Full Judgment Text
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 07.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 29.05.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 29.05.2026
+ W.P.(C) 7982/2013, CM APPL. 18654/2015 and CM APPL.
300/2016
9X MEDIA PVT. LTD. & ORS .....Petitioners
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7983/2013
B4U BROADBAND (INDIA) PVT. LTD. & ORS
.....Petitioners
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7984/2013
TV VISION LIMITED & ORS
.....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7985/2013
SUN TV NETWORKS LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
13:02:36
Signature Not Verified
W.P,(C) 7982/2013 and connected matters Page 1 of 68
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7987/2013
E 24 GLAMORU LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7988/2013
PIONEER CHANNEL FACTORY PVT. LTD .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 7989/2013, CM APPL. 4541/2014 and CM APPL.
74139/2025
M/S NEWS BRADCASTER ASSOCIATION & ORS
.....Petitioners
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 1150/2014 and CM APPL. 2408/2014
M/S. MAA TELEVISION NETWORK LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
13:02:36
Signature Not Verified
W.P,(C) 7982/2013 and connected matters Page 2 of 68
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 276/2014 and CM APPL. 5897/2014
SARTHAK ENTERTAINMENT PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATROY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 2944/2014
MEDIAWATCH - INDIA ( A REGISTERED SOCIETY)
.....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA (TRIA)
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 312/2014
KALAIGNAR TV PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 3804/2014 and CM APPL. 7659/2014
M/S. NDTV LIFESTYLE LIMITED AND ANR.
.....Petitioners
Through:
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
13:02:36
Signature Not Verified
W.P,(C) 7982/2013 and connected matters Page 3 of 68
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 544/2014
CELEBRITIES MANAGEMENT PVT LTD & ANR.
.....Petitioners
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 6602/2014
ODISHA TELEVISION LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Respondent
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 724/2014
EENADU TELEVISION PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND
ANR .....Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 739/2014
RAJ TELEVISION PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through:
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
13:02:36
Signature Not Verified
W.P,(C) 7982/2013 and connected matters Page 4 of 68
versus
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA &
ANR .....Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 4307/2021
NEWS BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION ORS
.....Petitioners
Through:
versus
UNION OF INDIA .....Respondent
Through:
Present for Petitioners:
Mr. Abhinav Mukerji, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Payak Kakra, Mr.
Akash Tyagi, Mr. Pranav, Ms. Khushboo, Advs. in Item No.104
Mr. Kunal Tandon, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Aanchal Tandon, Ms.
Niti Jain, Ms. Niharika Sharma, Mr. Nitai Agarwal, Advs. in
Item Nos.104 and 105.
Ms. Aanchal Tandon, Ms. Niti Jain, Mr. Nitai Agarwal, Advs.
in Item No.106.
Ms. Srishti Gupta, Adv. in Item No.107.
Ms. Nisha Bhambhani, Mr. Rajat Arora, Ms. Mariya Shahab,
Advs. in Item Nos.110 and 120.
Mr. Tribhuvan, Mr. Chandan, Ms. Anushka Sarraf, Advs. in
Item No.117.
Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, Mr. Rohan Dewan, Advs. with Prabhat
Ranjan AR of Petitioner in Item No.118.
Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Maanav Kumar, Ms.
Gauri Ramachandran, Advs. in Item No.119.
Present for Respondents:
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with Mr. Vikram Jetly, CGSC with
Ms. Laavanya Kaushik, Ms. Shreya Jetly, Ms. Khyaati Bansal
for UOI in Item Nos.104 to 120.
Mr. Ashish Mehta, Adv. for TRAI in Item Nos.104 to 120.
Mr. Abhishek Malhotra, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Srishti Gupta, Adv.
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NARAYAN
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for IBF – Intervenor in Item No.104.
Ms. Anushree Rauta, Mr. Nittin Bhatia, Mr. Shwetank Tripathi,
Ms. Devangini Rai, Advs. for Intervenor: Culver Max
Entertainment Private Limited in Item No.104.
Mr. Abhishek Malhotra, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Srishti Gupta, Adv.
in Item No.107.
Ms. Aanchal Tandon, Ms. Niti Jain, Mr. Nitai Agarwal, Advs.
for Applicant in Item No.104.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1. The present batch of 17 Writ Petitions have been filed under
1
Article 226 of the Constitution of India , by three group of Petitioners,
namely, general entertainment channels (GECs), news broadcasters
and regional channels. The aforestated channels, being major
stakeholders have assailed Rule 7(11) of the Cable Television
2
Network Rules, 1994 inserted by way of R. 452(E) dated 31.07.2006.
Similarly, the constitutional validity of Regulation 3 of Standard of
Quality of Service (Duration of Advertisements in Television
3
Channels) Regulations, 2012 , as amended by way of Standard of
Quality of Service (Duration of Advertisements in Television
4
Channels) (Amendments) Regulations, 2013 , framed by the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) in exercise of powers under
Sections 11(1)(b)(i) and (v) read with Section 36 of Telecom
5
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 , has also been challenged.
1
Hereinafter referred to as „the Constitution‟
2
Hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Rule‟
3
Hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Regulation of 2012‟
4
Hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Regulation of 2013‟
5
Hereinafter referred to as „Act of 1997‟
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2. The common ground of challenge by the Petitioners pertains to
the fixation of a time ceiling of 10+2 minutes per clock hour for
broadcasting of advertisements, with a 10-minute cap fixed for
commercial advertisements and a 2-minute cap pertaining to self-
promotional advertisements. It is the case of the Petitioners herein that
the aforesaid cap is violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
3. Before turning to the detailed background, followed by
consideration of the rival submissions, we deem it appropriate to
delineate, at the outset, that the primary challenge of the Petitioners is
directed at the Impugned Regulation of 2012 as amended in 2013,
which, as on date, constitutes the latest regulatory framework
governing the permissible duration of advertisements on a „per clock
hour‟ basis. By virtue of the said Regulations, Impugned Rule, stands
effected to the extent of the modifications so introduced. Pithily put,
the core issue raised in the present proceedings does not pertain to the
12-minute ceiling on advertising time per se; rather, the Petitions are
directed towards the stipulation that the said time ceiling is operational
on a „per clock hour‟ computation.
A. BRIEF BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK:
4. The regulatory framework governing broadcasting and cable
television in India traces its origin to the enactment of the Cable
6
Television Networks (Regulation) Ordinance, 1994 , which was
7
followed by the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 .
The said statutory framework was complemented by the enactment of
Rules of 1994, which were notified pursuant to the aforesaid
6
Hereinafter referred to as „Ordinance of 1994‟
7
Hereinafter referred to as „Act of 1995‟
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Ordinance of 1994. Originally, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India Act, 1997 stood confined to telecommunication services,
however, a pivotal shift in the framework occurred by way of a
subsequent notification dated 09.01.2004 bearing no.39 of 2004,
whereby broadcasting and cable services were brought within the
ambit of telecommunication services under Section 2(k) of the Act of
1997. Additionally, the regulatory reach of TRAI was expanded by
empowering its recommendatory domain over matters such as
duration of advertisements.
5. Further, the Cable TV framework came to be crystallised in the
year 2006, with the introduction of the Impugned Rule, thereby
prescribing a ceiling of upto 10+2 minutes of advertisements per hour
for commercial advertisements and self-promotional programmes,
respectively. Thereafter, this regulatory intent came to be refined
through a consultative process, culminating in the promulgation of the
Impugned Regulation of 2012, followed by an amendment by way of
Impugned Regulation of 2013. The Impugned Regulations, when read
conjointly for the purpose of the present petitions, lie at the heart of
the dispute, as by way of Regulation 3, they prescribed a uniform „per
clock-hour‟ ceiling on advertisement duration, to ensure an
uninterrupted and satisfactory viewing experience, thereby giving an
operational effect to the Impugned Rule.
6. As is evident, the Impugned Regulations did not travel
unchallenged. Primarily, the said Regulations became a subject matter
for scrutiny of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate
Tribunal (TDSAT). However, such proceedings were overtaken by a
jurisdictional pronouncement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bharat
Signature Not Verified
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NARAYAN
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8
Sanchar Nigam Limited vs TRAI , wherein, it was held that TDSAT
does not possess the authority to adjudicate upon such challenges
raised against the Impugned Regulations framed by TRAI.
Accordingly, the appeals stood dismissed, though liberty was granted
to approach the constitutional courts.
7. It is in this continuum that the present Petitions came to be
instituted before this Court, wherein the Petitioners challenged
Regulation 3 of the Impugned Regulations, whereas the Impugned
Rule came to be challenged in the year 2014 by way of W.P.(C)
724/2014. In the interlude, Discovery Communications India entered
the fray as an intervener. Against the aforesaid backdrop, the present
dispute invites this Court to scrutinize the equilibrium between
commercial speech of broadcasting channels and the power of TRAI
to regulate advertisement duration, in the interest of viewers, by way
of imposing a uniform per clock hour ceiling on advertisement
duration.
8. At this stage, it may also be relevant to underscore that the
expansion of definition of Telecommunication Service under the Act
of 1997, to bring within its ambit broadcasting and cable services,
brought an overlapping interplay between the Impugned Rule and the
Act of 1997. Consequently, TRAI, in exercise of its powers under
11(1)(b)(i) and (v), read with Section 36 of the Act of 1997,
introduced a corresponding amendment by way of Impugned
Regulation of 2012, as amended by Impugned Regulation of 2013.
9. Although, at first blush, the challenge before this Court may
8
(2014) 3 SCC 222
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appear to be twofold. However, upon a closer scrutiny, it becomes
apparent that, in substance, the challenges raised separately against the
Impugned Rule and Regulation 3 of the Impugned Regulation of
2012, are directed towards one common object, namely, the
imposition of a per clock hour ceiling on the advertisements. The said
ceiling finds its substantive manifestation in Regulation 3 of the
Impugned Regulation of 2012. Whereas, the Impugned Rule, when
read in conjunction with the notification of the year 2004 operates in
aid of, and derives content from, the Regulation 3. Consequently, the
validity of the Impugned Rule is inextricably linked to, and dependent
upon, the validity of Regulation 3 of the Impugned Regulation of
2012. Accordingly, for the purpose of adjudication, the controversy in
the present batch rests upon the validity of Regulation 3 of the
Impugned Regulation of 2012.
10. Before adverting towards the rival submissions made by the
parties herein, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce relevant
provisions of the Act of 1995, Act of 1997, Impugned Rule and
Regulations along with other statutes, which have been relied upon by
the learned senior counsels for the parties during their submissions,
which are as follows:
Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995-
2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(g) ―programme‖ means any television broadcast and
includes—
(i) exhibition of films, features, dramas, advertisements and
serials;
(ii) any audio or visual or audio-visual live performance or
presentation, and the expression ―programming service‖ shall
be construed accordingly;
5. Programme code .—No person shall transmit or re-transmit
through a cable service any programme unless such programme
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is in conformity with the prescribed programme code.
6. Advertisement code .—No person shall transmit or re-transmit
through a cable service any advertisement unless such
advertisement is in conformity with the prescribed advertisement
code.
Cable Television Networks Rules, 1994 (Impugned Rule)-
7. Advertising Code. –
(11) No programme shall carry advertisements exceeding 12
minutes per hour, which may include up to 10 minutes per hour
of commercial advertisements, and up to 2 minutes per hour of a
channel‘s self-promotional programmes.
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA ACT, 1997
2. Definitions .-(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
(k) "telecommunication service" means service of any description
(including electronic mail, voice mail, data services, audio tex
services, video tex services, radio paging and cellular mobile
telephone services) which is made available to users by means of
any transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images
and sounds or intelligence of any nature, by wire, radio, visual or
other electro-magnetic means but shall not include broadcasting
services.
11. Functions of Authority - (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (13 of 1885), the
functions of the Authority shall be to—
(a) make recommendations, either suo motu or on a request from
the licensor, on the following matters, namely:-
(i) need and timing for introduction of new service provider;
(ii) terms and conditions of licence to a service provider;
(iii) revocation of license for non-compliance of terms and
conditions of licence;
(iv) measures to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in
the operation of telecommunication services so as to facilitate
growth in such services;
(v) technological improvements in the services provided by the
service providers;
(vi) type of equipment to be used by the service providers after
inspection of equipment used in the network;
(vii) measures for the development of telecommunication
technology and any other matter relatable to telecommunication
industry in general;
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(viii) efficient management of available spectrum;
(b) discharge the following functions, namely:--
(i) ensure compliance of terms and conditions of licence;
(ii) notwithstanding anything contained in the terms and
conditions of the licence granted before the commencement of
the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Amendment) Act,
2000 (2 of 2000), fix the terms and conditions of inter-
connectivity between the service providers;
(iii) ensure technical compatibility and effective interconnection
between different service providers;
(iv) regulate arrangement amongst service providers of sharing
their revenue derived from providing telecommunication
services;
(v) lay-down the standards of quality of service to be provided
by the service providers and ensure the quality of service and
conduct the periodical survey of such service provided by the
service providers so as to protect interest of the consumers of
telecommunication service;
(vi) lay-down and ensure the time period for providing local and
long distance circuits of telecommunication between different
service providers;
(vii) maintain register of inter-connect agreements and of all
such other matters as may be provided in the regulations;
(viii) keep register maintained under clause (vii) open for
inspection to any member of public on payment of such fee and
compliance of such other requirement as may be provided in the
regulations;
(ix) ensure effective compliance of universal service obligations;
36. Power to make regulations.-(1) The Authority may, by
notification, make regulations consistent with this Act and the
rules made thereunder to carry out the purposes of this Act .
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the
following matters, namely:—
(a) the times and places of meetings of the Authority and the
procedure to be followed at such meetings under sub-section (1) of
section 8, including quorum necessary for the transaction of
business;
(b) the transaction of business at the meetings of the Authority
under sub-section (4) of section 8;
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(d) matters in respect of which register is to be maintained by the
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Authority [under sub-clause (vii) of clause (b)] of sub-section (1) of
section 11;
(e) levy of fee and lay down such other requirements on fulfilment
of which a copy of register may be obtained [under sub-clause
(viii) of clause (b)] of sub-section (1) of section 11;
(f) levy of fees and other charges [under clause (c)] of sub-section
(1) of section 11;
Standards of Quality of Service (Duration of Advertisements in Television
Channels) Regulations, 2012 (Impugned Regulation of 2012)-
― 3. Duration of advertisements in TV channels.— (1) No broadcaster
shall carry in its broadcast of a programme, advertisements exceeding
twelve minutes in a clock hour and any shortfall of advertisement
duration in any clock hour shall not be carried over.
(2) The advertisements in the clock hour shall include all types of
advertisements including advertisements promoting the channel(s) of the
broadcaster.
Explanation: The clock hour shall commence from 00.00 of the
hour and end at 00.60 of the hour (example: 14.00 to 15:00 hours).‖
Standards of Quality of Service (Duration of Advertisements in Television
Channels) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013 (Impugned Regulation of
2013)-
―2. For regulation 3 of the Standards of Quality of Service (Duration of
Advertisements in Television Channels) Regulations, 2012 (15 of 2012)
(hereinafter referred to as the principal regulations), the following
regulation shall be substituted, namely:-
―3. Duration of advertisements in a clock hour.- No broadcaster shall,
in its broadcast of a programme, carry advertisements exceeding twelve
minutes in a clock hour.
Explanation: The clock hour means a period of sixty minutes
commencing from 00.00 of an hour and ending at 00.60 of the hour.
(example: 14.00 to 15:00 hours).‖
Article 14 of the Constitution of India
14. Equality before law.— The State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India.
Article 19 of the Constitution of India
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech,
etc .—(1) All citizens shall have the right—
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade
or business.
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[(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the
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operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any
law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the
interests of 4 [the sovereignty and integrity of India], the security
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation
or incitement to an offence.]
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the
State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general
public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, 1 [nothing in
the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in
so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law
relating to,—
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade
or business; or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or
service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens
or otherwise.]
Article 31C of the Constitution of India
31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law giving
effect to the policy of the State towards securing 4 [all or any of the
principles laid down in Part IV] shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of
the rights conferred by 5 [article 14 or article 19;] 6 [and no law
containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy
shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not
give effect to such policy]:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State,
the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law,
having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has
received his assent.]
Article 39 of the Constitution of India
39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State .—The
State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing—
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the
community are so distributed as best to subserve the common
good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in
the concentration of wealth and means of production to the
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common detriment;
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Since the Petitioners herein represent diverse categories of
broadcasters, namely, GECs, news channels and regional channels,
learned senior counsel for each category have advanced independent
submissions. However, in view of the substantial overlap in issues, the
same are being considered conjointly. For the sake of convenience,
W.P.(C) 4307/2021 is treated as the lead matter for news broadcasters,
W.P.(C) 739/2014 for regional broadcasters, and W.P.(C) 7983/2013
for GECs. The submissions advanced on behalf of Discovery
Communications India, as an intervener in W.P.(C) 7982/2013, shall,
also be dealt with separately.
B. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
12. This Court has heard learned senior counsel for the parties at
length, and with their able assistance, have perused the paperbook
alongwith the judgments and written submissions forming part of the
pleadings.
13. At the threshold, it may be noted that although Mr. Chetan
Sharma, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the Respondent/UOI,
has assailed the maintainability of the present petitions in his written
submissions, however, the said challenge was not raised before this
Court at the time of oral arguments. Accordingly, this Court is
consciously not dealing with the issue pertaining to the maintainability
of the petitions. Even otherwise, the present regulatory framework, by
its very design, imposes an immediate obligation and has a direct
bearing on the Petitioners herein, making the present petitions
Signature Not Verified
maintainable.
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NARAYAN
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14. Before proceeding to examine the arguments on the merits of
the case, we deem it appropriate to note that, as stated in preceeding
paragraphs of this judgment, three distinct classes of broadcasters
have been separately represented before this Court. Accordingly, the
contentions of the Petitioners are considered and addressed in four
corresponding segments, so as to ensure clarity, coherence, and
category-specific adjudication. Similarly, the submissions advanced
on behalf of the Union of India (UOI) and TRAI, as well as the
rejoinder arguments advanced in response thereto, are also dealt with
separately.
Submissions on behalf of News Broadcasters:
15. Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of News Broadcasters, has made the following submissions:
15.1 At the outset, it has been highlighted that in 2017, TRAI issued
Interconnection Regulations and Tariff Order, imposing structured
price caps on television channels, including a ceiling of Rs. 19 per
channel and Rs. 12 for bouquet offerings, along with restrictions on
bouquet composition, discounting, promotional schemes, and
distribution arrangements. These regulations, however, came to be
upheld by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Star India (P) Ltd. v.
9
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion . It is their case that
the aforesaid regulation has already constrained the revenue streams of
broadcaster, particularly news channels, whose subscription rates are
substantially lower ranging between 25 paise to Rs. 3.5/- per month,
with several operating on a Free-to-Air (FTA) model.
9
(2019) 2 SCC 104
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15.2 Against the aforesaid backdrop, it is the case of the News
Broadcasters that, after the imposition of the price cap over
subscription fee, the primary source of sustenance for channels alike is
the advertising revenue. However, an additional imposition of uniform
time ceiling of 12 minutes of advertisements per clock hour across all
time slots aversely impacts the commercial speech guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
15.3 Reliance is placed on the judgment of TATA Press Limited v
10
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited , to argue that in the said
judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of
whether or not Telephone Nigam could restrain TATA Press from
publishing yellow page containing paid advertisements of business,
traders and association, held that commercial speech forms a part of
freedom of speech and expression provided under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution, and advertisements cannot be denied protection
merely because they are issued by the businessmen.
15.4 Further, it has been argued that the restriction on duration of
advertisements by way of Impugned Rule is violative of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution, in light of the jurisprudence established
by the Supreme Court in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. And Others v The
11 12
Union Of India , Bennett Colemon & Co. v Union Of India and
13
Hindustan Times & Ors. vs. State of UP . A common thread running
through all the three decisions, as has been argued by the learned
senior counsel, is that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has already settled
the law that any restriction either direct or indirect, on advertisement
10
(1995) 5 SCC 139
11
AIR 1963 SC 305
12
(1972) 2 SCC 788
13
(2003) 1 SCC 591
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space or revenue, forming the primary source of media funding,
necessarily impacts the circulation and editorial freedom leading to an
infringement of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
15.5 On the strength of the aforesaid authorities, it has been urged
that if indirect impact on advertisement revenue is impermissible, a
direct restriction under Impugned Rule is a fortiori violative of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Further, it is contended that, the
Impugned Rule/Regulations alongwith the 2017 tariff and distribution
controls, imposes a dual restriction on revenue streams, rendering it
arbitrary under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It has
been emphasized that the principles applicable to print media apply
with greater force to broadcasting, being a more potent medium of
expression.
15.6 It has been urged by learned senior counsel that the Impugned
Rule is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on three grounds.
Firstly , it fails to differentiate between prime time and non-prime
time; secondly , it treats unequal entities as equals, thereby failing to
recognise the disparities in revenue models between news channels
and GEC/sports channels and between pay and FTA channels.
Thirdly , it fails to distinguish between commercial advertisements,
public service advertisements and self-promotional advertisements.
Therefore, it has been contended that the uniform cap imposed is
unreasoned and lacks a valid classification leading to violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution as held in Kunnathat Thathunni
14
Moopil Nair Vs State of Kerala .
15.7 While highlighting that the Impugned Rule is disproportionate,
14
(1961) 3 SCR 77
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the reliance placed by the UOI on pricing regulations of foreign
jurisdictions, is distinguished contending that the said data pertains to
the year 2013 and the economic as well as regulatory conditions of
foreign countries are not similar to that of India. By relying upon the
judgments in Star India Pvt Limited Vs Telecom Regulatory
15
Authority of India and Star India (P) Limited (Supra) , it has been
submitted that, lower subscription charges enhance viewership and
public access, especially for FTA and low-cost channels. However,
sufficient advertisement time is essential to sustain affordability and
ensure wider dissemination of television content.
Submissions on behalf of GECs/Broadcasters:
16. Mr. Kunal Tandon, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of B4U Broadband (India) Pvt. Ltd., in addition to the arguments
made by learned senior counsel for news broadcasters, has made the
following submissions on the merits of the case:
16.1 An additional reliance has been placed on the judgment in
16
Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v Union of India , to
argue that all commercial advertisements cannot be denied the
protection under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution merely because
the same is issued by a businessman.
16.2 Reference has been made to Section 2(g) of the Act of 1995, to
argue that the definition of programme provided therein also includes
advertisements, which form a part of content, as such the Impugned
Rule and Regulations is violative of Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the
Constitution. It is urged that the restriction imposed by TRAI on the
15
(2007) SCC Online Del 951
16
1985 (1) SCC 641
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advertisement does not fall within either of the reasonable restrictions
enshrined under Articles 19(2) and 19(6) of the Constitution.
16.3 Further reliance has been placed on Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Govt. of India vs. Cricket Association of Bengal
17
& Ors. , to argue that merely because an organisation may profit
from an activity whose character is predominantly covered under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it would not convert the activity
into one involving Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
16.4 Learned senior counsel has also argued that TRAI lacks the
jurisdiction to regulate advertisements. In support of this contention,
reference is made to its functions under Section 11(1)(b)(i) and (v) of
the Act of 1997, to argue that such Regulations can only be brought by
the UOI and not TRAI.
16.5 Reference is also made to Section 2(1)(k) of the Act of 1997, to
argue that the role of TRAI is limited to technical and interconnection
aspects, while content regulation, including advertisements, falls
under the Programme and Advertisement Codes of Rules of 1994. It is
his case that the broadcasting comprises of two distinct spheres,
namely, the aspect of transmission, reception as well as dissemination
of signals and the aspect of programming services, i.e. the content
shown on channels.
16.6 While dealing further with the aforesaid aspects, it has been
argued that while the former falls within the domain of TRAI, the
latter falls outside the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction, and as such
Quality of Service (QoS) under Section 11(1)(b)(v) of the Act of
17
1995 (2) SCC 161
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1997, cannot be expanded to include regulation of viewing experience
or advertisement time.
Submissions on behalf of Regional Channels/Broadcaster:
17. Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of Raj Television Pvt. Ltd., a regional channel of Tamil Nadu, in
addition to the aforesaid averments, has made the following
submissions on the merits of the case:
17.1 At the outset, it has been argued that with subscription revenue
being negligible, the Petitioner, a regional broadcaster with a
predominantly Tamil-speaking audience, derives the overwhelming
part of its income from advertisements. Thus, any restriction on the
duration of advertisements directly threatens its economic viability
and continued existence as a broadcaster.
17.2 It is contended that the functions under Section 11(1)(a) of the
Act of 1997, are purely recommendatory, either suo motu or on a
request from the licensor (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting).
It is urged that TRAI cannot use these to directly regulate or set
binding norms regarding the duration and format of advertisements,
nor can it convert a recommendatory function into a legislative power.
17.3 It has been argued that the impugned subordinate legislation is
„law‟ under Article 13 of the Constitution and as such is void as it
infringes Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as reiterated in
18
Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v Union of India . In addition to
the aforesaid, it has been argued that the measures taken by TRAI fail
the proportionality test as no reasonable restriction under Article 19(2)
18
2023 SCC OnLine SC 366
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of the Constitution is clearly established.
17.4 Learned senior counsel also argued that the consultation process
by TRAI is vitiated by non-transparency and non-application of mind.
Despite stakeholder consultations, the final decision lacks reasoned
justification for the 12-minute per clock-hour time ceiling and the
rejection of objections by TRAIs. Reliance is placed on Cellular
Operators Association of India v Telecom Regulatory Authority of
19
India , to contend that regulatory decisions must be reasoned,
transparent, and responsive to stakeholder inputs, which requirement
is argued to be not satisfied in the present case.
17.5 It is the case of regional channels that the Impugned Rule and
Regulations fail constitutional scrutiny as they satisfy the well-settled
tests evolved by the Courts for determining infringement of Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution, namely the „ proximate effect / direct and
inevitable consequence’ test, the „ direct effect and qualitative–
quantitative impact ‟ test, and the doctrine of interference with
essential attributes of free speech. Reliance has been placed on
20
Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh , to argue that the
reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2) of the
Constitution are exhaustive and there cannot be any additional
restrictions other than already enumerated therein.
17.6 Firstly, applying the proximate effect or direct and inevitable
consequence test as laid down in Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. v
21
Union of India and reiterated in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of
19
(2016) 7 SCC 703
20
(2023) 4 SCC
21
1959 SCR 12
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22
India , it is argued that where the inevitable and proximate
consequence of a measure is curtailment of circulation, reach, or
financial viability of a medium, such measure squarely falls within
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is their case that, the impugned
actions of TRAI has direct and inevitable consequence on reduction of
advertisement revenue, thereby leading to increase in subscription
costs while simultaneously diminishing audience reach.
17.7 Secondly, reliance is placed on Bennett Coleman (Supra) , for
application of direct effect as well as qualitative and quantitative test
formulated therein. The Court in the said judgment held that freedom
of the press is both qualitative and quantitative, encompassing not
merely content but also circulation and economic capacity. It is
contended that the impugned action by TRAI directly affects the
revenue structure of broadcasters and thereby their capacity to produce
and disseminate content, with freedom of speech being impaired in
both its qualitative and quantitative dimensions.
17.8 Thirdly, reliance is placed on Sakal Papers (Supra), to submit
that where a regulatory measure strikes at an essential attribute of the
medium, such as circulation or advertisement space which sustains it,
such Regulations constitute a direct infringement of Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. Against the aforestated, it is contended that the
Impugned Rules 7(11), by restricting advertisement inventory, directly
undermines the financial foundation of broadcasting and thus
impermissibly interferes with an essential facet of expressive freedom.
18. Learned counsel appearing for the Intervener, Discovery
22
2020 SCC OnLine SC 25
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Communications India, while emphasising its position as a producer
of niche content, has broadly adopted the submissions already
advanced by the Petitioners hereinabove. In view of such substantial
overlap, the said contentions are not being reiterated for the sake of
brevity but are expressly adopted for the purposes of adjudication as
and when deemed necessary.
Response on behalf of UOI:
19. Learned ASG, while controverting the submissions made by the
learned senior counsel for the Petitioners, has made the following
submissions:
19.1 While substantiating the rationale for quantitative restriction of
12 minutes per clock hour on advertisements, it has been argued that
Advertisement in commercial sense means to draw attention to goods
for sale or services offered. Since the advertisement revenue is the
major source of revenue by broadcasters, they deliberately lengthen
the duration of commercial breaks, thereby reducing the quality of
viewing experience. It has been argued that Impugned Rule 7(11) is
the sole provision which regulates the advertising timing to enhance
the quality of experience in accordance with International
Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization
Sector, which defined quality of experience, as the overall
acceptability of an application or service, as perceived by the end-
user. Thus, the duration of advertisements introduced by Impugned
Rule and Regulations, eradicates the adverse impact by enhancing the
quality of viewing experience of the consumers.
19.2 Reference has also been made to the regulations on
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advertisement duration imposed in several countries, a tabular format
of the same has been provided hereinbelow:
S. No. Country Advertisement duration/hour
1. Argentina 12 Minutes (10 Minutes: Commercial; 2
minutes In-Programme)
SCA Law
2. Croatia 12 Minutes (Article 32 of The
Electronic Media Act)
3. Canada 12 Minutes on FTA, while
advertisement is totally prohibited on
pay channels
As per Competition Act
4. France Targeted advertising shall not exceed a
daily average of 4 min/hr
(Force of Decree n02020-983 of5
August 2020)
5. Germany 12 Minutes with a minimum of 20
minutes of programming in between
interruptions.
The Unfair Competition Act (UWG)
6. Ireland 12 Minutes
10 Min for children's programmes
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland
7. Italy 5 to 10 Minutes
Audiovisual Media Services Code
8. Norway 09 Minutes (15% per Hour) Norwegian
Media Authority
9. United Kingdom 7 minutes to 12 minutes I British
broadcasting regulator Of com
10. Indonesia (12 Minutes) 20% per hour Indonesian
Broadcasting Commission (KPI).
11. Denmark 15 per cent of the individual licensee's
daily broadcasting time, and a
maximum of 12 minutes per hour.
The Radio and Television Broadcasting
Act
19.3 As a foundational objection, it has been argued that there exists
no Fundamental Right (FR) guaranteed to the Petitioners under Article
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19(1)(a) of the Constitution to establish, maintain or operate
broadcasting services, nor do they possess any unfettered right to
access or use airwaves, which constitute scarce public property. In this
regard, reliance is placed on Secy, Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting (Supra) , to argue that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the
said judgment, has held that although right to receive and impart
information is protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, the
use of airwaves, being a public property and limited in nature, is
inherent to the State regulation. Additionally, reference is also made to
highlight that the Court in the aforesaid judgment also held that no
individual has a vested right to utilise such resources at will, and that
access thereto can only be regulated in accordance with law and in
public interest.
19.4 Reliance is also placed on Association of Unified Tele Services
23
Providers v. Union of India and Union of India v Assn of Unified
24
Telecom Service Providers of India , to argue that natural and
material resources of the community fall within the ambit of Article
39(b) of the Constitution, and as such their distribution is subject to
constitutional regulation in furtherance of the common good.
Accordingly, it is argued that access to broadcasting through airwaves
is a regulated privilege governed by statutory framework and
constitutional policy, and not a FR enforceable under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution.
19.5 It has been argued that the plea taken by the Petitioner that the
imposing of uniform cap of 12 minutes per clock hour will lead to
revenue loss is misplaced. It has been stated that the Impugned Rule
23
2014 6 SCC 110
24
2020 3 SCC 110
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operates across all broadcasters without regulating the pricing of
advertisement slots, which remain entirely market driven. In a
competitive ecosystem, advertisement rates are determined by demand
and viewership, and therefore the time cap does not ipso facto
diminish revenue.
19.6 Additionally, it is contended that the broadcasters possess
multiple revenue streams and the allegation of a revenue cap is
factually erroneous. Reference is made to the Tariff Order of 2017 to
argue that it does not impose any absolute price ceiling on channels; it
only stipulated conditional requirements where bouquets are offered
including pricing thresholds and composition norms. Further, it has
been clarified that even within the said framework, broadcasters are
free to price channels above the prescribed threshold when offered on
a-la-carte basis.
19.7 Reliance is placed upon Star India (P) Ltd. (Supra) , to argue
that the aforesaid position with respect to fixing of subscription fee as
introduced by way of Regulation and Tariff Order of 2017 has been
recognised by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The Court retained
complete freedom of broadcasters to fix subscription prices,
particularly for a-la-carte offerings, while highlighting that the
regulatory measures merely ensure a balance between consumer
interest and fair competition.
19.8 Reliance placed by learned senior counsels for the Petitioners
on the judgments of Sakal Papers (Supra) , Bennett Coleman (Supra) ,
Indian Express (Supra) and Hindustan Times (Supra) , has also been
distinguished by the learned ASG. In substance, it has been argued
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media is wholly inconceivable, since there is no parity in facts or
regulatory context. It has been contended that the print and electronic
media operate in distinct domains, warranting different considerations.
Drawing the attention of this Court to the distinct factual matrix of the
cited precedents, it has been argued that the measures impugned
therein directly curtailed core facets of free speech such as page limits,
pricing, ownership and newsprint supply. In contrast, the present
impugned framework imposes no restriction on broadcasting content,
duration, reach or subscription pricing.
19.9 In view of the aforesaid, it is contended that the 12-minute
ceiling on advertisements does not violate Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, since the broadcasters retain freedom to disseminate
content for the remaining 48 minutes of every hour, as the restriction
is confined solely to advertisement time without impinging the
essential exercise of free speech.
19.10 It has been contended that the Petitioners‟ invocation of the
doctrine of commercial speech and the asserted exhaustiveness of
Article 19(2) of the Constitution is misplaced. It is well-settled that
commercial speech does not enjoy absolute protection under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Reference is made to the judgment in
25
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India and Ors. , to argue that the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has excluded misleading and objectionable
advertisements from constitutional protection, a principle
subsequently followed in the judgment dated 07.02.2008 bearing W.P.
(C) 18761 of 2005 titled Mahesh Bhatt v. Union of India .
Additionally, it is contended that the decision in Tata Press Ltd.
25
AIR 1960 SC 554
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(Supra) does not confer an unqualified right to advertise but
recognises such speech as subject to reasonable regulation in public
interest.
19.11 Reliance has also been placed on Kaushal Kishor (Supra) to
argue that, the Supreme Court in the said judgment, while holding that
restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution are exhaustive,
Ramasubramanian, J. was pleased to rely upon the judgments of
26
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI and Asha Ranjan v.
27
State of Bihar to hold that the balancing of rights can always be
done by the Court by applying the test of 'paramount collective
interest.
19.12 Without prejudice, it is argued that the Impugned Rule and
Regulations, would, in any event, satisfy the test of reasonableness
under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. As recognised in Sahara
28
India (Supra) and Dharam Dutt v. Union of India , where the
exercise of free speech intersects with competing public interests,
calibrated and proportionate restraints may legitimately be imposed.
In the present case, the time ceiling on advertisement duration
advances viewer protection, preserves the quality of viewing
experience, and ensures that airwaves subserve the larger public good
rather than being driven solely by revenue considerations.
19.13 Additionally, learned ASG has also argued that the Impugned
Rule is protected by Article 19(2) of the Constitution, as it ensures
balanced use of public resources and is justified in the interest of
„public order‟. In this regard, reliance has been placed on Telecom
26
(2012) 10 SCC 603
27
2017 4 SCC 397
28
(2004) 1 SCC 712
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29
Watchdog v Union of India , wherein a legislative measure
restricting unsolicited commercial communications was challenged
and was inter alia sought to be justified on the ground of public order
under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. This Court observed that in
any event the State was fully within its powers to prevent the creation
of public nuisance by unrestricted and unlimited commercial
communications.
19.14 Lastly, a reference is made to the observations of the Hon‟ble
30
Supreme Court in A. Suresh & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
to argue that the activity of the broadcaster to provide entertainment is
a combination of two rights i.e. Speech and Business as referred to
under Article 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution, respectively. In this
regard, the Court had also observed that where the freedom of speech
gets intertwined with business it undergoes a fundamental change and
its exercise has to be balanced against societal interests.
Submission on behalf of TRAI:
20. In addition to the arguments advanced by the learned ASG, Mr.
Ashish Mehta, learned counsel appearing for TRAI has made the
following submissions:
20.1 While distinguishing the effect of print media and broadcast
media, it has been argued that television, unlike print media, operates
in a time-bound format where viewers cannot avoid advertisements
inserted mid-programme, including scrolls and overlays. Such
distinction necessitated the regulatory intervention in the interest of
viewers.
29
2012 OnLine Del 3601
30
(1997) 1 SCC 319
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20.2 It has been argued that the Impugned Regulations effectuating
the time ceiling for advertisement in the Impugned Rule, were
introduced pursuant to widespread consumer complaints and in
exercise of TRAI‟s statutory mandate under Sections 11 and 36 of the
Act of 1997, to ensure compliance with license conditions and
maintain QoS. Thus, the prescribed time ceiling directly addresses
excessive commercial interruptions that degrade viewing experience.
Rejoinder on behalf of News Broadcasters:
21. Mr. Arvind P Datar, learned senior counsel, in his rejoinder, has
contended that the reliance placed by the UOI on various judgments is
misconceived, as none governs the issue of time ceiling of
advertisement on broadcasting, thereby diluting the protection under
Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In support of the
aforesaid, following submissions have been made:
21.1 Reliance placed on Secy, Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting (Supra), has been distinguished, while contending that
the same concerns allocation and regulation of airwaves, not content-
based advertisements caps or revenue regulation of broadcasters. It is
argued that the said judgment itself confines restrictions to Article
19(2) of the Constitution and as such public interest cannot operate as
an independent ground for curtailing speech beyond the provided text.
21.2 Reliance on Sahara India (Supra) has also been argued to be
misplaced, on the ground that it dealt with postponement orders under
contempt jurisdiction and does not support expansion of restrictions
on speech under a broad “public interest” standard.
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21.3 Star India Private Limited (Supra), has been argued to be
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inapplicable as it concerned tariff Regulation in non-news channels
and was decided in the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating
adverse impact on broadcasters. Whereas, the present case involves
news and FTA channels, where advertisement revenue constitutes the
primary revenue stream, duly demonstrated by financial data.
21.4 Lastly, it has been contended that the Telecom Watchdog
(Supra) dealt with SMS spam regulation under telecom consumer
protection frameworks, not broadcasting content regulation or
advertisement caps; hence, it is irrelevant.
Rejoinder on behalf of Regional Channels/Broadcasters:
22. Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned senior counsel, in his rejoinder
arguments, while highlighting that the Impugned Rule is
unconstitutional, arbitrary and unsupported by evidence, has made the
following submissions:
22.1 It is contended that the plea of public interest is misconceived,
inasmuch as tariff Regulation and bouquet pricing already operate to
safeguard consumer interest. A further quantitative cap on
advertisement time constitutes duplicative and excessive regulation,
imposing an unjustified fetter on commercial speech.
22.2 While distinguishing the reliance placed on Secy, Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting (Supra) , it has been contended that
while airwaves are public property, the Impugned Rule does not
concern spectrum allocation but directly regulates content by capping
advertisement time.
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C. ANALYSIS AND REASONING:
23. This Court has heard learned senior counsels appearing on
behalf of the parties and, with their able assistance, has perused the
paperbook along with the written submissions placed on record. Upon
consideration of pleadings and submissions, two principal questions
arise for the consideration of this Court, which are as follows:
I. Whether the introduction of Regulation 3 of the Impugned
Regulation of 2012, fall within the statutory competence of TRAI?
II. Whether the time ceiling of 12 minutes per clock hour on
advertisements is violative of protection under Articles 14 and 19 of
the Constitution?
I. WHETHER THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULATION 3
OF THE IMPUGNED REGULATION OF 2012, FALL WITHIN
THE STATUTORY COMPETENCE OF TRAI?
24. Section 11(1)(b)(v) of the Act of 1997 entrusts TRAI with the
regulatory power to lay down the standards of QoS to be provided by
the service providers, in order to protect the interest of consumers of
telecommunication services. Whereas, Section 36 of the Act of 1997
enables TRAI to make regulations consistent with the Act and the
rules made thereunder, in order to carry out the purposes of the Act.
25. In the aforesaid backdrop, the subsequent notification issued in
2004 assumes significant importance in shaping the scope and
exercise of such regulatory powers. By virtue of the said notification,
the Central Government expanded the definition of
telecommunication service provided under Section 2(1)(k) of the Act
of 1997, to expressly include broadcasting as well as cable services.
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This enlargement of the definitional ambit effectively brought the
aforestated sectors within the regulatory purview of TRAI, thereby
enabling it to exercise its statutory powers and discharge its functions
in relation to broadcasting and cable services.
26. Having delineated the power of TRAI to act as a regulatory
body over broadcasting and cable services, we shall now proceed to
examine whether TRAI has acted within its statutory power by
introducing Impugned Regulation of 2012, to monitor the
advertisement time as prescribed therein.
27. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1997,
underlying the establishment of TRAI underscores that the Authority
as an independent regulatory body is entrusted with the responsibility
of acting as a watchdog for the telecommunications sector. Its
mandate includes the protection and promotion of consumer interests,
the facilitation of fair competition, and the progressive alignment of
telecommunication services in India with globally accepted standards.
The particular emphasis on transparency, accountability, and orderly
sectoral growth further reinforces the breadth of TRAI‟s regulatory
remit. The relevant excerpts are reproduced hereunder-
―In the context of the National Telecom Policy, 1994, which amongst
other things, stresses on achieving the universal service, bringing the
quality of telecom services to world standards , provisions of wide
range of services to meet the customers' demand at reasonable price,
and participation of the companies registered in India in the area of
basic as well as value added telecom services as also making
arrangements for protection and promotion of consumer interest
and ensuring fair competition, there is a felt need to separate
regulatory functions from service providing functions which will be in
keeping with the general trend in the world . In the multi-operator
situation arising out of opening of basic as well as value added
services in which private operator will be competing with Government
operators, there is a pressing need for an independent telecom
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regulatory body for regulation of telecom services for orderly and
healthy growth of telecommunication infrastructure apart from
protection of consumer interest.‖
4. The powers and functions of the Authority, inter alia, are—
(i) ensuring technical compatibility and effective inter-relationship
between different service providers;
(ii) regulation of arrangement amongst service providers of sharing
their revenue derived from providing telecommunication services;
(iii) ensuring compliance of licence conditions by all service
providers;
(iv) protection of the interest of the consumers of telecommunication
service ;
(v) settlement of disputes between service providers;
(vi) fixation of rates for providing telecommunication service within
India and outside India;
(vii) ensuring effective compliance of universal service obligations .
6. The Authority will have to maintain transparency while exercising
its powers and functions. The powers and functions would enable the
Authority to perform a role of watchdog for the telecom sector in an
effective manner .
(Emphasis Supplied)
28. Similarly, the Preamble of Act of 1997 reinforces the
aforestated position by expressly stipulating that the legislation seeks
to regulate telecommunication services, adjudicate disputes, protect
the interests of both service providers and consumers, while ensuring
the orderly growth of the sector, which is as follows:
2
―An Act to provide for the establishment of the [Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India and the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate
Tribunal to regulate the telecommunication services, adjudicate
disputes, dispose of appeals and to protect the interests of service
providers and consumers of the telecom sector , to promote and
ensure orderly growth of the telecom sector] and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
29. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, when read
harmoniously with the Preamble, clearly reflects the legislative intent
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underlying the establishment of the TRAI. It indicates that TRAI was
constituted to discharge regulatory functions aimed at maintaining an
equitable balance between the interests of consumers and service
providers, while simultaneously ensuring that the quality and
standards of telecommunication services progressively align with
universally accepted benchmarks. To put it succinctly, the role of
TRAI is not merely supervisory or administrative in nature, but
substantively regulatory, with a clear consumer centric orientation.
30. The jurisdiction of TRAI to regulate the telecom sector also
finds support in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India
31
v Association of Unified Telecom Service Provider of India ,
wherein the Court while distinguishing between the functions of TRAI
envisaged under Section 11 of the Act of 1997, highlighted that the
powers exercised by TRAI under Section 11(1)(b), are not merely
recommendatory in nature, rather is binding on the licensee. The
relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:
―45. The scheme of the TRAI Act therefore is that TRAI being an
expert body discharges recommendatory functions under clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act and discharges
regulatory and other functions under clauses (b), (c) and (d) of sub-
section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act. TRAI being an expert body,
the recommendations of TRAI under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
Section 11 of the TRAI Act have to be given due weightage by the
Central Government but the recommendations of TRAI are not
binding on the Central Government. On the other hand, the
regulatory and other functions under clauses (b), (c) and (d) of sub-
section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act have to be performed
independent of the Central Government and are binding on the
licensee subject to only appeal in accordance with the provisions of
the TRAI Act. ‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
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31. Turning now to the challenge raised pertaining to the imposition
of „per clock hour‟ regime under Impugned Regulation of 2012. It
may be noticed that in a medium such as television, where content
unfolds in real time and interruptions are inescapably experienced, the
frequency, duration as well as density of advertisement breaks are
integral to the quality of the viewing experience, thereby directly
affecting the interests of consumers, who does not possess the power
to skip or fast forward these advertisements. It is pertinent to highlight
that excessive or uneven commercial intrusion is not merely an
economic concern, rather it constitutes a direct impairment of the right
of consumers to a fair and reasonable viewing experience.
32. At this stage, we also deem it appropriate to briefly examine the
origin and essence of the Impugned Rule. The Act of 1995 provides a
clear and enabling statutory architecture for regulation of both
programmes and advertisements. Section 2(g) of the Act of 1995,
while defining the scope of a programme, expressly includes
advertisements within its ambit. Additionally, Sections 5 and 6 of the
Act of 1995, mandate conformity with the prescribed Programme
Code and Advertisement Code, respectively. Accordingly, the
simultaneous incorporation of Advertisement Code under Rule 7 of
the Rule of 1994, stands firmly anchored within, and derives
legitimacy from, the parent enactment.
33. The Impugned Rule, which prescribes a ceiling of 12 minutes
per hour on advertisements, is a classic conceptualization of
code-based normative standard that delineates the permissible
quantum of advertisements within a defined temporal framework.
Learned senior counsels representing the Petitioners, while
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challenging the validity of the Impugned Rule, have failed to draw the
attention of this Court to any statutory text suggesting that the
Advertisement Code is confined merely to qualitative or content-based
restrictions alone. On the contrary, a temporal limitation on the
quantum of advertisements is inherent in the very logic of regulating
advertising within a medium structured by time.
34. Coming back to the argument of the Petitioners pertaining to the
power of TRAI to introduce the Impugned Regulation of 2012, it may
be relevant to highlight that TRAI‟s statutory power to regulate the
prescribed time for advertisements can be deduced from Section
11(1)(b)(v) of the Act of 1997, a bare reading of which makes it
evident that TRAI while discharging its functions as envisaged in the
said provision, is also provided with a responsibility to lay down the
standards of QoS, which undisputedly, would also be inclusive of
enhancement of quality of viewer‟s experience. Whereas, a perusal of
Section 36 of the Act of 1997, would indicate that the TRAI, as a
regulatory authority, is envisaged with the power to make Regulation
and Rules, which shall serve the purpose of the Act of 1997. Thus, the
Impugned Regulation of 2012 represent a legitimate exercise of
delegate authority. It is the responsibility of TRAI to ensure that QoS
is maintained by the broadcasters which includes viewer experience,
once the viewers interest is to be kept in view, then the delicate
balance between the interest of broadcasters and the consumers is to
be maintained.
35. In view of the aforestated, the measure taken by TRAI to limit
the advertisements to 12 minutes per clock hour, is in pursuance of the
recognised QoS objective of TRAI, aimed at reducing excessive
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commercial breaks and preventing the artificial clustering of
advertisements, in order to ensure a more even and rational
distribution of advertising load across broadcast time. The Impugned
Regulation of 2012 serves to enhance the overall viewing experience
while promoting regulatory uniformity across broadcasters.
36. Accordingly, it would be incorrect to state that the power of
TRAI to regulate QoS is a narrow, technical or engineering-centric
function as has been argued by learned senior counsels appearing for
the Petitioners. On the contrary, it is a dynamic, evolving and living
mandate, encompassing all facets that materially shape consumer
experience. The regulation imposed by way of fixing an advertisement
duration, in a time-bound broadcast medium is manifestly one such
facet.
37. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid, the Impugned Regulation of
2012 cannot be stated to be excessive, they constitute a measured
exercise of statutory power, harmonising, the legislative intent of the
Act of 1995 with the consumer-centric regulatory framework provided
under the Act of 1997, and as such the Impugned Regulation of 2012
falls well within the bounds of legislative competence of TRAI.
II. WHETHER THE TIME CEILING OF 12 MINUTES PER
CLOCK HOUR ON ADVERTISEMENTS IS VIOLATIVE OF
PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 19 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
38. Since the present challenge raises a multi-layered question at
the intersection of free speech, business rights, and regulation of a
public resource, we deem it appropriate to structure this part of
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analysis under the following four sub-issues:
a. Public character of spectrum and State‟s power to regulate the
same;
b. Whether the rights of broadcasters argued under Article 14 and
Article 19 of the Constitution subserve the benefit of public at large?
c. Judgments forming part of core contentions of the Petitioners
are distinguishable;
d. Consultation, Transparency and Application of Mind by TRAI.
(a.) Public character of spectrum and State’s power to regulate
the same
39. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to briefly delineate the
evolution and operational architecture of broadcasting and cable
services in India, tracing their progression across technological
paradigms.
40. In its earliest form, television transmission was carried out
through terrestrial broadcasting, wherein television stations
disseminated signals using high-powered radio waves in the Very
High Frequency (VHF) or Ultra High Frequency (UHF) bands,
received by individual antennas, thereby constituting the traditional
FTA method, marking the genesis of broadcast dissemination. The
above-stated form of transmission was followed by the emergence of
cable television networks, which marked a significant shift from over-
the-air transmission to a guided physical delivery system. Under the
said mode of transmission, signals were transmitted directly to
television sets through wired infrastructure, typically coaxial or fibre-
optic cables, thereby enhancing signal quality and expanding the
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channels capacity as provided under the said network.
41. The next phase of transmission witnessed the emergence of
satellite television systems, namely, Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
or Direct to Home (DTH), wherein signals were uplinked from a
broadcast centre to geostationary satellites and thereafter downlinked
back to earth for reception. This model enabled wide-area coverage,
transcending geographical limitations and significantly expanding
access. The most recent evolution in transmission is reflected in
Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), wherein content is delivered
through broadband or fibre-based internet networks, representing the
convergence of broadcasting with digital communication
technologies.
42. Notwithstanding the diversity in the modes of transmission,
which has been evolving with the passage of time, a common and
unifying thread binding all forms pertains to the reliance on airwaves
and frequency for the dissemination of signals in each of the forms
delineated hereinabove. Each of these systems, either directly or
indirectly, rely upon the access to airwaves and frequency, which
constitutes as a limited public property and shall be used in the best
interest of the society. The aforestated position stands recognised by
the Supreme Court in Secy., Ministry of Information & Broadcasting
(Supra) , wherein it was held that airwaves are public property and
their use must be regulated by a public authority in the interest of the
public at large. The relevant excerpt of the said judgment is
reproduced hereunder-
122. We, therefore, hold as follows:
(i) The airwaves or frequencies are a public property . Their use has
to be controlled and regulated by a public authority in the interests of
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the public and to prevent the invasion of their rights. Since the
electronic media involves the use of the airwaves, this factor creates
an inbuilt restriction on its use as in the case of any other public
property .‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
43. The aforestated position has further emerged clearly from the
decision of the Supreme Court in Centre for Public Interest
32
Litigation and Others v Union of India and Others , wherein the
Court while deliberating upon the definition of natural resources, held
that Spectrum constitutes as a scarce, finite and renewable natural
resource. The Court further highlighted that such resources vest in the
people, with the State acting as a trustee, and that their allocation must
conform to the principles of equality, transparency, and public
interest, consistent with the mandate of Article 39(b) of the
Constitution. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:
―74. At the outset, we consider it proper to observe that even though
there is no universally accepted definition of natural resources, they
are generally understood as elements having intrinsic utility to
mankind. They may be renewable or non-renewable. They are thought
of as the individual elements of the natural environment that provide
economic and social services to human society and are considered
valuable in their relatively unmodified, natural form. A natural
resource's value rests in the amount of the material available and the
demand for it. The latter is determined by its usefulness to production.
Natural resources belong to the people but the State legally owns
them on behalf of its people and from that point of view natural
resources are considered as national assets, more so because the
State benefits immensely from their value.
75. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources. However,
as they constitute public property/national asset, while distributing
natural resources the State is bound to act in consonance with the
principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no action is
taken which may be detrimental to public interest. Like any other
State action, constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the
distribution of natural resources . In Article 39(b) of the Constitution
it has been provided that the ownership and control of the material
resources of the community should be so distributed so as thy best
subserve the common good, but no comprehensive legislation has
32
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been enacted to generally define natural resources and a framework
for their protection. Of course, environment laws enacted by
Parliament and State Legislatures deal with specific natural
resources i.e. forest, air, water, coastal zones, etc.
76 The ownership regime relating to natural resources can also be
ascertained from international conventions and customary
international law, common law and national constitutions. In
international law, it rests upon the concept of sovereignty and seeks to
respect the principle of permanent sovereignty (of peoples and
nations) over (their) natural resources as asserted in the 17th Session
of the United Nations General Assembly and then affirmed as a
customary international norm by the International Court of Justice in
the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda. Common law
recognises States as having the authority to protect natural
resources insofar as the resources are within the interests of the
general public. The State is deemed to have a proprietary interest in
natural resources and must act as guardian and trustee in relation
to the same. Constitutions across the world focus on establishing
natural resources as owned by, and for the benefit of, the country.
In most instances where constitutions specifically address ownership
of natural resources, the sovereign State, or, as it is more commonly
expressed, ―the People‖, is designated as the owner of the natural
resources.
77. Spectrum has been internationally accepted as a scarce, finite
and renewable natural resource which is susceptible to degradation
in case of inefficient utilisation. It has a high economic value in the
light of the demand for it on account of the tremendous growth in
the telecom sector. Although it does not belong to a particular State,
right of use has been granted to the States as per international
norms.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
44. Further, the Supreme Court in its judgment in Property Owners
33
Association & Ors. v State of Maharashtra & Ors. , reiterated that
the scarce and finite nature of resources like airwaves, thereby
recognising the power of government to protect the same in interest of
general public. The relevant excerpt is reproduced hereunder:
―223. ………... However, as the community has a vital interest in the
retention of the character of these resources, they fall within the
ambit of the expression ―material resources of the community‖.
224. We may refer to the Public Trust Doctrine that has been
evolved by this Court in a consistent line of precedent, to better
33
2024 INSC 835
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understand the ‗community‘ element of such resources. This
doctrine provides that the State holds all natural resources as a
trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent
with the nature of the trust. The doctrine was introduced to Indian
jurisprudence by a two-judge bench decision of this Court in M.C.
Mehta v. Kamal Nath. This Court, speaking through Justice Kuldip
Singh, held that the doctrine is rooted in the principle that certain
resources like ―air, sea, waters and forests‖ hold such importance to
the people, as a whole, that it would be unjustified to make them a
subject of private ownership. This Court held that the doctrine
mandates the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment
of the general public, rather than to permit their use for commercial
gains. Significantly, this does not mean that the state cannot
distribute such resources, sometimes even to private entities, rather
while distributing such resources, the state is bound to act in
consonance with the principles of public trust so as to ensure that no
action is taken which is detrimental to public interest.
225. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Special Reference No.
1, adverted to above, had occasion to observe that the Public Trust
Doctrine has expanded beyond resources like air, sea, water and
forests, to include other resources such as spectrum which also have
a community or public element. The Constitution Bench of this
Court, relying on Article 39(b), held that no part of such resources
can be dissipated as a matter of largess, charity, donation or
endowment, for private exploitation. The considerations may be in
the nature of the state earning revenue or to "best sub-serve the
common good". The idea, this Court held, is that one set of private
citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set of private citizens,
because such resources are owned by the community as a whole.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
45. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 2026 by way its judgment in
34
State Bank of India v Union of India & Ors. , while dealing with
spectrum in the context of insolvency summarised the earlier line of
authorities. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:
― 13.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a
specialised agency of the United Nations responsible for global
telecommunications regulation, divides the world into three regions,
each with specified frequency allocations. The ITU has allocated
various spectrum bands to India for mobile telecommunications,
satellite-based services, and other applications such as broadcasting.
The spectrum needs of our fastgrowing economy has been projected
to be around 2000 MHz by 2030. This is said to be far below the
34
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needs of defense, telecommunications and other sectors. In CPIL
(Supra), this Court explained spectrum as;
―77. Spectrum has been internationally accepted as a scarce,
finite and renewable natural resource which is susceptible to
degradation in case of inefficient utilization. It has a high
economic value in the light of the demand for it on account of
the tremendous growth in the telecom sector. Although it does
not belong to a particular State, right of use has been granted
to the States as per international norms.‖ 14. Beyond its
technical description, spectrum has consistently been
recognized as a public resource and it is precious also for the
reason that it is finite and limited.
B. Concept of ownership over natural resources and its
Constitutional Underpinnings:
15. Dealing with spectrum as a limited natural resource, this Court
in CPIL Case (Supra) had the occasion to deal with ownership and
control of the natural resource in the following terms ;
―74. …Natural resources belong to the people but the State
legally owns them on behalf of its people and from that point
of view natural resources are considered as national assets,
more so because the State benefits immensely from their value.
75. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources.
However, as they constitute public property/national asset
while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in
consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and
ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to
public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism
must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural
resources….‖
16. Applying the doctrine of public trust, recognized in M. C. Mehta
v. Kamal Nath this Court held that spectrum as a natural resource
of the nation is administered by the Central Government as a
Trustee. In a nuanced approach, this position was reaffirmed by the
Constitution Bench in Natural Resources Allocation, In re (Supra)
by holding that while the State may adopt different modalities of
allocation, it cannot part with the natural resource when the policy
of the State is not supported by social or welfare purpose.
―149. …Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and
the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives.
However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social
or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources
are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising
private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that
are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and
face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, rather
than prescribing or proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial
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scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in
consonance with the principles which we have culled out above.
Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review,
shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair,
unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14
of the Constitution.‖
17. The constitutional framework reinforces this understanding by
mandating that the ownership and control of this material resource
of the community be so distributed as best to subserve the common
good. Constitution obligates the State to ensure that access to and
use of such resource is regulated in a transparent, non-
discriminatory manner, so that, its benefit enure to the benefit of the
nation, rather than being treated as objects of private ownership or
unfettered commercial exploitation . This position is clear from the
following passage in CPIL (Supra);
―75. … while distributing natural resources the State is bound
to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public
trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be
detrimental to public interest . Like any other State action,
constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the
distribution of natural resources. In Article 39(b) of the
Constitution it has been provided that the ownership and
control of the material resources of the community should be
so distributed so as to best subserve the common good, but no
comprehensive legislation has been enacted to generally define
natural resources and a framework for their protection ….‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
46. The settled line of authorities establishes a well-settled
constitutional position that spectrum and airwaves constitute scarce,
finite public resources which vest in the people, and are held by the
State in a fiduciary capacity as trustee. Consequently, their allocation
and regulation must necessarily be informed by the foundational
principles of public interest, equality, and transparency, as reinforced
by the public trust doctrine. In furtherance of Article 39(b) of the
Constitution, such resources are required to be distributed so as to best
subserve the common good.
47. Accordingly, access to spectrum is neither inherent nor
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absolute; it is conditional, regulated, and circumscribed by statutory
and constitutional limitations. The broadcasters cannot claim an
unfettered right to exploit spectrum for commercial purposes. Their
use of such resource is subject to licensing conditions, statutory
frameworks, and regulatory oversight. The State, in discharge of its
constitutional obligations, is fully competent to regulate the manner
and extent of such usage in order to ensure that the public character of
the resource is preserved and that its benefits accrue to the community
at large.
(b) Whether the rights of broadcasters argued under Article 14
and Article 19 of the Constitution subserve the benefit of public at
large?
48. Before dealing with the arguments raised by learned senior
counsel for the Petitioners, with respect to Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution, we deem it apposite to highlight the interplay between
the State‟s duty to regulate natural resources and whether such duties
envisaged by the Constitution automatically stands superseded by the
principles enshrined under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
49. Article 39(b) forming part of Part IV of the Constitution under
the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), embodies a
fundamental constitutional directive which guides and informs State
policymaking. It delineates the constitutional obligation of the State to
ensure that the ownership and control of material resources of the
community are so distributed as to best subserve the common good. In
essence, it mandates that the State, while exercising its regulatory and
distributive functions, must adopt policies that ensure equitable
distribution of resources in furtherance of public welfare and socio-
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50. Article 39(c) of the Constitution, mandates that the State shall
direct its policy towards securing that the operation of the economic
system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of
production to the common detriment. The said DPSP, embodies a core
facet of the Constitution‟s socio-economic philosophy, aimed at
preventing structural imbalances thereby ensuring that economic
power is not disproportionately accumulated in the hands of a few,
leading to the prejudice of the broader community.
51. Article 31-C of the Constitution on the other hand, forming part
of Part-III under the FRs guaranteed thereunder, provides a
constitutionally significant interface between FRs and the DPSP. It
states that any law enacted to give effect to the policy of State towards
securing the principles enshrined under Part-IV shall not be deemed
void on the ground of inconsistency with, or abridgment of, the rights
conferred under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
52. The controversy pertaining to the complementary significance
of Article 31-C vis-à-vis Articles 39(b) and 39(c) of the Constitution,
holds a significant place in the constitutional history of India.
Chandrachud C.J., in the case of Minerva Mills Limited & Ors v
35
Union of India and Ors. , observed that Part III and Part-IV are the
two wheels of chariot, and as such, harmony and balance between the
two forms an essential feature of the basic structure, thus, giving
absolute primacy to either side would destroy such harmony.
53. The Supreme Court in the celebrated and landmark judgment of
36
Kesavnanda Bharati v State of Kerala , upheld the constitutional
35
(1980) 3 SCC 625
36
(1973) 4 SCC 225
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validity of Article 31-C in a limited sense, to the extent that it
provided immunity from challenges under Articles 14, 19 and the then
Article 31 of the Constitution to laws enacted to give effect to the
DPSP set out in clauses (b) or (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution.
Before adverting to the relevant extracts of the judgment, we must
highlight that Article 31-C of the Constitution, as it stands today, is a
product of rigorous constitutional evolution, having undergone
significant amendments and judicial scrutiny over time. However, for
the purpose of present analysis, we deem it unnecessary to delve
deeply into the entire doctrinal trajectory and leave said discussion for
the academic discourse.
54. Further, the Supreme Court in Kesavnanda Bharti (Supra) in
paragraph nos.1035, 1323, 1537, 1771 and 1788, also upheld the
constitutional validity of first part of Article 31-C of the Constitution,
to the extent it subsumes the rights guaranteed under Part-IV, in
particular, immunity from challenges under Articles 14, 19, and the
then Article 31 as long as a law made by the Government satisfies the
policies envisaged under Article 39(b) or (c) of the Constitution. In
this regard, the Court while dealing with power of judicial review
highlighted that the nexus or connection between the law and the
objective set out in Article 39(b) or (c) of the Constitution is a
condition precedent for the applicability of Article 31-C of the
Constitution and Courts can tear the veil to decide the real nature of
the statute if the facts and circumstances warrant such a course.
55. Moreover, the constitutional validity of the first part of Article
31-C of the Constitution, as it stands today, was also upheld by a
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in its consequent
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37
judgment in Waman Rao & Ors. v Union of India & Ors. , wherein
it was held that laws genuinely enacted to give effect to Article 39(b)
and (c) of the Constitution fortify, rather than damage, the basic
structure.
56. Having delineated the constitutional validity of Article 31-C of
the Constitution, and the Courts power to exercise judicial review over
legislations passed under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, we
shall now advert to the criteria/tests laid down by the Supreme Court
in order to examine whether a law passed by the Government gives
effect to Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. In this regard, a
reference is made to the judgment in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.
38
Ltd. v. State of Assam , wherein the Supreme Court while dealing
with the protection under Article 31-C of the Constitution, held as
follows:
―3. The principal question which falls for consideration is, whether
that declaration is justiciable and open to judicial review and the
extent of that judicial review. Article 39(b) of the Constitution enjoins
that the State in particular should direct its policy towards securing
that the ownership and control of the material resources of the
community are so distributed as to best subserve the common good
and that the operation of the economic system does not result in
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common
detriment. See, in this connection, the observations of Ray, J., as the
learned Chief Justice then was, in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala- (SCC pp. 585-86: SCR pp. 451-52). Hence in order to decide
whether a statute is within Article 31-C, the court, if necessary, may
examine the nature and the character of legislation and the matter
dealt with as to whether there is any nexus between the law and the
principles mentioned in Article 39(b) and (c). On such an
examination if it appears that there is no such nexus between the
legislation and the objectives and the principles mentioned in Article
39(b) and (c), the legislation will not enjoy the protection of Article
31-C. In order to see the real nature of the statute, if need be, the
court may also tear the veil.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
37
(1981) 2 SCC 362 [54]
38
(1989) 3 SCC 709
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57. Similarly, in a recent judgment of Property Owners Association
& Ors. (Supra), the Supreme Court broadly observed as follows:
―3. Article 31C of the Constitution provides certain legislations a safe
harbour and protects them from being challenged under Articles 14
and 19. The only requirement is that the legislation must give effect
to ―the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39‖.
In a sense, Article 31C is the ying to the yang of Article 39(b), which
gives it a unique colour and texture and provides it with far-
reaching consequences. Once it is established that a particular
legislation has a nexus with the principles specified in Article 39(b),
Article 31C provides the legislation with a lifeboat – protecting it
from a challenge to its constitutionality under Articles 14 and 19 of
the Constitution. ‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
58. As per the above precedents, the decisive test established to
determine a law giving effect to Article 39(b) and (c) of the
Constitution, is the existence of a real and substantive nexus between
the legislation and the objectives of the said Article, i.e., distribution
of material resources to subserve the common good and prevention of
concentration of wealth. Having regard to the aforesaid constitutional
position, we shall now turn to the examination of the Impugned
Regulation of 2012, on the anvil of tests laid down in Tinsukhia
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (Supra) and Property Owners Association &
Ors. (Supra).
59. At this stage, it also becomes pertinent to highlight that the
primary bone of contention of the Petitioners, challenging the
Impugned framework, lies not in the freedom of production or non-
production of content shown while advertisement, rather it finds its
genesis to the assertion that the Impugned Regulation of 2012, by way
of imposing a per clock hour regime on to the time ceiling of 12
minutes of advertisements, affects their „primary source of
sustenance‟ which namely advertising revenue. Such action taken by
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the Government, is argued to be undermining their economic viability,
accordingly, they are asserting a right to a particular quantum of
commercial gain from a public resource.
60. A reference may also be made to the explanatory memorandum
attached to the Impugned Regulation of 2012, which indicates that the
regulatory intervention was preceded by widespread consumer
complaints regarding excessive advertisement duration, frequency,
and disruptive formats. The relevant part is as follows:
―5. There have been several complaints, mainly from the consumers
raised at various fora, regarding overplaying of advertisements, long
duration of advertisements, overlaying of advertisements on the
screen, increased audio level during advertisements etc. It has been
said that the advertisement duration and formats are not in accordance
with the provisions stated above. It has often been pointed out that the
advertisements are played/repeated several times in between the
programmes, which break the continuity of the programme and often
done at crucial stages of a programme. In this context, there have
been requests to at least restrict and regulate the duration, frequency
and timings of the advertisements.
6. With the primary objective of striking a balance between giving a
consumer a good TV viewing experience, and protecting the
commercial interests of broadcasters, a consultation paper was issued
on 16th March 2012 titled ―Issues related to Advertisements in TV
channels‖ . In the consultation paper, various issues related to
advertisements on TV channels in India were discussed and a proposal
for regulation of duration and format of advertisements was put forth
for comments of the stakeholders. In response to this consultation
paper, 29 comments were received. Based on the comments/ views of
the stakeholders and analysis of various aspects, facts and available
studies, the Authority has decided to issue separate regulations for the
duration of advertisements carried in TV channels.
8. The other stakeholders comprising mainly the consumers,
consumer organisations and cable operators have supported the TRAI
proposal for the regulation of duration and format of advertisements
in the TV channels.
16. One of the cable operator association has stated that the limit for
the duration of the advertisement should be regulated on a clock hour
basis as well as on 24 hr basis. Supporting the clock hour based
capping of advertisement duration, one of the consumer organisation
has stated that this would avoid accumulation of advertisement slots,
especially in peak hours. Another consumer organisation has even
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stated that the limits may be more stringent for children specific
programmes.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
61. A perusal of the aforesaid would indicate that the impugned
action of the Government was preceded by, and is responsive to,
concerns articulated by consumers and consumer organisations
regarding the excessive duration and frequency of advertisements,
which were found to materially disrupt the continuity and smooth
viewing of television programmes. Therefore, the regulatory
intervention reflects a considered response to legitimate consumer
grievances, aimed at preserving the quality of the viewing experience
and safeguarding the interests of viewers.
62. Against the aforestated factual backdrop, the regulatory
framework governing advertisement time must be viewed as part of
broader statutory scheme of the Government in regulating the use of
spectrum, which constitutes a scarce and finite public resource, held
by the State in a fiduciary capacity, to be utilised in order to subserve
common good.
63. The measures taken by TRAI to impose a temporal limit on
advertisements, in order to ensure that no material resource is
exploited for excessive commercial gain by broadcasters, bear a
proximate and rational nexus to the constitutional mandate of ensuring
that material resources of the community are distributed and utilised
so as to subserve the common good. Accordingly, the Impugned Rule
and Regulations insofar as they prevent excessive commercial
exploitation, safeguard consumer interest and ensure equitable and
efficient utilisation of broadcast spectrum, can legitimately be
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regarded as effectuating the principles embodied in Articles 39(b) and
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(c) of the Constitution. Consequently, the measures taken by the
Government being the trustee of material resources, while imposing
the per clock hour regime, in order to meet the interests of consumers,
would be protected within the ambit of Article 31-C of the
Constitution, thereby foreclosing the challenge of the Petitioners on
alleged violations of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
64. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, even if the impugned
measures are tested independently on the touchstone of FRs, the
challenge would not sustain. The claim of the Petitioners on account
of loss of advertising revenue falls squarely within the ambit of
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which deals with freedom to carry
on business, and not the core of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Reliance in this regard is placed on paragraph no.9 of judgment in A.
Suresh (Supra) , wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, observed that
where a speech is intertwined with business, the activity undergoes a
fundamental change and must be balanced against societal interests.
65. Under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the Petitioners are
entitled to carry on the business of broadcasting, subject to
„reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public‟ under
Article 19(6) of the Constitution. The ceiling on advertisement time
constitutes one such restriction. In this backdrop, the rationale
underlying the Impugned Rule and Regulations framed by TRAI must
be understood in three contexts, each anchored in the principle of
reasonableness. Firstly , excessive advertisement breaks, driven by
revenue maximisation, degrade viewer experience and provoke
widespread consumer dissatisfaction. Secondly , international practice
across numerous jurisdictions including but not limited to Argentina,
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Croatia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, UK, etc., converges broadly
around a ceiling of 9 to 12 minutes per hour, thereby underscoring that
India‟s 12-minute cap is neither extreme nor novel. Thirdly , the
Impugned Regulations leaves intact the broadcasters‟ freedom to fix
advertisement rates, design subscription models, and curate
programme content for the remaining 48 minutes each hour; they
merely allocate a reasonable portion of each hour to non-commercial
content in the interest of viewers.
66. Therefore, to secure the commercial benefit of broadcasters is
not the constitutional duty of the State. A State‟s obligation,
particularly, where public resources are involved is to safeguard the
interest of viewers and the public at large, rather than allowing or
permitting its use for commercial gains as held in M.C. Mehta v
39
Kamal Nath and reiterated in Property Owners Association (Supra) .
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not guarantee profitability,
and certainly not a right to monetise public property beyond
reasonable structural limits imposed in the common good.
67. Adverting now to the Impugned Rule and Regulation, the 12
minutes time ceiling is not a content-based restriction, as it does not
prohibit category of advertisement, rather it imposes a neutral, time-
based limit on the quantity of advertisements that may occupy each
hour of broadcast. To reiterate, the objective of such time ceiling is
only to safeguard viewer experience and prevent the excessive
commercialisation of a scarce public resource. Such imposition of
regulations has been conferred to TRAI in a manner to regulate,
subject to, needless to say, the four corners of the relevant statute.
39
(1997) 1 SCC 388
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68. Further, the reliance placed by the Petitioners, on Kaushal
Kishore (Supra) , is distinguishable from the present controversy. The
aforesaid judgment holds that the grounds under Article 19(2) of the
Constitution are exhaustive and, as such, cannot be enlarged by
invoking other rights like Article 21 of the Constitution; and no new
restrictions on free speech can be judicially created beyond the eight
enumerated heads. However, in the present case, the actions of the
Government, stands justified under the reasonable restrictions
envisaged under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, in particular,
against the primary bone of contention of the Petitioners relating to
the loss of commercial gain. Moreover, the actions of the Government
also stand justified under the DPSP framework provided under Article
39 of the Constitution and are not an attempt to invent new restrictions
to Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
69. In this regard, a reference may be made to the judgment of
Supreme Court in Mohd Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme
40
Court of India and Others , wherein the Court while reiterating its
decision of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v
41
Union of India , highlighted that the various FRs contained in
different articles are not mutually exclusive. The relevant paragraph
reads as under:
― The minority judgment of Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. eventually
became law in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v.
Union of India, where the 11-Judge Bench finally discarded
Gopalan's view and held that various fundamental rights contained
in different articles are not mutually exclusive : (SCC p. 289, para
53)
"53. We are therefore unable to hold that the challenge to the
validity of the provision for acquisition is liable to be tested only
40
(2014) 9 SCC 737
41
(1970) 1 SCC 248
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on the ground of non-compliance with Article 31(2). Article
31(2) requires that property must be acquired for a public
purpose and that it must be acquired under a law with
characteristics set out in that Article. Formal compliance with
the conditions under Article 31(2) is not sufficient to negative
the protection of the guarantee of the right to property.
Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the
expression "law" means a law which is within the competence of
the Legislature, and does not impair the guarantee of the rights
in Part !!I. We are unable, therefore, to agree that Articles
19(1)(/) and 31(2) are mutually exclusive.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
70. Similarly, the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v
42
Union of India & Ors. , further clarifying the structure of Part III of
the Constitution, observed as follows:
―21. The theory that the fundamental rights are watertight
compartments was discarded in the judgment of eleven Judges of
this Court in Cooper. Gopalan had adopted the view that a law of
preventive detention would be tested for its validity only with
reference to Article 22, which was a complete code relating to the
subject. Legislations on preventive detention did not, in this view,
have to meet the touchstone of Article 19(1)(d).
The dissenting view of Fazl Ali, J. in Gopalan was noticed by J.C.
Shah, J. speaking for this Court, in Cooper. The consequence of the
Gopalan doctrine was that the protection afforded by a guarantee of
personal freedom would be decided by the object of the State action in
relation to the right of the individual and not upon its effect upon the
guarantee.
Disagreeing with this view, the Court in Cooper held thus: (SCC p.
289, para 52)
"52. ... it is necessary to bear in mind the enunciation of the guarantee
of fundamental rights which has taken different forms. In some cases it
is an express declaration of a guaranteed right: Articles 29(1), 30(1),
26, 25 and 32; in others to ensure protection of individual rights they
take specific forms of restrictions on State action-legislative or
executive-Articles 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22(1), 27 and 28; in some others,
it takes the form of a positive declaration and simultaneously
enunciates the restriction thereon : Articles 19(1) and 19(2) to (6); in
some cases, it arises as an implication from the delimitation of the
authority of the State, eg. Articles 31(1) and 31(2); in still others, it
takes the form of a general prohibition against the State as well as
others: Articles 17,23 and 24. The enunciation of rights either
42
(2017) 10 SCC 1
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express or by implication does not follow a uniform pattern. But one
thread runs through them: they seek to protect the rights of the
individual or groups of individuals against infringement of those
rights within specific limits. Part III of the Constitution weaves a
pattern of guarantees on the texture of basic human rights. The
guarantees delimit the protection of those rights in their allotted
fields: they do not attempt to enunciate distinct rights. ‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
71. The jurisprudential import of the aforesaid judgment is that Part
III of the Constitution embodies a unified charter of rights, where each
provision delineates a specific facet of liberty rather than existing as
isolated or self-contained compartments. Therefore, the analytical
focus, is not confined to the ostensible classification of the right
invoked, but extends to the real nature, effect, and constitutional
impact of the impugned measure.
72. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, the present
controversy, reveals that notwithstanding the primary argument of the
Petitioners based majorly on Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, this
Court is not refrained from examining the impugned regulatory
framework through the prism of Article 19(1)(g) as well. The various
clauses under Article 19 of the Constitution do not constitute mutually
exclusive or watertight compartments; rather, they represent different
facets of a broader constitutional guarantee of freedom. Consequently,
where State action is argued to be interfering with the commercial
structuring of a licensed activity involving public resources, the same
may legitimately be assessed under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution, even if it incidentally affects expressive elements under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
73. Similarly, the challenge pertaining to Article 14 of the
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Constitution proceeds on three footing that the Impugned Rule and
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Regulations: (i) does not distinguish between prime and non-prime
time; (ii) treats heterogenous channels, such as news channels, GECs,
regional channels, pay channels and FTA channels, uniformly and (iii)
makes no distinction between commercial, public-service and self-
promotional advertisements.
74. The Supreme Court in Sukanya Shantha v Union of India &
43
Ors. , while summarising the standards laid down by the Supreme
Court under Article 14 of the Constitution, held as follows:
―42. The constitutional standards laid down by the Court under
Article 14 can be summarised as follows. First, the Constitution
permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable
nexus with the object sought. Second, the classification test cannot be
merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion. A
challenge under Article 14 has to take into account the substantive
content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an individual.
Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate
legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary i.e. courts must adjudicate
whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally
and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something
which is excessive and disproportionate. In applying this
constitutional standard, courts must identify the "real purpose" of the
statute rather than the "ostensible purpose" presented by the State, as
summarised in ADR. Fourth, a provision can be found manifestly
arbitrary even if it does not make a classification. Fifth, different
constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity of
legislation as compared to subordinate legislation.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
75. The five-fold framework articulated in Sukanya Shantha
(Supra) when applied in its full doctrinal breadth, leaves little room
for sustaining a challenge to the impugned framework. The
prescription of a uniform ceiling of 12 minutes per clock hour rests on
a clear and intelligible structural distinction between programme
content and advertising time, which bears a direct and proximate
nexus to the ultimate objective of preserving viewer interest and
43
(2024) 15 SCC 535
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enhancing quality of experience. Therefore, the measure satisfies the
classical test of permissible classification.
76. Similarly, when tested on the touchstone of substantive equality
under Article 14 of the Constitution, the framework advances fair and
non-discriminatory treatment by securing for all viewers, irrespective
of channel or genre of broadcast, a baseline entitlement to content-
dominant broadcasting. Therefore, the regulatory focus is
appropriately aligned with the end-user, consistent with the consumer-
centric mandate governing the telecom sector.
77. On the axis of manifest arbitrariness, the impugned provisions
are anchored in a discernible regulatory principle, namely the
prevention of excessive commercialisation of a scarce public resource
and the mitigation of viewer disruption. The fixation of the ceiling is
neither capricious nor disproportionate, but is informed by
consultative processes, comparative international practice, and
identifiable consumer concerns. Therefore, the measure does not
suffer from the vice of arbitrariness as elucidated in contemporary
Article 14 jurisprudence.
78. Further, even if the framework is construed as a uniform, non-
classificatory rule, it cannot be impugned as inherently arbitrary, as it
embodies a rational, structured, and constitutionally legitimate
response to the regulation of spectrum-based services, which are
vested with public interest considerations.
79. Finally, having regard to the standard applicable to subordinate
legislation, both the Impugned Rule and Regulations are traceable to,
and operate within, the statutory contours of the parent enactments.
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They disclose no excess of delegation, nor any inconsistency with the
legislative scheme, and are supported by cogent policy rationale.
Accordingly, when assessed cumulatively across all the facets
delineated in Sukanya Shantha (Supra) , the Impugned Rules and
Regulations is found not to be ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution.
80. To conclude, the impugned regulatory framework represents a
constitutionally sound exercise of the State‟s authority to regulate a
scarce public resource in furtherance of the common good. The
framework being anchored in the DPSP embodied under Articles
39(b) and (c) of the Constitution and fortified by the protective ambit
of Article 31-C of the Constitution, strike a careful balance between
individual freedoms and collective welfare. The limitations imposed
on advertisement time neither abrogate the FRs of the Petitioners nor
transgress the guarantees under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution,
rather it constitutes a reasonable and proportionate restrictions aligned
with established constitutional doctrine. When viewed holistically, the
framework advances consumer interest, ensures equitable utilisation
of spectrum, and preserves the integrity of the broadcasting
ecosystem, thereby satisfying both the test of reasonableness under
Article 19(6) of the Constitution and the mandate of non-arbitrariness
under Article 14 of the Constitution. Consequently, the challenge to
the impugned provisions is unsustainable in law.
(c) Judgments forming part of core contentions of the Petitioners
are distinguishable
81. The Petitioners before this Court, with great ingenuity have
sought to cast what is fundamentally a grievance about loss of
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advertising revenue as a direct violation of their freedom of speech
and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. While making the aforesaid submission, a principal
reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in Sakal Papers (Supra), Bennett Coleman (Supra) and Tata Press
Ltd. (Supra).
82. However, while relying upon the aforesaid judgments, the
Petitioners have overlooked a very basic distinction between the lis
giving rise to the present petition as against the lis of the said
judgments. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
undoubtedly, laid down that programme includes advertisements and
Government has no power to put a cap, as it would be violative of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, the lis therein arose out
of the limitations pertaining to print media.
83. In this regard, the nature of the medium in the aforestated media
and usage of public resources for the same needs to be distinguished.
On one hand, print media uses privately owned resources like printing
presses, paper and distribution networks, while focusing on
registration and professional standards and not an ex-ante licensing of
editorial operations. Whereas, broadcasting media, on the other hand
uses the airwaves and spectrum, which has undisputedly been
characterised as a scarce public resource which shall necessarily be
utilised to promote public good. On account of the scarce and public
nature of broadcasting media, the State exercises the right to impose a
licensing and authorisation regime for broadcasters and regulate
access to spectrum.
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84. The distinction between print media and broadcasting has also
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been recognized by the Supreme Court in K.A. Abbas v Union of
44
India , wherein Hidayatullah, C.J. described the differences in the
context of motion pictures:
“ 20. Further it has been almost universally recognised that the
treatment of motion pictures must be different from that of other
forms of art and expression. This arises from the instant appeal of the
motion picture, its versatility, realism (often surrealism), and its co-
ordination of the visual and aural senses. The art of the cameraman,
with trick photography, vista-vision and three-dimensional
representation thrown in, has made the cinema picture more true to
life than even the theatre or indeed any other form of representative
art. The motion picture is able to stir up emotions more deeply than
any other product of art. Its effect particularly on children and
adolescents is very great since their immaturity makes them more
willingly suspend their disbelief than mature men and women. They
also remember the action in the picture and try to emulate or imitate
what they have seen. Therefore classification of films into two
categories of 'U' films and 'A' films is a reasonable classification. It is
also for this reason that motion pictures must be regarded differently
from other forms of speech and expression. A person reading a book
or other writing or hearing a speech or viewing a painting or
sculpture is not so deeply stirred as by seeing a motion picture.
Therefore the treatment of the latter on a different footing is also a
valid classification . ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
85. Likewise, the Supreme Court in the judgment of Secy. Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting (Supra), while dealing with the
nuances of censorship, reiterated the distinction between the print
medium and the audio-visual medium:
―15. ……..Though a movie enjoys the guarantee under Article
19(1)(a), there is one significant difference between a movie and other
modes of communication. Movie motivates thought and action and
assures a high degree of attention and retention. In view of the
scientific improvements in photography and production, the present
movie is a powerful means of communication. It has a unique
capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It has much potential for evil
as it has for good. With these qualities and since it caters for mass
audience who are generally not selective about what they watch, a
movie cannot be equated with other modes of communication. It
cannot be allowed to function in a free market-place just as does the
newspaper or magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore,
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(1970) 2 SCC 780
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not only desirable but also necessary. But the First Amendment to the
US Constitution does not permit any prior restraint, since the
guarantee of free speech is in unqualified terms. Censorship is
permitted mainly on the ground of social interests specified under
Article 19(2) with emphasis on maintenance of values and standards
of society.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
86. Turning now to the circumstances in the present case, the rights
claimed by broadcasters is in a capacity of a licenced user of public
resources, i.e., airwaves and frequencies. This distinction is not merely
formal, rather it informs the scope and character of permissible
regulation. The use of a public resource necessarily attracts an
additional layer of regulatory control to ensure that such resource is
deployed in a manner that subserves the larger public good as
highlighted in the preceeding paragraphs of this judgment. Television
channels, though privately operated, function within this shared
communicative space, meant for public access and consumption.
87. Accordingly, once broadcasters avail themselves of the
privilege of utilising public spectrum under statutory licence, they
cannot disclaim the corresponding obligation to adhere to conditions
designed to regulate its use in the public interest. The imposition of a
temporal ceiling on advertisements is one such condition, directed not
at suppressing expression, but at structuring the use of a public
resource in a manner consistent with viewer welfare.
88. Therefore, the Petitioners, while equating the two media, have
overlooked this essential constitutional distinction between private
means of expression and public means of transmission, a distinction
that decisively informs the validity of the impugned measure.
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(d) Consultation, Transparency and Application of Mind by
TRAI
89. The record shows that TRAI followed a structured process:
issuing consultation papers, inviting detailed submissions, holding
open-house sessions, and publishing explanatory materials before
finalising the Impugned Regulations. However, it has been argued by
one of the Petitioners that their objections, pertaining to economic
impact and the clock-hour construct were not accepted or exhaustively
discussed.
90. In accordance with Cellular Operators Association of India
(Supra) , TRAI as a regulatory body of Government is required to act
transparently, rationally, and to engage with stakeholder input; it does
not require them to accept every industry position or to produce
quasi-judicial orders addressing each argument in seriatim . So long as
the material indicates that TRAI understood the competing
considerations, took note of foreign practice, weighed consumer
complaints against broadcaster concerns, and then adopted a uniform
cap for articulated reasons, the process requirement is met. Moreover,
the contending Petitioner has not demonstrated that TRAI shut out
relevant material or proceeded on no evidence; at best, they show a
disagreement with the regulator‟s policy choice, which is outside the
scope of judicial review in economic-regulatory matters.
91. In view of the aforesaid, it is noted that a right to maximise
advertising inventory on public spectrum cannot override the public-
interest considerations. The loss of revenue as projected by
broadcasters is at best a reduction in one revenue lever, not a denial of
their right to carry on business. In view of the aforesaid precedents
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and constitutional terms, what is subject to protection as a FR is the
freedom to conduct business of broadcasting, not a guarantee of any
particular level of profit gained from the sale of advertising minutes
on public property. Even otherwise, since the actions of Government
highlight satisfies the tests laid down under Article 39(b) and (c) of
the Constitution, the actions stand subsumed by Article 31-C of the
Constitution.
D. CONCLUSION:
92. On a cumulative consideration of the statutory scheme, the
special constitutional position of spectrum-based media, the Impugned
Rule and Regulations withstand scrutiny under the Constitution, on
following grounds:
a. TRAI acted within its statutory authority under Sections 11 and
36 of the Act of 1997, read with the 2004 notification, in issuing the
Impugned Regulation of 2012 covering broadcasting and cable
services. The per clock hour advertisement cap is a valid exercise of
its regulatory power relating to QoS;
b. spectrum and airwaves are scarce public resources held in trust
by the State. Their regulation must align with Articles 39(b) and (c) of
the Constitution and the public trust doctrine. The impugned
framework furthers this objective by preventing excessive commercial
exploitation and ensuring equitable use, thereby attracting protection
under Article 31-C of the Constitution;
c. even otherwise the grievance relating to loss of advertising
revenue primarily falls within Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and
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not the core of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The 12-minute cap
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is a neutral, time-based regulation that does not restrict content but
only regulates quantity of advertising time;
d. the framework is reasonable under Article 19(6) of the
Constitution, as it serves the interests of the general public, preserves
viewer experience, and does not interfere with broadcasters‟ freedom
to determine content, pricing, or business models. There is no
constitutional guarantee of profitability or unlimited monetisation of
public resources;
e. the challenge based on Article 14 of the Constitution is
unsustainable as the classification between programme content and
advertisement time is intelligible and bears a rational nexus with the
objective of preventing over-commercialisation and protecting
consumer interest;
f. the framework is not manifestly arbitrary, being based on
consultation, empirical consumer concerns, and comparative
international practice. It reflects a structured and principled regulatory
approach; and
g. decision-making process adopted by TRAI satisfies the
requirements of consultation, transparency and application of mind.
93. The Rule 7 (11) of the Rules of 1994 and Regulation 3 of the
Regulation of 2012, as amended in 2013, constitute a constitutionally
valid exercise of regulatory power, striking a proportionate balance
between broadcaster rights and the public interest in efficient and fair
use of broadcast spectrum.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
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94. Keeping in view the above position of law, as well as the facts
and circumstances of the present case, the present Petitions are
dismissed. The Regulation 3 of the Regulation of 2012 passed by the
TRAI, effectuating Rule 7 (11) of the Rule of 1994, which are under
challenge herein, fail to meet the rights envisaged under Articles 14
and 19 of the Constitution.
95. All the pending applications also stand closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
MAY 29, 2026
jai/hr
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:29.05.2026
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