Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GOA SAMPLING EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GENERAL SUPERINTENDANCE CO. OF INDIA PVT. LTD. AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1984
BENCH:
DESAI, D.A.
BENCH:
DESAI, D.A.
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)
CITATION:
1985 AIR 357 1985 SCR (2) 373
1985 SCC (1) 206 1984 SCALE (2)978
ACT:
Industrial Disputes Act 1947, Sections 2 (a) (i) and 10
(1) (d).
Industrial dispute in a Union Territory-Central
Government whether ’appropriate Government’ to refer dispute
to the Industrial Tribunal.
Constitution of India 1950, Article 239.
’Administration of Union Territory’-Administrator-
Central Government whether ’appropriate Government’ to refer
industrial dispute in a Union Territory to the industrial
Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.
General Clauses Act 1897 Sections 3 (8), 3 (60),
3,(62A).
’Central Government’-’State Government’-Union
Territory’-’Administration of Union Territory’-’Distinction
between.
Word & Phrases-Meaning of:
’appropriate Government’-Section 2 (a) (i) Industrial
Dispute Act 1947
in relation to the administration of Union‘ Territory’-
Section 3 (8) (b) (iii) and 3 (60) (c) General Clauses Act.
1897.
HEADNOTE:
The Central Government as an ’appropriate Government’
referred the Industrial dispute between the Appellant-
employees’ Association and the first Respondent-employer in
each of the Appeals under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 to the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal.
A preliminary objection was raised that the CENTRAL
Government was not the ’appropriate Government’ in relation
to the said industrial disputes and consequently the Central
Government had no power under Sec. 10 (l) (d) of the Act to
make the five references and that the Tribunal would have no
jurisdiction to entertain the same- The Appellant-
Association repelled this objection by contending that the
workmen were ’dock workers’ within the meaning of the
expression in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment)
Act. 1948 and as they were working at Mormugao Port, a major
port in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman Diu, the Central
Government would be the ’appropriate Government’ in relation
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to the industrial dispute and consequently the references
were valid and competent.
374
The Tribunal held that the workmen covered by the
reference who were iron-Ore samplers were ’dock workers’ as
defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act,
1948 and as they were working in a major port, in a Union
Territory, the Central Government would be the ’appropriate
Government’ for referring the industrial dispute. The
Tribunal over-ruled the preliminary objection and set down
the references for final hearing.
The first respondent-employers filed applications
under Article 227 in the High Court which held that the
workmen, who were iron ore samplers, were neither
comprehended in the expression ’dock workers’ as defined in
the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948. nor
involved in any work connected with or related to a major
port. and were not involved in an industrial dispute
concerning a major port and therefore the Central Government
was not the appropriate Government’ for referring the
industrial dispute. It further held that the Central
Government is not the State Government for the Union
Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu under Section 2 (a) (i) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but it is the
Administrator appointed under Article 239 and therefore the
Central Government was not the ’appropriate Government’ and
had no jurisdiction to make the references. The rule was
made absolute and the references quashed.
Allowing the Appeals to this Court,
^
HELD: 1. The Central,Government as the ’appropriate
Government had made the references The High Court was
clearly in error in quashing the references. The judgment of
the High Court is quashed and set aside and the award of the
Tribunal on the preliminary point about the competence of
the Central Government to make the reference under Section
10(1) of Industrial Disputes, Act 1947 is confirmed. The
tribunal will be at liberty to examine the contention
whether iron ore samples are involved in any work connected
with or related to a major part or are dock workers and come
to its own decision uninfluenced by the view taken by the
High Court. As the dispute is an old one, the Tribunal is to
give top priority and dispose of the matter within a period
of six months. [386G; 387D-E, C]
2 (i) Indisputable the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
is a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 and the relevant definitions
having been recast to meet the constitutional and statutory
requirements the expressions ’Central Government, ’State
Government’,and ’Union Territory’ must receive the meaning
assigned to each in the General Clauses Act, 1897 unless
there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in
which it is used. No. such repugnancy was brought to the
notice of the Court. [384B-C]
(ii) On a conspectus of the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and the Union Territories Act 1963, it
clearly transpires that the concept of State Government is
foreign to the administration of Union Territory and Article
239 provides that every Union Territory is to be
administered by the President. The President may act through
an Administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus the
delegate of the President. His position is wholly different
from that
375
Of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ with his
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Minister and he must then obtain the orders of the President
meaning thereby of the Central A Government. The
Administrator of Union Territory does not therefore qualify
for the description of a State Government. The Central
Government is therefore the ’appropriate Government’ [384F-
G]
(iii) The High Court fell into an error in
interpreting clause (c) of Section 3 (60) of the General
Clauses Act 1897 which upon its true construction would show
that in the Union Territory there is no concept of State
Government but wherever the expression ’State Government’ is
used in relation to the Union Territory, the Central
Government would be the State Government. The very concept
of State Government in relation to Union Territory is
obliterated by the definition. [383D-H]
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors., [1955] SCR 549
and the State of Madhya Pradesh v, Shri Moula Bux & Ors.
[1962] 2 SCR 794, held inapplicable.
3. (i) The definition of three expression ’Central
Government’ (Section 3 (8), ’State Government’ (Section 3
(60)), and Union Territory’ (Section 3 (62A)) in the General
Clauses Act, 1897 Would unmistakably show that the framers
of the Constitution as also the Parliament in enacting these
definitions have clearly retained the distinction between
State Government and Administration of Union Territory as
provided by the Constitution. It is especially made clear in
the definition of expression ’Central Government’ that in
relation to the Administration of a Union Territory the
Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the
authority given to him under Article 239 of the
Constitution. would be comprehended in the expression
’Central Government. When this inclusionary part is put in
juxtaposition with exclusionary part in the definition of
the expression State Government’ which provides that as
respects anything done or to be done after the commencement
of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall
mean, in a State, the Governors and in a Union Territory,
the Central Government, the difference conceptually speaking
between the expression’ State Government’ and the
’Administration of a Union Territory’ clearly emerges There
is no room for doubt that the expression Administration of a
Union Territory’, Administrator however having been
described, would not be comprehended in the expression State
Government as used in any enactment These definitions have
been modified to bring them to their present form at by the
Adaptation of Laws (No.1) Order, 1956. [386E-G]
(ii) The High Court clearly fell into an error when it
observed that the inclusive definition of the expression
’State Government, does not necessarily enlarge the scope of
the expression but may occasionally point to the contrary;
[386C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4904-
4908 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.9.83 of the
Bombay
376
High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 97B/80, 98B/80,
100B/80, 99B/80 and 67B/80.
VA Bobde, K.J. John and Ms. N. Srivastava for the
appellant.
F.S. Nariman, Miss A. Subhashini M.S. Usgaocar, S.K.
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Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DESAI, J. Special leave granted.
Again the rigmarole of an utterly unsustainable
preliminary objection, and valuable time of a decade is
wasted in this bizarre exercise frustrating the search for
socio-economic justice, making it a distant dream, if not an
optical illusion.
The Central Government as an appropriate Government
referred the Industrial dispute between the appellant-Goa
Sampling Employees’ Association (’Association’ for short)
and the first respondent (’employer’ for short) in each
petition under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (’Act’ for short) to the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Bombay by different orders made
in the year 1974 and 1975. Five separate references were
made because even though the Association representing
employees is common in all references, employer is different
but each raising a common question. When the references came
up before the Tribunal for hearing, it appears that the
employer in each case raised a preliminary objection but
what was the earliest preliminary objection eluded us. The
Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection whereupon the
employer filed some appeal to an authority which is not
made clear in the record. It appears the matters were
remitted to the Tribunal and thereafter all the five
references stood transferred to the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal No. 1 (’Tribunal’ for short).
When the references again came up before the Tribunal
for hearing, the history repeated. A preliminary objection
was raised that the Central Government was not the
appropriate Government in relation to the industrial dispute
between the Association and the employer and therefore, the
Central Government had no power under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the
Act to make the reference
377
and accordingly the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to
entertain A the same. The Association attempted to repell
this contention by urging that the workmen were dock workers
within the meaning of the expression in Dock Workers
(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and as they are working
in a major port, the Central Government will be the
appropriate Government in relation to the industrial dispute
between the Association and the workmen and therefore, the
reference is valid and the Tribunal should deal with the
same on merits according to law. As a second string to the
bow, it was contended that in relation to a union territory
Central Government is the appropriate Government.
It appears that evidence was led before the Tribunal
by both the sides. The Tribunal after exhaustively examining
the evidence held that the workmen covered by the reference
would be comprehended in the definition of expression ’Dock
Workers’ as defined in the Dock Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Act and as they were working at Mormugao Port
which is a major port, in respect of the industrial dispute
raised by them the Central Government would be the
appropriate Government. The Tribunal then proceeded to
examine whether the reference would be competent on the
assumption that the employees are not covered by the
expression ’Dock Workers’ and held that the work performed
by the employees is in a major port and the dispute arise
out of the duty performed and work rendered in the major
port and therefore, the Central Government would be the
appropriate Government to make the necessary reference. The
Tribunal then proceeded to consider the alternative
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submission whether the reference would be competent even if
the State Government is the appropriate Government in view
of the fact that Goa, Damen and Diu constitute Union
Territory as set out in the First Schedule to the
Constitution and its administration is carried on by the
Administrator appointed by the President under Art. 239 of
the Constitution. Therefore, also the Central Government is
the appropriate Government. After discussing the rival
contentions the Tribunal did not record a finding on this
contention. The Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection
and set down the reference for final hearing by its order
dated July 14, 1980.
The employer in each reference filed special civil
application under Art. 227 of the Constitution in the High
Court of Judica-
378
ture at Bombay. All the five special civil applications came
up before the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court for
final hearing and they were disposed of by a common judgment
The High Court held that the iron ore samplers, the workmen
represented by the appellant association are not involved in
any work connected with or related to a major port. The High
Court further held that the industrial dispute in which iron
ore samplers are involved is not an industrial dispute
concerning the major port within the meaning of Sec- 2 (a)
(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 nor are the workmen
comprehended in the expression ’Dock Workers’ as defined in
the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 and
therefore the Central Government is not the appropriate
Government for referring the industrial dispute to the
Tribunal. Dealing with the second limb of the submission
that the Central Government itself can be said to be the
State Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and
Diu, the High Court held that the Central Government is not
the State Government for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman
and Diu under Sec 2 (a) (ii) of the Act but it is the
administrator appointed under Art, 239 of the Constitution
of India who is the State Government for the Union Territory
of Goa Daman and Diu and he is the appropriate Government
within the meaning of Sec. 2 (a) of the Act. The High Court
felt that if the Central Government is also held to be the
State Government for this purpose there would be two State
Governments for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu
and this would lead to utter confusion: The High Court
accordingly concluded that the Administrator is the
appropriate Government for the purpose of Sec 2(a) of the
Act and therefore the Central Government was not the
appropriate Government and had no jurisdiction to make the
impugned references. In accordance with this finding, the
High Court made the rule absolute quashing the references.
Hence these appeals by special leave.
The question that must engage our attention is whether
in relation to the industrial dispute between the employees
represented by the Association and the employer which is the
appropriate Government which can exercise power under Sec.
10 of the Act. Sec. 10 provides that ’where the appropriate
Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists
or is
379
apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer
the dispute etc. to a Tribunal for adjudication.’ There are
two A provisos to the section. which are not material for
the present purpose. Thus the power is conferred on the
appropriate Government to make the reference for
adjudication of an industrial dispute which either exists or
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is apprehended.
’Appropriate Government’ is defined in Sec. 2 (a) of
the Act to mean C(i) in relation to any industrial dispute
concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority
of the Central Government (omitting the words not relevant
for the present purpose), a major port. The ( central
Government, and (ii) in relation to any other industrial
dispute, the State Government.’
The employer contended that the employees represented
by the Association in each case are iron ore samplers and
they are not connected with the work of a major port or
their duties are not ancillary or incidental to the working
of a major port and therefore, Sec. 2 (a) (i) would not be
attracted. As a corroleory, it was submitted that the case
would fall in the residuary clause (ii) and therefore, the
State Government would be the appropriate Government. The
employees repelled the contention by saying that they are
employees working in a major port and the industrial dispute
directly touches the functioning and administration of a
major port and therefore, the Central Government is the
appropriate Government. Alternatively it was contended on
behalf of the Association/appellant herein that any rate in
relation to a Union Territory, there is no State Government
and the Central Government, if it at all can be said to be
one, is the only Government and in the absence of a State
Government the Central Government will also have all the
powers of the State Government and therefore, the Central
Government would be the appropriate Government for the
purpose of making the reference. It is the second limb which
we propose to examine in these appeals because in our
opinion it goes to the root of the matter and the appeals
can be finally disposed of by answering this contention.
Before we deal with the contention on merits, it is
necessary to focus attention on constitutional and statutory
provisions relevant to the contention.
380
Art. 239 (1) provides that ’save as otherwise provided
by Parliament by law, every Union Territory shall be
administered by the President acting, to such extent as he
thinks fit through an Administrator to be appointed by him
with such designation as he may specify.’ Art. 239A which
was inserted by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act.
1962 confers power Parliament by law to create local
legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain
Union Territories including Goa, Damen and Diu. The law by
which the local legislature and/or Council of Ministers are
created will also specify their constitution, powers and
functions in each case. By sub-art.(2) it was ensured that
such law when enacted shall not be deemed to be an amendment
of the Constitution for the purpose of Art. 368. Art. 240
confers power on the President to make regulations for the
peace, progress and good government of the Union Territories
specified therein. Art. 246 (4) provides that ’Parliament
has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any
part of the territory of India not included in a State
notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in
the State List.’ The expression ’Central Government’ has
been defined in Sec. 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897
(omitting the words not relevant for the present purpose) as
under:
"(8) "Central Government" shall-
(a) .- ...... - .. ; ...
....................................
(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the
commencement of the Constitution, mean the President, and
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shall include,
(i)
(ii)
(iii) in relation to the administration of a
Union Territory, the administrator thereof acting
within the scope of the authority given to him under
Article 239 of the Constitution."
The expression ’State Government’ is defined in Sec. 3
(60) (omitting the words not necessary for the present
purpose,) as under:
"(60) "State Government",
381
(a) ............................. ... ....
(b) .......................................
(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the
commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union
Territory, the Central Government ;"
The expression ’Union Territory’ is defined in Sec. 3
(62A) to mean "Union Territory specified in the First
Schedule to the Constitution and shall include any other
territory comprised within the territory of India but not
specified in that Schedule."
Parliament enacted the Government of Union Territories
Act, 1963 (’1963 Act’ for short). Its long title reveals the
object underlying the enactment, namely to provide for
Legislative Assemblies and Council of Ministers for certain
Union Territories and for certain other matters. Union
Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu is governed by the 1963 Act
(See Sec. 2 h). The expression ’Administrator’ has been
defined in Sec. 2 (a) of the 1963 Act to mean ’the
Administrator of a Union Territory appointed by the
President under Art. 239.’ Sec. 18 specifies the extent of
legislative power of the Legislative Assembly of a Union
Territory to encompass any of the matters enumerated in the
State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule.
Sec. 44 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers
in each Union territory with the Chief Minister at the head
to aid and advise the Administrator in exercise of his
functions in relation to matters with respect to which the
Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory has power to
make laws except in so far as he is required by or under the
Act to act in his discretion or by or under any law to
exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. There is
a proviso to Sec 44 (1) which sheds light on the position of
the Administrator and powers of the Council of Ministers.
According to the proviso in the event of a difference of
opinion between the Administrator and the Ministers of any
matter, the Administrator shall refer it to the President
for decision given therein by the President etc. Thus the
executive power of the Administrator extends to all subjects
covered by the legislative power. But in the event of a
difference of opinion the President
382
decides the point. When President decides the point, it is
the Central Government that decides the point. And that is
binding on the Administrator and also the Ministers. Section
45 provides that ’the Chief Minister of a Union Territory
shall be appointed by the President.’ Section 46 confers
power on the President to make rules for the conduct of
business. Section 55 provides that ’all contracts in
connection with the administration of a Union Territory are
contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the
Union and all suits and proceedings in connection with the
administration of a Union Territory shall be instituted by
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or against the Government of India.’ In exercise of the
power conferred by Article 240, the President has infer alia
enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu (Laws) Regulation, 1962. By
clause (3) of the regulation, the Acts enumerated in the
Schedule appended to the Act were extended to the Goa, Daman
and Diu subject to the modifications, if any, specified in
the Schedule. The Schedule includes Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 as a whole without any modification.
Section 10 (l) of the Act confers power on the
appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute for
adjudication to one or the other of the various authorities
enumerated in the section. Thus the power is the power of
the appropriate Government to make the reference. The
cotention which found favour with the High Court is that in
relations to the industrial dispute raised by the workmen
represented by the Association by broadly described as iron
ore samplers. the appropriate Government is the State
Government and not the Central Government and that as the
reference in this case is made by the Central Government,
the same being without jurisdiction, the Industrial
Tribunal did not acquire any jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
the same.
Would it be constitutionally correct to describe
Administration of a Union Territory as State Government ?
Article 1 provides that ’India, that is Bharat, shall be a
Union of States’. Sub-article (2) provides that ’the States
and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the
First Schedule’- Sub-article (3) introduced a dichotomy
between the State as understood in the Constitution and the
Union Territory when it provides that ’the territory of
India shall comprise-(a) the territories of the States, and
(b) the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule.
The provisions of Part
383
VI of the Constitution do not apply to the Union
Territories. Part VI of the Constitution which deals with
States clearly indicates that A the Union Territory is not a
State. Therefore, the Union Territory constitutionally
speaking is something other than a State. As far as the
States are concerned, there has to be a Governor for each
State though it would be permissible to appoint the same
person as Governor of two or more States. Part VIII provides
for administration of Union Territories. Article 239
conferred power on the president for administration of Union
Territories unless otherwise provided by an act of
Parliament. Therefore, apart from the definitions of the
expressions ’Central Government’, ’State Government’ and
’Union Territory’ as enacted in the General Clauses Act,
1897, the Constitution itself makes a distinction between
State and its Government called the State Government and
Union Territory and the Administration of the Union
Territory. Unless otherwise clearly enacted, the expression
’State will not comprehend Union Territory’ and the ’State
Government’ would not comprehend Administration of Union
Territory. Now if we recall the definition of three
expressions ’Central Government’ (Section 3 (8), ’State
Government’ (Section 3 (60)) and Union Territory’ ( Section
3 (62A)) in the General Clauses Act, it would unmistakably
show that the framers of the Constitution as also the
Parliament in enacting these definitions have clearly
retained the distinction between State Government and
Administration of Union Territory as provided by the
Constitution. It is especially made clear in the definition
of expression ’Central Government’ that in relation to the
Administration of a Union Territory, the Administrator
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thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to
him under Article 239 of the Constitution, would be
comprehended in the expression ’Central Government’. When
this inclusionary part is put in juxta-position with
exclusionary part in the definition of the expression ’State
Government’ which provides that as respects anything done or
to be done after the commencement of the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, it shall mean, in a State,
the Governor, and in a Union Territory, the Central
Government, the difference conceptually speaking between the
expression ’State Government’ and the ’Administration of a
Union Territory’ clearly emerges. Therefore, there is no
room for doubt that the expression ’Administration of a
Union Territory’, Administrator howsoever having been
described, would not be comprehended in the expression state
Government’ as used in any enactment. These definitions have
been modified to being them to their present format by
384
adaptation of laws (No. 1) Order 1956. Section 3 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that in all General Acts
and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act
unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or
context, the words defined therein will have the meaning
assigned therein. lndisputably the lndustrial Disputes Act,
1947 is’ a Central Act enacted after the commencement of the
General Clauses Act and the relevant definitions having been
recast to meet the constitutional and statutory
requirements, the expressions ’Central Government, ’Stale
Government’ and ’Union Territory’ must receive the meaning
assigned to each in the General Clauses Act unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context in which it is
used. No such repugnancy was brought to our notice.
Therefore, these expressions must receive the meaning
assigned to them.
The High Court after referring to the definitions of
the aforementioned three expressions as set out and
discussed herein first observed that on a careful reading of
the definition, it appears ’that in relation to the
administration of a Union Territory, the administrator
thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to
him under Article 239 of the Constitution is the Central
Government.’ So far there is no dispute. The High Court then
observed that it must follow that the Administrator is the
State Government in so far as the Union Territory is
concerned, and it is so provided in the definition of the
State Government in Section 3(60) of the General Clauses
Act.’ The High Court fell into an error in interpreting
clause (c) of Section 3 (60) which upon its true
construction would show that in the Union Territory, there
is no concept of State Government but wherever the
expression ’State Government’ is used in relation to the
Union Territory, the Central Government would be the State
Government. The very concept of State Government in relation
to Union Territory is obliterated by the definition. Our
attention was, however, drawn to the two decisions of this
Court in Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev & Ors.(’) and the
decision of this Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Shri Moula Bux & Ors.(2) in which with reference to Part
States, some observations have been made that the authority
conferred under Article 239, as it then stood, to administer
Part States has
(1) [1955] S.C.R. 549.
(2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 794.
385
not effect of converting those States into the Central
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Government, and that under Article 239 the President
occupies in regard to Part States, a position analogous to
that of a Governor in Part A States and of a Rajpramukh in
Part in States.’ It was also observed that ’though the Part
States are centrally administered under the provisions of
Article 239, they do not cease to be States and become
merged with the Central Government.’ It was then urged that
by the amendment to Articles 239 and 240 by the Constitution
(Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 and introduction of Article
239 A and 239 by the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment)
Act, 1962, only the nomenclature of the Part States has
undergone a change, now being described as Union Territory,
but the position the Union Territory is the same as it was
as Part States and therefore, the view taken in the
aforementioned decisions that the administration of Part
States could appropriately be described as State Government
would mutatis mutandis apply to the administration of Union
Territories. In other words, it was said that they can be
appropriately described as State Governments for various
purposes. Both the decisions were rendered prior to the
amendment of Part VIII of the Constitution in 1956 and the
insertion of the Articles 239 A and 239 in 1962 and more
specifically after the enactment of the 1963 Act. The
concept of Union Territory with or without a Legislative
Assembly and with or without a Council of Ministers with
specified legislative and executive powers have been set out
in the 1963 Act. Coupled with this, modifications were made
in the definitions of aforementioned three expressions.
Therefore, the two decisions are of no assistance in
resolutation of the present controversy.
It was then pointed out that the definition of the
expression ’appropriate Government’ in Section 2(a)(i) of
the Act unless it is shown in relation to any industrial
dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the
authority of the Central Government or the enumerated
industries or a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an
oilfield, a Cantonment Board, or a major port, the
appropriate Government will be the Central Government and in
any other case a State Government- It was therefore,
submitted that unless it is shown that in relation to the
industrial dispute raised by the Association, the
appropriate Government would be the Central Government, the
case would fall under the residuary provision, namely, that
in relation to any other industrial dispute, the appro-
386
priate Government would be the State Government. The
submission does not commend to us because before one can say
that the appropriate Government is the State Government in
relation to an industrial dispute, there has to be some
State Government in which power must be located for making
the reference. If there is no State Government but there is
some other Government called the Administration of Union
Territory, the question would arise whether in such a
situation the Administration of Union Territory should be
described as State Government for the purpose of Section
2(a)(i) read with Section 10(1) ?
The High Court clearly fell into an error when it
observed that the inclusive definition of the expression
’State Government’ does not necessarily enlarge the scope of
the expression, but may occasionally point to the contrary.
Let as assume it to be so without deciding it. But where the
High Court fell into the error was when it held that the
President representing the Central Government and the
Administrator, and appointee of the President and subject to
all orders of the President constitute two different
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governments for a Union Territory. The position, the power,
the duties and functions of the Administrator in relation to
the President have been overlooked. On a conspectus of the
relevant provisions of the Constitution and the 1963 Act, it
clearly transpires that the concept of State Government is
foreign to the Administration of Union Territory and Article
239 provides that every Union Territory is to be
administered by the President. The President may act through
an administrator appointed by him. Administrator is thus the
delegate of the President. His position is wholly different
from that of a Governor of a State. Administrator can differ
with his Minister and he must then obtain the orders of
the President meaning thereby of the Central Government.
Therefore, at any rate the administrator of Union Territory
does not qualify for the description of a State Government,
Therefore, the Central Government is the ’appropriate
Government’.
If the Central Government as the appropriate
Government has made the reference, the High Court was
clearly in error in quashing the reference.
Learned counsel for the appellant-Association made
an alter native submission that the workmen involved in the
dispute are workmen working in a major port and are dock
workers and there
387
fore, also the Central Government will be the
appropriate Government for the purpose of making reference
under Sec. 10(1). This contention found favour with the
Tribunal. The High Court reached a contrary conclusion
observing that the iron ore samplers are not involved in any
work connected with or related to a major port nor are they
dock workers. We do not propose to examine this alternative
submission because if the reference is held to be competent,
it is not necessary to undertake elaborate examination of
the second contention to sustain the reference. It is,
however, urged that this aspect is likely to figure again
before the Tribunal while examining the industrial dispute
referred to it for adjudication on merits. In this situation
the proper thing is to keep the contention between the
parties open. The Tribunal will be at liberty to examine
this contention whether iron ore samplers are involved in
any work connected with or related to a major port or are
dock workers. The Tribunal may come to its own decision
uninfluenced by the view taken by the High Court and if the
question does require examination the same will have to be
examined over again.
Accordingly, all these five appeals are allowed and
the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and
the award of the Tribunal on the preliminary point
especially about the competence of the Central Government to
make the reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, for the reasons hereinmentioned is
confirmed. The respondents shall pay the costs of the
appellant in each case quantified at Rs. 1,000 in all Rs.
5,000 shall be paid by the respondents to the appellant as
costs.
As the dispute is an old one, hanging resolution for
years, the Tribunal is directed to give top priority to it
and dispose it of on merits within a period of six months
from today,
N.V.K.
Appeals allowed.
388
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