MANOJ MISHRA @ CHHOTKAU vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

                                                           REPORTABLE    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1167 OF 2021   (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 7828/2019) Manoj Mishra @ Chhotkau          .…Appellant(s) Versus The State of Uttar Pradesh                            ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T A.S. Bopanna,J. 1. The appellant is before this Court assailing the judgment dated 14.03.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal No.1102/2017. Through the said judgment, the High Court has dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction and sentence ordered to the   appellant   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Court  and   Special Judge POCSO Act, Bahraich in C.C. No.18/2014. The appellant Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2021.10.08 16:36:43 IST Reason: herein was arrayed as Accused No.4 in the said case. 1 The brief facts leading to the conviction and sentence of 2. the appellant is that the father of the prosecutrix filed a written report   dated   09.08.2013   at   22:35   hours   before   the   police alleging therein that one Ramasre alias Siri had enticed his daughter aged about 14 years on 02.08.2013 and had taken her away. In the said complaint, it was further alleged that Raksharam, Nangodiya and Manoj Kumar alias Chhotkau i.e. the appellant herein had cooperated with him in the alleged incident.   An   FIR   was   lodged   in   Crime   No.625/2013   under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. The prosecutrix was found by the police along with Ramasre alias Siri. She was brought back and subjected to medical examination.   The case was investigated and a charge sheet was filed under Sections 363, 366, 376 and 506 Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) as also sections 3 and 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (for short ‘POCSO Act’).   The Court had thereafter framed the charges against the accused. On the accused denying the charge, trial was conducted.  The father and mother of the prosecutrix were examined as PW­1 and PW­2 respectively, while the prosecutrix herself was examined as PW­3.   Dr. Rabia Sultan who had conducted   the   medical   examination   on   the   prosecutrix   was 2 examined as PW­4. The Constable Pramod Kumar Shah who had   carried   the   FIR   was   examined   as   PW­5   and   the   Sub­ Inspector Tara Prasad Pandey who had investigated the case was examined as PW­6. The trial court having analysed the said evidence which 3. was tendered before it, also taking into consideration the denial put forth by the accused while recording the statement under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘Cr.PC’) had arrived at the conclusion that the charge alleged against the accused was proved.  Accordingly the accused were sentenced to (i) 3 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.3000/­ for the   offence   under   Section   363   IPC;   (ii)   5   years   rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.5,000/­   for the offence under Section 366 IPC; (iii) 20 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.25,000/­ for the offence under Section 376­D IPC; (iv) 2 years   rigorous   imprisonment   with   fine   of   Rs.2,000/­   under Section 506 IPC and (v) 7 years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.7,000/­ for the offence under Section 4 of POCSO Act.  The default sentence for non­payment of the fine was also imposed   and   the   sentence   for   the   offence   under   the   said provisions   were   ordered   to   run   concurrently   through   the 3 judgment dated 20.05.2015.  Through the said judgment one of the   accused   Raksharam   was   acquitted   on   holding   that   the charges against him were not proved.   The appellant had assailed the said judgment before the 4. High Court in Criminal Appeal No.1102/2017.   The learned Judge while adverting to the evidence tendered before the trial court   had   reappraised   the   same   in   the   background   of   the contentions that were urged and, in that light, had arrived at the conclusion that the appellant had raped the prosecutrix number of times after being enticed away by him.  In that view of the matter the learned Judge was of the opinion that the trial court had rightly arrived at the conclusion on the basis of the prosecution evidence that the appellant was involved in the commission   of   the   crime.     The   judgment   of   conviction   and sentence was accordingly confirmed.   The appellant therefore claiming to be aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Judge of the High Court is before this Court in this appeal.   We   have   heard   Mr.   Anoop   Prakash   Awasthi   learned 5. counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Parmanand Pandey 4 learned standing counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh and perused the appeal papers. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant while seeking to contend   that   the   trial   court   as   also   the   High   Court   had committed an error in convicting and upholding the conviction would seek to refer to the contradictions in the very manner in which the complaint was initiated and the various statements made   by   the   prosecutrix   herself.   It   is   contended   that   the criminal proceedings was set in motion by the complaint dated 09.08.2013 wherein it has been stated that his daughter has been tricked and enticed, therefore eloped somewhere.  When a statement was recorded on 10.08.2013, he has alleged that Ramasre alias  Siri had  enticed his  minor  daughter and his statements had been varying from time to time.  It is his case that even the prosecutrix has made contradicting statements with regard to the nature of the incident as also her age. In that light, it is contended that the entire theory of the prosecutrix being kidnapped, enticed or being raped in the manner as has been put forth is not reliable.   It is contended that even with regard to the manner in which the prosecutrix had stated of having gone with Ramasre alias Siri, it only indicates that it 5 was   consensual   and   in   any   event   the   appellant   has   been named only thereafter when a statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC.  Though in her evidence as PW­3 she has stated, with regard to the incident; in her cross­examination she has stated, with regard to the physical relation she had for the first time which had been told by her to the family but has again stated that she disclosed the same when she was four months’ pregnant and the family members enquired her about the same.  7.  The learned counsel therefore contends that neither the evidence of the parents who were examined as PW­1 and PW­2 nor   the   evidence   tendered   by   the   prosecutrix   as   PW­3   was reliable and the trial court as well as the High Court ought not to have passed the conviction and sentence on such evidence. Though PW­4 in her evidence and with reference to the medical examination   report   has   stated   about   the   prosecutrix   being pregnant and the foetus being of 20­23 weeks, that by itself cannot establish the charge made against the appellant is his contention.   Alternatively,   it   is   contended   that   even   if   the statement of the prosecutrix about the physical relations of the appellant with her and that she has filed the complaint when 6 the appellant had refused to marry her despite she becoming pregnant is accepted, it only indicates that it was consensual and when she herself has stated that she was 20 years and also   when   PW­4   the   doctor   in   her   cross­examination   has indicated that due to the development of her body even if she is stated to be 16­17 years there could be variation and it can be 17­18 years as per general variations. In such event, the charge would not be sustainable.   Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstance, the conviction under Section 376­D IPC is not justified and said provision ought not to have been invoked as it does not qualify to be a gang rape.  For all the said reasons, he contends that the judgment is liable to be set aside. The   learned   standing   counsel   for   the   State   of   Uttar 8. Pradesh contends that the trial court as also the High Court has referred to the evidence available on record.  Though there may   be  certain  discrepancies   in  the  various   statements  the same cannot qualify as contradictions and in that circumstance when PW­1, PW­2 and PW­3 have all stated with regard to the incident   in   support   of   the   prosecution   and   when   there   is categorical medical examination to indicate that the prosecutrix was   pregnant,   the   charge   would   stand   established.     It   is 7 contended that in such circumstance when the father of the prosecutrix has indicated the age as 14 years and the doctor also   has   indicated   the   age   to   be   around   16   years,   the contention of the consensual sex will not be acceptable.  In that view he contends that the judgment passed by the trial court as also the High Court does not call for interference.   In   the   light   of   the   above,   we   have   taken   note   of  the 9. nature of consideration made by the trial court as also the High Court.  In so far as the incident based on which the charge was framed   against   the   accused,   more   particularly   against   the appellant, the parents of the prosecutrix and the prosecutrix herself were examined as PW­1 to PW­3 who have spoken with regard   to   the   same.     Though   reference   was   made   to   the complaint and the statement of PW­1 and at the first instance the complainant having named Ramasre alias Siri, it was in the circumstance when he had noticed that the prosecutrix, i.e. his daughter was not in the house and had accordingly lodged the complaint on suspicion.  It is pursuant to the complaint when the police took action, the prosecutrix and the said Ramasre alias Siri were retrieved by the police when they were travelling to   Mumbai   as   per   the   very   statement   recorded   by   the 8 prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.PC.   In that circumstance what   would   be   relevant   is   the   statement   and   the   evidence tendered   by   the   prosecutrix   as   PW­3   before   the   trial   court which described the events prior thereto and the circumstance which forced her to be with Ramasre alias Siri at that point. Though certain discrepancies were referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant in the manner the prosecutrix had described   the   incident   to   contend   that   as   per   her   own statement the thatched hut was open from all sides and the act was alleged to be committed during the day time which cannot be probable, it is noticed that the sum and substance of the evidence  tendered  by the  prosecutrix as  PW­3  is  essentially with   regard   to   the   physical   relationship   she   had   with   the appellant due to which she had become pregnant and this was disclosed to her family members only when they had noticed her   to   be   pregnant.     She   has   further   stated   that   in   that situation when she had insisted on the appellant marrying her, he had refused, threatened and he had taken the help of the co­accused   and   got   her   married   to   Ramasre   alias   Siri,   by enticing and taking her away. 9 In   that   background,   the   fact   that   the   appellant   had 10. physical relationship with the prosecutrix on more than one occasion and the prosecutrix had not disclosed the same to her parents when it had happened for the first time about four months   earlier   but   was   brought   to   their   notice   when   her pregnancy was noticed will have to be viewed from the stand point   as   to   whether   the   charges   as   framed   would   stand established.   It is no doubt true that the prosecutrix in her deposition   has   stated   that   on   the   day   of   the   incident   the appellant, Ramasre alias Siri, Nangodiya etc. had caught hold of her.  However, there is no specific indication as to whether the other accused and the appellant had indulged in sexual act along with the appellant herein or the reference is with regard to   that   they   having   assisted   the   appellant   in   enticing   and taking her away on the date of the complaint so as to marry her of to Ramasre alias Siri.  What is also to be taken note of, is that the said Ramasre alias Siri and Nangodiya are siblings being the sons of Raksharam who was acquitted by the trial court.   To   establish   common   intention   on   their   part   in furthering the sexual assault committed by the appellant, there is convincing evidence to that effect. 10 From   the   evidence   tendered   by   PW­2   to   PW­3,   more 11. particularly the evidence of PW­4 i.e., the doctor who examined the prosecutrix it would disclose that she had examined the prosecutrix at 7 pm on 19.08.2013. She has stated that the victim   who   was   unmarried   was   fully   grown   up   and   on conducting the necessary tests it was seen that the rupture of the hymen was old and she was found to be 24 weeks into her pregnancy.   The   medical   report   was   exhibited   as   K­2.   The complementary report dated 24.08.2013 was marked as exhibit K­4. In the cross­examination she has referred to the age of prosecutrix as 16 to 17 years. Though she has stated that it could be 17 to18 years as per general variations, no definite opinion  to  that  effect  has   been  given  by   her.   In  the   cross­ examination she has however stated that the pregnancy was of 23 weeks. The report of the doctor indicates it to be 23 weeks while the pathology report gives the status of the single alive foetus of 20 weeks 2 days as on 20.08.2013. Though there is marginal   variation   with   regard   to   the   number   of   weeks mentioned, the pregnancy was not less than 20 weeks and if the   same   is   kept   in   the   backdrop,   the   statement   of   the prosecutrix that the appellant had intercourse with her for the 11 first   time,   four   months   earlier,   which   is   an   approximate indication and that she became pregnant would coincide with the period. Though there are minor discrepancies with regard to   the   statement   made   under   Section   164   Cr.PC   and   the evidence tendered by the prosecutrix as PW­3, the thrust of the allegation has been that   the appellant had committed physical contact with her against her will. In such circumstance, the evidence of the prosecutrix and the medical evidence would establish the charge of rape.  12. The   question   which   would   however   arise   for   our consideration is as to whether the charge framed against the accused under Section 376 D IPC would be justified and as to whether the case would qualify to be one of gang rape. On this aspect, the evidence of PW­1 and PW­2 does not establish the same.   The   evidence   of   PW­3   i.e.,   the   prosecutrix   is   not categorical in as much as the prosecutrix has alleged that when she was sitting in her thatched hut, the appellant came after parking his vehicle (tractor) besides the road and asked for water. At that time, he asked where her father was and after she told that he had gone out, the appellant had forced himself upon her. She has further alleged that he kept doing the wrong 12 act with her for four months and she became pregnant. When she disclosed the pregnancy and asked the appellant to marry her, he did not   yield. Therefore, insofar as the incident of rape attributed   to   the   appellant  it   does   not  disclose   that  all the accused   had   committed   rape   on   her   or   had   the   common intention and aided the commission. It is no doubt true that she refers to the incident on the day she was said to have been taken away by all the accused. In that regard except stating that she was carried to the home of a lady who they were calling as Aunty, and at her place committed sexual act there is no other evidence available on record to indicate that the spot was visited in the course of the investigation and the lady who is   alleged   to   have   aided   has   either   been   apprehended   or examined. It is also not established that all of them were seen together or aided with common intention. In fact, the very conclusion reached by the High Court 13. itself would indicate that the allegation of rape as established by   the   prosecution   is   against   the   appellant   and   the   other accused are not involved in such act.  The relevant conclusions read as hereunder: 13 “23. It has also been placed before the court that the other co­accused were real brothers and their father, as such   the   truthfulness   of   the   incident   is   highly improbable. The main co­operation of other co­accused appears to be in enticing the prosecutrix away but the allegation of specific rape has been levelled against the present   accused­appellant   only   and   that   too   four months prior to the incident on one threat or the other. This   also   gives   a   reason   for   enticing   her   away   and getting her married to Ram Asrey alias Sirri. 26.   To   conclude,   the   prosecutrix   was   raped   by   the accused­appellant number of times after being enticed away   by   him   and   also   before   the   incident   the truthfulness   or   reliability   of   her   statement   is undoubtful and there is nothing which may negate the acceptance   of   her   testimony.   In   the   instance,   the commission   of   alleged   crime   against   the   prosecutrix cannot be ruled out.  27. In view of above, it is difficult to comprehend the circumstances   in   which   the   charge   of   rape   and enticement   against   the   accused­appellant   cannot   be levelled.   The   reason   given   by   the   trial   court   for conviction of the appellant are sufficient enough to hold him guilty.” Further, when the prosecutrix was traced based on the 14. complaint lodged by her father all of them were not with her but she was found only with Ramasre @ Siri. That apart, as noted the other three accused apart from the appellant are the siblings and their father Raksharam has been acquitted by the trial court. In that circumstance, the charge of gang rape has not been established with convincing evidence. However, having already   noted   that   the   incident   of   rape   alleged   had   been established, it would be a case to convict the appellant under 14 Section 376 of IPC. However, the conviction handed down by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court under Section 363, 366 and under Section 4 of POCSO Act and the sentence as ordered thereunder would not call for interference.  Insofar as the charge alleged against the appellant under 15. Section 506 of IPC, it is noticed that the charge alleged against the appellant is that on the date referred to i.e 02.08.2013, the appellant threatened to kill the prosecutrix, the daughter of the complainant and therefore had committed the offence which is punishable   under   Section   506   IPC.   In   respect   of   the   said charge we do not find that there is any supporting evidence except the vague statement of the prosecutrix in her evidence as PW­3 that whenever she shouted when he had attempted to have sexual acts with her, the appellant had threatened her not to say anything to anyone as otherwise he would kill her. There is no other statement or evidence relating to the incident or the manner in which the threat in its true sense was put forth. In that view, we are or of the opinion that the conviction and sentence under Section 506 imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. 15 On arriving at the conclusion that the appellant is liable 16. to be convicted under Section 376 IPC and not under Section 376   D   IPC,   the   appropriate   sentence   to   be   imposed   needs consideration.   The   incident   in   question   is   based   on   the complaint dated 09.08.2013. In this circumstance, though it is noted that Section 376 has been amended w.e.f. 21.04.2018 providing for the minimum sentence of 10 years, the case on hand is of 2013 and the conviction of the appellant was on 20.05.2015. The incident having occurred prior to amendment, the pre­amended provision will have to be taken note. The same provides that a person committed of rape shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. In the instant case, taking into consideration all facts including that no material is available on record   to   indicate   that   the   appellant   has   any   criminal antecedents and that he is also a father of five children and the eldest son is more than 18 years, it appears that there is no reason   to   apprehend   that   the   appellant   would   indulgence similar   acts   in   future.   In   that   circumstance,   we   deem   it appropriate   that   the   sentence   of   7   years   would   have   been 16 sufficient   deterrent   to   serve   the   ends   of   justice.   From   the custody   certificate   dated   05.12.2017   issued   by   the   Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Bahraich, it is noticed that the appellant   has been in custody from 20.09.2013. If that be the position, he has been in custody and served the sentence for more than 8 years which shall be his period of sentence. As such   he   has   served   the   sentence   imposed   by   us   except payment of fine. The fine and default sentence as imposed by the trial court is maintained.  17. In the result we make the following order: ­ The conviction and sentence under Section 363, (i) 366, and Section 4 of POCSO Act is confirmed. The   conviction   under   Section   506   IPC   is   set aside. The conviction order made by the trial court and (ii) confirmed by the High Court under Section 376 D   IPC   is   modified.   The   appellant   is   instead convicted   under   Section   376   IPC   and   is sentenced,   for   the   period   undergone.   The   fine 17 and   default   sentence   as   imposed   by   the   trial court shall remain unaltered.  (iii) Since   the   custody   certificate   dated   20.09.2013 indicates   that   the   appellant   has   undergone sentence for more than 8 years, the appellant is ordered to be released on payment of fine as all the sentences have run concurrently and if he is not required to be detained in any other case.  The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.  (iv) (v) Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.  ……………………….J. (M.R. SHAH)                                                      ……………………….J.                                                (A.S. BOPANNA) New Delhi, October 08, 2021  18