X vs. Y

2024 INSC 476 Non­Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7210 OF 2024     X                              … Appellant versus     Y   … Respondent J U D G M E N T ABHAY S. OKA, J. FACTUAL ASPECTS 1. This   is   an   unfortunate   case   in   which   the   appellant­ husband   and   respondent­wife,   notwithstanding   continuous separation at least from 2008, have not been able to settle their matrimonial dispute. For the sake of privacy, we have masked their names. The marriage between the parties was solemnised on 2. th 25  March 1999.  Two children were born from the marriage. Both of them are adults.   The matrimonial dispute led to multiple litigations. The matrimonial discord started in 2006, which led to the appellant filing a petition under Section 9 of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2024.07.08 18:10:03 IST Reason: the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955   (for   short,   ‘HM   Act’)   for restitution   of   conjugal   rights.     The   petition   was   filed   on

th 17   December   2008.     By   the   judgment   and   decree   dated th 15   May   2013,   the   learned   Additional   Civil   Judge (Sr.Division),   Barnala,   passed   a   decree   of   restitution   of conjugal rights under which the respondent was directed to join the appellant's company within three months.  According to the case of the appellant, as the respondent did not abide rd by the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, on 23  August 2013, the appellant filed a petition under Section 13 of the HM Act before the Family Court at Barnala seeking a decree of   divorce   on   the  grounds   of   cruelty  and   desertion.   Being aggrieved by the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, in the   year   2013   itself,   the   respondent   preferred   an   appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.   The appeal was dismissed by the judgment dated 19th February 2015, and   the   decree   for   restitution   of   conjugal   rights   was confirmed.   st 3. On 1   August 2016, the learned Judge of the Family Court   at   Barnala  allowed   the   divorce   petition   filed   by   the appellant and dissolved the marriage between the appellant and   respondent.     The   respondent   challenged   the   divorce decree by preferring an appeal before the Punjab and Haryana th High Court.  By the  impugned  judgment  dated  4   October 2019, the High Court has set aside the divorce decree. 4. There were two other litigations between the parties. The respondent filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, claiming maintenance against the th appellant. On 19  October 2013, the said petition was partly

allowed.     The   Trial   Court   denied   maintenance   to   the respondent on the ground that the respondent had refused to live with the appellant without any sufficient cause. However, the Trial Court directed the appellant to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.3500/­ and Rs.4000/­ per month respectively to the children. The respondent filed a complaint before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate alleging the commission of offences   punishable   under   Section   406   and   498A   of   the th Indian Penal Code against the appellant. On 16  April 2014, the   learned   Magistrate   dismissed   the   complaint.     The respondent preferred a revision application against the order of dismissal of the complaint. The revision application was th rejected by the order dated 18  October 2016 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.  5. During the pendency of this appeal, the dispute was referred   to   the   Supreme   Court   Mediation   Centre.   On   2nd August 2021, the learned Mediator submitted a failure report. Orders dated 22nd March and 6th May 2024 show that even this Court attempted to bring about a settlement. But the efforts could not succeed. SUBMISSIONS 6. Shri   Sukumar   Pattjoshi,   learned   senior   advocate appearing for the appellant, submitted that as the decree for restitution   of   conjugal   rights   was   not   abided   by   the respondent, a decree on the ground of desertion must follow. He   submitted   that   consistent   denial   by   the   respondent   to

resume the matrimonial relationship caused mental cruelty to the appellant. Therefore, there was no reason for the High Court to disturb the decree of divorce.  7. Shri   Sharma,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the respondent, submitted that after considering the evidence on record, the High Court found that the appellant failed to prove the grounds for divorce pleaded by him. He submitted that looking at the evidence on record, the findings recorded by the High Court cannot be disturbed.  CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS 8. We may note here that though an effort made by this Court   to   bring   about   a   settlement   did   not   succeed,   the learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant,   on instructions, stated that the appellant’s offer of payment of Rs. 30 lakhs as lumpsum  maintenance or alimony to  the respondent is still open subject to respondent agreeing for passing a decree of divorce. 9. There is no dispute that the parties have been residing separately since 2008. In IA No. 109594 of 2024, filed by the appellant,   he   has   stated   that   their   son   and   daughter   are major. The application records that the daughter resides in Canada and the son is in India.   There is no dispute about this factual position.  10. As noted earlier, the appellant filed a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights in December 2008.  The petition

th was decreed on 15  May 2013.  The learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Division), Barnala, recorded the following findings in the judgment.  “10.  Thus, from the entire evidence adduced by the petitioner,   it has been established on   record   that   the   respondent   has   left the   company   of   the   petitioner   without any reason and cause and has neglected  The petitioner and deserted the petitioner. has   still   love   and   affection   with   the respondent and is ready to keep her with him as his wife…………………………..”             (emphasis added) The   High   Court   dismissed   the   appeal   preferred   by   the respondent   and   confirmed   the   decree   for   restitution   of conjugal rights. In paragraph 10 of the decision, the High Court held thus: “………… The trial court has rightly drawn the conclusion that the appellant had left the company of the respondent without any reasonable excuse   and had neglected and deserted him as he was ready to keep her with him as his wife……………..”      (emphasis added) th The appeal was dismissed on 19  February 2015. st 11. Thereafter, on 1  August 2016, the divorce petition filed by the appellant was decreed in which a finding was recorded that   the   appellant   made   every   effort   to   bring   back   the respondent­wife   and   despite   the   decree   of   restitution   of conjugal rights, the respondent did not resume cohabitation. In the divorce petition filed by the appellant, he specifically

relied upon the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against the respondent and stated that after the decree, the respondent had not resumed cohabitation.   The Trial Court accepted the grounds of cruelty and desertion, and a decree of divorce was passed.  12. In   the   impugned   judgment,   while   setting   aside   the decree of divorce, the High Court held that the ground of desertion was not made out as the appellant has continuously neglected   his   duties   as   a   husband   and   considering   his conduct, the respondent had no choice but to leave him and stay at her parental home.  13. In our view, it is not possible to sustain the judgment of the   High   Court   on   the   issue   of   desertion.     As   mentioned earlier, on 15th May 2013, the Civil Court passed a decree for restitution   of   conjugal   rights   against   the   respondent   on   a petition   filed   by   the   appellant   in   the   year   2008.     The categorical finding recorded by the Trial Court was that the respondent left the appellant's company without reasonable th cause.  The decree of the Trial Court was confirmed on 19 February   2015.     The   Family   Court   decreed   the   divorce st petition filed by the appellant on 1   August 2016.   Nothing was brought on record by the respondent to show that after th 19   February   2015,   when   the   decree   for   restitution   of conjugal rights was confirmed by the High Court, any effort was made by her to resume cohabitation. We must note that st between   1   August   2016,   when   a   decree   of   divorce   was passed, and 4th October 2019, when the decree was set aside

by   the   impugned   decree,   no   efforts   were   made   by   the respondent to resume cohabitation.   She had not made out any such case. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that after the decree of restitution of conjugal rights was passed, the respondent showed even an inclination to resume cohabitation with the appellant.  There is a concluded finding th recorded by the Trial Court on 15  May 2013 while passing a decree   of   restitution   of   conjugal   rights   that   it   was   the respondent who had deserted the appellant without sufficient cause. 14. Section 13(1) and 13(1A) of the HM Act read thus :  “ 13. Divorce. ­ Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce ­ on the ground that the other party (i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had   voluntary   sexual   intercourse   with   any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia)  has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib)  has   deserted   the   petitioner   for   a continuous   period   of   not   less   than   two years   immediately   preceding   the presentation of the petition; or (ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or (iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to

such   an   extent   that   the   petitioner   cannot reasonably   be   expected   to   live   with   the respondent. Explanation.­ In this clause,­ (a) the expression “mental disorder” means mental   illness,   arrested   or   incomplete development   of   mind,   psychopathic disorder   or   any   other   disorder   or disability   of   mind   and   includes schizophrenia; (b) the   expression   “psychopathic   disorder” means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub­ normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally   aggressive   or   seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other   party,   and   whether   or   not   it requires   or   is   susceptible   to   medical treatment; or (iv) … … … … (v) has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has   renounced   the   world   by   entering   any religious order; or (vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period   of   seven   years   or   more   by   those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; Explanation. ­In   this   sub­section,   the   expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and

its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly. (1A)   Either   party   to   a   marriage,   whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this   Act,   may   also   present   a   petition   for   the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground­ (i) that   there   has   been   no   resumption   of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage   for   a   period   of   one   year   or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial   separation   in   a   proceeding   to which they were parties; or (ii) that   there   has   been   no   restitution   of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution   of   conjugal   rights   in   a proceeding to which they were parties.”                         (emphasis added) We may note here that under Section 13(1A)(ii), it is provided that a divorce petition can be presented on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year and more after passing the decree for restitution of conjugal rights.  Indeed, the period of one year was not complete when the appellant th filed the divorce petition.   In the Judgment dated 15   May 2013 passed by the Trial Court, which was affirmed by the High Court, the Courts accepted the appellant's case that the continuous desertion was from December 2006.  The decree th was  confirmed  on  19   February  2015  by  the  High  Court. Admittedly, the respondent did not resume the co­habitation

th after   15   May   2013   till   the   date   of   filing   of   the   divorce petition.  It is not her case that any event happened after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed, which prevented her from joining the appellant's company.  Hence, the desertion of the appellant at least from 2008 till the date of filing the divorce petition in 2013 continued without any reasonable   cause.   Therefore,   a   decree   for   divorce   on   the ground   of   desertion   under   Section   13(1)(ib)   ought   to   have been passed. Thus, in our view, the High Court ought to have confirmed the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. This is a case of a complete breakdown of marriage for last 16 years and more. 15. The appellant has offered to pay the respondent a lump sum alimony of Rs. 30 lakhs. In the facts of the case, this amount is  reasonable and  can  be accepted  as a  one­time lump sum alimony. Though we are passing a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, we will have to clarify that the decree shall come into operation after a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs is paid to the respondent.  16. Hence, we pass the following order: The appeal is partly allowed by setting aside that part a. of the impugned judgment by which the High Court interfered with the decree for divorce on the ground of desertion. Accordingly, the marriage between the appellant and respondent, solemnised on 25th March 1999,   is   hereby   dissolved   by   a   decree   of   divorce

under Section 13(1)(ib) of the HM Act.  The finding of the   High   Court   on   the   ground   of   cruelty   is   not disturbed;  b. The decree passed as above shall come into force only on the appellant paying a sum of Rs. 30 lakhs to the respondent by directly transferring the amount to the respondent's account. We direct the advocate for the respondent to provide the bank account details of the respondent and a cancelled cheque of her account to the   advocate   for   the   appellant   within   three   weeks from today. The appellant shall pay the sum of Rs. 30 lakhs   to   the   respondent   within   a   period   of   three months from today by direct transfer to the account of the respondent;  c. The appellant shall file an affidavit before this Court immediately on making payment of Rs. 30 lakhs to the respondent, along with proof of payment.  If the respondent does not furnish her bank account details within three weeks from today, it will be open for the appellant to deposit the said amount with this Court within three months from today. The deposit of the said amount with the Supreme Court shall also be treated   as   compliance,   and   immediately   on   the compliance being made, the decree of divorce shall become effective.  The respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited in this Court; 

Registry shall immediately draw a decree of divorce d. after the proof of payment or deposit of the amount of Rs.30 lakhs is filed on record; The payment of the sum of Rs.30 lakhs shall be in e. full   and   final   settlement   of   the   claim   of   the respondent for maintenance; and f. The   appeal   is,   accordingly,   partly   allowed   on   the above terms with no order regarding costs.                    ….…………………….J.                   (Abhay S. Oka) …..…………………...J.   (Ujjal Bhuyan) New Delhi; July 08, 2024.