Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1295 of 1997
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1603 of 1997
PETITIONER:
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI RAM SINGH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/02/2000
BENCH:
K.T. Thomas & R.P. Sethi.
JUDGMENT:
SETHI,J.
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Heard. Leave granted.
Relying upon the judgment of this Court in State of
Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 (1) Suppl.
SCC 335] and exercising powers under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
vide the judgment impugned in these appeals quashed the
investigations and consequent proceedings against the
respondents initiated, conducted and concluded by the police
under Sections 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act). The Court found that for the offence punishable
under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act the investigation had not
been conducted by an authorised officer in terms of Section
17 of the Act. It was observed: It is of utmost
importance that investigation into criminal offence must
always be free from any objectionable features or
infirmities which may legitimately lead to the grievance of
the accused that the work of investigation is carried on
unfairly and with any ulterior motive. The prosecution of
the accused on the basis of investigation by a person who
had no legal authority to investigate cannot be allowed:
In order to appreciate the legal controversy, it is
proper to refer to some of the facts regarding which there
does not appear to be any dispute at this stage in these
appeals.
Regarding Ram Singh respondent, a secret information is
stated to have been received on 4.7.1992 alleging that when
he was a Sub Inspector, Excise and District Excise Officer,
he had acquired properties disproportionate to his known
sources of income. On verification it was found that he had
earned movable and immovable properties allegedly much more
disproportionate to his known sources of income during the
check period commencing from 1.1.1982 to 4.8.1992.
Resultantly Crime No.103/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and
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13(2) of the Act was registered against him. On 4.8.1992 a
raid was conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent
of Police, SPE, Lokayukt Office, Gwalior after obtaining a
search warrant from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior
and a seizure memo was prepared with respect to recovery of
movable articles from the possession of his son, namely,
Pratap Singh, Advocate. On 7.8.1992 another raid was
conducted by Shri C.P.S. Chaturvedi, Dy.Supdt. of Police,
Lokayukt Office, Gwalior at the Government Quarter allotted
to the said respondent at Vikas Nagar, Betul, under a search
warrant dated 3.8.1992. Some documents, one transistor, one
pistol and diaries were recovered in the raid. The
respondent Shri Ram Singh moved Criminal Misc.No.143 of 1993
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior praying
for anticipatory bail which was allowed. Vide letter dated
14.12.1993, the Additional Excise Commissioner, Madhya
Pradesh, Gwalior directed the respondent to submit the
statement on the prescribed form Nos.1, 2 and 3 to the
Lokayukt Gwalior. The statements were submitted to Shri
P.S. Sisodia, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt
Office, Moti Mahal, Gwalior on 16.5.1994. It was mentioned
in the statement that the total income of the respondent
from all sources was Rs.4,19,000/- and expenditure was
Rs.2,58,700/- which show the savings of Rs.1,60,300/-. He
declared that his assets were not disproportionate to the
known sources of his income. After further information was
submitted by the respondent, a further enquiry was made on
5.6.1995 with respect to his bank account. In May, 1996 the
respondent filed the Petition No.2481/96 under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing the
proceedings relating to Crime No.143/93 and charge-sheet
thereof filed against him. He contended that the entire
search and seizure made by Special Police Establishment was
illegal, malafide and without any basis. It was further
contended that the search was conducted without jurisdiction
and was in contravention of the provisions of Section 17 of
the Act. He alleged that the investigation was malicious
inasmuch as the accounts of his family members had illegally
been freezed. The State in its reply filed in the High
Court alleged that after investigation it had transpired
that during the check period, the respondent had a total
income of Rs.3,13,470.68 from all known sources and his
expenditure being Rs.16,25,723.49. Thus the
disproportionate amount came to Rs.13,12,252.81 which was
stated to be 350 times more than the known sources of his
income. After investigation sanction was obtained and
charge-sheet was filed. The initial investigation was
conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent of Police,
Special Police Establishment, Gwalior and thereafter by Shri
D.S. Rana, Inspector SPE, Gwalior who was stated to have
been duly authorised by the Superintendent of Police, SPE,
Gwalior vide order No.SPE/2766/94 dated 12.12.1994. The
order of the Supteintendent of Police was claimed to be
strictly under Section 17 of the Act. Respondent Jagdish
Prasad was appointed as a Sub-Inspector and was also holding
the post of A.D.E.O. On 16.11.1984 Preliminary Enquiry
No.120/84 was registered against him. On 7.5.1985 one Shri
Tara Chand, resident of Dahimandi, Gwalior filed a complaint
against the said respondent whereupon another Preliminary
Enquiry No.5/85 was registered which was taken for
investigation. On the basis of Preliminary Enquiry No.5/85
Crime No.132/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act
was registered against him on 7.10.1992. After
investigation it transpired that during check period
commencing from 1.2.1964 to 31.1.1984 the respondent had
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earned a sum of Rs.1,12,380.54 from his known sources of
income and incurred an expenses of Rs.2,14,608.84. In this
way he was found to be possessing disproportionate property
worth Rs.1,02,228.30. After obtaining the sanction for
prosecution by the competent authority a charge-sheet was
submitted in the Court on 5.8.1986. The respondent moved
the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code praying for quashing the investigation and consequent
proceedings against him in the light of the judgment in
Bhajan Lals case (supra) which was allowed vide the order
impugned. Respondent Kedarilal Vaishya had joined the
service in the Government on 15.7.1978 as Sub-Engineer and
was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer on 8.3.1990.
An information was received in the office of the
Superintendent of Police, SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya,
Gwalior that the aforesaid respondent had immovable
properties much more disproportionate to known sources of
his income. After verification Crime No.17/94 was
registered under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the Act. A search warrant was received by
Inspector Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria from the Court of the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior. The Superintendent of
Police SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior issued
order No.454 dated 8.2.1994 authorising the investigation of
the case by Shri Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria. On
investigation it was found that during the check period from
7.7.1978 to 2.9.1994 the respondent had earned a total
amount of Rs.3,86,966.75 and incurred an expenditure of
Rs.7,95,243.98. In this way he was found to be possessing
Rs.4,08,277.23 more than his earnings which was found to be
disproportionate to his known sources of income, punishable
under Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act. The sanction
for prosecution was obtained on 26th October, 1996
whereafter a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent
in the Court of Sub-Judge Shivpuri which was registered as
Special Session Case No.4/1996. Not satisfied with the
investigation the respondent filed a petition under Section
482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing of
the investigation and consequent proceedings in Crime
No.17/94 which was allowed vide the order impugned in these
appeals. Corruption in a civilised society is a disease
like cancer, which if not detected in time is sure to
maliganise the polity of country leading to disastrous
consequences. It is termed as plague which is not only
contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a
jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS,
being incurable. It has also been termed as Royal thievery.
The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded
communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own
weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social
order, being not only anti people, but aimed and targeted
against them. It affects the economy and destroys the
cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the
earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence shaking of the
socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy,
wealthy, effective and vibrating society. The menace of
corruption was found to have enormously increased by first
and second world war conditions. The corruption, at the
initial stages, was considered confined to the bureaucracy
who had the opportunities to deal with a variety of State
largesse in the form of contracts, licences and grants.
Even after the war the opportunities for corruption
continued as large amounts of Government surplus stores were
required to be disposed of by the public servants. As
consequence of the wars the shortage of various goods
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necessitated the imposition of controls and extensive
schemes of post-war reconstruction involving the
disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in the control
of the public servants giving them wide discretion with the
result of luring them to the glittering shine of the wealth
and property. In order to consolidate and amend the laws
relating to prevention of corruption and matters connected
thereto, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted
which was amended from time to time. In the year 1988 a new
Act on the subject being Act No.49 of 1988 was enacted with
the object of dealing with the circumstances, contingencies
and shortcomings which were noticed in the working and
implementation of 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention
of corruption was essentially made to deal with the public
servants, as understood in the common parlance but
specifically defined in the Act. The Act was intended to
make effective provision for the prevention of bribe and
corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a
social legislation defined to curb illegal activities of the
public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so
as to advance its object. Dealing with the object
underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R.
Antulay [1984 (2) SCC 183] held: The 1947 Act was enacted,
as its long ltitle shows, to make more effective provision
for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably,
therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such
construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the
object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not
defeat it. If the words of the Statute are clear and
unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give
effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the
provision. The question of construction arises only in the
event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used
in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is
entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to
remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the
Statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief
when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the
Legislature enacted the Statute. The rule of construction
is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by
precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a
question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two
views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of
the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the
object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective
provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and
at any rate not defeat it.
Procedural delays and technicalities of law should not
be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by
the Act. The overall public interest and the social object
is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various
provisions of the Act and decided cases under it.
For the purposes of deciding these appeals reference to
Sections 13 and 17 of the Act is necessary. Section 13
deals with the criminal misconduct of the public servants
and prescribes the punishment for the commission of offence
of criminal misconduct. A public servant is said to commit
the offence of criminal misconduct:
(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to
accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or
for any other person any gratification other than legal
remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in
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section 7; or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to
accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other
person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a
consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any
person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely
to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or
about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with
the official functions of himself or of any public servant
to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows
to be interested in or related to the person so concerned;
or
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or
otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to@@
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him or under his control as a public servant or allows any@@
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other person so to do; or
(d) if he,--
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or
for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant,
obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest; or
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession
or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in@@
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possession for which the public servant cannot@@
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satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property
disproportionate to his known sources of income.
ExplanationFor the purposes of this section, known
sources of income means income received from any lawful
source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance
with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time
being applicable to a public servant
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
be not less than one year but which may extend to seven
years and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 17 deals with investigation into cases under the
Act and provides:
17. Persons authorised to investigateNotwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,--
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;
(b) in the metropolitan area of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras
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and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as
such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant
Commissioner of Police;
(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a
police officer of equivalent rank.
shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act
without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make
any arrest therefore without a warrant;
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of
an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government
in this behalf by general or special order, he may also
investigate any such offence without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,
as the case may be, or make arrest therefore without a
warrant;
Provided further that an offence referred to in clause
(e) of sub- section (1) of section 13 shall not be
investigated without the order of a police officer not below
the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
This Section provides that no police officer below the
rank of an Inspector in the case of Delhi Special Police
Establishment, an Assistant Commissioner of Police in the
metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad
and any other metropolitan area notified as such and
Dy.Superintendent of Police or a police officer of the
equivalent rank shall investigate an offence punishable
under the Act without prior order of the metropolitan
Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, as the case
may be, or make any arrest thereof without warrant.
According to the first proviso if a police officer not below
the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the
Government in this behalf by general or special order, he
can also investigate in such offences without the order of
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Magistrate of First Class, as
the case may be, or make arrest thereof without a warrant.
Regarding compliance of this part of the section there is no
controversy in the present appeals. However, the second
proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause
(e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 is sought to be
investigated, such an investigation shall not be conducted
without the order of a Police Officer not below the rank of
a Superintendent of Police. The interpretation of this
proviso is involved in the present controversy. The
investigation conducted and the consequent proceedings are
stated to have been quashed on similar grounds in Bhajan
Lals case(supra). The facts of that case were, one Dharam
Pal presented a complaint against Ch.Bhajan Lal, the former
Chief Minister of Haryana making certain serious allegations
against him which prima facie showed commission of offence
punishable under the Act. The complaint was presented in
the Chief Ministers Secretariat on 12.1.1987 when said Shri
Bhajan Lal had ceased to be the Chief Minister. An
endorsement was made by the Officer on Special Duty in the
Chief Ministers Secretariat to the effect: C.M. has
seen. For appropriate action and was marked to the
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Director General of Police who in turn made endorsement on
the same day which read, Please look into this; take
necessary action and report and marked it to the
Superintendent of Police, Hissar. The complaint alongwith
the above endorsement of OSD and DGP was put up before the
SP on 21.11.1987 on which date the SP made his endorsement
reading Please register a case and investigate. The
Station House Officer of the Police Station registered a
case on the basis of the allegations in the complaint under
Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and Section
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After
forwarding the copy of the First Information Report to the
Magistrate and other officers concerned, the SHO took up the
investigation and proceeded to the spot accompanied by his
staff. At this stage Shri Bhajan Lal filed Writ Petition
No.9172/87 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India seeking quashing of the First Information Report and
issuance of directions restraining the police from further
proceeding with the investigation. The High Court held that
allegations made in the complaint do not constitute a
cognizable offence for commencing a lawful investigation and
granted relief as prayed for by the petitioner therein.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the State of Haryana
preferred an appeal in this Court which was disposed of as
under:- We set aside the judgment of the High Court
quashing the First Information Report as not being legally
and factually sustainable in law for the reasons
aforementioned; but, however, we quash the commencement as
well as the entire investigation, if any, so far done for
the reasons given by us in the instant judgment on the
ground that the third appellant (SHO) is not clothed with
valid legal authority to take up the investigation and
proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5A(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, as indicated in this
judgment. Further we set aside the order of the High Court
awarding costs with a direction that the said costs is
payable to the first respondent (Ch.Bhajan Lal) by the
second respondent (Dharam Pal).
In the result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly but
at the same time giving liberty to the State Government to
direct an investigation afresh, if it so desires, through a
competent Police Officer empowered with valid legal
authority in strict compliance with S.5A(1) of the Act as
indicated supra. No order as to costs.
In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court
posed a question to itself in the following terms:
Now what remains for consideration is whether there is
any valid order of the S.P. permitting the third appellant
to investigate the offence falling under clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of Section 5. As we have already mentioned
in the earlier part of this judgment, the S.P. (the second
appellant) has given the one word direction on 21.11.1987
investigate. The question is whether the one word
direction investigate would amount to an order within
the meaning of second proviso of Section 5A(1).
The Court found on facts that as there was absolutely no
reason given by the SP in directing the SHO to investigate,
the order of the SP was directly in violation of the dictum
of law. The SHO was, therefore, found not clothed with the
requisite legal authority within the meaning of second
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proviso to Section 5A(1) of 1947 Act to investigate the
offences under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. This
Court held that (1) as the salutary legal requirement of
disclosing the reason for according the permission is not
complied with; (2) as the prosecution is not satisfactorily
explaining the circumstances which impelled the SP to pass
the order directing the SHO to investigate the case; (3) as
the said direction manifestly seems to have been granted
mechanically and in a very casual manner, regardless of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court and (4) as the
SHO had got neither any order from the Magistrate to
investigate the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor
any order from the SP for investigation of the offences
under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in
the manner known to law, the order of direction reading only
investigate suffered from legal infirmity. The Court
found that despite quashing the direction of the SP and the
investigation thereupon would not, in any manner, deter the
State of Haryana to pursue the matter and direct the
investigation afresh in pursuance of the FIR, if the State
so desire.
It may be noticed at this stage that a three Judge Bench
of this Court in H.N. Rishbud & Anr.vs. State of Delhi
[AIR 1955 SC 196] had held that a defect or illegality in
investigation, however, serious, has no direct bearing on
the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or
trial. Referring to the provisions of Section 190, 193, 195
to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) in
the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, the Court held:
A defect or illegality in investigation, however
serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the
procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a
police report which results from an investigation is
provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on which
cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a
valid and legal police report is the foundation of the
jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190,
Cr.P.C. is one out of a group of sections under the heading
Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. The
language of this section is in marked contrast with that of
the other sections of the group under the same heading,
i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.
These latter sections regulate the competence of the
Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in
compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no
doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section
190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it
is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police
report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an
invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b)
of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we
need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so
taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding
antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537,
Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms is attracted:
Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no
finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or
revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity
in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation,
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order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial
or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code,
unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact
occasioned a failure of justice.
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police
report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision
relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the
result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside
unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to
have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an
illegality committed in the course of investigation does not
affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for
trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu
v. Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73 (C) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v.
The King, AIR 1950 PC 26(D).
It further held:
In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is
brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the
trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent
of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such
investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by
such officer as it considers appropriate with reference to
the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the
light of the above considerations that the validity or
otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section
5(4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be
adopted in these proceedings, determined.
In Bhajan Lals case this Court had found on facts that
the SP had passed the order mechanically and in a very
casual manner regardless of the settled principles of law.
The provisions of Section 17 of the Act had not been
complied with. As earlier noticed the SP while authorising
the SHO to investigate had made only endorsement to the
effect please register the case and investigate. The SP
was shown to be not aware either of allegations or the
nature of the offences and the pressure of work-load
requiring investigation by an Inspector. There is no denial
of the fact that in cases against the respondents in these
appeals, even in the absence of the authority of the SP the
Investigating Officer was in law authorised to investigate
the offence falling under Section 13 of the Act with the
exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of
the Act. After registration of the FIR the Superintendent
of Police in the instant appeals is shown to be aware and
conscious of the allegations made against the respondents,
the FIR registered against them and pending investigations.
The order passed by the SP in case of Ram Singh on
12.12.1994 with respect to a Crime registered in 1992 was to
the effect: In exercise of powers conferred by the
provisions on me, under Section 17 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, I P.K. RUNWAL, Superintendent of
Police, Special Police Establishment, Division-I Lokayukt
Karyalaya, Gwalior Division Gwalior (M.P.), authorised Shri
D.S. RANA INSP-(SPE) LAK-GWL (M.P.) to investigate Crime
No.103/92 U/s 13(1)(E), 23(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri RAM SINGH D.O. EXCISE
BATUL (M.P.).
Similar orders have been passed in the other two cases
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as well. The reasons for entrustment of investigation to
the Inspector can be discerned from the order itself. The
appellant-State is, therefore, justified in submitting that
the facts of Bhajan Lals case were distinguishable as in
the instant case the Superintendent of Police appears to
have applied his mind and passed the order authorising the
investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The reason for entrustment of
investigation were obvious. The High Court should not have
liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of
the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the serious
charges made against the respondents in relation to
commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to
curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public
officers. It is brought to our notice that under similar
circumstances the High Court had quashed the investigation
and consequent proceedings in a case registered against Shri
Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal Appeal No.1754 of 1986
was filed in this Court which was allowed on 27th September,
1986 by setting aside the order of the High Court with a
direction to the trial court to proceed with the case in
accordance with law and in the light of the observations
made therein.
We are not satisfied with the finding of the High Court
that merely because the order of the Superintendent of
Police was in typed proforma, that showed the
non-application of the mind or could be held to have been
passed in a mechanical and casual manner. As noticed
earlier the order clearly indicates the name of the accused,
the number of FIR, nature of the offence and power of
Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a
junior officer to investigate. The time between the
registration of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second
proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind
and the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent
of Police to direct authorisation to order the
investigation.
Under these circumstances the appeals are allowed and
the judgments of the High Court impugned in these appeals
regarding the interpretation of Section 17 and holding the
investigation to have not been investigated by an authorised
officer being not sustainable in law are hereby set aside
with the direction to the Trial Court to proceed with the
trial in accordance with the provisions of law. The
respondents would be at liberty to defend their cases on all
such contentions on facts and law as are available to them
which have not been adjudicated upon against them by the
High Court and this Court.