Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
RAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN & IRS, ETC. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PEAREY LAL WORKSHOP (P) LTD. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/04/1986
BENCH:
MISRA, R.B. (J)
BENCH:
MISRA, R.B. (J)
DUTT, M.M. (J)
CITATION:
1986 AIR 1682 1986 SCR (2) 537
1986 SCC (3) 38 JT 1986 415
1986 SCALE (1)550
ACT:
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, s. 14(2) - Tenant
depositing arrears of rent - When entitled to protection of
non-eviction.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants-landlords flied three eviction petitions
against not the three respondents tenants in respect of
different portions of a building situated in New Delhi under
section (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952
(Act of 19523 on the ground of non-payment of rent. During
the pendency of the proceedings, the Delhi Rent Control Act
1958 (Act of 1958) came into force. The respondents-tenants,
however, deposited the arrears and got the benefit of non-
eviction under Section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and the
petitions were dismissed
The appellants-landlords again flied three petitions
for eviction of the respondents on the ground that the
respondents-tenants had committed a second default in the
payment of arrears of rent. The respondents deposited the
arrears of rent in time as contemplated by section 15 of the
Act of 1958 and sought the protection of non-eviction within
the meaning of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act of
1958. The appellants contended before the Additional Rent
Controller that the respondents had derived benefit of non-
eviction under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 once and
they were not entitled to get the same benefit under section
14(2) twice over in view of the proviso to sub-section (2)
of section 14 of the Act of 1958. It was argued on behalf of
the respondents that they had deposited the arrears of rent
as provided by 8.15 of the Act of 1958 and therefore they
were entitled to get the benefit of sub-section 2 of section
14 and the benefit derived by the respondents under section
13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not stand in the way of the
respondents getting the benefit of sub-section 2 of section
14 of the Act of 1958. The
538
Additional Rent Controller dismissed the petitions holding
that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of sub-
section 2 of section 14 of the Act on account of the deposit
made by them in pursuance of the provisions of section 15 of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
the Act of 1958 and that the benefit once derived by the
respondents under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not
attract the proviso to sub-section 2 and they are entitled
to the benefit of non-eviction under sub-section 14(2) of
the Act of 1958. The Rent Control Tribunal and the High
Court confirmed the order of the Additional Rent Controller
in the first and second appeal respectively.
Dismissing the appeals by the appellants,
^
HELD: 1. The respondents cannot be deprived of the
benefit of section 14(2) of the 1958 Act merely because they
had obtained similar benefit under sub-section 2 of section
13 of the Act of 1952. [546 F-G]
2(i). If the words of statute are clear, there is no
question of interpretation. Grammatical construction has
been accepted as the golden rule. [546 F]
2(ii). Sub-section 2 of s. 14 of the 1958 Act
contemplates to give the benefit to a tenant of non-
eviction, if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required
by section 15. Obviously, therefore, sub-section 2
contemplates that the benefit of non-eviction under this
sub-section can be given only to a tenant who has made a
deposit as required by section 15 of the Act of 1958.
Therefore, the deposit made under section 13(2) of the Act
of 1952 has been completely excluded by sub-section 2. The
proviso to sub-section 2 also puts a bar on deriving the
benefit under this sub-section i.e. sub-section 2 of section
14; thus if the expressions "deposit, under-section 15 in
sub-section 2 of section 14" and "such benefit" in the
proviso thereto is given a meaning, there is no escape from
the conclusion that no second benefit can be given to a
tenant if he had already received the benefit under sub-
section 2 by deposit made in accordance with the provisions
of section 15 of the Act of 1958. [545 C-E]
3. Sub-section 2 of s. 57 is a saving clause and
provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1952,
539
all suits and other proceedings under the said Act pending
at the commencement of this Act, before any court or other
authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the said act, as if the said Act hat
continued in force and this Act had not been passed. In view
of this clear saving clause the deposit made by the
respondents must be taken to be a deposit under section
13(2) of the Act of 1952 and if the case is covered squarely
by sub-section 2 of section 57, it is not at all necessary
to take into consideration the other provisions of the Act.
[545 H; 546 A-B]
4. There is marked difference between the provisions of
8. 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and 88. 14(2) and 15 of the Act
of 1958. Section 15(2) is redically different from the
provisions of section 13 of the old Act and the distinction
between the two sections has been clearly made out by the
Delhi High Court in Dhan Raj Jayna v. S.P. Singh, A.I.R.
1973 Delhi 297. [546 E-F]
Dhan Raj Jayna v. S,P, Singh, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 297,
approved.
J.K. Steel Ltd, v. Union of India, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 481,
497, referred to. E
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1921 of
1976 etc.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
From the Order dated 17.9.75 of the Delhi High Court in
S.A.O. No. 144 of 1975.
Madan Bhatia and Sushil Kumar for the appellants.
R.P. Bhatt and Parveen Kumar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G
R.B. MISRA, J. The fate of the present connected
appeals by special leave hinges upon the interpretation of
section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1958").
Premises No. 9607 known as Pyare Lal Building, Janpath
and Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi, is owned by the appellants.
Three
540
different portions of the said building were let out to
three different firms, M/s. Pearey Lal Workshop (P) Ltd.,
M/s. Ghaziabad Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. and M/s. Pearey Lal
& Sons, on agreed rent of Rs. 400, Rs. 273 and Rs. 1094 per
month respectively.
The tenants-respondents had applied for fixation of
standard rent before the Rent Controller who fixed standard
rent of the three premises but on appeal the order of the
Rent Controller fixing standard rent was set aside by the
High Court by its order dated May 22, 1972 holding that the
tenants were liable to pay the agreed rent.
It appears that the tenants fell in arrears of rent
and did not pay the same in spite of service of notice of
demand. The appellants, therefore, were compelled to file
three different petitions for eviction of the respondents
under section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,
1952 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1952"). During
the pendency of the proceedings the Act of 1958 came into
force. The tenants however deposited the arrears and got the
benefit of non-eviction under section 13(2) of the Act of
1952 which provides that no decree or order for the recovery
of possession of any premises shall be passed on the ground
of default in payment of rent if, on the first date of the
hearing of the proceedings for eviction or within such
further time as may be allowed by the court, the tenant pays
in cash the arrears of rent then due together with the costs
of the suit.
The respondents again committed a default in the
payment of arrears of rent and failed to pay the same within
two months of the service of notice of demand as required by
Clause (a) of sub-section 1 of section 14 of the Act of
1958. The appellants therefore filed three petitions giving
rise to the present appeals for eviction on the ground of
second default. The respondents, however, deposited the
arrears of rent within one month of the date of the order as
contemplated by section 15 of the Act of 1958 and sought the
protection of non-eviction within the meaning of sub-section
2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958. The appellants, however,
sought the advantage of the proviso to sub-section 2 of
section 14 and alleged that the respondents had derived the
benefit of
541
non-eviction under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 once and
they are not entitled to get the same benefit under section
14(2) twice over in view of the proviso to sub-section of
section 14 of the Act of 1958.
These petitions for eviction were resisted by the
respondents on the ground, inter alia, that they had
deposited B the arrears of rent as provided by section 15 of
the Act of 1958. They were entitled to get the benefit of
sub-section (2) of section 14 and the benefit derived by the
respondents under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
stand in the way of the respondents getting the benefit of
sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958.
The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the petitions
of the appellants holding that the respondents were entitled
to the benefit of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act on
account of the deposit made by them in pursuance of the
provisions of section 15 of the Act of 1958. He was of the
view that the benefit once derived by the respondents under
section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not attract the
proviso to sub-section 2 and they are entitled to the
benefit of non-eviction under section 14(2) of the Act of
1958.
The appellants feeling aggrieved took up the matter
before the Rent Control Tribunal by way of appeal but the
Tribunal relying upon Dhan Raj Jayna v. S.P. Singh, A.I.R.
1973 Delhi 297 dismissed the appeal. The appellants took up
the matter to the High Court in second appeal but those
appeals also met the same fate. The appellants have now
approached this Court by special leave.
The only point that survives for consideration is
whether the respondents are entitled to the benefit of sub-
section 2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958 and the decision
of this question depends upon the interpretation of sub-
section 2 together with its proviso.
Section 13(1) of the 1952 Act, insofar as material,
reads :
"13.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
in any other law or any contract, no decree or
order
542
for the recovery of possession of any premises
shall be passed by any Court in favour of landlord
against any tenant (including a tenant whose
tenancy is terminated.)
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any suit or other proceeding for such
recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied.
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered
the whole of the arrears of rent due within one
month of the date on which a notice of demand for
the arrears of rent has been served on him by the
landlord in the manner provided in section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882);
or
(2) No decree or order for recovery of possession
shall be passed on the ground specified in clause
(a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if, on the
first day of the hearing of the suit or within
such further time as may be allowed by the Court,
the tenant pays in Court the arrears of rent then
due together with the costs of the suit.
The corresponding provision to s.13 of the 1952 Act is s. 14
of the 1958 Act. In so far as material it reads :
"14.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or contract, no order
or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any court or Controller
in favour of the landlord against a tenant.
Provided that the Controller may, on an
application made to him in the prescribed manner,
make an order for the recovery of possession of
the premises on one or more of the following
grounds only, namely:-
(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered
the whole of the arrears of the rent legally
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
recoverable from him within two months of the date
543
On which a notice of demand for the arrears of
rent A has been served on him by the landlord in
the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882;
..................................................
(2) No order for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made on the ground specified in
clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if
the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by
section 15;
Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the
benefit under this sub-section, if, having
obtained such benefit once in respect of any
premises he again makes a default in the payment
of rent of those premises for three consecutive
months."
The learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in
Dhan Raj Jayna v. S.P. Singh (Supra) dealing with the
interpretation of sub-section 2 of section 14 observed as
follows :
"Once the tenant pays the arrears of rent and the
future rent in accordance with section 15(1) he is
entitled to the benefit of section 14(2) to have
the petition for eviction dismissed. me proviso to
section 14(2) however, denies to the tenant such
benefit for a second time. He can thus get such
benefit only once, it is to be noted that the
previous suit was dismissed by Shri Tandon and the
dismissal was confirmed by the High Court under
section 13(2) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control
Act, 1952. The provisions of section 13(2) were
not in pari materia to the provisions of section
14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. me
payment under section 13(2) of the old Act was to
be made on the first hearing of the suit or
without such further time as may be allowed by the
Court. On the other hand, under Section 14(2) of
the new Act, in addition to the arrears of rent
the Controller can also order the payment of
pendente lite rent. Under section 13(2) of the old
Act there was no provision
544
for the payment of pendente lite rent. The benefit
of section 14(2) under the new Act is available on
payment of the arrears as well as the pendente
lite rent. In view of these differences between
the two provisions it cannot be said that the
dismissal of the previous suit by Shri Tandon was
under Section 14(2) of the new Act. me benefit of
Section 14(2) is being given to the tenant,
therefore, for the first time in the present
proceedings. m e proviso to section 14(2) is not
therefore, a bar to the grant of this benefit to
him."
Shri Bhatia appearing for the appellants contended
that the aforesaid observation made in the reported case is
only by way of obiter dicta inasmuch as no arguments were in
fact advanced as to the true interpretation and the scope of
section 14(2) of the Act of 1958 and it appears to have been
assumed in this case by the parties concerned that the
benefit of non-eviction on account of non-payment of rent
derived by a tenant under the old Act cannot be taken into
consideration under section 14(2) of the Act of 1958.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
This contention, in our opinion, has no force. The High
Court of Delhi had construed the provisions of section 14(2)
as there was a dispute between the parties on the
interpretation of section 14(2). The construction put by the
High Court on the interpretation of sub-section 2 of section
14 along with the proviso thereto is fully warranted by the
language of this section.
Shri Bhatia laid much emphasis on the expression
"having obtained such benefit once". According to him, the
expression is wide enough to include even a benefit derived
under the Act of 1952. It was further contended by the
counsel that if the Legislature intended to put any fetter
on the wide expression used in the proviso it would have
clearly said so that the benefit derived under the Act of
1952 disentitled a tenant from ting the benefit of section
14(2) the Act of 1958. As a second limb of his contention,
Shri Bhatia, further submitted that under the Act of 1952 a
tenant could commit default times without number and each
time he could get the benefit of non-eviction if he
deposited the rent on the first day of the hearing. A tenant
could tire out the landlord by
545
adopting such an attitude. me Legislature, therefore, wanted
A to remove the vice of the Act of 1952 and that is why the
proviso to sub-section 2 of section 14 contemplates that the
benefit of non-eviction once derived by the tenant under
sub-section 2 of section 14 will not be given the benefit of
non-eviction for the second time.
There is no denying the fact that the Legislature
wanted to remove the vice of the Act of 1952 but to what
extent the tenant will be deprived of the benefit of sub-
section 2 of section 14 will depend upon the expression used
by the Legislature in the section. The argument advanced by
Shri Bhatia loses sight of certain words of sub-section 2
and of the proviso thereto. Sub-section 2 contemplates to
give the benefit to a tenant of non-eviction if the tenant
makes payment or deposit as required by section 15.
Obviously, therefore, sub-section 2 contemplates that the
benefit of non-eviction under this sub-section can be given
only to a tenant who has made a deposit as required by
section 15 of the Act of 1958. therefore, the deposit made
under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 has been completely
excluded by sub-section 2. me proviso to sub-section 2 also
puts a bar on deriving the benefit under this sub-section
i.e. sub-section 2 of section 14, thus if the expressions
"deposit under-section 15 in sub-section 2 of section 14"
and "such benefit" in the proviso thereto is given a
meaning, there is no escape from the conclusion that no
second benefit can be given to a tenant if he had already
received the benefit under sub-section 2 by deposit made in
accordance with the provisions of section 15 of the Act of
1958.
It was further contended on the strength of the proviso
to sub-section 2 of section 57 of the Act of 1958, that even
if the deposit was made under section 13(2) of the Act of
1952 during the pendency of the Act of 1958, the Court or
the authority shall have to take into consideration the
provisions of the Act of 1958 and in that view of the matter
it can safely be assumed that the deposit made by the
respondents during the pendency of the Act of 1958 is a
deposit within the meaning of section 15 of Act of 1958.
Thus argument again ignores sub-section 2 of section 57.
Sub-section 2 is a saving clause and provides that
notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1952, all suits and
other proceedings under the said Act
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
546
pending at the commencement of this Act, before any Court or
other authority shall be continued and disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of the said Act, as if the
said Act had continued in force and this act had not been
passed. In view of this clear saving clause, the deposit
made by the respondents must be taken to be a deposit under
section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and if the case is covered
squarely by sub-section 2 of section 57 it is not at all
necessary to take into consideration the other provisions of
the Act.
Shri Bhatia further contended that the benefit, either
under the Act of 1952 or the Act of 1958, afforded a tenant
the benefit of non-eviction and this benefit was identical
in both these sections 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and 14(2) of
the Act of 1958. Section 13(2) of the old Act and section
14(2) of the new Act, according to learned counsel, form one
scheme, one code and re-enforce each other and in support of
this contention he relies on J.K. Steel Ind. v. Union of
India, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 481, 497. He contends that these
sections are in pari materia and the modification introduced
by section 14(2) and section 15 of the Act of 1958 is only
regarding the mode of deposit. We find it difficult to
accept this contention either. There is marked difference
between the three provisions. Section 15(2) is radically
different from the provisions of section 13 of the old Act
and the distinction between the two sections has been
clearly made out by the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid
reported decision. If once we accept the interpretation put
forward by the Tribunal on section 14(2) read with the
proviso thereto it is not at all necessary to enter into the
alterative contentions raised by Shri Bhatia. If the words
of statute are clear, there is no question of
interpretation. Grammatical construction has been accepted
as the golden rule and so construed, the respondents cannot
be deprived of the benefit of section 14(2) merely because
they had obtained similar benefit under sub-section 2 of
section 13 of the Act of 1952. We see no reason to differ
from the view taken by the Tribunal as confirmed by the High
Court.
In the result the appeals must fail. They are
accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case,
there is no order as to costs.
M.L.A. Appeals dismissed.
547