Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
J. V. BHAT, ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1974
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
BENCH:
ALAGIRISWAMI, A.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CITATION:
1975 AIR 596 1975 SCR (2) 407
1975 SCC (1) 110
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1991 SC1117 (15)
ACT:
Natural justice-Mysore Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1958 Validity of the notifications issued
under the Act-Principles of Natural Justice Whether can be
implied when the statute is silent- Natural justice for
subjective satisfaction of an administrative body.
HEADNOTE:
The provisions of sections 3, 9, 12 and 15 of the Act were
challenged as unconstitutional for violating principles of
natural justice.
Section 3(1) reads as under :
"(1) where the competent authority upon report from any of
its officers or other information in its possession is
satisfied that-
(a) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used
for human habitation-
(i)are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or
(ii) are, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty
arrangement or design, narrowness of faulty arrangement of
streets, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitation
facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental
to safety, health or morals; it may, by notification in the
official Gazette, declare such area to be a slum area-
Section 9(1) reads as under
"(1) where the competent authority upon a report from any of
its officers or other information in its possession is
satisfied as respects any slum area that the most
satisfactory method of dealing with the conditions in the
area is the demolition of all the buildings in the area
the authority shall by an order notified in the official
Gazette, declare the area to be a clearance area, that is to
say, an area to be cleared of all buildings in accordance
with the provisions of this Act : ,
Provided that any building in the area which is not unfit
for human Habitation or dangerous or injurious to health may
be excluded from the declaration if the authority considers
it necessary."
Section 12 empowers the State Government to clear land
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surrounded by any such slum area or clearance area or any
other land in any locality.
Section 15 prescribes the basis for determination of
compensation for the land acquired. No appeal is provided
against the declarations made under secs. 3 and 9.
The validity of the Notifications made under the provisions
of sections 3, 9 and 12 were also challenged.
The High Court of Mysore struck down sections 3 and 9 as
violative of Art. 19(1)(f) and section 12(1)(b) as violative
of Art. 14. It did not deal with section 15.
It was contended before this Court that provisions of
sections 3,9,12 and 15 are invalid for violating the
principles of natural justice. It was also contended that
the notifications issued under the Act were invalid. it was
also contended that the declarations under sections 3 and 9
have far-reaching consequences. That while acting under
sections 3 and 9 the possibility of arbitrary decisions
cannot be ruled out and no appeal is provided against the
declarations made under sections 3 and 9.
408
HELD : There are two possible approaches to the question.
One is to hold that the provisions of the statute are
themselves unconstitutional because they do not provide a
reasonable opportunity to the affected parties to be heard.
The other is to hold that as there is nothing in the
statutory provisions which debar the application of the
principles of natural justice while the authorities exercise
the statutory powers under the Act and as the principles of
natural justice Would apply unless the statutory provisions
point to the contrary the statutory provisions themselves
are not unconstitutional though the notifications issued
under them may be struck down if the authorities concerned
do not observe the principles ’of natural justice. As there
is a presumption of constitutionality, of statutes it is the
latter course that appears to us to be the proper approach.
We, think that the duty to hear those whose dwellings are to
be condemned becomes imperative before deciding to demolish
their particular buildings although no quasi-judicial trial
was called for. All that was necessary was to hear
objections, checked by spot inspections where needed, before
taking a decision. There can be no two opinion about the
need to hear the affected persons before declaring an area
to be a glum area under section 3, or an area as a clearance
area under section 9 or before taking action under section
10. All the difficulties would be removed if the affected
parties are given an opportunity to be heard in respect of
the action proposed. Section 12(1)(b) which empowers the
authority to acquire any other land in any locality does not
suffer from any constitutional defect. By its very nature,
a slum area is likely to be over-crowded and in redeveloping
it, it may be necessary to acquire other lands. The power
under section 12(1)(b) is relatable to the purpose of slum
clearance itself. [409 A-D, 412 E-F; 417B]
The Act is valid but the three notifications issued under
the Act are bad as the affected persons were not given an
opportunity of making representations against them.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1736 to
1740 of 1967.
From the Judgment & Order dated the 9th October, 1969 of the
Mysore High Court in W.P. Nos. 1249, 1260, 1432, 2206 and
2271 of 1963.
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B.R.L. Iyengar and M. Veerappa, for the appellants.
H. B. Datar and R. B. Datar, for the respondents. (in C.A.
Nos.,1736 & 1740/67).
M. C. Bhandare and R. B. Datar, for respondent (in C. A.
No. 1739/67).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI, J.-These five appeals arise out of five writ
petitions filed before the High Court of Mysore questioning
three notifications issued under the Mysore Slum Areas
(Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1958. The notifications were
(1) a Declaration under section 3 of the Act, dated 17-11-
1960, (2) a declaration under section 9 of the Act, dated
20-4-1961, and (3) a notification by the Government dated
20-12-1962 under section 12 by which certain lands were to
be acquired under the Act. The provisions of section 3, 9,
12 and 15 were also impugned as unconstitutional. The High
Court struck down sections 3 and 9 as violating Article
19(1)(f) of the Constitution and section 12(1) (b) as
violating Article 14. It did not consider it necessary to
consider the constitutional validity of section 15. It,
however, held that the three notifications above referred to
were not unconstitutional because in exercising their
functions under sections 3, 9 and 12 the authorities
concerned were not exercising a quasi judicial power.
409
But the result of striking down the section of the Act above
referred to was that the notifications also fell along with
them. The State of Mysore has filed these appeals under
certificate granted by the High Court.
There are two possible approaches to this question. One is
to hold that the provisions of the statute are themselves
unconstitutional because they do not provide a reasonable
opportunity for the affected parties to be heard; the other
is to hold that as there is nothing in the statutory
provisions which debar the application of the principles of
natural justice while the authorities exercise the statutory
powers under the Act, and as the principles of natural
justice would apply unless the statutory provisions point to
the contrary the statutory provisions themselves are not
unconstitutional though the notifications issued under them
may be struck down if the authorities concerned do not
observe the principles of natural justice while exercising
their statutory powers. As there is a presumption of
constitutionality of statutes unless contrary is established
it is the latter course that appears to us to, be the proper
approach.
This Court has made considerable advances in recent years in
its attitude towards the question of the application of the
principles of natural justice. The High Court referred to
the decisions in Cooper v.The Board of Works for the
Wandsworth District [14CB(NS)180] King v. The Electricity
Commissioners [ 1924 (1) KB 171 ] as well as Nakkuda Ali v.
M.F.De S. Jayaratne (1951 AC 66), as also to the decision of
this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani
(AIR 1950 SC 222). It referred to the decision in Ridge v.
Baldwin [1963 (2) All E.R. 66] and considered that it had
considerably shaken the foundations of King v. The
Electricity Commissioners (supra). It noticed the decision
of this Court in Board of High School & Intermediate
Education U.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta (AIR 1962 SC
11,10). It did not however refer to the decision of this
Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors.
[1967(2) SCR 625] nor the decision in A. K. Kraipak v.
Union [1970](1) SCR 4571 as they were subsequent decisions
of this Court.
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In Binapani Dei’s case this Court held:
"The rule that a party to whose prejudice an
order is intended to be passed is entitled to
a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals
and bodies of persons invested with authority
to adjudicate upon matters involving civil
consequences. It is one of the fundamental
rules of our constitutional set-up that every
citizen is protected against exercise of
arbitray authority by the State or its
officers. Duty to act judicially would
therefore arise from the very nature of the
function intended to be performed, it need not
be super. added. If there is power to decide
and determine to the prejudice of a person,
duty to act judicially is implicit in the
exercise of such power. If the essentials of
justice be ignored and an order to the
prejudice of a person is made, the order is a
nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule
of law and importance thereof transcends the
significance of a decision in any particular
case."
410
In Krajak’s case it was held:
"The rules of natural justice operate in areas
not covered by any law validly made, that is,
they do not supplant the law of the lard but
supplement it. They are not embodied rules
and their aim is to secure justice or to
prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is
their purpose there is-no reason why they
should not be made applicable to
administrative proceedings also, especially
when it is not easy to draw the line that
demarcates administrative enquiries from
quasi-judicial ones, and an unjust decision in
an administrative enquiry may have are far
reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-
judicial enquiry.
It is further observed :
"The concept of natural justice has undergone
a great deal of change in recent years. What
particular rule of natural justice should
apply to a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of that
case, the framework of the law under which the
enquiry is held and the constitution of the
Tribunal or the body of persons appointed for
that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made
before a court that some principle of natural
justice had been contravened, the court has to
decide whether the observance of that rule was
necessary for a just decision on the facts of
that case. The rule that enquiries must be
hold in good faith and without bias, and not
arbitrarily or unreasonably, is now included
among the principles of natural justice."
This Court also pointed out:
"The dividing line between an administrative
power and a quasijudicial power is quite thin
and is being gradually obliterated. For
determining whether a power is an
administrative power or a quasi-judicial power
one has to look to the nature of the power
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conferred, the person or persons on whom it is
conferred, the framework of the law conferring
that power, the consequences ensuring from the
exercise of that power and the manner in which
that power is expected to be exercised......
in recent years the concept of quasi-judicial
power has been undergoing a radical change.
What was considered as an administrative power
some years back is now being considered as a
quasi-judicial power."
It also observed:
"With the increase of the power of the
administrative bodies it has become necessary
to provide guidelines for the just exercise of
their power. To prevent the abuse of that
power and to see that it does not become a
new despotism, Courts are gradually evolving
the principles to be observed while exercising
such powers. In matters like these, public
good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to
precedents. New problems call for now
solutions. It is neither possible nor
desirable to fix the limits of a quasijudicial
power."
411
The audi alteram rule was held to be applicable by
implication, to a case of deprivation of a right in
property in Daud Ahmed v. District Magistrate Allahabad &
Ors. (AIR 1972 SC 896 & 899) where this Court held:
"It is the nature of the power and the
circumstances and conditions under which it is
exercised that will occasion the invocation of
the principle of natural justice. Deprivation
of property affects rights of a person. If
under the Requisition Act the petitioner was
to be deprived of the occupation of the
premises the District Magistrate had to hold
an enquiry in order to arrive at an opinion
that there existed alternative accommodation
for the petitioner or the District Magistrate
was to provide alternative accommodation."
The Mysore High Court, in the judgment under appeal, seems
to have boon of opinion that the principle laid down in
Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District
(supra) was departed from in King v. The Electricity
Commissioners (supra) and by the Privy Council in Nakkuda
Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne (supra). The Electricity
Commissioners’ case was followed by this Court in Province
of Bombay v. Khushadas .’V. Advani (supra). The High
Court’s view seems to have been that this line of reasoning
prevented the Court from inferring any procedure apart from
that laid down in the statute. It seemed to have been of
opinion that only what was laid down in the Constitution is
the Constitutional law of the land. This is clear from the
following passage in the judgment under appeal:
"The principles of natural justice recognised
in this country arc largely if not wholly’
moulded by the decisions of the English
Courts. In this country, as in England, though
the principles of natural justice are of
utmost importance in the administration of
justice they do not form part of the
Constitutional law of our country except
probably when we consider cases falling under
Article 311 of the Constitution. Some of our
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statutes embody those principles but largely
they are the product of judicial decisions.
Those principles do not over-ride specific
provisions contained in any. statute unless
the same comes into conflict with any of the
provisions in the Constitution."
We may point out that, in holding the impugned provision
void for contravention of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution,
the High Court itself relied on a principle of natural
justice inasmuch as it held that a procedure providing ,or
due hearing to the party affected before a building was
condemned to be demolished was not provided in the impugned
Act. In other words, the High Court itself was treating
rules of natural justice as part of requirements of our
Constitutional law although they are not specifically
conferred upon citizens under a separate heading.
We think that the Electricity Commissioners’ case (supra)
which was followed by this Court in Khushaldas S. Advani’s
case (supra), was not really a departure from the general
principle laid down in
412
Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District
(supra), but, it was an attempt to formulate the conditions
under which the general principle laid down thereby Erle,
C.J., who quoted the Biblical story of how even God Himself
had given Adam an opportunity of answering why he had eaten
the forbidden fruit before, expelling him from Paradises was
applicable in the circumstances of an increasingly complex
economic and social order whose problems compelled the
emergence of the welfare socialistic State with its many
organs armed with extensive powers. Courts attempted, in
the interests of justice, where its imperative demands were
not met, to control administrative action by assimilating it
to judicial action over which Courts could exercise
supervision. In later cases, emphasis was more on the needs
of justice and fairness rather than upon the distinction
between the judicial and administrative action.
Administrative action had, however, to be given free scope
within its legitimate sphere without jeopardizing rights of
individuals affected. Policies and schemes framed under
statutory provisions, which affected rights of individuals
could impose the obligations upon the authorities taking
what were essentially administrative decisions at points at
which they begin to impinge on specific individual rights.
It is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually
prohibit the giving of an opportunity to be heard, but, on
the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed
itself necessarily implied an obligation to hear before
deciding that the "audi alteram partem" rule could be
imported. The nature of the hearing would, of course, vary
according to the nature of the function and what its just
and fair exercise required in the context of rights
affected.
We must, therefore, examine the nature of functions imposed
by statute and the requirements they are designed to meet in
applying the tests stated above. We think that, the duty to
hear those whose dwellings are to be condemned becomes
imperative before deciding to demolish their particular
buildings although we do not think that any quasi-judicial
trial was called for. All that was necessary was to I hear
objections, checked by spot inspections, where needed,
before taking a decision. This would have met with the
requirements of natural justice in such cases where emergent
action may sometimes be very necessary. We may point out
that, in cases of demolition orders, pursuant to schemes
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framed under the Housing Act in England, the duty to hear
before making them was held by the Court to be implied. The
earliest of these cases was Cooper v.The Board of Works for
Wandsworth District.These duties are now imposed by statute
(see Sections 16 and 20 of Housing Act, 1967).
Before proceeding to deal with the questions that arise it
is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions.
Section 3 provides for declaration of slum areas. It reads
"(1) Where the competent authority upon report from any of
its
officers or other information in its possession is satisfied
that-
(a) any area is or may become a source of danger to the
public health, safety or convenience of residents in that
area or in its
413
neighbourhood. by reason of the area being lowlying,
insanitary squalid or otherwise, or
(b) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used
for human habitation-
(i) are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or
(ii) are, by reason of dilapidation, over crowding, faulty
arrangement or design, narrowness or faulty arrangement of
streets, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitation
facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental
to safety,. health or morals;
it may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare
such area to tea slum area-
(2) In determining whether a building is unfit for human
habitation for the purposes of this Act, regard hall be had
to its condition in respect of the following matters, that
is to any-
(a) repair;
(b) stability;
(c) freedom from damp;
(d) natural light and air;
(e) water supply;
(f) drainage and sanitary conveniences;
(g) facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food
and for the disposal of waste water;
and the building shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid if
and only if it is so far defective in one or more of the
said matters that it is not reasonably suitable for
occupation in that conditions."’
Once an area is declared as a slum area, the owner of every
building in that area has to apply to the competent
authority as required by section 3-A(1) of the Act for the
registration of the building owned by him in that area and
also furnished to the said authority such particulars as may
be required by it.
Section 3-B lays down:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force; no person shall-
(ii)in respect of any area declared as a slum area under
section 3 after the commencement of the said Act, subsequent
to the date of declaration of such area as a slum area,
erect any new building in such slum area, or make any addi-
tion to or any alteration in any building already existing
on the said date in such slum area, except with the previous
permission in writing of the competent authority and subject
to such restrictions or conditions as may be imposed by the
said authority."
414
Section 9 gives power to declare any slum area to be a
clearance ;area. It leads :
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.lm15
"(1) Where the competent authority upon a report from any of
its Officers or other information in its possession is
satisfied .as respects any slum area that the most
satisfactory method of dealing with the conditions in the
area is the demolition of all the buildings in the area, the
authority shall by an order notified ,in the official
Gazette, declare the area to be a clearance area, that is to
say, an area to be cleared of all buildings in accordance
with the provisions of this Act :
Provided that any building in the area which is not unfit
for human habitation or dangerous or injurious to health may
be excluded from the declaration if the authority considers
it necessary.
(2)The competent authority shall forthwith transmit to the
State Government a copy of the declaration under this
section together with a statement of the number of persons
who .on a date specified in the statement were occupying
buildings comprised in the clearance area."
Section 12 gives power to the State Government to acquire
land. It reads :
" (1) Where on any representation from the competent
authority it appears to the State Government that, in order
to enable the authority to execute any work of improvement
in relation to any building in a slum area or to form or
widen lanes .and roads the-rein or to re-develop any
clearance area, or to rehabilitate slum dwellers it is
necessary to acquire-
(a) any land within, adjoining or surrounded by any such
slum area or clearance area; or
(b) any other land in any locality;
the State Government may acquire the land by publishing in
the official Gazette a notice to the effect that the State
Government has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of
this section :
Provided that before publishing such notice the State Gov-
ernment may call upon the owner, or any other person who, in
the opinion of the State Government may be interested in,
such land to show cause why it should not be acquired, and
after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or
any other person interested in the land, the State
Government may pass such order as it may deem fit.
(2)When a notice as aforesaid is published in the official
,Gazette, the land shall on and from the date on which the
notice is so published, vest absolutely in the State
Government free from all encumbrances."
415
Section 16 prescribes the basis for determination of
compensation for the land acquired under section 12. It
reads :
"(1) The amount payable as compensation in
respect of any land acquired under this Act,
shall be determined in the manner specified in
sub-section (2).
(2)(a) In respect of any land within adjoining
or surrounded by any slum area or clearance
area-
(i) the amount payable as compensation shall
be the amount equal to sixty times the net
average monthly income actually derived from,
such land during the period of five consecu-
tive years immediately preceding the date of’
publication of the notice referred to in
section12; and
(ii) the net average monthly income referred
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to, above shall be calculated in accordance
with the principles and in the manner set out
in the Second Schedule.
(b) In respect of any other land, the amount
payable: as compensation shall be,an amount
equal to the market value of such land on the
date of publication of the notice under
section 12 :
Provided that the amount payable under clause (a) or clause
(b) shall not be in excess of the market value of the: land
or similar land on the first day of July 1959.
(3)The prescribed authority shall, after holding an inquiry,
in the prescribed manner, determine in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (2) the amount payable as compensa-
tion and publish a notice in the official Gazette specifying
the amount so determined and calling upon the owner of the
land’ and every person interested therein to intimate to it
before a. date specified in the notice whether such owner or
person agrees, to the amount so determined and if he does
not so agree, what. amount he claims to be the amount
payable as compensation-
(4)Any person who does not agree to the amount of com-
pensation determined by the prescribed authority under sub-
section (3) and claims a sum in excess of that amount may
prefer an appeal to the Court of the District Judge having
jurisdiction within thirty days from the date specified in
the notice referred to in that sub-section.
(5)On. appeal, the Court of the District Judge shall deter-
mine the amount of compensation and its determination shall
be final.
(6)Where there is any building on the arid in respect of
which the amount of compensation has been determined
416
under clause (a) of sub-section (2) no separate compensation
shall be paid in respect of such building.
Provided that where the owner of the land and the owner of
the building on such land are different, the prescribed
authority shall apportion the amount of compensation between
the owner of the land and the owner of the building in such
proportion as it considers reasonable:
Provided further that the compensation in respect of the
building shall not in any case exceed fifty per cent of the
total amount of compensation which has been determined in
accordance with the provisions of this section."
As pointed out by the High Court, no appeal is provided
against the declaration made under sections 3 and 9. Those
declarations have far-reaching consequences. While acting
under section 3 and 9 the possibility of arbitrary decisions
cannot be ruled out. ’ It must also be borne in mind that
most of the owners of properties in the slum area-, are
likely to be poor persons with slender means. On the other
hand it may also be necessary to bear in mind that quite
often the persons who live in the slums may not be owners of
the property but all the slum area might be owned by a rich
person. In such cases .the residents of slums themselves
might be interested in the slums being declared as slums.
Once an area is declared as a slum area the owners of every
building therein have to apply for registration of their
buildings. No owner of a property in the area can erect any
now building or make any addition to, or alteration in any
existing building without previous permission which may be
subject to such restrictions or conditions as may be imposed
by the competent authority. The authority concerned may
also call upon the owners to carry out works of improvement
and if such a direction is not complied with the authority
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may itself execute the works of improvement and recover the’
cost from him. Under section 10 the owners of the buildings
may be asked to vacate and demolish them and on failure to
do so the buildings may be demolished and the cost of de-
molition recovered from the owners.
A notification under section 9 enables an area to be
declared a ,clearance area on the ground that the most
satisfactory method of dealing with the conditions in the
area is the demolition of all the buildings in the area.
But even in a slum area there may be buildings which may not
have to be pulled down and they may be in quite good
condition. The proviso to sub-section (1) provides for such
a contingency but if there is no provision for hearing the
affected person he cannot bring to the notice of the
concerned authority that his building is not unfit for human
habitation or dangerous or injurious to health and such
person would go unheard. There can be no two opinions about
the need to hear the affected persons before declaring an
area to be a slum area under section 3 or an area as a
clearance area under section 9 or before taking action under
section 10. All these difficulties will be removed if the
affected persons are given an opportunity to be heard in
respect of the action proposed.
417
With regard to section 12(1)(b), however, we do not consider
that that is a section which suffers from the same vice as
the other sections. The validity of section 12(1)(a) has
been upheld by the High Court and as we agree with the High
Court we do not think it is necessary to say anything more.
As regards section 12(1)(b), however, we do not agree with
the High Court that the power to acquire any other land in
any locality suffers from any constitutional objection. The
power under section 12(1) is exercisable to execute any work
of improvement in relation to any building in a slum area or
to form or widen lanes and roads therein or to re-develop
any clearance area. The power under section 12(1) (a) would
be relatable to this purpose. But that section also enables
acquisition of lands to rehabilitate slum dwellers. Such
rehabilitation may not be in the original slum area itself.
By its very nature a slum area is likely to be over-crowded
and in redeveloping it not enough land may be available to
house all persons formerly living in the cleared area. It
may be necessary to acquire other lands for the purpose of
rehabilitating them., Therefore the power under section
12(1)(b) is relatable to the purpose of slum clearance
itself. Furthermore, that power is nothing more than the
power available to a State Government under the Land
Acquisition Act. As the section itself provides for calling
upon the owner or any other person interested in the land to
show cause why it should not be acquired, which provision
corresponds to section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, we do
not consider that this section suffers from any defect.
As regards section 15 though the High Court considered that
it was not necessary to go into its validity in view of its
finding regarding the other sections, it may be necessary to
consider the validity of this section in the view that we
have taken holding that the sections themselves are not bad
but only the notifications issued thereunder. But we were
informed at the bar by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf of the State of Mysore that a subsequent amendment of
the Act has made provision regarding compensation applicable
to acquisitions under section 12 of the Act on the same
terms as under the Land Acquisition Act. We do not,
therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion on
the validity of section 15.
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In the result the appeals are allowed in part. We hold that
sections 3, 9 and 12(1)(a) and (b) are valid but the three
notifications, already referred to, are bad as the affected
persons were not given an opportunity of making
representations against them. In the circumstances of this
case there will be no order as to costs.
P.H.P.
Appeals allowed in part.
418