Full Judgment Text
SLPR 2653-54/2016
2024 INSC 413
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal Nos 2481-2482 of 2024
(Arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 2653-2654 of 2016)
Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya ….Appellant
Versus
State of Gujarat ….Respondent
O R D E R
1 Leave granted.
2 Since the issues raised in both the captioned appeals are the same, the
parties are also the same and the challenge is also to the self-same
judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were taken up for
hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.
3 The appellant before this Court is the original first informant (complainant).
The appellant lodged a First Information Report No I-179/2012 at the
Surendranagar City Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections
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147, 148, 149, 427, 323, 325, 506(2), 384 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The FIR was lodged in all against five
accused persons.
4 The respondents before this Court are the original accused Nos 1 and 2
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN KUMAR
Date: 2024.05.14
17:17:44 IST
Reason:
respectively. Out of the five accused persons, two were named in the FIR,
“IPC”
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whereas three were not named. The respondents herein ultimately were put
to trial for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 329, 384,
387, 427, 506(2), 323 and 325 respectively of the IPC and Section 135 of the
Bombay Police Act.
5 The respondents herein came to be convicted by the Sessions Court for the
offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC and were sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment of five years with fine of Rs 5,000/- each. The
trial court also convicted the respondents for the offence punishable under
Section 323 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year and for the offence punishable under
Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, they came to be sentenced with
rigorous imprisonment of one year with fine of Rs 1,000/-.
6 The original accused Nos 3, 4, and 5, who were not named in the FIR came to
be acquitted by the trial court.
7 Against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court, the
respondents herein went in appeal before the High Court.
8 The two captioned appeals before this Court originate from Criminal Appeal
(For Enhancement) No 906 of 2014 and Criminal Appeal No 1330 of 2014
decided by the High Court.
9 These two appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos 906 of 2014 and 1330 of 2014
respectively came to be preferred by the appellant herein, one for
enhancement of sentence and the connected appeal against the order of
acquittal so far as the original accused Nos 3 to 5 are concerned. It may not
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be out of place to state at this stage that the respondents as original convicts
also preferred Criminal Appeal Nos 723 of 2014 and 733 of 2014 respectively
against the order of conviction and sentence.
10 The High Court heard in all five appeals, two filed by the appellant herein,
two filed by the respondents and the fifth appeal was filed by the State of
Gujarat. The acquittal appeal filed by the State of Gujarat was against the
original accused Nos 3 to 5. The High Court disposed of all the five appeals
by a common judgment. The operative part of the judgment and order
passed by the High Court reads thus:
“(a) The impugned judgment and order dated 31.05.2014
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Surendranagar in
Sessions Case No.14/2013 is modified only to the extent
that sentence imposed upon both original accused no.1 &
2 for conviction u/s.325 IPC is reduced from Five Years to
Four Years, without disturbing the order regarding fine and
default sentence. Rest of the impugned judgment and
order remains unaltered.
(b) Considering the principle rendered by Apex Court in
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (6)
SCC 770 and the request made by learned counsel Mr.
Hriday Buch that both Rs.2.50 lacs each, totalling Rs.5.00
Lacs (Rupees Five Lacs only), to the victim under the
provisions of Section 357 Cr.P.C., we do not find any
reasons in the facts and circumstances of the case for
denying the said benefit in favour of both accused no.1 &
2.
(c) Accordingly, while granting benefit of the judgment
rendered in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad’s case (supra) to
original accused no.1 & 2, it is directed that if both
accused no.1 & 2 deposit a sum of Rs.2.50 lacs each,
totalling Rs.5.00 Lacs (Rupees Five lacs only), before the
Registry of the concerned Sessions Court, within a period
of TEN WEEKS from today, which, in turn, shall be paid as
compensation to the victim, then both accused no.1 & 2
are not required to undergo the remainder sentence
imposed upon them, which has been modified by this
Court as aforesaid. On such deposit being made, the
Registry of concerned Sessions Court shall pay the entire
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amount to the victim, after due verification. It is clarified
that if any one or both the accused persons fail to deposit
the amount as aforesaid, they shall surrender to custody
on expiry of the aforesaid period failing which the
investigating agency shall take necessary steps for
sending them to jail custody. The impugned judgment and
order stands modified accordingly.”
11 Thus, it appears that the sentence of five years’ imprisonment as imposed by
the trial court came to be reduced to four years. The High Court further held
that if an amount of Rs 2.50 lakh is paid by each of the two respondents
before it, then the respondents need not undergo even the four years’ of
sentence as reduced by the High Court.
12 In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant (original complainant)
is before this Court with the present appeals.
13 Mr Harin P Raval, the learned senior counsel appearing for the complainant
vehemently submitted that what has been done by the High Court is
something impermissible in law. The amount of compensation which is
awarded to the victim has nothing to do with the substantive order of
sentence which the court imposes upon holding the accused guilty of the
alleged offence. According to Mr Raval, the High Court having reduced the
sentence of five years as imposed by the trial court to four years could not
have further modified the order of sentence on the premise that the
respondents are ready and willing to pay an amount of Rs 5 lakh by way of
compensation to the victim. He further submitted that the reliance placed by
the High Court on the decision of this Court in the case of Ankush Shivaji
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Gaikwad vs State of Maharashtra , is completely misplaced.
(2013) 6 SCC 770
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14 In such circumstances referred to above, Mr Raval prayed that the impugned
judgment of the High Court be set aside and the respondents be asked to
undergo sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment.
15 On the other hand, these appeals have been vehemently opposed by Mr
Purvish Malkan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents (original
accused persons). He would submit that no error much less an error of law
could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned order. He also submitted that it’s been now twelve years since the
incident had occurred. He also submitted that the amount of Rs 5 lakh has
been deposited before the trial court.
16 In such circumstances referred to above, he prayed that there being no merit
in these appeals, the same may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
17 Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone
through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our
consideration is whether the procedure adopted by the High Court, as
reflected in paragraph 19 of the operative part of the order, could be said to
be in accordance with law.
18 Section 357of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads thus:
“357. Order to pay compensation .—(1) When a Court
imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence
of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when
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passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine
recovered to be applied—
( a ) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the
prosecution;
( b ) in the payment to any person of compensation for
any loss or injury caused by the offence, when
compensation is, in the opinion of the Court,
recoverable by such person in a civil court;
( c ) when any person is convicted of any offence for
having caused the death of another person or of
having abetted the commission of such an offence, in
paying compensation to the persons who are, under
the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855) , entitled to
recover damages from the person sentenced for the
loss resulting to them from such death;
( d ) when any person is convicted of any offence which
includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal
breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly
received or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted
in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having
reason to believe the same to be stolen, in
compensating any bona fide purchaser of such
property for the loss of the same if such property is
restored to the possession of the person entitled
thereto.
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal,
no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for
presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be
presented, before the decision of the appeal.
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not
form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the
accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount
as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered
any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused
person has been so sentenced.
(4) An order under this section may also be made by an
Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when
exercising its powers of revision.
(5) At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent
civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into
account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under this
section.”
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19 Way back in 1981, this Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in Maru Ram
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vs Union of India & Others , held that while social responsibility of the
criminal to restore the loss or heal the injury is part of the punitive exercise;
the length of the prison term is no reparation to the crippled or bereaved and
is futility compounded with cruelty. Section 357 provides power to award
compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed
on accused. Time and again this Court has reiterated that it is an important
provision but courts seldom invoke the same. It empowers the court to award
compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to
conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of
compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused.
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20 In Hari Singh vs Sukhbir Singh and Others , this Court held that the
power to award compensation under Section 357 of the CrPC is not ancillary
to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to
do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the
criminal justice system. As observed in Hari Singh (supra), it is a measure
of responding appropriately to crime as well as of reconciling the victim with
the offender. It is, a constructive approach to crimes.
21 The High Court having upheld the conviction for the offence punishable
under Section 325 of the IPC so far as the two respondents herein are
concerned and having reduced the sentence from five years rigorous
imprisonment to four years rigorous imprisonment could not have further
diluted the order of sentence by asking the accused persons to pay
3 (1981) 1 SCC 107
(1988) 4 SCC 551
4
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compensation. In other words, the High Court having once affirmed the
conviction and awarded sentence of four years could not have further in lieu
of the same reduced it by ordering compensation. To this extent, we have no
hesitation in holding that the High Court fell into error.
22 The idea of victim compensation is based on the theory of victimology which
recognizes the harsh reality that victims are unfortunately the forgotten
people in the criminal justice delivery system. Victims are the worst
sufferers. Victims ‟ family is ruined particularly in cases of death and grievous
bodily injuries. This is apart from the factors like loss of reputation,
humiliation, etc. Theory of Victimology seeks to redress the same and
underscores the importance for criminal justice administration system to
take into consideration the effect of the offence on the victim's family even
though human life cannot be restored but then monetary compensation will
at least provide some solace.
23 The provision of Section 357 recognizes the aforesaid and is victim centric in
nature. It has nothing to do with the convict or the sentence passed. The
spotlight is on the victim only. The object of victim compensation is to
rehabilitate those who have suffered any loss or injury by the offence which
has been committed. Payment of victim compensation cannot be a
consideration or a ground for reducing the sentence imposed upon the
accused as victim compensation is not a punitive measure and only
restitutory in nature and thus, has no bearing with the sentence that has
been passed which is punitive in nature.
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24 The words “ any loss or injury ” used in Section 357 of the CrPC clearly
indicates that the sole factor for deciding the compensation to be paid is the
victim’s loss or injury as a result of the offence, and has nothing to do with
the sentence that has been passed. Section 357 of CrPC is intended to
reassure the victim that he/she is not forgotten in the criminal justice
system. It is a constructive approach to crimes based on the premise that
mere punishment of the offender may not give solace to the victim or its
family.
25 As such, when deciding the compensation which is to be paid to a victim, the
only factor that the court may take into consideration is the convict’s
capacity to pay the compensation and not the sentence that has been
imposed. In criminal proceedings the courts should not conflate sentence
with compensation to victims. Sentences such as imprisonment and / or fine
are imposed independently of any victim compensation and thus, the two
stand on a completely different footing, either of them cannot vary the other.
Where an accused is directed to pay compensation to victims, the same is
not meant as punishment or atonement of the convict but rather as a step
towards reparation to the victims who have suffered from the offence
committed by the convict.
26 If payment of compensation becomes a consideration for reducing sentence,
then the same will have a catastrophic effect on the criminal justice
administration. It will result in criminals with a purse full of money to buy
their way out of justice, defeating the very purpose of criminal proceedings.
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27 Having held so as above, the last question that falls for our consideration is
how do we modify the order of the High Court. According to Mr Raval that
part of the High Court’s order be set aside and the respondents be directed
to undergo sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment.
28 We could have easily done as submitted by Mr Raval, but in the facts and
circumstances of the case, more particularly, keeping in mind that a period
of twelve years has elapsed and when the respondents (original convicts)
have already deposited the amount of Rs 5 lakh, we are not inclined to direct
the respondents to undergo further sentence of four years. However, having
said so, we direct each of the respondents to deposit a further sum of Rs 5
lakh, i.e. in all Rs 10 lakh, in addition to what they have already deposited
before the trial court. This deposit shall be made within a period of eight
weeks from today. The trial court shall disburse the entire amount of Rs 15
lakh to the appellant herein (original complainant) after proper identification.
29 With the aforesaid, the appeals are disposed of.
30 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
….....…...….......…………………..J.
[J B Pardiwala]
.....…........……………….…........J.
[Manoj Misra]
New Delhi;
May 9, 2024
CKB
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ITEM NO.22 COURT NO.15 SECTION II-B
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.2653-2654/2016
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 29-10-2015
in CRLA No.960/2014 and CRLA No.1330/2014 passed by the High Court
of Judicature of Gujarat)
RAJENDRA BHAGWANJI UMRANIYA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s)
(With IA No. 35887/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T., IA
No.5856/2016 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and IA No.34536/2020 -
PERMISSION TO PLACE ON RECORD SUBSEQUENT FACTS)
WITH S.L.P.(Crl) Nos.7072-7073/2016 (II-B)
(With IA No.14382/2016 - CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING and IA No.
15004/2016 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT)
Date : 09-05-2024 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv.
Mr. Purvish Jitendra Malkan, Adv.
Mr. Vikash Singh, AOR
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Adv.
Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv.
Mr. Rushabh N. Kapadia, Adv.
Mr. Mohit Prasad, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singh, Adv.
Mr. Harin P Raval, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ritvik Bhanot, Adv.
Ms. Shrestha Narayan, Adv.
Ms. Urmi H Raval, Adv.
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Ms. Shreya Bhansal, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, AOR
Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Adv.
Ms. Srujana Suman Mund, Adv.
Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv.
Mr. Purvish Jitendra Malkan, Adv.
Mr. Vikash Singh, AOR
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Adv.
Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv.
Mr. Rushabh N. Kapadia, Adv.
Mr. Mohit Prasad, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
SLP (Crl) Nos 2653-2654 of 2016
1 Leave granted.
2 The criminal appeals are disposed of in terms of the signed order.
3 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
SLP (Crl) Nos 7072-7073 of 2016
1 We are not inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petition under Article 136
of the Constitution of India.
2 The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
3 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(CHETAN KUMAR) (RAM SUBHAG SINGH)
A.R.-cum-P.S. Court Master
(Signed Reportable Order is placed on the file)
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