Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
IN THE MATTER OF MADHU LIMAYE & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
18/12/1968
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
BENCH:
GROVER, A.N.
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1969 AIR 1014 1969 SCR (3) 154
ACT:
Constitution of India, Art. 22,(1)-Necessity of informing
person arrested grounds for his arrest-Arrest illegal if
Article not complied with-Order of remand by magistrate
cannot cure constitutional infirmity.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners were arrested on November 6, 1968 at a
railway station in Bihar. According to the Sub-Inspector’s
report recorded in the general diary they had taken out a
procession in defiance of a prohibitory order under s. 144
Cr. P.C. and had been arrested under s. 151 Cr. P.C. It
was stated that report was being submitted "under sections
107 and 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under s. 188
of the Indian Penal Code." On November 6 itself the first
petitioner sent a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
in the form of a letter mentioning that he and his
companions had been arrested but no grounds of ’arrest had
been communicated to them and they had been merely told that
the arrests had been made "under sections which were
bailable". It was prayed that a writ of Habeas Corpus be
issued. On November 7, 1968 a similar petition was sent by
the petitioners from Jail. The additional fact given was
that the arrested persons had been produced before the sub-
Divisional Magistrate who bad on their refusal to furnish
bail remanded them to custody upto November 20, 1968. Rule
nisi was issued by this Court to the State authorities to
produce the petitioners before the Court on November 25,
1968. On November 19, 1968 a first information report was
recorded in which it was alleged that the petitioners had on
November 6, 1968 committed offences under ss. 188 and 143 of
the Penal Code. In the return, before this Court it was
explained on behalf of the State that the officer-in-charge
while forwarding the arrested persons on November 6, 1968,
had by mistake omitted to mention s. 143 I.P.C. which was a
cognizable offence. It was urged that the order of remand
passed by the Magistrate could not be said to be illegal
merely because of the omission of s. 143 I.P.C. in the order
sheet when the police report clearly made out a case under
that section. It was not claimed that the grounds of arrest
had been supplied to the petitioners.
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HELD : (i) When the arrests were effected by the Sub-
Inspector on November 6, 1968, the offences for which the
arrests were made were not stated to be cognizable. In the
various reports etc. the only offence alleged was one under
s. 188 I.P.C. which is non-cognizable. There was force in
the suggestion of the petitioners that the first information
report came to be recorded formally on November 19, 1968
only because the matter had been brought to this Court by
way of a petition under Art. 32 and a further petition had
been moved in the :High Court under Art. 226. It was not
proved that the arrest had been made at the direction of a
Magistrate who was present. It was somewhat surprising that
no affidavit of the said Magistrate had been filed. It
would be legitimate to conclude that the arrest of the
petitioners was effected by the police officers concerned
without any specific orders or directions of a Magistrate on
November 6, 1968 for the offences and proceedings mentioned
before in the various reports made prior to November 19,
1968. 1159 D-E; 160 B-161 B]
155
(ii) The two requirements of cl. (1) of Art. 22 are meant to
afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to
remove any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in
the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know
exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can
exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal
practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him.
Whenever the Article is not complied with the petitioner
would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corp s directing his
release. [162 E-163 C]
In the present case the return filed by the State did not
contain any information as to when and by whom the
petitioners were informed of the grounds of their -arrest.
It had not been contended on behalf of the State that the
circumstances were such that the arrested persons trust have
known the, general nature of the alleged offences for which
they had been arrested. The petitioners were therefore
entitled to be released on this ground alone. [ 163 F]
(iii) Once it was shown that the arrests made by the
police officers were illegal it was necessary for the State
to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate
directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind
to all relevant matters. This the State had failed to do.
The remand orders were patently routine and appeared to have
been made mechanically. if the detention of the petitioners
in, custody could not continue after their arrest because
of the violation of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution’, they
were entitled to be released forthwith. The
orders of remand were not such as would cure the
constitutional infirmities. [1163 G-164 B]
Christie & Anr. v. Leachinsky, [1947] 1 All, E.R. 567, Ram
Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors., A.I.R. 1953 S.C.
277, applied.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 355 of 1968.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for writ
in the nature of habeas corpus.
The petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 appeared in person.
M. C. Chagla and D. Goburdhun, for the State of Bihar.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Grover, J. Madhu Limaye, Member of Lok Sabha, and several
other persons were arrested on November 6, 1968 at
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Lakhisarai Railway Station near Monghyr. On the same date
Madhu Limaye addressed a petition in the form of a letter to
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution mentioning that
he along with his companions had been arrested but had not
been communicated the reasons or the grounds for arrest. It
was stated that the arrested persons had been merely told
that the arrests had been made "under sections which were
bailable". It was prayed that a writ of Habeas Corpus be
issued for restoring liberty as the arrest and detention
were illegal. On November 7, 1968, a similar petition was
sent from Monghyr jail. The additional fact given was that
the arrested persons had been produced before the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate who had offered to
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release them on bail but they had refused to furnish bail.
The Magistrate had, thereupon, remanded them to custody up
to November 20, 1968. This Court issued a rule nisi to the,
GOVernment of Bihar and Supdt. District Jail, Moghyr to
produce Madhu Limaye and others whose names were given in
the order dated November 12, 1968 on November 25, 1968.
The State of Bihar filed a return but on November 25, 1968
the Court directed the Advocate General of Bihar to produce
the relevant documents in connection with the recording of
the first information report, the investigation made, the
report to the Magistrate and order sheet, etc. The hearing
was adjourned to December 2, 1968.
It is apparent from the documents and papers placed before
us that on November 2, 1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
Monghyr issued an order under s. 144, Cr.P.C. prohibiting
assemblage of five or more persons within the limits of 100
yards of Kiul and Lakhisarai Railway Stations for a period
of one week from November 5, 1968 to November 12, 1968.
According to the report submitted by the Sub-Inspector in-
charge of the Government Railway Police Station Kiul to the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Madhu Limaye and others
had defied the prohibitory orders issued under s. 144
Cr.P.C., by holding and addressing a public meeting at the
railway ground at Lakhisarai Railway Station between 4.30
p.m. and 6.30 p.m. on November 5, 1968 and some out of them
had exhorted the public in provocative language to offer
satyagraha at the Railway Station and to disrupt the railway
communications as also to obstruct the normal functioning of
the railway offices at Lakhisarai. It was prayed that their
prosecution be ordered under s. 188. Indian Penal Code.
Dharamraj Singh Sub-Inspector entered a report (Sanha) No.
109 on November 6, 1968, in the general diary. It was
stated inter alia that Madhu Limaye and others took out a
procession at 3 O’Clock with a flag in violation of the
order made under s. 144, Cr.P.C. They had entered the Rail-
way Station for launching a strike shunting slogans. This
group had been followed by several other groups of persons
the last being the 8th group (the names in each group were
mentioned). All these persons had been arrested under s.
151, Cr.P.C. and had been sent to the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, Sadar, Monghyr. These incidents happened in the
presence of Shri Mathur, Magistrate 1st Class, Monghyr, Shri
B. N. Singh, Railway Magistrate Kiul etc. It was stated
that the report was being submitted " under sections 107 and
117 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under S. 188 of the
Indian Penal Code". Admittedly no first information report
was formally registered on that date which was done on
November 19, 1968 at 23.30 hrs. In this report
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in which the date of occurrence is mentioned ’as November 6,
1968 it was stated that the accused persons had entered the
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Railway Station by illegally forming a mob disobeying the
order under s. 144, Cr.P.C. to disturb the normal
functioning of the railways and had committed offences under
s. 143, I.P.C. and s. 122 of the Railways Act.
The State of Bihar has filed a return according to which the
circumstances in which the prohibitory order was promulgated
under s. 144, Cr.P.C., are set out. It was stated that from
the leaflets circulated by the Lakhisarai unit of the
Samyukta Socialist Party on November 4, 1968, it appeared
that the party had decided to hold a public meeting on
November 5, 1968 and to launch satyagraha at Lakhisarai on
November 6, under the leadership of Madhu Limaye. On
November 5, Madhu Limaye and others held a public meeting of
about 400 persons at the railway ground in defiance of the
order under s. 144 Cr.P.C. and exhorted the public to hold
satyagraha at Lakhisarai Railway Station on November 6 etc.
A report was submitted by the officer-in-charge of the Kiul
Government Railway Police Station on November 6, on which
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, made an order on
November 11, 1968 directing show cause notices to be issued
to Madhu Limaye and others as to why action under s. 188,
Indian Penal Code, should not be taken against them. On
November 6, 1968, a procession of about 200 persons of
Samyukta Socialist Party led by Madhu Limaye and others came
to the main gate of the platform of Lakhisarai Railway
Station where a Magistrate, Inspector of Railway Police and
Officer-in-charge of Kiul Government Railway Police Station
were present. When these persons, in spite of the warning,
forcibly entered the platform and violated the order under
s. 144, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate on duty, Shri K. B. Mathur,
directed the police officers present to arrest them. Madhu
Limaye and others were arrested and a case was instituted
against them. They were produced before the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate who, on November 6, remanded them to jail custody
till November 20, as they refused to furnish bail bonds. On
November 6, another report was submitted by ’the officer-in-
charge, Kiul Government Railway Police Station for the inci-
dents which happened on November 6, 1968. A case had been
started on that report and show cause notices had been
issued for November 20, 1968 as to why action should not be
taken under s. 188, I.P.C. It was claimed that Madhu Limaye
and others had committed offences under s. 188 and under s.
143 Penal Code (which is cognizable) by violating the orders
made under s. 144 Cr.P.C., and by forming unlawful assembly.
It was explained that while forwarding the arrested persons
the Officer-in-charge, my mistake, omitted to mention s.
143. It
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was asserted that the order of remand passed by the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate could not be said to be illegal merely
because of omission of s. 143, Indian Penal Code, in the
order sheet when the police report clearly made out a case
under that section. It was affirmed that Madhu Limaye and
others had not been arrested on November 6, while they were
participating in a peaceful satyagraha or that the officer-
in-charge Kiul purported to arrest all these persons only
under ss. 151, 107 and 117 of the Cr.P.C.
The annexures attached to the return filed by the State and
the documents contained in the original records which were
sent for have revealed the following state of affairs. On
November 6, the officer-in-charge, Government Railway Police
Station Kiul made what is called report (annexure-D) under
s. 107(3), Cr.P.C. This contained a prayer that Madhu Limaye
and 115 others, vide list attached, should be bound over
under s. 107 with an order to furnish ad-interim bonds. It
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was stated under column No. 5 (brief history of the case)
that as their acts on November 6, 1968 between 09.15 hrs.
and 16.30 hrs. on the Lakhisarai Railway Station were likely
to lead to breach of peace 1.51, Cr.P.C. The same police
officer addressed a letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Sadar, to the following effect :
"I am forwarding herewith the following
accused persons (list attached herewith) in
custody as they have been arrested u/s
151/107/117(3), Cr.P.C. They may kindly be
remanded in jail Hazat for a fortnight by
which time report u/s 107/117(3) Cr.P.C. and
188 T.P.C. be routed through proper channel."
As stated in the return two show cause notices were issued
by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Shri P. P. N. Sahi on
November 11, 1968 relating to the incidents on November 5,
1968 and the following day. Madhu Limaye and others were
asked to show cause why action should not be taken against
them under s. 188. On November 19, 1968 another order was
made by a different Sub-Divisional Magistrate Shri K. K.
Pathak saying that a petition had been filed on behalf of
the State in which it was alleged that the accused persons
had committed offences tinder ss. 143/448 I.P.C., by forming
unlawful assembly with the common object of committing
criminal trespass in violation of the duly promulgated order
under s. 144 Cr.P.C. It was prayed that these persons be
summoned for being tried for offences under the aforesaid
sections. A show cause notice appears to have been issued
on or about November 20, 1968. The remand orders which were
passed on November 6 and 20, 1968
159
were made on the basis that the accused persons had been
"arrested and forwarded under custody under ss. 151/107/117
Cr-P.C. by Sub-Inspector, Government Railway Police Station
Kiul".
Madhu Limaye, who has addressed arguments in person’, has
raised, inter alia, the following main contentions :
1. The arrests on November 6, 1968 were
illegal inasmuch as they had been effected by
Police Officers for offences which were non-
cognizable.
2. There, was a violation of the mandatory
provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution.
3. The orders for remand were bad and
vitiated.
4. The arrests were effected for extraneous
considerations and were actuated by mala
fides.
The entire sequence of events from November 5, 1968 onwards
is somewhat unusual and has certain features which have not
been explained on behalf of the State. In the first place
when the arrests were effected by the Sub-Inspector In-
charge of Government Railway Police Station on November 6,
1968 the offences for which the arrests were made were not
stated to be cognizable. In the various reports etc., to
which reference has been made the only offence alleged was
one under s. 188 I.P.C. which is non-cognizable. On
November 6, 1968 apart from the allegation of commission of
offences under s. 188 the police reports disclose a variety
of proceedings which were sought to be taken. Section 151
in all likelihood was invoked for effecting the arrests but
proceedings were initiated under s. 107 which appears in
Chapter VIII of the Cr.P.C. Under that section the
Magistrate can require a person about whom information has
been received that he is likely to commit a breach of peace,
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to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond
for a period not exceeding one year, for keeping peace.
Under s. 117, which was also invoked, the Magistrate makes
an enquiry as to the truth of an information. But
proceedings under S. 107 have to follow the procedure laid
down in Chapter VIII and arrest cannot be effected unless a
Magistrate issues a warrant for that purpose under s. 114.
Section 151 which has been repeatedly referred to in various
documents is meant for arresting without a warrant and
without orders from a Magistrate if a police officer knows
of a design to commit any cognizable offence and if it
appears to him that the commission of such offence cannot be
otherwise prevented.
There can be no manner of doubt, and this position has
hardly been controverted by Mr. Chagla for the State, that
in all the documents which were prepared before November 19,
16 0
1968 there was no mention of an offence under S. 143 I.P.C.
having been committed by Madhu Limaye and other persons who-
were arrested on November 6, 1968. It is obviously for that
reason that no formal first information report was recorded
on November 6, 1968 which would have necessarily been done
if the police officers effecting arrests had thought of S.
143, Indian Penal Code which is a cognizable offence. No
explanation has been furnished on behalf of the State as to
why the information which was recorded in the general diary
on November 6, was not recorded as an information in
cognizable cases under s. 154 of the Cr.P. Code. There
is,force in the suggestion of Madhu Limaye that the first
information report came to be recorded formally on November
19, 1968 only because the matter had been brought to this
Court by way of a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
and after a rule nisi had been issued and a petition under
Art. 226 had been filed in the Patna High Court. The
authorities then realised that they had been completely
oblivious of the true position that arrests could not have
been effected for a non-cognizable offence made punishable
under s. 188, Indian Penal Code or for taking proceedings
under s. 107, Cr.P.C. Under S. 151 Cr.P.Code the police
officer could have arrested without a warrant but Mr. Chagla
has not sought justification for the arrests under that
provision. He has pointed out that a prohibitory order had
been issued under s. 144 which had been defied by Madhu
Limaye and the other persons and therefore an offence had
been committed under S. 143 I.P.C. The mere omission, he
says, to mention a section cannot affect the legality or
validity of the proceedings. Mr. Chagla has also laid a
great deal of emphasis on the statement in the return that
when Madhu Limaye and others were arrested they had violated
the orders under S. 144, Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate on duty
Shri K. B. Mathur directed the police officers present to
arrest them. The return is supported by an affidavit of
Shri S. C. Prasad, Magistrate 1st Class, Monghyr according
to whom the contents of para 6 in which this statement
occurs were true to his knowledge. It is somewhat
surprising that the affidavit of Shri K. B. Mathur has not
been filed who would have deposed to all that happened in
his presence and the reasons for ordering the arrests. It
is most unusual and extraordinary that in spite of arrests
having been ordered by the Magistrate there is not one word
in any of the papers or documents which have been produced
relating to this fact. The least that was expected was that
there would have been some mention of the order in the
detailed statement entered in General Diary by the Sub-Ins-
pector in-charge Kiul Police Station on November 6, on the
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basis of which a formal first information report was
registered on November 19, 1968. There, however, only the
pre-
161
sence of certain officers and other persons including Shri
Mathur is noted. It would be legitimate to conclude that
the arrest of Madhu Limaye and his companions was effected
by the police officers concerned without any specific orders
or directions of a Magistrate on November 6, 1968 for the
offences and the proceedings mentioned ’before in the
various reports made prior to November 19, 1968.
The submission of Madhu Limaye on the second point has
hardly been effectively met on behalf of the State. Art.
22(1) provides that no person who is arrested shall be
detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may
be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied
the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner
of his choice. Madhu Limaye had, in his petitions addressed
to this Court, made a positive assertion that he and his
companions had not been informed of the grounds for their
arrest. In the return filed by the State this assertion has
neither been controverted nor has anything been stated with
reference to it, It appears that the authorities wanted to
invoke all kinds of provisions like ss. 151, 107/117 of the
Cr.P.C. apart from s. 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Since
no arrest could be effected for an offence under s. 188 by
the police officers without proper order these officers may
have been naturally reluctant to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Art. 22(1) by giving the necessary
information. At any rate, whatever the reasons, it has not
been explained even during the course of arguments before us
why the arrested persons were not told the reasons for their
arrest or of the offences for which they had been taken into
custody.
Art. 22(1) embodies a rule which has always been regarded as
vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal liberty in
all legal systems where the Rule of Law prevails. For
example, the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America contains similar provisions and so does
Art. XXXIV of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In
England whenever an arrest is made without a warrant, the
arrested person has a right to be informed not only that he
is being arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the
arrest. The House of Lords in Christie & Another v.
Leachinsky(1) went into the origin and development of this
rule. In the words of Viscount Simon if a policeman who
entertained a reasonable suspicion that X had committed a
felony were at liberty to arrest him and march him off to a
police station without giving any explanation of why he was
doing this, the prima facie right of personal liberty would
be gravely infringed. Viscount Simon laid down several
proposi-
(1) [1947] 1 AII E.L.R.567.
162
tions which were not meant to be exhaustive. For our
purposes we may refer to the first and the third :
"1. If a policeman arrests without warrant
upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of
other crime of a sort which does not require a
warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances
inform the person arrested of the true ground
of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the
reason to himself or to give a reason which is
not the true reason. in other words, a
’citizen is entitled to know on what charge or
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on suspicion of what crime he is seized.
2.............................
3. The requirement that the person arrested
should be informed of the reason why he is
seized naturally does not exist if the
circumstances are such that he must know the
general nature of the alleged offence for
which he is detained."
Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the
circumstances where the accused must know why
he is being arrested:
"There is no need to explain the reasons of
arrest if the arrested man is caught red-
handed and the crime is patent to high
Heaven."
The two requirements of clause (1) of Art. 22 are meant to
afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to
remove any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in
the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know
exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can-
exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal
practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him.
Clause (2) of Art. 22 provides ’the next and most material
safeguard that the arrested person must be produced before a
Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest so that an
independent authority exercising judicial powers may without
delay apply its mind to his case. The Criminal Procedure
Code contains analogous provisions in ss. 60 and 340 but our
Constitution makers were anxious to make these safeguards an
integral part of fundamental rights. That is what Dr. B.
-R. Ambedkar said while moving, for insertion of Art. 15A
(as numbered in the draft Bill of the Constitution) which
corresponded to present Art. 22 :
"Article 15A merely lifts from the provisions
of the Criminal Procedure Code two of the most
fundamental principles which every civilised
country follows as principles of international
justice. It is quite true that these two
provisions contained in clause 1) and clause
163
(2)are already to be found in the Criminal
Procedure Code and thereby probably it might
be said that we are really not making any very
fundamental change. But we are, as I contend,
making a fundamental change because what we
are doing by the introduction of Article 15A
is to put a limitation upon the authority both
of Parliament as well as of the Provincial
Legislature not to abrogate these two
provisions, because they are now introduced in
our Constitution itself."
As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors. this
Court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon
to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what
they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and
scrupulously, observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever
that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ
of Habeas Corpus directing his release.
It remains to be seen whether any proper cause has been
shown in the return for declining the prayer of Madhu Limaye
and other arrested persons for releasing them on the ground
that there was non-compliance-with the provisions of Art.
22(1) of the Constitution. In Ram Narayan Singh’s case(1)
it was laid down that the Court must have regard to the
legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the
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return. In the present case the return dated November 20,
1968 was filed before the date of the first hearing after
the rule nisi had been issued. The return, as already
observed, does not contain any information as to when and by
whom Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons were informed
of the grounds for their arrest. It has not been contended
on behalf of the State that the circumstances were such that
the arrested persons must have known the general nature of
the alleged offences for which they had been arrested’, vide
proposition No. 3 in Christie & Another v. Leachinsky (2).
Nor has it been suggested that the show cause notices which
were issued on November 11, 1968 satisfied the
constitutional requirement. Madhu Limaye and others are,
therefore, entitled to be released on this ground alone.
Once it is shown that the arrests made by the police
officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to
establish that at the stage -of remand the Magistrate
directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind
to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do.
The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have
been made mechanically. All that Mr. Chagla has said is
that if the arrested person wanted to challenge their
legality the High Court should have been moved
(1) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277.
(2) [1947] All F.I.R. 567,
164
under appropriate, provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and
others have, by moving this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, complained of detention or confinement in jail
without compliance with the constitutional and legal
provisions. If their detention in custody could not
continue after their arrest because of the violation of Art.
22(1) of the Constitution they were entitled to be released
forthwith. The orders of remand are not such as would cure
the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the third
contention of Madhu Limaye.
We have been pressed to decide the question of mala fides
which is the fourth contention of Madhu Limayes Normally
such matters are not gone into by this Court in these
proceedings and can be more appropriately agitated in such
other legal action as he may be advised to institute or
take.
We would like to make it clear that we have ordered the
release of Madhu Limaye and the other arrested persons with
regard to whom rule nisi was issued on the sole ground of
violation of the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the
Constitution. We desire to express no opinion on the
legality or illegality of the arrests made on November 6,
1968 of these persons with reference to the first point,
namely, that the police officer purported to have effected
the arrests for the offences under s. 188. Indian Penal
Code, and under S. 151 as also in respect of proceedings
under s. 107 of the Cr.P.C., as these matters are subjudice.
We may also proceed to add that any expression of opinion or
observation in these proceedings shall not affect the course
of the enquiry or trial of the arrested persons concerning
the occurrences on November 5 and 6, 1960 which may be
pending in the courts in the State of Bihar and such
proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons have already been
ordered to be released by this Court and no further
directions are necessary in the matter of their being set at
liberty.
G.C. Petitions allowed.
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