Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 445 of 1993
PETITIONER:
Radha Mohan Lal
RESPONDENT:
Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench)
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/02/2003
BENCH:
Y.K. Sabharwal & H.K. Sema
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
[With Criminal Appeal No.449 of 1993]
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.
By the impugned judgment and order dated 31st March, 1993, the High Court has come t
o the conclusion that the appellant Radha Mohan Lal (Criminal Appeal No.445/93) and his advo
cate, appellant Sualal Yadav (Criminal Appeal No.449/93) have committed the contempt of cour
t. Both have been sentenced to three months’ simple imprisonment each besides fine of R
s.1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, to further suffer simple imprisonment for
15 days.
The basis for initiation and punishment for contempt of court is the averment made i
n para 4 of the application dated 18th September, 1991 that had been filed before a learned
Single Judge of the High Court in a civil revision petition which was listed before the lear
ned Judge. The said para 4 reads as under :
"That apart from it, the undersigned has been informed by his client-Shri Radha Mohan Lal Va
kil Ex. Chairman of the Municipal Council, Jaipur, that he along with other non-petitioners
have moved a complaint in writing against Hon’ble Shri R.S. Kejriwal to the Hon’ble Chief Ju
stice requesting him to list the above revision before a Bench of which Hon’ble Shri R.S. Ke
jriwal is not a member as they have reasonable grounds to believe that no impartial justice
would be imparted from this Bench.
In the light of the above exceptional and extraordinary facts and circumstances of t
he matter, the above revision may kindly be allowed to be listed before a Bench not constitu
ted of the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kejriwal as the non-petitioners are known to have lost faith
in this Bench for reason obvious. In case the above revision is not allowed to be listed be
fore another Bench the applicant may be allowed sufficient time to approach the Supreme Cour
t for transfer of this case."
The revision petition arose out of an interim order passed in a civil suit that had
been filed by appellant Radha Mohan Lal and four others in representative capacity allegedly
to ensure that access to the temple which was the subject matter of the suit is not obstruc
ted as a consequence of encroachments by the Rajasthan Sports Council. The interim order gr
anted in their favour had been assailed in the revision petition. It is claimed that some o
bservations made by the learned Judge on 13th September, 1991 in course of hearing of argume
nts led to about 50 senior citizens representing to the Chief Justice that the petition be h
eard by some other Judge. On 18th September, 1991, when the matter came up for hearing befo
re the learned Single Judge, the fact of representation having been made to the Chief Justic
e was given out and this led to the filing of the application dated 18th September, 1991. U
ltimately, the averments made in the application led to initiation of proceedings for contem
pt of court and the finding of contempt and punishment on the appellants as aforestated. Ap
pellant Sualal Yadav was the advocate for Radha Mohan Lal both in the revision petition as a
lso in the contempt petition.
When Criminal Appeal No.445 of 1993 came up for hearing for the first time before th
is Court on 3rd June, 1993, appellant Radha Mohan Lal, who was present in Court, gave an und
ertaking to this Court through his counsel that he shall file in this court on affidavit wit
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hin one week an unconditional apology for the allegations made by him against Hon’ble Mr. Ju
stice R.S. Kejriwal of the High Court of Rajasthan and shall appear in person in open court
before the Hon’ble Judge and shall tender such apology to him. Accepting that undertaking,
this Court directed stay of the impugned order. In terms of the order dated 3rd June, 1993,
the appellant on 9th June, 1993 filed his affidavit tendering unconditional and without any
qualification his apology for any statement made or pleaded before Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.S.
Kejriwal in the pending revision petition. It further appears that the appellant, in a
ccord with his undertaking, also tendered apology before Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.S. Kejriwal.
Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Jagdeep Dhankar, has very candidly not made a
ny attempt to justify the actions of Radha Mohan Lal before the High Court in filing the ap
plication as aforenoticed. Learned counsel has only argued for acceptance of the apology.
Learned counsel submits that the appellant has impressive and unimpeachable credentials of b
eing a freedom fighter and a vakil (an advocate) and Chairman of Jaipur Municipal Council.
It has been further submitted that he is an old man of 82 years of age suffering from seriou
s heart ailment and for quite some time his mobility is limited to his room under medical pr
escription. The appellant is a senior citizen who had no malice towards the Hon’ble Jud
ge. It is contended that during his long distinguished career, the present episode was
the result of a single momentary derailment that was neither due to deliberation nor due to
any motivation and once the matter was before this Court, the appellant, on his own, even be
fore hearing, tendered unqualified apology and also volunteered to tender an unqualified and
unconditional apology before the Hon’ble Judge of the High Court in open Court which was do
ne immediately after the reopening of the High Court after summer vacation in the year 1993.
Having regard to the aforesaid facts, it appears that although the apology has been
tendered after the appellant had been found guilty of contempt of court and after the High C
ourt had inflicted the imprisonment on him but still the apology seems to be sincere and not
to ward of the punishment. We accept the contention of Mr. Dhankar that the apology he
re is evidence of real contrite as also of his consciousness of wrong done by him. In t
he case of M.Y. Shareef & Anr. v. The Hon’ble Judges of High Court of Nagpur & Ors. [(1955)
1 SCR 757], a Constitution Bench of this Court accepted the apology that was tendered before
this Court for the first time.
In view of the aforesaid, while we uphold the impugned judgment holding that the app
ellant Radha Mohan Lal committed contempt of court but accepting the apology, we set aside t
he punishment of simple imprisonment as also the fine imposed on him.
The case of appellant Sualal Yadav is, however, different. He has persisted with th
e same approach before this Court as he had before the High Court. Unfortunately, he la
bours under an erroneous impression that it is not only his duty but a constitutional obliga
tion to say and submit before the Court whatever he is instructed by his client. He submits
that everyone has liberty to have faith or not on a particular judge. A grievance was also
sought to be made by him that only Radha Mohan Lal was picked up and not others similarly p
laced and likewise contempt proceedings were initiated against him and not other advocates.
The submissions are wholly untenable. We have already noticed that Radha Mohan Lal, realiz
ing his mistake, tendered unconditional and unqualified apology even before the matter was h
eard before this Court. He has also tendered apology in open court before the learned judge
of the High Court. The application was only signed by Radha Mohan Lal and this appella
nt and, therefore, there is no substance in the grievance why proceedings were not initiated
against others. Even otherwise, such a contention is entirely misplaced. It is unfortunat
e that despite having spent so many years in legal profession, the appellant persists with h
is erroneous impressions about the duties of the members of the Bar to say whatever they are
asked by their clients to say without any liability despite the settled position to the con
trary.
In Shareef’s case (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the misconception in a s
ection of the Bar has to be rooted out by a clear and emphatic pronouncement and it should b
e widely made known that counsel who sign applications or pleadings containing matter scanda
lizing the Court without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of
adequate grounds therefor, with a view to prevent or delay the course of justice, are thems
elves guilty of contempt of Court, and that it is no duty of a counsel to his client to take
any interest in such applications; on the other hand, his duty is to advise his client for
refraining from making allegations of this nature in such applications. Hope expressed in S
hareef’s case that this kind of conduct will not be repeated by counsel in any High Court in
this country, and no more test cases of this kind would have to be fought out has been beli
ed despite passage of nearly 50 years.
The liberty of free expression as was sought to be contended by Mr. Sualal Yadav can
not be equated or confused with a licence to make unfounded and irresponsible allegations ag
ainst the judiciary. The imputation that was made was clearly contemptuous. The effect is
lowering of the dignity and authority of the Court and an affront to the majesty of justice.
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In Shamsher Singh Bedi v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana [(1996) 7 SCC 99], this Cou
rt held that an advocate cannot escape his responsibility for drafting a scandalous notice t
o a Magistrate on the ground that he did so in his professional capacity.
An advocate is not merely an agent or servant of his client. He is an officer of th
e Court. He owes a duty towards the Court. There can be nothing more serious than an act
of an advocate if it tends to impede, obstruct or prevent the administration of law or it d
estroys the confidence of the people in such administration. In M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. Hi
gh Court of Punjab & Haryana & Ors. [(1991) 3 SCC 600] while deciding a criminal appeal file
d by an advocate against an order of the High Court, this Court said :
"The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled el
ements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is hi
gh time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap
gimmicks with a view to browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful. W
hen there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the liti
gating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerne
d judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use
of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are
often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired
order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned j
udge but the entire institution. The foundation of our system which is based on the independ
ence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remar
ks are made against the presiding judicial officers with impunity. It is high time that we r
ealise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the e
xecutive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system. An i
ndependent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society. Judicial independence was n
ot achieved overnight. Since we have inherited this concept from the British, it would not b
e out of place to mention the struggle strong-willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, Chief Just
ice of the Common Pleas, and many others had to put up with the Crown as well as the Parliam
ent at considerable personal risk. And when a member of the profession like the appellant wh
o should know better so lightly trifles with the much endeared concept of judicial independe
nce to secure small gains it only betrays a lack of respect for the martyrs of judicial inde
pendence and for the institution itself. Their sacrifice would go waste if we are not jealou
s to protect the fair name of the judiciary from unwarranted attacks on its independence."
In view of clear and well settled legal position in respect of the rights and duties
of advocates, we unhesitantly confirm the finding of the High Court that the appellant, Sua
lal Yadav, committed contempt of court.
The question now to be considered is that of sentence. The appellant has been sentenced to
three months’ simple imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine
to further suffer simple imprisonment for 15 days. It is painful to punish anyone and more
particularly a member of legal profession for contempt of court but in order to secure the e
nds of justice, in extreme cases, it becomes the duty of the Court to do so. Ordinarily, on
the facts of the case as abovenoticed, we would have been very reluctant to interfere with
the sentence imposed by the High Court but for the age of the appellant. He is a senior cit
izen. His age is 81 years. We are told that he is hardly in active practice anymore.
He is stated to have already undergone one day imprisonment. Despite the fact that he has b
een reckless and persistent, yet we think that object of punishment will be served by reduci
ng three months’ simple imprisonment to one already undergone by the appellant while maintai
ning the fine and the imprisonment in default of payment of fine.
Criminal Appeal Nos.445 and 449 of 1993 are, thus, disposed of in the above terms.