c)
issuing chargesheet to conduct an inquiry and pass consequential
order of dismissal from service would withstand the scrutiny of law?
(d) In the facts and looking to the legal position discussed, whether
the judgments of the High Court warrant interference?
ANAYSIS
16. On appraisal of the rival contentions and to deal with the
questions posed above, for ready reference, it is necessary to first
refer the relevant provisions of the Pension Regulation applicable as
on the date, governing the issue of voluntary retirement. Regulation
29 of Chapter V of the Pension Regulation is relevant therefore
reproduced as under:
12
“29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement. – (1) On or after
st
the 1 day of November, 1993 at any time after an
employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service
he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in
writing to the appointing authority retire from service;
Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
employee who is on deputation or on study leave abroad
unless after having been transferred or having returned to
India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has
served for a period of not less than one year;
Provided further that this sub-regulation shall not apply to
an employee who seeks retirement from service for being
absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public
sector undertaking or company or institution or body,
whether incorporated or not to which he is on deputation at
the time of seeking voluntary retirement;
Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
employee who is deemed to have retired in accordance
with clause (I) of regulation 2.
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-
regulation (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing
authority;
Provided that where the appointing authority does not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the
retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of
the said period.”
(emphasis supplied)
st
17. Upon reading, it is quite clear, if an employee on or after 1 day
of November 1993 completes twenty years of qualifying service, and
furnishes a notice of not less than three months to the appointing
13
authority, he may retire voluntarily. Provisos of Regulation 29(1) of
the Pension Regulation deal with the contingencies which are not
relevant for the present case. Regulation 29(2) makes it further clear
that notice for voluntary retirement is required to be given as per
Regulation 29(1), which is required to be accepted by the appointing
authority. Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation applies subject to
proviso to the said sub-regulation, whereby in case the appointing
authority does not refuses the permission of voluntary retirement
before the period specified in the notice, the voluntary retirement
would be effective ipso facto from the date specified in the notice.
Therefore, in Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement is qualified by
an act of the appointing authority to refuse within the notice
period. Otherwise, the notice of voluntary retirement shall be
deemed to be accepted from the date or period as indicated in the
notice.
18. In view of the discussions made regarding provisions
contained in Pension Regulation and to understand the import of
the said provision, we may take guidance from judgments delivered
14
by this Court dealing with pari materia provisions and
interpretation thereto.
19. In the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam
6
& Ors. a Three-Judge bench of this Court was having an occasion
to deal with a similar issue of voluntary retirement in the context of
Fundamental Rule 56 (c), wherein this Court observed as follows -
Before we proceed further we may read F. Rule 56 as
7.
amended:
“F. Rule 56. (a) The date of compulsory retirement of a
Government servant is the date on which he attains
the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service
after this age with sanction of the State Government
on public grounds which must be recorded in writing,
and proposals for the retention of a Government
servant in service after this age should not be made
except in very special circumstances.
(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules
the appropriate authority may, if he is of the opinion
that it is in the public interest to do so, retire
government servant by giving him notice of not less
than three months in writing or three months' pay
and allowances in lieu of such notice, after he has
attained fifty years of age or has completed 25 years
of service, whichever is earlier.
(c) Any government servant may, by giving
notice of not less than three months in writing
to the appropriate authority, retire from service
after he has attained the age of fifty years or
has completed 25 years of service, whichever is
.”
earlier
6 (1977) 4 SCC 441
15
*
……While the Government reserves its right to
8.
compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his
wish, there is a corresponding right of the government
servant under F. Rule 56(c) to voluntarily retire from
service by giving the Government three months'
notice in writing. There is no question of acceptance
of the request for voluntary retirement by the
Government when the government servant exercises
his right under F. Rule 56 (c). Mr Niren De is
therefore right in conceding this position.
*
17. The High Court committed an error of law holding that
consent of the Government was necessary to give legal
effect to the voluntary retirement of the Appellant under F.
Rule 56(c). Since the conditions of F. Rule 56(c) are fulfilled
in the instant case, the Appellant must be held to have
lawfully retired as notified by him with effect from August
2, 1976.
20. By the said judgment it was made clear that, as per relevant
rules, to give effect to the voluntary retirement, the consent of the
Government was not necessary since the notice given by employee
reflects the intention to retire voluntarily from the date so specified
in the notice. Nonetheless, it appears that the said provision did not
contain any option on the part of the government to refuse the
request for voluntary retirement.
16
21. In another judgment of three-Judge Bench in
B.J. Shelat Vs.
7
, wherein this Court dealt with the
State of Gujarat and Ors.
question of jurisdiction of the authority to take a disciplinary action
and was observed as thus: -
“6. We will proceed to consider the question of the
jurisdiction of the authority to take disciplinary action
against the Appellant after his retirement. It may be
recalled that the Appellant gave a notice intimating his
intention to retire on July 17, 1973 stating that he intended
to retire on reaching the age of 55 years on December 3,
1973. He attained the age of 55 years on December 3,
1973 and it is common ground that the notice of
suspension was issued by the High Court only on
December 11, 1973. But before December 3, 1973 it is
admitted that a show-cause notice was issued on
November 23, 1973 by the Chief City Magistrate on the
directions of the High Court calling upon the petitioner to
submit his explanation and the Appellant submitted his
explanation on November 26, 1973.
7. Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides for
the retirement of Government servants before attaining the
age of superannuation. Rule 161(1)(aa) provides—
“Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(a):
(1) An appointing authority shall, if he is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have
the absolute right to retire any Government servant to
whom clause (a) applies by giving him notice of not
less than three months in writing or three months'
pay and allowances in lieu of such notice:
*
Sub-rule (2)(ii) is as follows:
7 (1978) 2 SCC 202
17
“Any Government servant to whom clause (a)
applies may, by giving notice of not less than three
months in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire
from service... and in any other case, after he has
attained the age of 55 years.”
There is no dispute that the Rule applicable is Rule 161(2)
(ii) and the Appellant is entitled to retire by giving a notice
of not less than 3 months after he has attained the age of
55 years. Under Rule 161(1)(aa)(1) the appointing authority
has an absolute right to retire any Government servant to
whom clause (a) applies in public interest by giving him
notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. But the
Government servant has no such absolute right. A right is
conferred on the Government servant under Rule 161(2)(ii)
to retire by giving not less than three months' notice on his
attaining the prescribed age. Such a right is subject to the
proviso which is incorporated to the sub-section which
reads as follows:
“
Provided that it shall be open to the
appointing authority to withhold permission to
retire to a Government servant who is under
suspension, or against whom departmental
proceedings are pending or contemplated, and
who seeks to retire under this sub-clause.”
But for the proviso a Government servant would be at liberty to retire
by giving not less than three months' notice in writing to the
appointing authority on attaining the prescribed age.”
In the above case, the judgment of
22. Dinesh Chandra Sangma
(Supra) was relied upon and applying the law as prevalent, the
Court observed as thus:
“8. ……. In the case before us it is incumbent on the
appointing authority to withhold permission to retire on one
of the conditions mentioned in the proviso.
We are of the
view that the proviso contemplates a positive action
by the appointing authority. The words “It shall be
18
open to the appointing authority to withhold
permission” would indicate that the appointing
authority has got an option to withhold permission
and that could be exercised by communicating its
intention to withhold permission to the Government
servant. The appointing authority may have
considered the question and might not have taken a
decision either way or after considering the facts of
the case might have come to the conclusion that it is
better to allow the Government servant to retire than
take any action against him. For the proviso to become
operative it is necessary that the Government should not
only take a decision but communicate it to the Government
servant.”
23. The Court also interpreted the meaning of the word ‘withhold’
in case the disciplinary proceedings are pending and a person
applied for voluntary retirement, wherein following was observed :-
“9. Mr Patel next referred us to the meaning of the word
“withhold” in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary which is given as “hold back” and submitted
that the permission should be deemed to have been
withheld if it is not communicated. We are not able to read
the meaning of the word “withhold” as indicating that in
the absence of a communication it must be understood as
the permission having been withheld.
10. It will be useful to refer to the analogous provision in
the Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of India
applicable to the Central Government servants.
Fundamental Rule 56(a) provides that except as otherwise
provided in this Rule, every Government servant shall
retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the
month in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years.
Fundamental Rule 56(j) is similar to Rule 161(aa)(1) of the
Bombay Civil Services Rules conferring an absolute right
19
on the appropriate authority to retire a Government servant
by giving not less than three months' notice. Under
Fundamental Rule 56(k) the Government servant is
entitled to retire from service after he has attained the age
of fifty-five years by giving notice of not less than three
months in writing to the appropriate authority on attaining
the age specified. But proviso (b) to sub-rule 56(k) states
that it is open to the appropriate authority to withhold
permission to a Government servant under suspension
who seeks to retire under this clause. Thus under the
Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of India
also the right to the Government servant to retire is not an
absolute right but is subject to the proviso whereunder the
appropriate authority may withhold permission to a
Government servant under suspension. On a
consideration to Rule 161(2)(ii) and the proviso, we
are satisfied that it is incumbent on the Government
to communicate to the Government servant its
decision to withhold permission to retire on one to
the grounds specified in the proviso.
11. In the view we have taken that the appointing
authority has no jurisdiction to take disciplinary
proceedings against a Government servant who had
effectively retired, the question as to whether the
High Court was right in holding that the disciplinary
authority had sufficient grounds for dismissing the
Appellant does not arise.
…..As already stated, as we have come to the conclusion
that the disciplinary action cannot be taken after the date
of his retirement, we refrain from expressing any opinion
on the correctness of the decision taken by the appointing
authority.”
In the said context, it is evident that until the appointing authority
withholds the permission to let an employee voluntarily retire,
pendency of disciplinary proceedings against such Government
20
servant has no adverse consequence. Therefore, withholding
permission in terms of the rules was found to be a prerequisite.
24. Both the above referred judgments have been further cited
with approval in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Sayed
8
Muzaffar Mir and the Court held as thus: -
“ 3.The learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri Ahmed
appearing for the Appellants, has contended that the right
of premature retirement conferred by the aforesaid
provision could be denied to a railway servant in case he
be under suspension, as was the Respondent at the
relevant time. This is what finds place in the proviso to the
aforesaid provision. The Additional Solicitor General also
seeks to place reliance on what has been stated in Rule
1801(d) which starts with non-obstante clause and states
that the competent authority may require a railway servant
under suspension to continue his service beyond the date
of his retirement in which case he shall not be permitted by
that authority to retire from service and shall be retained in
service till such time as required by that authority. Relying
on these provisions the contention advanced is that though
the Respondent had sought premature retirement by his
letter dated 22-7-1985 and though the three months'
period had expired on 21-10-1985, the Railways were
within the rights not to permit the premature retirement
because of the suspension of the Respondent at the
relevant time, which had come to be ordered in the course
of a disciplinary proceeding which was then pending
against the Respondent.
4. There are two answers to this submission. The
first is that both the provisions relied upon by the
learned counsel would require, according to us,
8 1995 Supp (1) SCC 76
21
passing of appropriate order, when the government
servant is under suspension (as was the Respondent),
either of withholding permission to retire or
retaining of the incumbent in service. It is an
admitted fact that no such order had been passed in
the present case. So, despite the right given to the
appropriate/competent authority in this regard, the
same is of no avail in the present case as the right
had not come to be exercised. We do not know the
reason(s) thereof. May be, for some reason the
authority concerned thought that it would be better
to see off the Respondent by allowing him to retire.
5. The second aspect of the matter is that it has been held
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dinesh Chandra
Sangma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 441 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 7] , which has dealt with a pari materia provision
finding place in Rule 56(c) of the Fundamental Rules, that
where the government servant seeks premature retirement
the same does not require any acceptance and comes into
effect on the completion of the notice period. This decision
was followed by another three-Judge Bench in B.J.
Shelat v. State of Gujarat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 208].
6. The period of notice in the present case having expired
on 21-10-1985, and the first order of removal having been
passed on 4-11-1985, we hold that the Tribunal had
rightly come to the conclusion that the order of removal
was non est in the eye of law.
”
25. In another case of S.K. Singhal (Supra), this Court was
having an occasion to consider the pari materia provision of Punjab
Civil Services Rules wherein the rule contemplates about “notice to
retire” and “not a request seeking permission to retire”. In the said
22
case, this Court has relied upon the above referred three judgments
and held as thus: -
“ 13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is clear that
if the right to voluntarily retire is conferred in absolute
terms as in Dinesh Chandra Sangma case [(1977) 4 SCC
441 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 7] by the relevant rules and there is
no provision in the rules to withhold permission in certain
contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect
automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the
notice. If, however, as in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC
202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 208] and as in Sayed Muzaffar Mir
case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
the
authority concerned is empowered to withhold
permission to retire if certain conditions exist, viz.,
in case the employee is under suspension or in case
a departmental enquiry is pending or is
contemplated, the mere pendency of the suspension
or departmental enquiry or its contemplation does
not result in the notice for voluntary retirement not
coming into effect on the expiry of the period
specified. What is further needed is that the
authority concerned must pass a positive order
withholding permission to retire and must also
communicate the same to the employee as stated
in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 208] and in Sayed Muzaffar Mir case [1995
Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256] before the
expiry of the notice period. Consequently, there is no
requirement of an order of acceptance of the notice to be
communicated to the employee nor can it be said that non-
communication of acceptance should be treated as
amounting to withholding of permission.”
14. Before referring to the second category of cases where
the rules require a positive acceptance of the notice of
voluntary retirement and communication thereof, it is
necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Baljit
Singh (Dr) v. State of Haryana [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997
23
SCC (L&S) 313] strongly relied upon by the learned counsel
for the Appellants and to Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v.
Pramod Kumar Bhatia [(1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 941] . The former case arose under Rule 5.32(B) of
the Punjab Civil Services Rules. That rule extracted earlier
contains an express provision in the proviso to sub-rule (2)
that the retirement takes effect automatically if refusal is
not communicated within 3 months. In that case, when the
employee gave notice for voluntary retirement on 20-9-
1993, criminal cases were pending against him. After
expiry of 3 months, on 25-2-1994, the competent authority
declined to accept the notice. A two-Judge Bench of this
Court, however, held that the voluntary retirement did not
come about automatically on the expiry of the notice period
but that it could take effect only upon acceptance of the
notice by the Government and that the acceptance must
also be communicated and till then the jural relationship of
master and servant continues. This Court referred only to
the decision of the two-Judge Bench in Sayed Muzaffar
Mir case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
and stated that that case was to be confined to its own
facts. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in Baljit
Singh case [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 313]
did not notice that there were two three-Judge Bench
cases in Dinesh Chandra Sangma [(1977) 4 SCC 441 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 7] and Shelat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 208] taking the view under similar
rules that a positive order was to be passed within
the notice period withholding permission to retire
and that the said order was also to be communicated
By stating that
to the employee during the said period.
an order of acceptance of the notice was necessary and
that the said acceptance must be communicated to the
employee and till that was done the jural relationship
continued and there was no automatic snapping thereof on
the expiry of 3 months' period, the two-Judge Bench, in our
view, has gone contrary to the two three-Judge Bench
cases which were not brought to its notice. In the above
24
circumstances, we follow the two three-Judge Bench cases
for deciding the case before us.
”
26. After taking clue from the above judgments, if we look into the
language of Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation which deals
with the voluntary retirement, acceptance of the notice by the
appointing authority is subject to compliance of proviso, whereby
refusal to let the employee retire voluntarily ought to be ordered
before expiry of the notice period, and communicate, otherwise, in
terms of proviso to Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement shall be
deemed to be effective on lapse of the notice period. Therefore, a
positive act of passing an order of refusal is required to be
undertaken by the appointing authority.
27. In the judgment of Tek Chand (Supra) decided by another
Three-Judge Bench, this Court has considered all the above
referred judgments and in the context of the language used in the
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Central Services Pension
Rules, 1972 dealing with the voluntary retirement, the Court in
paragraphs 33 and 35, held as thus: -
“ 33. It is clear from sub-rule (2) of the Rule that the
appointing authority is required to accept the notice of
voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1). It is open to
25
the appointing authority to refuse also, on whatever
grounds available to it, but such refusal has to be before
the expiry of the period specified in the notice. The proviso
to sub-rule (2) is clear and certain in its terms. If the
appointing authority does not refuse to grant the
permission for retirement before the expiry of the period
specified in the said notice, the retirement sought for
becomes effective from the date of expiry of the said
period. In this case, admittedly, the appointing authority
did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement to
Nikka Ram before the expiry of the period specified in the
notice dated 5-12-1994. The learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent argued that the acceptance of voluntary
retirement by appointing authority in all cases is
mandatory. In the absence of such express acceptance the
government servant continues to be in service. In support
of this submission, he drew our attention to Rule 56(k) of
the Fundamental Rules. He also submitted that acceptance
may be on a later date, that is, even after the expiry of the
period specified in the notice and the retirement could be
effective from the date specified in the notice. Since the
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A is clear in itself and the
said Rule 48-A is self-contained, in our opinion, it is
unnecessary to look to other provisions, more so in the light
of law laid down by this Court. An argument that
acceptance can be even long after the date of the
expiry of the period specified in the notice and that
the voluntary retirement may become effective from
the date specified in the notice, will lead to
anomalous situation. Take a case, if an application for
voluntary retirement is accepted few years later from the
date specified in the notice and voluntary retirement
becomes operative from the date of expiry of the notice
period itself, what would be the position or status of such
a government servant during the period from the date of
expiry of the notice period up to the date of acceptance of
the voluntary retirement by the appointing authority? One
either continues in service or does not continue in service.
It cannot be both that the voluntary retirement could be
26
effective from the date of expiry of the period mentioned in
the notice and still a government servant could continue in
service till the voluntary retirement is accepted. The proviso
to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Rules does not admit
such situation.
35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the contention
urged on behalf of the Appellant in this regard. In this
judgment, it is observed that there are three
categories of rules relating to seeking of voluntary
retirement after notice. In the first category,
voluntary retirement automatically comes into force
on expiry of notice period. In the second category
also, retirement comes into force unless an order is
passed during notice period withholding permission
to retire and in the third category voluntary
retirement does not come into force unless
permission to this effect is granted by the competent
authority. In such a case, refusal of permission can
be communicated even after the expiry of the notice
period. It all depends upon the relevant rules. In the
case decided, the relevant Rule required acceptance
of notice by appointing authority and the proviso to
the Rule further laid down that retirement shall
come into force automatically if the appointing
authority did not refuse permission during the notice
period. Refusal was not communicated to the
Respondent during the notice period and the Court
held that voluntary retirement came into force on
expiry of the notice period and subsequent order
conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have
The present case is
voluntary retired had no effect.
almost identical to the one decided by this Court in the
aforesaid decision. ”
28. In the above mentioned precedents, the pari materia provisions
dealing with the contingency of voluntary retirement have been
27
dealt with and it was made clear that subject to applicable law, the
request if not refused within the period specified in the notice or
withheld, the deemed approval of voluntary retirement would be
effective on expiry of notice period.
There may be three contingencies for the employees with
29.
respect of retirement. First is on attaining the age of
superannuation; second would be a situation of compulsory
retirement in public interest and third is where an employee sought
retirement voluntarily indicating his intention to cease the master-
servant relationship. In the third contingency, subject to applicable
regulations or rules, where an employee voluntarily ceases the
employment and indicates his intention in the notice of voluntary
retirement, until it is refused or withheld by an order within the
notice period, the intention of the employee would become effective
from the date as specified by him. Meaning thereby, if an employee
voluntarily wishes to severe his relationship with employer, and by
virtue of rule, the prescription is not followed, i.e., requiring the
authorities to indicate their intention to refuse the request, as per
28
deemed approval clause, in our opinion, the request becomes
effective ipso facto.
30. In the case at hand, the notice of three months indicating
intention to retire voluntarily was given on 04.10.2010 and the
period was supposed to expire on 04.01.2011, to which refusal was
not ordered within the notice period. The non-approval
communicated on 29.06.2011, after expiry of the notice period and
cessation of work vide notice dated 14.05.2011 with effect from
16.05.2011, is of no avail to the bank.
31. Reverting to the arguments as advanced by the Appellant,
relying upon Regulation 20(3)(ii) of Service Regulation, it sets forth
an embargo upon an officer against leaving or discontinuing or
resigning from service of bank without giving a notice in writing.
The said provision is relevant, therefore, reproduced for ready
reference as under: -
–
“20. Termination of Service.
(1)
(2)
(3) (i) An officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are
pending shall not leave/discontinue or resign from his
service in the bank without the prior approval in writing of
29
competent authority and any notice or resignation given by
such an officer before or during the disciplinary
proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by
the Competent Authority.
(ii) Disciplinary proceedings shall deemed to be pending
against any employee for the purpose of this regulation if
he has been placed under suspension or any notice has
been issued to him to show cause why disciplinary
proceedings shall not be instituted against him and will be
deemed to be pending until final orders are passed by the
Competent Authority.
(iii) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date
of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will
continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are
concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. The
concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or
allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also
not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till
the proceedings are completed and final order is passed
thereon except his own contributions to CPF. ”
32. Upon reading, it is discernable that if disciplinary proceedings
against an officer are pending and he wishes to leave/discontinue or
resign, he may be permitted to do so by prior approval of the
competent authority in writing. Such notice, if any, given by the
officer before or during the disciplinary proceedings, shall not be
given effect unless accepted by the competent authority. The
pendency of the disciplinary proceedings would include suspension
or issuance of a show-cause notice for institution of the disciplinary
30
proceedings. Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation applies
where the disciplinary proceedings were initiated prior to attaining
the age of superannuation, and prescribes the recourse to the bank
after attaining the age of superannuation, which is not of much
relevance in the facts of this case.
33. The argument as advanced to apply Regulation 20(3)(i) and
20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation may have some relevance as it
imposes embargo upon an officer against ‘leaving or discontinuing or
resigning’ from service without the prior approval of the authority if
disciplinary proceedings are pending. It also provides what would
mean by pendency of disciplinary proceedings. As discussed,
Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation governs the voluntary
retirement and its acceptance until refused by the appointing
authority within notice period, otherwise it would become effective
on lapse of the time specified in the notice.
Looking at the provision of Regulation 20(3)(i), (ii), (iii) of
34.
Service Regulations and Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension
Regulation, it ought to be read in tandem harmoniously. Regulation
20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service Regulation deals with cessation of
31
service and when it would not affect the pendency of disciplinary
proceedings. It puts an embargo only in two specific contingencies,
first , where the officer is placed under suspension, second , where a
show-cause notice has been issued for institution of disciplinary
proceedings. In either of the situation, an officer would require prior
approval of the competent authority. Indeed it is true that voluntary
retirement is also a mode to ‘leave or discontinue ’ service, therefore
to such extent, Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) may have relevance.
Nonetheless, voluntary retirement is not a mere act of leaving or
discontinuing, rather, a distinct right of an employee that is
available on completion of the requisite number of years of service,
etc. For exercising the option of voluntary retirement, Regulation 29
of the Pension Regulation is the main provision. Given the
situation, without considering both provisions harmoniously,
otherwise, this leads to an anomalous situation. We say so because
as per intent of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii), the employee cannot leave
without approval of the competent authority pending the
disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the fact that he has tendered
notice to that effect. However, on literal reading of proviso to
Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation, the intent thereof seems to
32
be otherwise i.e., unless refused by the competent authority within
the period prescribed in the notice, the voluntary retirement shall
become automatically effective. It is in this context provisions of
both regulations ought to be harmoniously constructed.
Under Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of Service Regulation,
35.
competent authority can retain the employee against whom
disciplinary proceedings are pending, unless permitted. At the same
time, Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation requires
acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement by authority.
Nonetheless, its proviso contemplates that the notice for voluntary
retirement becomes effective unless positively refused by the
competent authority. On said reading, the intent can be gathered
that while drafting Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation, the intent
of Regulation 20(3)(i) and (ii) of Service Regulation has been duly
taken care of, albeit in a different language. While Regulation 20(3)
(i) & (ii) of Service Regulation permits the authority to not grant
‘approval’ where disciplinary proceedings are pending; Regulation
29 of Pension Regulation also achieves the same effectively, through
its proviso, by permitting the authority to ‘refuse’ voluntary
33
retirement, but within the notice period. Therefore, essence and
intent are the same subject to some restrictions. In this manner,
said provisions are to be applied harmoniously.
36. Now reverting to the argument of issuance of the show cause
notice dated 11.11.2010 is concerned, such notice must indicate
the intention of institution of disciplinary proceedings, to trigger the
embargo under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. For
understanding the nature and context of the show-cause notice
dated 11.11.2010, its relevant operative part is reproduced
hereunder: -
“ Due to above action M/s. Progressive Exim Ltd. is
aggrieved on the Bank and the Bank’s image has suffered.
Since money was withdrawn from Current account of M/s.
Bhanu Road Carriers, which was not belonging to them,
the Bank was out of fund for a period from 08/10/2008 to
02/06/2010.
You are advised to submit your explanation within seven
days from the receipt of this letter. If no reply received
from you it will be construed that you have nothing
to say in the matter and further course of action will
be taken against you.”
37. After reading the operative portion as above, it is clear, an
explanation vis-à-vis allegations was sought from the officer and in
absence of which, bank was to take further recourse. In our view,
34
the aforesaid content of show cause notice, is not suggestive of the
intention to institute disciplinary action. Mere mention of ‘further
course of action’ cannot be construed as intention to institute
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, even said contention of the
Appellant falls flat.
Insofar as reliance is placed on the judgments of
38. R.L. Capoor
(Supra) and its review in (Supra), it is
– I R.L. Capoor – II
necessary to understand its factual matrix. In the said case, the
employee was working as a Branch Manager in UCO Bank and was
allowed to superannuate on 1-11-1996. Prior to his retirement, only
show-cause notices were issued to him on 24-10-1996 and 30-10-
1996 in connection with alleged irregularities committed while
sanctioning and disbursing loans under the PMRY Scheme. A
charge-sheet was issued only on 13-11-1998, nearly two years after
his superannuation, and upon conclusion of enquiry, the penalty of
removal from service was imposed, which was also affirmed in
appeal. The Respondent's writ petition was allowed in part by the
High Court, which converted the penalty into compulsory
35
retirement, and the LPA preferred by the Bank was dismissed,
taking the matter to this Court.
39. In the judgment of R.L. Capoor – I (Supra), this Court
dismissed the Bank's appeal and held the entire disciplinary
proceeding is illegal and without jurisdiction on the ground that
Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation could be invoked only
when disciplinary proceedings had been initiated prior to
superannuation, and since initiation of a proceeding is only upon
issuance of a charge-sheet and not merely upon a show-cause
notice, the legal fiction thereunder could not be attracted.
40. The Bank thereafter filed a Review Petition, giving rise to the
judgment of (Supra), seeking to rely upon
R.L. Capoor – II
Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. The review petition
was dismissed and this Court held that the legal fiction of deemed
pendency under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation is of
limited scope, operating only to prevent an officer from resigning
during such proceedings, and cannot be extended to constitute
initiation of disciplinary proceedings for purposes of Regulation
20(3)(iii).
36
41. In both of these cases, therefore, this Court primarily
examined the scope and import of Regulations 20(3)(i), 20(3)(ii) and
20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation, and elaborated upon the
meaning of the legal fiction as created by the expression ‘deemed to
be pending’
. Therefore, both these judgements only dealt with a very
specific issue i.e., applicability of legal fiction contained in
Regulation 20(3)(ii) for the purpose of Regulation 20(3)(iii). As such,
we find ourselves in agreement with the submission made by the
learned amicus that R.L. Capoor - I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor – II
(Supra) only deals with the contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii) and
do not apply on the facts of the present case.
42. The view taken in RL Capoor – I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor - II
(Supra) has also been reiterated in the judgment of D.R.P.
Sundharam (Supra) by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court. It is to
observe here that in neither of these judgements the effect of the
Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation has been considered. More so,
all the judgments relate to the Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service
Regulation without dealing with the purport of Regulation 20(3)(i) &
(ii) of Service Regulation which is applicable to the facts of the case
37
at hand. Judgements of this Court in
State Bank of India & Ors.
9
and
v. Navin Kumar Sinha UCO Bank & Ors. v. M.B.Motwani
10
dealt with the cases involving
(Dead) thr. L.Rs and Ors ,
retirement on attaining the age of superannuation and the dispute
was adjudicated in light of R.L.Capoor – I (Supra), R.L.Capoor – II
(Supra) and D.R.P. Sudharam (Supra). As such, these judgements
will not have any implication on the fact of the present appeals.
43. In light of the discussions made above and by applying the
rule of harmonious construction with respect to the interplay of the
said provisions of the Pension Regulation and the Service
Regulation, the situation as emerges is that the officer submitted
his notice of voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010, giving three
months' notice as required, which would be effective till 04.01.2011.
In the meantime, a show cause notice was issued by the Appellant
on 11.11.2010 and as discussed, it would not indicate the intention
to institute disciplinary proceedings in terms of Regulation 20(3)(ii)
of the Service Regulation. Nonetheless, the existence of such a show
cause notice itself is not sufficient without refusal by competent
9 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3369
10 (2024) 13 SCC 109
38
authority to stop the automatic operation of the notice of voluntary
retirement. In absence, the notice of voluntary retirement would
take its course. In the present case, no such order of refusal or
order of withholding was passed by the competent authority within
the stipulated period. The notice of voluntary retirement, therefore,
became effective automatically by efflux of time upon the expiry of
the three-month period on 04.01.2011. This Court, accordingly,
finds no infirmity in the view taken by the High Court, which is
liable to be upheld.
Before parting with this judgment, we deem it necessary to
44.
place on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance
rendered by learned Amicus Curiae Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, Senior
Advocate by way of filing erudite submissions, therefore, we
acknowledge his assistance and place the same on record.
CONCLUSION
45. In the light of discussion made hereinabove, in our view, while
passing the impugned judgment, the High Court has not committed
any infirmity. The judgment rendered by the High Court is after a
thorough examination of facts and applicable regulations, therefore,
39
the conclusion drawn as such is in right perspective. In our view, it
is correct to hold that when an employee decides to severe master
servant relationship and serves a notice indicating such intention
specifying the period, by operation of law it will become effective in
absence of any order of refusal. The subsequent act of issuing
chargesheet and consequential order of dismissal is also not
justified in law. As directed by the High Court, the Respondent
shall be entitled to all consequential post-retiral benefits in terms of
this order as well. The Bank is directed to settle all the dues within
a period of three months along with applicable interest rate.
Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Appellant-Bank fail and are,
hereby, dismissed.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…….…………….…………J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)
…….…………….…………J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
New Delhi;
April 07, 2026.
40
2026 INSC 328
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2020
UCO BANK & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SK SHRIVASTAVA … RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 376 OF 2020
UCO BANK & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SK SHRIVASTAVA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
J.K. MAHESHWARI, J.
1. The Civil Appeal No. 375 of 2020 is arising out of the
judgment dated 07.01.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 824 of 2018 by the
Signature Not Verified
High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur (hereinafter ‘High Court’ )
Digitally signed by
Gulshan Kumar Arora
Date: 2026.04.07
16:41:59 IST
Reason:
preferred against the judgment dated 28.09.2018 in WP (S) No.
1620 of 2012, wherein the direction for grant of terminal benefits to
1
Respondent No. 1 was issued. Learned Single Judge was of the view
that after completion of the notice period of three months as
specified in the notice for voluntary retirement or from the date of
stopping to attend the service, the Respondent be treated retired
voluntarily. Since he stood retired prior to institution of the
disciplinary proceedings, therefore, he is entitled to all
consequential benefits as per Rules governing the field. The
Division Bench reaffirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge
inter alia observing that since option of refusal of notice for
voluntary retirement was not exercised by the Appellant-Bank
before the expiry of notice period i.e. 04.01.2011 or even prior to
16.05.2011 i.e. the date since when the employee decided to severe
the master servant relationship, therefore, communication made
subsequently to refuse the request of voluntary retirement cannot
be given retrospective effect to undo an act which was deemed to
have been done.
2. In Civil Appeal No. 376 of 2020, the judgment dated
12.07.2019 in Writ Appeal No. 321 of 2019 is under challenge,
whereby, the judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed in WP (S) No. 5109
2
of 2012 was assailed. Learned Single Judge while allowing the writ
petition opined that the employee stood retired with effect from the
date of severance of master servant relationship i.e. 16.05.2011,
therefore, the chargesheet issued on 05.03.2012 after retirement is
liable to be quashed. In view of the judgment dated 28.09.2018
delivered in WP (S) No. 1620 of 2012 which was affirmed by the
Division Bench, the learned Single Judge quashed the chargesheet
and the consequential order of dismissal along with costs of Rs.
25,000/-.
In the present two appeals filed by the Appellant-bank, the
3.
Respondent herein was the petitioner before High Court. The former
writ petition relates to grant of terminal benefits to him and the
latter relates to challenge to chargesheet and his dismissal from
service. Consequent upon the decision in the previous writ petition,
the latter writ petition was allowed. Since both the appeals have
been filed in relation to the same employee, therefore, both the Civil
Appeals are heard analogously and being decided by this common
judgment.
3
4. The issue pertaining to the voluntary retirement is governed
by the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995
(hereinafter referred to as ‘ Pension Regulation ’) as stood on the
date on which notice for voluntary retirement was submitted by the
Respondent. The service conditions of the employee are governed by
(hereinafter
the UCO Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979
referred to as ‘ Service Regulation ’) applicable for termination or
discontinuation from employment of the Bank. The said Regulation
was later amended on 30.04.2011.
FACTUAL MATRIX
5. The facts unveiling the controversy are that the Respondent
was appointed as Clerk-cum-Godown Keeper in UCO Bank on
10.09.1983 and promoted as an Assistant Manager with effect from
01.01.2000. He was further promoted as Manager w.e.f.
26.04.2007. In July 2010, while working as Branch Manager at
Raipur Branch, some suspicious transactions in the account of
M/s. Bhanu Road Carriers and M/s. Progressive Exim Ltd. came to
the knowledge of the Appellant. Internal correspondence was made
from Head Office to Zonal Office regarding the same. In the
4
meantime, Respondent sent a notice of voluntary retirement on
04.10.2010 to the General Manager, Kolkata. In response, Zonal
Office asked for fresh application under the Pension Regulation. The
Head Office also sought information regarding vigilance, non-
vigilance or court case and an undertaking to the effect that he
would not accept any commercial employment for two years from
the date of acceptance of his voluntary retirement.
6. In the interregnum, the Zonal Office issued a show-cause
notice dated 11.11.2010 and asked explanation regarding alleged
transactions and suspicious entries in the accounts as referred
above. An internal communication between the Head Office and the
Zonal Office dated 11.12.2010 indicates that voluntary retirement of
Respondent was not considered because of proposed changes in
Pension Regulation, therefore, the Respondent was advised to
continue in service, and a communication from Zonal Office to the
Chief Manager, UCO Bank, Bilaspur was made on 20.12.2010 to
that effect. The Head Office wrote another letter to Zonal Office on
06.04.2011 stating that since show cause notice has been issued on
11.11.2010 to the Respondent, therefore his request for voluntary
5
retirement cannot be considered, and the same was communicated
to the branch office.
7. On 09.05.2011, reply to the show cause notice was submitted,
and in the meantime, an undertaking was furnished by the
Respondent on 11.04.2011 that he shall not take any commercial
employment. Since the period specified in the notice for voluntary
retirement had elapsed, hence, after writing a letter dated
14.05.2011, Respondent stopped working with the bank w.e.f.
16.05.2011. Later, vide communication dated 29.06.2011 it was
informed to the Respondent by post sent from Bilaspur Branch that
his request for voluntary retirement is not being accepted. As per
information supplied by the Postal Department, the said letter was
never delivered to the Respondent and the High Court has also
taken note of the said fact.
8. After about eight months from the date when he severed his
employment with the Appellant, the Respondent was charge-sheeted
on 05.03.2012 alleging the suspicious transactions as mentioned
hereinabove. Challenging the non-acceptance of voluntary
retirement and consequent initiation of inquiry and dismissal, the
6
Respondent filed the respective writ petitions, which were allowed
by the learned Single Judge and confirmed in writ appeal by the
High Court vide impugned order. Hence, the present two appeals.
9. In the course of hearing, both the parties have placed reliance
on the judgments of this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal
1
Capoor (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - I’ ), UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal
2
Capoor (hereinafter ‘R.L. Capoor - II’ ) and the judgment of Three-
3
Judge Bench in Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam . All the said
judgments deal with Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation,
consequential effect of show cause notice and meaning of deemed
pendency. Considering the peculiar facts of the case and that the
Respondent himself was appearing in person as well as looking to
the questions of law as involved, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior
counsel, was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court, who
agreed to assist us in examining the legal issues involved in these
two appeals.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES
1 (2007) 6 SCC 694
2 (2008) 5 SCC 257
3 (2016) 12 SCC 724
7
10. Learned counsel for the Appellant, the Respondent-in-person
and learned amicus curiae have advanced their arguments and were
heard at length. Learned counsel for the Appellant assailed the
judgment of the High Court placing reliance on Regulation 20(3)(ii)
of the Service Regulation and contended that in case a notice to
show cause for institution of disciplinary action has been issued, it
would amount to pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, and
during such pendency, the request for voluntary retirement cannot
be accepted. It is further argued that the deeming fiction as
contained in Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension Regulation may
not be applicable on elapse of three months’ notice period as
specified therein, in case the disciplinary proceeding is pending as
per Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. In support of his
contentions, reliance has been placed upon the aforementioned
judgments.
11. Per contra , the Respondent-in-person, submitted that while
allowing the writ petition, the High Court recorded the reasons in
detail indicating that the voluntary retirement was deemed to have
been accepted w.e.f. the date of expiry of three months’ notice
8
period or from the date of cessation of employment i.e., 16.05.2011.
It was contended that the show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does
not indicate about initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as required
under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. It is also
contended, in case the disciplinary proceedings is not initiated prior
to retirement, dismissal from service consequent to such
proceedings is arbitrary and without any sanction under the law,
and as such, the findings of the High Court do not warrant
interference. In view of the above submissions, it was prayed that
the Appeals preferred by the Bank may be dismissed with direction
to pay the post retiral and pensionary benefits within time frame
along with interest.
12. Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel and amicus , has
placed all the facts in detail in his brief note of submissions and
argued that Regulation 29 of the Pension Regulation would apply for
voluntary retirement on completion of 20 years of service in case
the notice to that effect proposing a date of not less than three
months has been given in writing to the appointing authority. As
per the proviso to Regulation 29(2), such notice shall become
9
effective if not refused during the notice period. He submits that
Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulation
operate in different spheres and the judgments referred hereinabove
only deal with the contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii), therefore,
Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation, particularly in facts of
the present case, requires independent consideration. As per his
contention, show cause notice dated 11.11.2010 does not indicate
the institution of disciplinary proceedings and satisfy the
requirement contemplated in Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service
Regulation. It was also stated that nothing has been placed on
record to indicate that the competent authority fulfilling the
requirement of clause 20(3)(ii) of Service Regulation and Clause
29(2) of Pension Regulation has passed any order refusing voluntary
retirement within the notice period. Lastly, it was submitted that
the judgment of the High Court is just, equitable and in accordance
with law, therefore, warrants no interference.
13. It is pointed out, the documents dated 28.07.2010
(communication of Vigilance Department advising to lodge FIR) and
12.08.2010 (a draft show cause notice) placed before this Court
10
along with additional affidavit were not filed with counter affidavit
before the High Court. The communication of these two documents
and internal correspondences of the Head Office to the Zonal Office
dated 11.12.2010, 20.12.2010 and 06.04.2011 to the Respondent
was also not averred in counter affidavit.
14. Learned amicus has drawn a distinction between “notice to
retire” and “request seeking permission to retire” placing reliance on
the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. S.K.
4
Singhal . It is his contention that any refusal to accept notice
within the period specified in the notice has not been placed before
the Court. Therefore, in terms of proviso of Regulation 29(2) of the
Pension Regulations, the voluntary retirement is deemed to come
into force immediately after expiry of the date as specified in the
notice. In support, reliance was also placed on
Tek Chand v. Dile
5
.
Ram
15. In the facts of both these Appeals, the following four questions
falls for our consideration - Under Regulation 29 of Pension
(a)
Regulation, a notice of voluntary retirement if not refused within the
4 (1999) 4 SCC 293
5 (2001) 3 SCC 290
11
prescribed period of three months or before the date as specified in
the notice, whether such notice would be deemed to be accepted on
expiry of such period? (b) Whether issuance of show cause notice
dated 11.11.2010 by the Appellant may fall within the purview of
institution of the disciplinary proceedings and such proceedings be
treated as pending in terms of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service
Regulation? Whether further action taken by the Appellant in
(c)
issuing chargesheet to conduct an inquiry and pass consequential
order of dismissal from service would withstand the scrutiny of law?
(d) In the facts and looking to the legal position discussed, whether
the judgments of the High Court warrant interference?
ANAYSIS
16. On appraisal of the rival contentions and to deal with the
questions posed above, for ready reference, it is necessary to first
refer the relevant provisions of the Pension Regulation applicable as
on the date, governing the issue of voluntary retirement. Regulation
29 of Chapter V of the Pension Regulation is relevant therefore
reproduced as under:
12
“29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement. – (1) On or after
st
the 1 day of November, 1993 at any time after an
employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service
he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in
writing to the appointing authority retire from service;
Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
employee who is on deputation or on study leave abroad
unless after having been transferred or having returned to
India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has
served for a period of not less than one year;
Provided further that this sub-regulation shall not apply to
an employee who seeks retirement from service for being
absorbed permanently in an autonomous body or a public
sector undertaking or company or institution or body,
whether incorporated or not to which he is on deputation at
the time of seeking voluntary retirement;
Provided that this sub-regulation shall not apply to an
employee who is deemed to have retired in accordance
with clause (I) of regulation 2.
(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-
regulation (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing
authority;
Provided that where the appointing authority does not
refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the
expiry of the period specified in the said notice, the
retirement shall become effective from the date of expiry of
the said period.”
(emphasis supplied)
st
17. Upon reading, it is quite clear, if an employee on or after 1 day
of November 1993 completes twenty years of qualifying service, and
furnishes a notice of not less than three months to the appointing
13
authority, he may retire voluntarily. Provisos of Regulation 29(1) of
the Pension Regulation deal with the contingencies which are not
relevant for the present case. Regulation 29(2) makes it further clear
that notice for voluntary retirement is required to be given as per
Regulation 29(1), which is required to be accepted by the appointing
authority. Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation applies subject to
proviso to the said sub-regulation, whereby in case the appointing
authority does not refuses the permission of voluntary retirement
before the period specified in the notice, the voluntary retirement
would be effective ipso facto from the date specified in the notice.
Therefore, in Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement is qualified by
an act of the appointing authority to refuse within the notice
period. Otherwise, the notice of voluntary retirement shall be
deemed to be accepted from the date or period as indicated in the
notice.
18. In view of the discussions made regarding provisions
contained in Pension Regulation and to understand the import of
the said provision, we may take guidance from judgments delivered
14
by this Court dealing with pari materia provisions and
interpretation thereto.
19. In the case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma Vs. State of Assam
6
& Ors. a Three-Judge bench of this Court was having an occasion
to deal with a similar issue of voluntary retirement in the context of
Fundamental Rule 56 (c), wherein this Court observed as follows -
Before we proceed further we may read F. Rule 56 as
7.
amended:
“F. Rule 56. (a) The date of compulsory retirement of a
Government servant is the date on which he attains
the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service
after this age with sanction of the State Government
on public grounds which must be recorded in writing,
and proposals for the retention of a Government
servant in service after this age should not be made
except in very special circumstances.
(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules
the appropriate authority may, if he is of the opinion
that it is in the public interest to do so, retire
government servant by giving him notice of not less
than three months in writing or three months' pay
and allowances in lieu of such notice, after he has
attained fifty years of age or has completed 25 years
of service, whichever is earlier.
(c) Any government servant may, by giving
notice of not less than three months in writing
to the appropriate authority, retire from service
after he has attained the age of fifty years or
has completed 25 years of service, whichever is
.”
earlier
6 (1977) 4 SCC 441
15
*
……While the Government reserves its right to
8.
compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his
wish, there is a corresponding right of the government
servant under F. Rule 56(c) to voluntarily retire from
service by giving the Government three months'
notice in writing. There is no question of acceptance
of the request for voluntary retirement by the
Government when the government servant exercises
his right under F. Rule 56 (c). Mr Niren De is
therefore right in conceding this position.
*
17. The High Court committed an error of law holding that
consent of the Government was necessary to give legal
effect to the voluntary retirement of the Appellant under F.
Rule 56(c). Since the conditions of F. Rule 56(c) are fulfilled
in the instant case, the Appellant must be held to have
lawfully retired as notified by him with effect from August
2, 1976.
20. By the said judgment it was made clear that, as per relevant
rules, to give effect to the voluntary retirement, the consent of the
Government was not necessary since the notice given by employee
reflects the intention to retire voluntarily from the date so specified
in the notice. Nonetheless, it appears that the said provision did not
contain any option on the part of the government to refuse the
request for voluntary retirement.
16
21. In another judgment of three-Judge Bench in
B.J. Shelat Vs.
7
, wherein this Court dealt with the
State of Gujarat and Ors.
question of jurisdiction of the authority to take a disciplinary action
and was observed as thus: -
“6. We will proceed to consider the question of the
jurisdiction of the authority to take disciplinary action
against the Appellant after his retirement. It may be
recalled that the Appellant gave a notice intimating his
intention to retire on July 17, 1973 stating that he intended
to retire on reaching the age of 55 years on December 3,
1973. He attained the age of 55 years on December 3,
1973 and it is common ground that the notice of
suspension was issued by the High Court only on
December 11, 1973. But before December 3, 1973 it is
admitted that a show-cause notice was issued on
November 23, 1973 by the Chief City Magistrate on the
directions of the High Court calling upon the petitioner to
submit his explanation and the Appellant submitted his
explanation on November 26, 1973.
7. Rule 161 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules provides for
the retirement of Government servants before attaining the
age of superannuation. Rule 161(1)(aa) provides—
“Notwithstanding anything contained in clause
(a):
(1) An appointing authority shall, if he is of the
opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have
the absolute right to retire any Government servant to
whom clause (a) applies by giving him notice of not
less than three months in writing or three months'
pay and allowances in lieu of such notice:
*
Sub-rule (2)(ii) is as follows:
7 (1978) 2 SCC 202
17
“Any Government servant to whom clause (a)
applies may, by giving notice of not less than three
months in writing to the Appointing Authority, retire
from service... and in any other case, after he has
attained the age of 55 years.”
There is no dispute that the Rule applicable is Rule 161(2)
(ii) and the Appellant is entitled to retire by giving a notice
of not less than 3 months after he has attained the age of
55 years. Under Rule 161(1)(aa)(1) the appointing authority
has an absolute right to retire any Government servant to
whom clause (a) applies in public interest by giving him
notice of not less than three months in writing or three
months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. But the
Government servant has no such absolute right. A right is
conferred on the Government servant under Rule 161(2)(ii)
to retire by giving not less than three months' notice on his
attaining the prescribed age. Such a right is subject to the
proviso which is incorporated to the sub-section which
reads as follows:
“
Provided that it shall be open to the
appointing authority to withhold permission to
retire to a Government servant who is under
suspension, or against whom departmental
proceedings are pending or contemplated, and
who seeks to retire under this sub-clause.”
But for the proviso a Government servant would be at liberty to retire
by giving not less than three months' notice in writing to the
appointing authority on attaining the prescribed age.”
In the above case, the judgment of
22. Dinesh Chandra Sangma
(Supra) was relied upon and applying the law as prevalent, the
Court observed as thus:
“8. ……. In the case before us it is incumbent on the
appointing authority to withhold permission to retire on one
of the conditions mentioned in the proviso.
We are of the
view that the proviso contemplates a positive action
by the appointing authority. The words “It shall be
18
open to the appointing authority to withhold
permission” would indicate that the appointing
authority has got an option to withhold permission
and that could be exercised by communicating its
intention to withhold permission to the Government
servant. The appointing authority may have
considered the question and might not have taken a
decision either way or after considering the facts of
the case might have come to the conclusion that it is
better to allow the Government servant to retire than
take any action against him. For the proviso to become
operative it is necessary that the Government should not
only take a decision but communicate it to the Government
servant.”
23. The Court also interpreted the meaning of the word ‘withhold’
in case the disciplinary proceedings are pending and a person
applied for voluntary retirement, wherein following was observed :-
“9. Mr Patel next referred us to the meaning of the word
“withhold” in Webster's Third New International
Dictionary which is given as “hold back” and submitted
that the permission should be deemed to have been
withheld if it is not communicated. We are not able to read
the meaning of the word “withhold” as indicating that in
the absence of a communication it must be understood as
the permission having been withheld.
10. It will be useful to refer to the analogous provision in
the Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of India
applicable to the Central Government servants.
Fundamental Rule 56(a) provides that except as otherwise
provided in this Rule, every Government servant shall
retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the
month in which he attains the age of fifty-eight years.
Fundamental Rule 56(j) is similar to Rule 161(aa)(1) of the
Bombay Civil Services Rules conferring an absolute right
19
on the appropriate authority to retire a Government servant
by giving not less than three months' notice. Under
Fundamental Rule 56(k) the Government servant is
entitled to retire from service after he has attained the age
of fifty-five years by giving notice of not less than three
months in writing to the appropriate authority on attaining
the age specified. But proviso (b) to sub-rule 56(k) states
that it is open to the appropriate authority to withhold
permission to a Government servant under suspension
who seeks to retire under this clause. Thus under the
Fundamental Rules issued by the Government of India
also the right to the Government servant to retire is not an
absolute right but is subject to the proviso whereunder the
appropriate authority may withhold permission to a
Government servant under suspension. On a
consideration to Rule 161(2)(ii) and the proviso, we
are satisfied that it is incumbent on the Government
to communicate to the Government servant its
decision to withhold permission to retire on one to
the grounds specified in the proviso.
11. In the view we have taken that the appointing
authority has no jurisdiction to take disciplinary
proceedings against a Government servant who had
effectively retired, the question as to whether the
High Court was right in holding that the disciplinary
authority had sufficient grounds for dismissing the
Appellant does not arise.
…..As already stated, as we have come to the conclusion
that the disciplinary action cannot be taken after the date
of his retirement, we refrain from expressing any opinion
on the correctness of the decision taken by the appointing
authority.”
In the said context, it is evident that until the appointing authority
withholds the permission to let an employee voluntarily retire,
pendency of disciplinary proceedings against such Government
20
servant has no adverse consequence. Therefore, withholding
permission in terms of the rules was found to be a prerequisite.
24. Both the above referred judgments have been further cited
with approval in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Sayed
8
Muzaffar Mir and the Court held as thus: -
“ 3.The learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri Ahmed
appearing for the Appellants, has contended that the right
of premature retirement conferred by the aforesaid
provision could be denied to a railway servant in case he
be under suspension, as was the Respondent at the
relevant time. This is what finds place in the proviso to the
aforesaid provision. The Additional Solicitor General also
seeks to place reliance on what has been stated in Rule
1801(d) which starts with non-obstante clause and states
that the competent authority may require a railway servant
under suspension to continue his service beyond the date
of his retirement in which case he shall not be permitted by
that authority to retire from service and shall be retained in
service till such time as required by that authority. Relying
on these provisions the contention advanced is that though
the Respondent had sought premature retirement by his
letter dated 22-7-1985 and though the three months'
period had expired on 21-10-1985, the Railways were
within the rights not to permit the premature retirement
because of the suspension of the Respondent at the
relevant time, which had come to be ordered in the course
of a disciplinary proceeding which was then pending
against the Respondent.
4. There are two answers to this submission. The
first is that both the provisions relied upon by the
learned counsel would require, according to us,
8 1995 Supp (1) SCC 76
21
passing of appropriate order, when the government
servant is under suspension (as was the Respondent),
either of withholding permission to retire or
retaining of the incumbent in service. It is an
admitted fact that no such order had been passed in
the present case. So, despite the right given to the
appropriate/competent authority in this regard, the
same is of no avail in the present case as the right
had not come to be exercised. We do not know the
reason(s) thereof. May be, for some reason the
authority concerned thought that it would be better
to see off the Respondent by allowing him to retire.
5. The second aspect of the matter is that it has been held
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dinesh Chandra
Sangma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 441 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 7] , which has dealt with a pari materia provision
finding place in Rule 56(c) of the Fundamental Rules, that
where the government servant seeks premature retirement
the same does not require any acceptance and comes into
effect on the completion of the notice period. This decision
was followed by another three-Judge Bench in B.J.
Shelat v. State of Gujarat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 208].
6. The period of notice in the present case having expired
on 21-10-1985, and the first order of removal having been
passed on 4-11-1985, we hold that the Tribunal had
rightly come to the conclusion that the order of removal
was non est in the eye of law.
”
25. In another case of S.K. Singhal (Supra), this Court was
having an occasion to consider the pari materia provision of Punjab
Civil Services Rules wherein the rule contemplates about “notice to
retire” and “not a request seeking permission to retire”. In the said
22
case, this Court has relied upon the above referred three judgments
and held as thus: -
“ 13. Thus, from the aforesaid three decisions it is clear that
if the right to voluntarily retire is conferred in absolute
terms as in Dinesh Chandra Sangma case [(1977) 4 SCC
441 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 7] by the relevant rules and there is
no provision in the rules to withhold permission in certain
contingencies the voluntary retirement comes into effect
automatically on the expiry of the period specified in the
notice. If, however, as in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC
202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 208] and as in Sayed Muzaffar Mir
case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
the
authority concerned is empowered to withhold
permission to retire if certain conditions exist, viz.,
in case the employee is under suspension or in case
a departmental enquiry is pending or is
contemplated, the mere pendency of the suspension
or departmental enquiry or its contemplation does
not result in the notice for voluntary retirement not
coming into effect on the expiry of the period
specified. What is further needed is that the
authority concerned must pass a positive order
withholding permission to retire and must also
communicate the same to the employee as stated
in B.J. Shelat case [(1978) 2 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 208] and in Sayed Muzaffar Mir case [1995
Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256] before the
expiry of the notice period. Consequently, there is no
requirement of an order of acceptance of the notice to be
communicated to the employee nor can it be said that non-
communication of acceptance should be treated as
amounting to withholding of permission.”
14. Before referring to the second category of cases where
the rules require a positive acceptance of the notice of
voluntary retirement and communication thereof, it is
necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Baljit
Singh (Dr) v. State of Haryana [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997
23
SCC (L&S) 313] strongly relied upon by the learned counsel
for the Appellants and to Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v.
Pramod Kumar Bhatia [(1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 941] . The former case arose under Rule 5.32(B) of
the Punjab Civil Services Rules. That rule extracted earlier
contains an express provision in the proviso to sub-rule (2)
that the retirement takes effect automatically if refusal is
not communicated within 3 months. In that case, when the
employee gave notice for voluntary retirement on 20-9-
1993, criminal cases were pending against him. After
expiry of 3 months, on 25-2-1994, the competent authority
declined to accept the notice. A two-Judge Bench of this
Court, however, held that the voluntary retirement did not
come about automatically on the expiry of the notice period
but that it could take effect only upon acceptance of the
notice by the Government and that the acceptance must
also be communicated and till then the jural relationship of
master and servant continues. This Court referred only to
the decision of the two-Judge Bench in Sayed Muzaffar
Mir case [1995 Supp (1) SCC 76 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 256]
and stated that that case was to be confined to its own
facts. The two-Judge Bench of this Court in Baljit
Singh case [(1997) 1 SCC 754 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 313]
did not notice that there were two three-Judge Bench
cases in Dinesh Chandra Sangma [(1977) 4 SCC 441 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 7] and Shelat [(1978) 2 SCC 202 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 208] taking the view under similar
rules that a positive order was to be passed within
the notice period withholding permission to retire
and that the said order was also to be communicated
By stating that
to the employee during the said period.
an order of acceptance of the notice was necessary and
that the said acceptance must be communicated to the
employee and till that was done the jural relationship
continued and there was no automatic snapping thereof on
the expiry of 3 months' period, the two-Judge Bench, in our
view, has gone contrary to the two three-Judge Bench
cases which were not brought to its notice. In the above
24
circumstances, we follow the two three-Judge Bench cases
for deciding the case before us.
”
26. After taking clue from the above judgments, if we look into the
language of Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation which deals
with the voluntary retirement, acceptance of the notice by the
appointing authority is subject to compliance of proviso, whereby
refusal to let the employee retire voluntarily ought to be ordered
before expiry of the notice period, and communicate, otherwise, in
terms of proviso to Regulation 29(2), voluntary retirement shall be
deemed to be effective on lapse of the notice period. Therefore, a
positive act of passing an order of refusal is required to be
undertaken by the appointing authority.
27. In the judgment of Tek Chand (Supra) decided by another
Three-Judge Bench, this Court has considered all the above
referred judgments and in the context of the language used in the
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Central Services Pension
Rules, 1972 dealing with the voluntary retirement, the Court in
paragraphs 33 and 35, held as thus: -
“ 33. It is clear from sub-rule (2) of the Rule that the
appointing authority is required to accept the notice of
voluntary retirement given under sub-rule (1). It is open to
25
the appointing authority to refuse also, on whatever
grounds available to it, but such refusal has to be before
the expiry of the period specified in the notice. The proviso
to sub-rule (2) is clear and certain in its terms. If the
appointing authority does not refuse to grant the
permission for retirement before the expiry of the period
specified in the said notice, the retirement sought for
becomes effective from the date of expiry of the said
period. In this case, admittedly, the appointing authority
did not refuse to grant the permission for retirement to
Nikka Ram before the expiry of the period specified in the
notice dated 5-12-1994. The learned Senior Counsel for the
Respondent argued that the acceptance of voluntary
retirement by appointing authority in all cases is
mandatory. In the absence of such express acceptance the
government servant continues to be in service. In support
of this submission, he drew our attention to Rule 56(k) of
the Fundamental Rules. He also submitted that acceptance
may be on a later date, that is, even after the expiry of the
period specified in the notice and the retirement could be
effective from the date specified in the notice. Since the
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A is clear in itself and the
said Rule 48-A is self-contained, in our opinion, it is
unnecessary to look to other provisions, more so in the light
of law laid down by this Court. An argument that
acceptance can be even long after the date of the
expiry of the period specified in the notice and that
the voluntary retirement may become effective from
the date specified in the notice, will lead to
anomalous situation. Take a case, if an application for
voluntary retirement is accepted few years later from the
date specified in the notice and voluntary retirement
becomes operative from the date of expiry of the notice
period itself, what would be the position or status of such
a government servant during the period from the date of
expiry of the notice period up to the date of acceptance of
the voluntary retirement by the appointing authority? One
either continues in service or does not continue in service.
It cannot be both that the voluntary retirement could be
26
effective from the date of expiry of the period mentioned in
the notice and still a government servant could continue in
service till the voluntary retirement is accepted. The proviso
to sub-rule (2) of Rule 48-A of the Rules does not admit
such situation.
35. In our view, this judgment fully supports the contention
urged on behalf of the Appellant in this regard. In this
judgment, it is observed that there are three
categories of rules relating to seeking of voluntary
retirement after notice. In the first category,
voluntary retirement automatically comes into force
on expiry of notice period. In the second category
also, retirement comes into force unless an order is
passed during notice period withholding permission
to retire and in the third category voluntary
retirement does not come into force unless
permission to this effect is granted by the competent
authority. In such a case, refusal of permission can
be communicated even after the expiry of the notice
period. It all depends upon the relevant rules. In the
case decided, the relevant Rule required acceptance
of notice by appointing authority and the proviso to
the Rule further laid down that retirement shall
come into force automatically if the appointing
authority did not refuse permission during the notice
period. Refusal was not communicated to the
Respondent during the notice period and the Court
held that voluntary retirement came into force on
expiry of the notice period and subsequent order
conveyed to him that he could not be deemed to have
The present case is
voluntary retired had no effect.
almost identical to the one decided by this Court in the
aforesaid decision. ”
28. In the above mentioned precedents, the pari materia provisions
dealing with the contingency of voluntary retirement have been
27
dealt with and it was made clear that subject to applicable law, the
request if not refused within the period specified in the notice or
withheld, the deemed approval of voluntary retirement would be
effective on expiry of notice period.
There may be three contingencies for the employees with
29.
respect of retirement. First is on attaining the age of
superannuation; second would be a situation of compulsory
retirement in public interest and third is where an employee sought
retirement voluntarily indicating his intention to cease the master-
servant relationship. In the third contingency, subject to applicable
regulations or rules, where an employee voluntarily ceases the
employment and indicates his intention in the notice of voluntary
retirement, until it is refused or withheld by an order within the
notice period, the intention of the employee would become effective
from the date as specified by him. Meaning thereby, if an employee
voluntarily wishes to severe his relationship with employer, and by
virtue of rule, the prescription is not followed, i.e., requiring the
authorities to indicate their intention to refuse the request, as per
28
deemed approval clause, in our opinion, the request becomes
effective ipso facto.
30. In the case at hand, the notice of three months indicating
intention to retire voluntarily was given on 04.10.2010 and the
period was supposed to expire on 04.01.2011, to which refusal was
not ordered within the notice period. The non-approval
communicated on 29.06.2011, after expiry of the notice period and
cessation of work vide notice dated 14.05.2011 with effect from
16.05.2011, is of no avail to the bank.
31. Reverting to the arguments as advanced by the Appellant,
relying upon Regulation 20(3)(ii) of Service Regulation, it sets forth
an embargo upon an officer against leaving or discontinuing or
resigning from service of bank without giving a notice in writing.
The said provision is relevant, therefore, reproduced for ready
reference as under: -
–
“20. Termination of Service.
(1)
(2)
(3) (i) An officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are
pending shall not leave/discontinue or resign from his
service in the bank without the prior approval in writing of
29
competent authority and any notice or resignation given by
such an officer before or during the disciplinary
proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by
the Competent Authority.
(ii) Disciplinary proceedings shall deemed to be pending
against any employee for the purpose of this regulation if
he has been placed under suspension or any notice has
been issued to him to show cause why disciplinary
proceedings shall not be instituted against him and will be
deemed to be pending until final orders are passed by the
Competent Authority.
(iii) The officer against whom disciplinary proceedings
have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date
of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will
continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are
concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. The
concerned officer will not receive any pay and/or
allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also
not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till
the proceedings are completed and final order is passed
thereon except his own contributions to CPF. ”
32. Upon reading, it is discernable that if disciplinary proceedings
against an officer are pending and he wishes to leave/discontinue or
resign, he may be permitted to do so by prior approval of the
competent authority in writing. Such notice, if any, given by the
officer before or during the disciplinary proceedings, shall not be
given effect unless accepted by the competent authority. The
pendency of the disciplinary proceedings would include suspension
or issuance of a show-cause notice for institution of the disciplinary
30
proceedings. Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation applies
where the disciplinary proceedings were initiated prior to attaining
the age of superannuation, and prescribes the recourse to the bank
after attaining the age of superannuation, which is not of much
relevance in the facts of this case.
33. The argument as advanced to apply Regulation 20(3)(i) and
20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation may have some relevance as it
imposes embargo upon an officer against ‘leaving or discontinuing or
resigning’ from service without the prior approval of the authority if
disciplinary proceedings are pending. It also provides what would
mean by pendency of disciplinary proceedings. As discussed,
Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation governs the voluntary
retirement and its acceptance until refused by the appointing
authority within notice period, otherwise it would become effective
on lapse of the time specified in the notice.
Looking at the provision of Regulation 20(3)(i), (ii), (iii) of
34.
Service Regulations and Regulation 29(1) and (2) of the Pension
Regulation, it ought to be read in tandem harmoniously. Regulation
20(3)(i) & (ii) of the Service Regulation deals with cessation of
31
service and when it would not affect the pendency of disciplinary
proceedings. It puts an embargo only in two specific contingencies,
first , where the officer is placed under suspension, second , where a
show-cause notice has been issued for institution of disciplinary
proceedings. In either of the situation, an officer would require prior
approval of the competent authority. Indeed it is true that voluntary
retirement is also a mode to ‘leave or discontinue ’ service, therefore
to such extent, Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) may have relevance.
Nonetheless, voluntary retirement is not a mere act of leaving or
discontinuing, rather, a distinct right of an employee that is
available on completion of the requisite number of years of service,
etc. For exercising the option of voluntary retirement, Regulation 29
of the Pension Regulation is the main provision. Given the
situation, without considering both provisions harmoniously,
otherwise, this leads to an anomalous situation. We say so because
as per intent of Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii), the employee cannot leave
without approval of the competent authority pending the
disciplinary proceedings irrespective of the fact that he has tendered
notice to that effect. However, on literal reading of proviso to
Regulation 29(2) of Pension Regulation, the intent thereof seems to
32
be otherwise i.e., unless refused by the competent authority within
the period prescribed in the notice, the voluntary retirement shall
become automatically effective. It is in this context provisions of
both regulations ought to be harmoniously constructed.
Under Regulation 20(3)(i) & (ii) of Service Regulation,
35.
competent authority can retain the employee against whom
disciplinary proceedings are pending, unless permitted. At the same
time, Regulation 29(2) of the Pension Regulation requires
acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement by authority.
Nonetheless, its proviso contemplates that the notice for voluntary
retirement becomes effective unless positively refused by the
competent authority. On said reading, the intent can be gathered
that while drafting Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation, the intent
of Regulation 20(3)(i) and (ii) of Service Regulation has been duly
taken care of, albeit in a different language. While Regulation 20(3)
(i) & (ii) of Service Regulation permits the authority to not grant
‘approval’ where disciplinary proceedings are pending; Regulation
29 of Pension Regulation also achieves the same effectively, through
its proviso, by permitting the authority to ‘refuse’ voluntary
33
retirement, but within the notice period. Therefore, essence and
intent are the same subject to some restrictions. In this manner,
said provisions are to be applied harmoniously.
36. Now reverting to the argument of issuance of the show cause
notice dated 11.11.2010 is concerned, such notice must indicate
the intention of institution of disciplinary proceedings, to trigger the
embargo under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. For
understanding the nature and context of the show-cause notice
dated 11.11.2010, its relevant operative part is reproduced
hereunder: -
“ Due to above action M/s. Progressive Exim Ltd. is
aggrieved on the Bank and the Bank’s image has suffered.
Since money was withdrawn from Current account of M/s.
Bhanu Road Carriers, which was not belonging to them,
the Bank was out of fund for a period from 08/10/2008 to
02/06/2010.
You are advised to submit your explanation within seven
days from the receipt of this letter. If no reply received
from you it will be construed that you have nothing
to say in the matter and further course of action will
be taken against you.”
37. After reading the operative portion as above, it is clear, an
explanation vis-à-vis allegations was sought from the officer and in
absence of which, bank was to take further recourse. In our view,
34
the aforesaid content of show cause notice, is not suggestive of the
intention to institute disciplinary action. Mere mention of ‘further
course of action’ cannot be construed as intention to institute
disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, even said contention of the
Appellant falls flat.
Insofar as reliance is placed on the judgments of
38. R.L. Capoor
(Supra) and its review in (Supra), it is
– I R.L. Capoor – II
necessary to understand its factual matrix. In the said case, the
employee was working as a Branch Manager in UCO Bank and was
allowed to superannuate on 1-11-1996. Prior to his retirement, only
show-cause notices were issued to him on 24-10-1996 and 30-10-
1996 in connection with alleged irregularities committed while
sanctioning and disbursing loans under the PMRY Scheme. A
charge-sheet was issued only on 13-11-1998, nearly two years after
his superannuation, and upon conclusion of enquiry, the penalty of
removal from service was imposed, which was also affirmed in
appeal. The Respondent's writ petition was allowed in part by the
High Court, which converted the penalty into compulsory
35
retirement, and the LPA preferred by the Bank was dismissed,
taking the matter to this Court.
39. In the judgment of R.L. Capoor – I (Supra), this Court
dismissed the Bank's appeal and held the entire disciplinary
proceeding is illegal and without jurisdiction on the ground that
Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation could be invoked only
when disciplinary proceedings had been initiated prior to
superannuation, and since initiation of a proceeding is only upon
issuance of a charge-sheet and not merely upon a show-cause
notice, the legal fiction thereunder could not be attracted.
40. The Bank thereafter filed a Review Petition, giving rise to the
judgment of (Supra), seeking to rely upon
R.L. Capoor – II
Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation. The review petition
was dismissed and this Court held that the legal fiction of deemed
pendency under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulation is of
limited scope, operating only to prevent an officer from resigning
during such proceedings, and cannot be extended to constitute
initiation of disciplinary proceedings for purposes of Regulation
20(3)(iii).
36
41. In both of these cases, therefore, this Court primarily
examined the scope and import of Regulations 20(3)(i), 20(3)(ii) and
20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulation, and elaborated upon the
meaning of the legal fiction as created by the expression ‘deemed to
be pending’
. Therefore, both these judgements only dealt with a very
specific issue i.e., applicability of legal fiction contained in
Regulation 20(3)(ii) for the purpose of Regulation 20(3)(iii). As such,
we find ourselves in agreement with the submission made by the
learned amicus that R.L. Capoor - I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor – II
(Supra) only deals with the contingency of Regulation 20(3)(iii) and
do not apply on the facts of the present case.
42. The view taken in RL Capoor – I (Supra) and R.L. Capoor - II
(Supra) has also been reiterated in the judgment of D.R.P.
Sundharam (Supra) by a Three-Judge Bench of this Court. It is to
observe here that in neither of these judgements the effect of the
Regulation 29 of Pension Regulation has been considered. More so,
all the judgments relate to the Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service
Regulation without dealing with the purport of Regulation 20(3)(i) &
(ii) of Service Regulation which is applicable to the facts of the case
37
at hand. Judgements of this Court in
State Bank of India & Ors.
9
and
v. Navin Kumar Sinha UCO Bank & Ors. v. M.B.Motwani
10
dealt with the cases involving
(Dead) thr. L.Rs and Ors ,
retirement on attaining the age of superannuation and the dispute
was adjudicated in light of R.L.Capoor – I (Supra), R.L.Capoor – II
(Supra) and D.R.P. Sudharam (Supra). As such, these judgements
will not have any implication on the fact of the present appeals.
43. In light of the discussions made above and by applying the
rule of harmonious construction with respect to the interplay of the
said provisions of the Pension Regulation and the Service
Regulation, the situation as emerges is that the officer submitted
his notice of voluntary retirement on 04.10.2010, giving three
months' notice as required, which would be effective till 04.01.2011.
In the meantime, a show cause notice was issued by the Appellant
on 11.11.2010 and as discussed, it would not indicate the intention
to institute disciplinary proceedings in terms of Regulation 20(3)(ii)
of the Service Regulation. Nonetheless, the existence of such a show
cause notice itself is not sufficient without refusal by competent
9 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3369
10 (2024) 13 SCC 109
38
authority to stop the automatic operation of the notice of voluntary
retirement. In absence, the notice of voluntary retirement would
take its course. In the present case, no such order of refusal or
order of withholding was passed by the competent authority within
the stipulated period. The notice of voluntary retirement, therefore,
became effective automatically by efflux of time upon the expiry of
the three-month period on 04.01.2011. This Court, accordingly,
finds no infirmity in the view taken by the High Court, which is
liable to be upheld.
Before parting with this judgment, we deem it necessary to
44.
place on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance
rendered by learned Amicus Curiae Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, Senior
Advocate by way of filing erudite submissions, therefore, we
acknowledge his assistance and place the same on record.
CONCLUSION
45. In the light of discussion made hereinabove, in our view, while
passing the impugned judgment, the High Court has not committed
any infirmity. The judgment rendered by the High Court is after a
thorough examination of facts and applicable regulations, therefore,
39
the conclusion drawn as such is in right perspective. In our view, it
is correct to hold that when an employee decides to severe master
servant relationship and serves a notice indicating such intention
specifying the period, by operation of law it will become effective in
absence of any order of refusal. The subsequent act of issuing
chargesheet and consequential order of dismissal is also not
justified in law. As directed by the High Court, the Respondent
shall be entitled to all consequential post-retiral benefits in terms of
this order as well. The Bank is directed to settle all the dues within
a period of three months along with applicable interest rate.
Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Appellant-Bank fail and are,
hereby, dismissed.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…….…………….…………J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)
…….…………….…………J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
New Delhi;
April 07, 2026.
40